JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—These two applications, moved by the plaintiff/ applicant (hereafter referred to as the plaintiff’claiming mandatory and prohibitory temporary injunction, are being disposed of by this single order. 2. In OMP No. 184 of 1999, the plaintiff has prayed for a direction to the respondents-defendants (hereafter referred to as the defendants) to remove the seals/locks put by them on the property comprising khasra Nos. 490/62 (old and 332/1, 333 to 338, 340 and 342 measuring 252. 79 square yards at Aroma Hotel, situate in Station Ward, Chhota Shimla, (hereafter referred to as the suit property) on the grounds that the suit property which was evacuee property was purchased by one Dina Nath Malhotra vide sale certificate dated 28.6.1961 and the plaintiff is a purchaser of the property from said Dina Nath. However, the defendants have sealed a certain portion of the suit property. The plaintiff has instituted a suit for damages, declaration of his title, mandatory injunction directing defendant No. 3 to remove the seals/locks aforesaid and consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction directing the defendants not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit property and that the plaintiff had a good prima facie case and in case the interim injunction as prayed for is not allowed, he will suffer huge and irreparable loss and that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of interim relief as prayed for. In OMP No. 346, on the aforesaid grounds, the plaintiff has prayed for restraining the defendants 2 and 3 from selling or auctioning the suit property during the pendency of the suit. 3. Defendants have contested both these applications mainly on the ground that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff who is not the owner or in possession of the suit property. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the voluminous record consisting of various documents relied upon by the parties. 5. The principles regarding grant or refusal of injunction by now are well settled and well defined. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the voluminous record consisting of various documents relied upon by the parties. 5. The principles regarding grant or refusal of injunction by now are well settled and well defined. To succeed, the party applying for grant of an injunction whether temporary or perpetual, has to show existence of the following requisites (i) that it has a prima facie case; (ii) that in the event of refusal of injunction, irreparable injury incapable of being compensated in terms of money will be caused to it; and (iii) that the balance of convenience is in favour of grant of injunction. 6. Apart from these requisites, the injunction may be granted to prevent multiplicity of litigation and shall be refused if the party applying for it has not approached the Court with clean hands. 7. In the case in hand, in fact the basic order by which the right of the plaintiff as herein claimed by way of declaration was denied is the order dated 7.12.1973 passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Therefore, the cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff on 7.12.1973. The period of limitation to sue, therefore, prima facie starting running on the said date. The present suit has been instituted on 15.3.2000. It has been pleaded in the plaint that the aforesaid order was assailed by the plaintiff by way of a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Relief and Rehabilitation Department) exercising the powers of Central Government under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and he dismissed the revision petition vide order dated 18.12.1981. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred a Civil Writ Petition (CWP No. 104 of 1982, titled Kundan Lal Ahuja v. Union of India and others) which was dismissed on 12.11.1996. The plaintiff assailed the decision of this Court dismissing his said writ petition in the Apex Court and the Special Leave Petition preferred by him was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court vide order dated 14.3.1997. The plaintiff assailed the decision of this Court dismissing his said writ petition in the Apex Court and the Special Leave Petition preferred by him was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court vide order dated 14.3.1997. After the dismissal of his aforesaid Civil Writ Petition by this Court, the defendant No. 3 sealed certain portion of the suit property and this act of the said defendant was challenged by the plaintiff by way of another Civil Writ Petition in this Court and prayed therein for removal of the seals but vide order dated 23.4.1998 this Court observed that no case for interference was made out particularly in view of the dismissal of Civil Writ Petition No. 104 of 1982 decided on 12.11.1996 and that the plaintiff might resort to appropriate remedy available to him under law. Hence the present suit. 8. To prima facie show that the suit is within limitation, the plaintiff vide para 16 of the plaint averred that cause of action arose to him on 12.11.1996 when his Civil Writ Petition (presumably CWP No. 104/82) was dismissed and on 14.3.1997 when his Special Leave Petition (against the order dated 12.11.1996 dismissing his civil writ petition aforesaid) was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court and on 23.4.1998 when liberty was granted to him to approach appropriate Court of law in Civil Writ Petition No. 593/1997 and is still continuing. 9. As already stated, prima facie, the cause of action to sue for declaration of title had accrued to the plaintiff on 7.12.1973 when his title over the suit property stood negatived and denied by the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. No Court has the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation, therefore, the order dated 23.4.1998 passed by this Court in CWP No. 593/ 1997 will not give a fresh cause of action to the plaintiff to sue for declaration of his title, nor will it extend the prescribed period of limitation. 10. To wriggle out of the above situation, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff had contended that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and because of such benefit the suit is within limitation. The contention, however, is not substantiated by the pleadings of the plaintiff himself. 11. The relevant portion of Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads as follows :— "14. The contention, however, is not substantiated by the pleadings of the plaintiff himself. 11. The relevant portion of Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads as follows :— "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.— (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) ................................................................................................ (3) ................................................................................................... Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b)................................................................................................... (c) ........................................................................................ 12. It is apparent from a bare reading of the above provisions that these contain a principle based on justice, equity and good conscience providing that limitation will remain suspended while the plaintiff is prosecuting in good faith and with due diligence another civil proceeding against the defendant in a Court of Justice. Thus, the period which will be excluded in computing the period of limitation in such a case is the period of pendency of the other civil proceeding. To take benefit of such exclusion, the plaintiff has to plead and prove the period during which such civil proceedings remained pending and that he was prosecuting such proceeding with due diligence and in good faith. As is evident from the plaint, particularly para 16 thereof that the plaintiff has not made any averment therein that any period what-so-ever for any reason what-so-ever is to be excluded for computing the period of limitation. In fact, ignoring the basic date of cause of action, the suit has been laid as if cause of action had accrued to him for the first time on 12.11.1996 when Civil Writ Petition No. 104 of 1982 was dismissed. It is also not pleaded that he had been litigating in the other proceedings with due diligence and in good faith. It is also not pleaded that he had been litigating in the other proceedings with due diligence and in good faith. Thus, for want of pleading the material particulars, the suit, prima facie, cannot be said to have been instituted within the period of limitation. 13. The order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 7.12.1973, the order of the Financial Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Relief and Rehabilitation) dated 18.12.1981, order of this Court dated 12.11.1996 and order dated 14.3.1997 passed by the Honble Supreme Court are all against the plaintiff. 14. In view of the above discussion, it cannot be said at this stage that the plaintiff has a prima facie case. He is, therefore, not entitled to the interim mandatory injunction as prayed for. 15. At the time of arguments the learned Assistant Advocate General has submitted that the defendants do not intend to transfer or dispose of the suit property in any manner. In view of these submissions, even the application for restraining the defendants No. 2 and 3 from selling or putting the suit property to auction is premature. 16. It was submitted for the plaintiff that in case, in view of the submissions for the defendants, the OMP No. 346/99 is found not maintainable at this stage, liberty may be granted to the plaintiff to apply for grant of appropriate relief in case the defendants at a later stage, during the pendency of the suit, decide to sell/auction the suit property. There cannot be any objection to allow this oral prayer. 17. For the reasons hereinabove stated, both these OMPs are dismissed. However, liberty is granted to the plaintiff to apply for temporary injunction restraining the defendants from selling/ auctioning the suit property, if the occasion arises to do so hereafter during the pendency of the suit. Petition dismissed. -