MANJULA CHELLUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of the decision given by the Employees' Insurance Court, Bangalore, in application No. 15 of 1992. Under section 75 of the Employees' State Insurance Act ('the Act' for short) the applicant approached the E. I. Court seeking a direction to the respondent No. 1, i. e. , E. S. I. Corporation to assess the degree of disability as required under the provisions of the E. S. I. Act and seeking benefits to which he was entitled as an employee. ( 2 ) IT was the case of the applicant that he met with an accident on 15. 6. 1987 while he was working as operator attached to the Prestige Department thereby he sustained severe injuries to his right hand resulting in permanent disability. He was first taken to E. S. I. Hospital where he was treated as in-patient, contending that the injury was in the course of employment and he is entitled for all the accidental benefits, he approached the concerned authorities for payment of sickness benefit and also permanent disability benefit. So far as the sickness benefit is concerned, the Corporation allowed the same and when it came to the question of permanent disablement benefit they refused to give benefit on the ground that as on the date of the accident, i. e. , 15. 6. 1987 he ceases to be an employee as defined under section 2 (9) of the Act. The E. I. Court after appreciating the material on record came to the conclusion that the employee sustained injury in an accident out of and during the course of employment. It also granted permanent disablement benefit to the employee. Aggrieved by the said order, the corporation has filed this appeal. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant contends that the respondent-employee is not entitled for any benefit under the E. S. I. Act as the accident has occurred when he was not an employee as defined under the act. He further contends that by paying contribution for the contribution period whatever benefit he is entitled to for that period, gets postponed, i. e. , corresponding benefit period and, therefore, the cause of action of claiming the benefit being the injury which has happened during the benefit period on 15. 6. He further contends that by paying contribution for the contribution period whatever benefit he is entitled to for that period, gets postponed, i. e. , corresponding benefit period and, therefore, the cause of action of claiming the benefit being the injury which has happened during the benefit period on 15. 6. 1987 and by virtue of the employee ceasing to be an employee under the Act he is not entitled for the benefit. He also took me through the Regulation IV of E. S. I. Act and also relies on the decision of this court in M. F. A. Nos. 393 and 394 of 1989 which was disposed of on 10. 8. 1998. ( 4 ) THE point that would fall for court's consideration is, whether the respondent no. 1 is entitled for the permanent disablement benefit under the Act for the injury in the benefit period during which he ceases to be an employee? 5. It is necessary to mention the relevant section and the regulation for disposal of this appeal. Section 2 (9) pertains to the definition of employee which reads as under: "2 (9) 'employee' means any person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment to which this Act applies and (i) who is directly employed by the principal employer on any work, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of the factory or establishment, whether such work is done by the employee in the factory or establishment or elsewhere; or (ii) who is employed by or through an immediate employer on the premises of the factory or establishment or under the supervision of the principal employer or his agent on work which is ordinarily part of the work of the factory or establishment or which is preliminary to the work carried on in or incidental to the purpose of the factory or establishment; or (iii) whose services are temporarily lent or let on hire to the principal employer by the person with whom the person whose services are so lent or let on hire has entered into a contract of service. 2 (9) (a) (b) any person so employed whose wages (excluding remuneration for overtime work) exceed such wages as may be prescribed by the Central Government a month: provided that an employee whose wages (excluding remuneration for overtime work) exceed such wages as may be prescribed by the Central Government at any time after (and not before) the beginning of the contribution period, shall continue to be an employee until the end of that period. " section 49 deals with 'sickness benefit' available to the employee and section 51 deals with disablement benefit to which the employee is entitled. In particular section 51 (b) deals with 'permanent disablement benefit'. Regulation 4 provides the different periods as under: ( 5 ) CONTRIBUTION and benefit periods. Contribution periods and the corresponding benefit periods shall be as under: ( 6 ) IT is not in dispute that the respondent No. 1 was the employee of the respondent No. 2 in the Prestige Department as an operator. It is also not in dispute that the injury occurred on 15. 6. 1987 out of and during the course of employment. So far as payment of sickness benefit on account of the accident in question, it is not in dispute. But according to the appellant it was only a mistaken payment. This was not the defence taken by them before the E. I. Court. The payment of contribution from 1. 4. 1986 to 30. 9. 1986 by the respondent no. 1 herein is not under challenge. The occurrence of the accident on 15. 6. 1987 during the corresponding benefit period, i. e. , 1. 1. 1987 to 30. 6. 1987 is also not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that from 1. 10. 1986 the respondent No. 1 employee ceased to be an employee as defined under section 2 (9) of the Act on account of enhancement of his wages. Whether the employee would be barred for claiming disablement benefit as he sustained injury subsequent to 1. 10. 1986 on the plea that has made contribution between 1. 4. 1986 and 30. 9. 1986 on which date he was an employee under the respondent No. 2. According to the appellant, the cause of action arises for the employee only when employment injury is caused and as on that date he was not an employee, therefore, they are not liable to pay the benefit. 4. 1986 and 30. 9. 1986 on which date he was an employee under the respondent No. 2. According to the appellant, the cause of action arises for the employee only when employment injury is caused and as on that date he was not an employee, therefore, they are not liable to pay the benefit. According to the respondent-employee he is seeking benefit for the contribution he has already made, therefore, the appellant cannot absolve its liability as contended by them. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent no. 1 relies on the decision in Tirupur textiles (P) Ltd. v. E. S. I. Corporation, 1988 (1) LLN 688, in which para 13 reads as under:" (13) It is to be seen that the respondent No. 3 who was an employee under the appellant was paying contribution and the appellant was also paying the management contribution and the respondent No. 1 had objected to the eligibility of the respondent No. 3 for permanent disablement benefit on the ground that he was not an employee within section 2 (9) of the Act since he was drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1,000 on the date of accident on account of the increase in the dearness allowance due to rise in the cost of living. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, viz. , the respondent No. 1 in the counter filed in the lower court has stated that he was an employee drawing a salary of less than Rs. 1,000 and was entitled to the benefits under the E. S. I. Scheme but has stated that according to the Act if salary of the employee reaches the stage of Rs. 1,000 and above he automatically ceases to come under this Scheme. All the same he will be entitled to medical sickness benefits and cash benefits by virtue of the contributions paid in the earlier contribution period. He ceased to be an employee under the Act with effect from 24. 11. 1984, but he had to be provided with the medical benefits on the date of the accident and subsequently due to the contributions paid from november, 1983 to May, 1984 and from May, 1984 to 24. 11. 1984. He ceased to be an employee under the Act with effect from 24. 11. 1984, but he had to be provided with the medical benefits on the date of the accident and subsequently due to the contributions paid from november, 1983 to May, 1984 and from May, 1984 to 24. 11. 1984. It is also further stated in the said counter that the respondent No. 3 being an insured person is entitled to enjoy the above benefits as per sections 46 (1) (a) and 46 (1) (e) of the Act and he need not be an employee at the time of the accident. In this connection, it is to be pointed out while stating that from 24. 11. 1984, the respondent No. 3 ceased to be an employee under the Act, but he had to be provided sickness benefit and medical benefit on the date of accident and subsequently due to contributions paid in the earlier contribution periods, the proviso to section 2 (9) of the Act has not been taken into consideration. Under the proviso to section 2 (9) it is provided that an employee whose wages (excluding the remuneration of overtime work) exceeds one thousand rupees before the amendment in the year 1985 a month at any time after and not before the beginning of the contribution period shall continue to be an employee until the end of that period. The respondent No. 3 belonged to the said C category and as per regulation 4 of the Employees' State insurance (General) Regulations, 1950, the contribution period for the said C category is from last Saturday of May to last Saturday in next November and the corresponding benefit period is from november to May. Even in the counter statement filed by the respondent No. 1 it is clearly admitted that even though the respondent No. 3 ceased to be an employee under the Act with effect from 24. 11. 1984, he had to be provided with sickness benefit and medical benefit on the date of accident and subsequently due to the contributions paid from November, 1983 to May, 1984 and from may, 1984 to 24. 11. 1984. It is also further stated therein that the respondent no. 11. 1984, he had to be provided with sickness benefit and medical benefit on the date of accident and subsequently due to the contributions paid from November, 1983 to May, 1984 and from may, 1984 to 24. 11. 1984. It is also further stated therein that the respondent no. 3 being an insured person is entitled to enjoy the above benefits as per sections 46 (1) (a) and 46 (1) (e) of the Act and he need not be an employee at the time of the accident. While that is so it is not known why the Employees' State insurance Corporation is denying the liability to provide disablement benefit as contemplated under section 51 of the act. Section 51 of the Act provides for disablement benefit whether total or partial. The lower court has failed to take the said provision into consideration providing for disablement benefit under the Act. It is also to be pointed out that the lower court failed to consider the corresponding benefit periods for the contribution periods of employees under set C. It appears that only in november, 1984, the respondent No. 3 became entitled to wages at Rs. 1,033 and from 25. 11. 1984, contributions had not been recovered. In such cases there could be no doubt that the proviso to section 2 (9) of the Act will come into play. Even assuming that the respondent no. 3 happened to receive more than one thousand rupees much earlier having regard to the fact that during the contribution period from November, 1982 to May, 1983, he will be entitled to benefits during the corresponding benefit period, viz. , from August, 1984 to February, 1985. In this connection it may also be pointed out that under Act 45 of 1984, the wage limit of Rs. 1,000 was raised to Rs. 1,600 with effect from 27. 1. 1985. But the accident in this case occurred on 7. 1. 1985. But having regard to amendment it may be pointed out how Parliament was interested in protecting the welfare of the employees by raising the wages limit so as to cover the employees whose wages will be less than Rs. 1,600. " ( 8 ) IN the above case, as on the date of the accident on account of increase in the dearness allowance due to inflation the corporation denied to pay permanent disablement benefit. 1,600. " ( 8 ) IN the above case, as on the date of the accident on account of increase in the dearness allowance due to inflation the corporation denied to pay permanent disablement benefit. But their Lordships of madras High Court held that for the contribution period from November, 1982 to may, 1983 he would be entitled to benefits during the corresponding benefit period, i. e. , August, 1984 to February, 1985. Just because the employee receives more than rs. 1,000 salary as on the date of the accident he cannot be barred from receiving the benefit from the Corporation. ( 9 ) THE decision relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant Mr. M. Papanna deals with a case where from the beginning of the contribution period the employee was drawing more than Rs. 1,000 wages. Therefore, this court held in that case that as the employee ceases to be an employee at the beginning of the contribution period itself, he was not entitled for any benefit which would accrue to him in the corresponding benefit period. ( 10 ) FROM the above two decisions, it follows that the employee must be an employee at the beginning of contribution period as defined under section 2 (9) of the Act and contribution must be made to claim the benefit in the corresponding benefit period. Merely because he ceases to be an employee during the corresponding benefit period, he is not precluded from claiming statutory benefit which accrues to him under the Act. If we look into the facts of the present case, the respondent No. 1 employee has made the contribution for the corresponding benefit period during which he sustained employment injury. Therefore, he is entitled for all the benefits available under the statute. Therefore, the award of the E. I. Court does not call for any interference. 11. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .