Judgment D.K. Seth, J. The Question: Mr. Debayan Bera, learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the vires of the proviso to section 9 (3B) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 1984 Act), as amended in West Bengal by Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997. According to him by reason of West Bengal Act XXV of 1996, introducing section 7A in West Bengal Land <Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 being Act II of 1948, (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act), a notice issued under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act shall stand lapsed unless award is made within 3 years from the date of publication of the notice, if issued after 1st of April, 1992 or within one year from 1st of April. 1994 if issued 2 years before 1st of April, 1994. Thus, the proviso providing calculation of compensation on the basis of the valuation on the date of issue of notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 has two impact. One in respect of notices under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act which are valid and have not lapsed by reason of section 7A of the 1948 Act, can very well be treated as good law. But the other would revive a lapsed notice without amending section 7A of 1948 Act at a point of time when 1948 Act itself had lapsed and a notice issued under section 4(1a) could not be revived when the Act itself stood effaced. Thus, in such case even if section 9(3B) of 1894 Act is resorted to, but the basis for calculation of compensation shall be the date of issue of notice under sub-section (3B) of that Act. Submission by respondent: 2. This contention has, however, been resisted by Mr. A.N. Banerjee for the respondent on the ground that in view of the decision in Samarendra Nath Paul vs. West Bengal Housing Board, 2000 (2) CHN 771 , the question is no more a res integra. It is already held in the said decision that the provisions of 1948 Act has been validated for keeping alive the acquisition of the land through enactment of Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997. The effect of proviso to section 9(3B) of 1894 Act is not reviving the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act. It is already held in the said decision that the provisions of 1948 Act has been validated for keeping alive the acquisition of the land through enactment of Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997. The effect of proviso to section 9(3B) of 1894 Act is not reviving the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act. It only fixes a date on which the basis of calculation of compensation is founded. It is almost similar to the provision as provided in section 23 of 1894 Act. He has also relied on the decision in Abodh Behari Yadav vs. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 122 , to contend that where possession is already taken non-publication of an award would not have the effect of lapse of the acquisition proceedings. He contended that on the issue of the notification under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act the land stood vested in the Government. Once vested cannot be divested. On this principle by reason of the proviso to section 9 (3B) of the 1894 Act the proceeding is revalidated and as such the principle laid down in Abodh Behari (supra) is attracted. Alternatively, he contended that the decision in Abodh Behari (supra) proceeds on the footing that the possession of the land has been taken, as was the case in the said decision where possession was taken under section 17(1) of 1894 Act. Thus, there is no question of lapse of notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act. He then relied on the decision in State of Tamil Nadu vs. L. Krishnan & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 497 , in order to contend that delay in passing award is not fatal to the notification under section 4 of 1894 Act since the owners of the land are well protected under section 48A and section 23(1A) of the 1894 Act. According to him the ratio decided in L. Krishnan (supra) can be well attracted in respect of the proviso to section 9(3B) since the compensation under the said provision is to be calculated according to section 23 countervailing protection of section 48A of the 1894 Act, by reason of Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997 through which requisition made under 1948 Act, is brought within the purview of the 1894 Act, Mr. Banerjee had also cited the decision in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Mahalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1996 SC 866. Banerjee had also cited the decision in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Mahalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1996 SC 866. Relying on this decision he had again attempted to substantiate that the delay in making award would not vitiate the proceedings. He then placed reliance on U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow vs. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 1170 , to contend that where possession is taken, section 11A prescribing limitation for passing award resulting into lapse of the proceeding, is not attracted. On the same principle the proviso to section 9 (3B) of 1894 Act cannot be held to be ultra vires. He had also relied on the decision in Starling S. Brokers vs. State of West Bengal, 2001 (1) CHN 531 , of the Division Bench and submitted that in view of the ratio decided therein the question raised by Mr. Bera can no more be gone into by this court. The Reply: 3. In reply, Mr. Bera had contended that the decisions relied on by Mr. Banerjee has no manner of application where the particular provision, on which the foundation is being sought to be based under section 9 (3B) of 1894 Act, is not more in the statute. In other wards the statute being non-existent the same cannot be revived by implication through any manner in a different statute. It is only the proceedings under Act II of 1948 which was revalidated and brought within the purview of 1894 Act. It cannot revive any other provisions of the 1948 Act. On the other hand if would have the effect of reviving a lapsed statute. I have heard the learned counsel of the respective parties at length. Facts: 4. In order to appreciate the question raised, it would be necessary to refer to the facts of the case which are not in dispute. Pursuant to a case No. L.A. III 74 of 1975-76 under section 3(1) of West Bengal Act II of 1948 possession of the lands of the petitioners were taken for the purpose of construction of E.M. Bypass. On 7th March, 1981 notification under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act was published in the Calcutta Gazette. On 18th March, 1999 notice under section 9 (3A) of the Land Acquisition (W.B. Amendment) Act, 1997 was issued (annexure p-6). Thereafter on 17th August, 2000 a notice under section 9 (3B) of the 1997 Act was issued (annexure p-7). 5. On 7th March, 1981 notification under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act was published in the Calcutta Gazette. On 18th March, 1999 notice under section 9 (3A) of the Land Acquisition (W.B. Amendment) Act, 1997 was issued (annexure p-6). Thereafter on 17th August, 2000 a notice under section 9 (3B) of the 1997 Act was issued (annexure p-7). 5. In this background the question has to be looked into as raised by Mr. Bera that the issue of a notice under section 9 (3B), subsequent to the issue of notice under section 9 (3A) of the 1894 Act is incompetent and void. However, Mr. Banerjee had pointed out that this was so done by reason of the clarification received by the Department from the legal department with regard to the effect and application of the proviso to sub-section (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act. The Law: The Changes: 6. The West Bengal Act II of 1948 was amended by West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994 (W.B. Act No. XIV of 1994 published in the Official Gazette on 31st March. 1994), By virtue of the said amendment the validity of the said Act II of 1948 was extended till 31st of March, 1997 by replacing the respective words, figures and letters in sub-section (4) of section 1 thereof. Section 3 of the Act II of 1948 was ommitted with effect from 151 of April, 1994 subject to certain savings provided in the proviso thereto. 7. The said Act was further amended by West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act XXV if 1996 published in the Official Gazette on 8th October, 1996). By virtue of the said Act section 7A, akin to section 11A of 1894 Act, was inserted after section 7 of 1948 Act. The amended section 7A of 1948 Act provided as follows:- "7A. By virtue of the said Act section 7A, akin to section 11A of 1894 Act, was inserted after section 7 of 1948 Act. The amended section 7A of 1948 Act provided as follows:- "7A. Award by Collector:- The Collector shall make an award under sub-section (2) of section 7 within a period of 3 years from the date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1a) of section 4 (hereinafter referred to as the said notice), and if such award is not made within the period as aforesaid, the said notice shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said notice has been published more than two years before the commencement of the West Bengal (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, (West Bengal Act XIV of 1994), the award shall be made within a period of one year from the date of commencement of that Act. Explanation:- In computing the period of three years or one year, as the case may be, under this section, the period during which an action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said notice is stayed by an order of a court having jurisdiction, shall be excluded." 8. Having regard to the scheme of the 1996 amendment it may be noted that Act II of 1948 was intended not to be extended any further by ommitting section 3 thereof and incorporating lapse of notice under section 4 (1a) as contemplated therein. The validity of Act II of 1948 was not extended any further. By reason thereof the said Act ceased to be operative or stood effaced on the expiry of 31st of March, 1997. In this background, the present case has to be examined. 9. Act II of 1948 in section 3 empowered the State Government to requisition certain properties on certain grounds. Section 3 was ommitted by virtue of Act XIV of 1994. Therefore, the State Government was denuded of the power to requisition any land under Act II of 1948 since after 31st of March, 1994. However, section 4 of the Act II of 1948 provided the power to acquire a land requisitioned under the said Act. The said section prescribed as follows: "4. Therefore, the State Government was denuded of the power to requisition any land under Act II of 1948 since after 31st of March, 1994. However, section 4 of the Act II of 1948 provided the power to acquire a land requisitioned under the said Act. The said section prescribed as follows: "4. Acquisition of land.-(1) Where any land has been requisitioned under section 3, the State Government may use or deal with such land for any of the purpose referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3 as may appear to it to be expedient. (1a) The State Government may acquire any land requisitioned under section 3 by publishing a notice in the Official Gazette that such land is required for a public purpose referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3. (2) Where a notice as aforesaid is published in the Official Gazette the requisitioned land shall, on and from the beginning of the day on which the notice is so published, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the period of requisition of such land shall end." 10. Section 7 of the 1948 Act provided for payment of compensation in respect of land acquired under section 4 thereof. Section 7 is a complete code in itself so far as compensation payable under 1948 Act for acquisition or requisition land. The effect: 11. Having regard to the above proposition now let us examine the effect of lapse or cessation or effacement of Act II of 1948. After the amendment under Act XIV of 1994 there could be no further requisition. But, however, the land already requisitioned could have been acquired under section 4(1a) of that Act. Originally no time limit for completion of the acquisition was provided for. In the 1996 amendment by insertion of section 7A in the 1948 Act, limitation has since been introduced. 12. A plain reading on section 7A of 1948 Act makes it clear that award has to be made within 3 years from the date of publication of the notice under section 4(1a) of that Act. Unless such an award is made within the time specified the notice shall lapse. The 3 years limitation was referred to from the date of publication of the notice. In the present case, the notice was issued on 7th March, 1981. Unless such an award is made within the time specified the notice shall lapse. The 3 years limitation was referred to from the date of publication of the notice. In the present case, the notice was issued on 7th March, 1981. Thus, by reason of section 7A of 1948 Act, (without the proviso) the notice would deem to have lapsed on 7th of March, 1984. Though such limitation was introduced under Act XXV of 1996 published in the Official Gazette on 8th October, 1996 but the same was given retrospective effect from 1st of April, 1994. But then a proviso was added to the said section. By reason of the said proviso, a notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act, if issued two years before the commencement of Act XIV of 1994, in that event the award was to be made within one year from commencement of Act XIV of 1994. Thus, a notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act, issued two years before 31st, March, 1994, particularly in the present case, could not lapse until 21st March, 1995. A notice that was issued two years before 31st March, 1994 would deem to lapse one year after 31st March, 1994 namely on 31st March, 1995. Thus, by reason of insertion of section 7A in 1948 Act the notice that was issued in the present case on 7th March, 1981, stood lapsed on 31st March, 1995. West Bengal Amendment of 1894 Act: 13. The Land Acquisition Act was amended by W.B. VII of 1997 in its application in West Bengal. By way of amendment sub-sections (3A) and (3B), after sub-section (3) of section 9, were incorporated. It had also incorporated a proviso to section 11A as well as section 23 of 1894 Act to include the effect of amendment of section 9 within the scope and ambit of the said two sub-sections of the principal Act. Similarly section 54A was also inserted to induct the benefit of appeal even in respect of amended section 9 of 1894 Act. Sub-section (3A) and sub-section (3B) of section 9 of the 1894. Act as amended in West Bengal provides as follows:- "3A. Similarly section 54A was also inserted to induct the benefit of appeal even in respect of amended section 9 of 1894 Act. Sub-section (3A) and sub-section (3B) of section 9 of the 1894. Act as amended in West Bengal provides as follows:- "3A. the Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on all such persons known or believed to be interested in any land or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act II of 1948) (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said Act), as re-enacted by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Re-enacting Act, 1977 (West Bengal Act 15 of 1977) and, in every such case, the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4, section 5, section 5A, section 6, section 7 and section 8 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with: Provided that the date of notice under this sub-section shall be the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land under this Act: Provided further that when the Collector has made an award under section 11 in respect of any such land, such land shall, upon such award, vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances." "3B. The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on all such persons known or believed to be interested in any land, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the said Act, and notice for acquisition of such land has also been published under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the said Act, and, in every such case, the provisions of section 4, section 5, section 5A, section 6, section 7, section 8 and section 16 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with: Provided that the date of publication of notice under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the said Act shall be the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land under this Act: Provided further that in every such case, the Collector shall make an award under section 11 in respect of such land only for the purpose of payment of due compensation to the persons interested in such land has, upon the Collector taking possession thereof, already vested absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances." The fiction: 14. This was necessary for continuation of acquisition and calculation and payment of compensation. Inasmuch as after the 1948 Act stood effaced the acquisition could not continue since the acquisition was an acquisition under a lapsed/effaced Act. The calculation and payment of compensation was also to be made under the provisions of the 1948 Act since lapsed/effaced. Therefore, in view of 1997 amendment of 1894 Act, by fiction of law, the acquisition sought to be made under the 1948 Act was revived under the 1894 Act and compensation was to be paid in terms of that Act (1894 Act). 15. Then again, in terms of sub-section (2) of section 4 of Act II of 1948 with the publication of notice under section 4(1a) the property vests absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the period of requisition stood ended. But by reason of section 7A incorporated under 1996 amendment in Act II of 1948 the notice under section 4(1a) was to lapse on the expiry of the period prescribed. As such in the present case it having lapsed with effect from 1st of April, 1995 the requisition revived and continued till 31st March, 1997. But by reason of section 7A incorporated under 1996 amendment in Act II of 1948 the notice under section 4(1a) was to lapse on the expiry of the period prescribed. As such in the present case it having lapsed with effect from 1st of April, 1995 the requisition revived and continued till 31st March, 1997. Thus with the issue of the notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act the requisition becomes an acquisition and on the date of issue of notice under section 9(3A), section 4(1), section 5, section 5A, section 6, section 7 and section 8 including section 16 in case of notice under section 9(3B) of Act I of 1894 stood complied with. 16. Thus, the only question that remains to be determined is the question of payment of compensation in terms of sub-section (3A) or (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act. The notice under sub-section (3A) of that Act was issued on 18th March, 1999. The proviso added to section 11A of 1894 Act by Act VII of 1997 makes it incumbent to pass the award within two years, which expired on 18th March, 2001. The effect of the proviso to section 11A would be attracted in case the award is not published within the said date. Fiction: Temporary statute: 17. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 provides for the effect of repeal of an enactment in clauses (a) to (e) thereof respectively. But these provisions cannot be invoked in regard to statute which are of temporary nature. Statute that expires by efflux of time or on the happening of certain contingencies without recourse to legislation are temporary statute. Inasmuch as the effect conceived of here are of repeal. A temporary statute does not require any repeal. It dies a natural death. On the expiry of the statute by efflux of time it is effaced from the legislation. It does not servive. We may find support for this proposition in State of Orissa vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 . 18. Any proceeding taken under such a statute also dies a natural death and cannot survive. None of the consequences mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) could be attracted to save the situation. It does not servive. We may find support for this proposition in State of Orissa vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 . 18. Any proceeding taken under such a statute also dies a natural death and cannot survive. None of the consequences mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) could be attracted to save the situation. In Gopichand vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 SC 609 , it was held that proceedings taken under a temporary statute, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, ipso facto terminate as soon the statute expires. In Yusuf Begam vs. Waheeda Banu Begam, AIR 1957 Hyd 6, it was held that as a general rule, after a temporary Act has expired, no proceeding can be taken upon it and ceases to have further effect. If any action has been taken under the expired Act with respect of any matter arising under it during its continuance, the question whether such action would lie or not would depend upon any special provision to the contrary in the temporary Act itself, and its construction. Therefore, section 6 of the General Clauses Act (section 8 of Bengal General Clauses Act) would not apply to a case of expiry as distinguished from repeal. Legislature sometimes, in order to avoid such situation, enacts saving clause similar to the effect of the provisions of section 6, in such statute. The effect of the expiry of a temporary statute is dependent upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provision of the temporary Act and upon their character whether the said right and liability are enduring or not. It would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule with regard to the effect of expiration of a temporary statute. Therefore, it requires an examination whether the character of the right or liability created under the temporary statute is enduring and vested. 19. Having regard to the present case the vesting as contemplated in section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 was of an enduring character and could not have been divested but for the 1996 amendment inserting section 7A in that Act. Section 7A had limited the enduring character or in other wards the nature of the acquisition was made non-enduring in character. Section 7A had limited the enduring character or in other wards the nature of the acquisition was made non-enduring in character. In those cases where the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act lapsed by reason of section 7A of that Act the vesting cannot continue. It was only a legal fiction. In fact by reason of section 4(1a) of 1948 Act the right under Article 300A of the Constitution was restricted. But if the statute itself makes a provision with regard to the duration of such restriction the same has to be respected. The legislature was not prevented from providing any saving clause. The legislature had never intended to do so. As it would be apparent when in the same 1996 amendment section 3 of 1948 Act was ommitted. It was itself an intention that the temporary statute would not be continued further. When in the same piece of legislation an intention is manifested not to extend the temporary statute further, by omitting section 3 and limiting the effect of section 4(1a) of 1948 Act, in the absence of saving clause, there is nothing to the contrary to deviate from the general rule of termination of the proceedings under section 4(1a) in those cases where the notice lapsed by efflux of time provided in section 7A of that Act. The question would be different where such notice survived on 31st of March, 1997. 20. The question of enduring character may be confined to the validation of the requisition but it cannot apply with regard to the date being relevant for calculation of compensation. Inasmuch as the validation Act itself has not treated the date being the basis for calculation of compensation as of enduring character in incorporating sub-sections (3A) and (3B) in section 9 of 1894 Act, making two distinctions. Therefore, this distinction has to be interpreted according to law. The characteristic of enduring nature cannot affect the interpretation when the legislature itself had intended to make a distinction. If such distinction is accepted the nature or enduring character is neither altered nor affected. The question of validation sought to be made through fresh legislation also remains unaffected. Revalidation of Requisition for Acquisition: 21. It is open to the legislature to re-validate or revive the expired statute by enacting fresh statute. If such distinction is accepted the nature or enduring character is neither altered nor affected. The question of validation sought to be made through fresh legislation also remains unaffected. Revalidation of Requisition for Acquisition: 21. It is open to the legislature to re-validate or revive the expired statute by enacting fresh statute. But such validation should be effective in respect of such matters which remain valid and effective on the commencement of the subsequent enactment unless anything contrary thereto is provided for. Admittedly, nothing is provided for in the 1997 Amendment Act to validate a lapsed proceeding under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act. The proviso to section 9(3B) determines the basis or foundation for calculation of compensation. So far it relates to notices those survived on 31st of March, 1997, cannot be questioned. However, the vires of the said proviso with regard thereto cannot be raised in the facts and circumstances of this case. When it cannot be gone into in respect of a particular question it cannot be declared ultra vires, though strenuously argued by Mr. Bera. Vires: Reading down: 22. In the present case since for one reason or other the vires cannot be gone into on a particular contingency it can be read down to interprete the effect in respect of the other contingency where the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act stood lapsed under section 7A of that Act; 23. By no stretch of imagination it can be conceivably argued that the proviso to section 9(3B) is an invalid piece of legislation or is ultra vires. Inasmuch as its application cannot be denied in respect of a valid and subsisting notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act. But so far as its application to such a notice since lapsed, can be read down and interpreted to mean that the said proviso does not apply to such a notice since lapsed. Before proceeding to hold that a particular provision is ultra vires it is incumbent on the court to examine whether the provision could be read down and reconciled and if it can be so done in that event it is the Court's duty to do so. 24. Where the court finds a particular provision on the statute can be read down and reconciled in the event it cannot strike it down. 24. Where the court finds a particular provision on the statute can be read down and reconciled in the event it cannot strike it down. On the other hand, it can interpret it so as to apply the same correctly to a particular situation. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court that the principle of reading down can be applied in a case to avoid striking down of a statutory provision as illegal. The principle therefore, cannot be applied in the present case where the vires has not been challenged. It is a simple question of interpretation as was held in Nelson Matis vs. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1983. On the other hand in terms of the ratio decided in Nelson Matis (supra) a provision has to be reasonably interpreted. Similar view was taken by this court in Dr. Roma Sur vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., 95 CWN 1 (para-49). The reference to notice under section 4(1a) 1948 Act must be read to mean as it meant in the existing enactment to which the reference has been made or as it existed prior to its effacement namely notices which were valid and had not lapsed on 31st March, 1997. Can a lapsed Notice/Notification be Revived: 25. Having regard to the position of law as discussed above, in the absence of anything to the contrary in Act II of 1948 or saving clause in 1996 amendment of 1948 Act a lapsed notice under section 4(1a) could not be saved or could not survive after 31st of March, 1997. Similarly, in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the 1997 amendment of the 1894 Act, lapsed notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act could not be revived, though the process of acquisition could be validated by issuing a notice under section 9(3A) of the 1997 amendment Act. Section 9(3B) of that Act can validate such process where the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act did not lapse or was surviving on 31st March, 1997. 26. Section 7 of General Clauses Act, 1897 read with section 9 of Bengal Clauses Act, 1899 deals with revival of repeated enactment. Section 9(3B) of that Act can validate such process where the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act did not lapse or was surviving on 31st March, 1997. 26. Section 7 of General Clauses Act, 1897 read with section 9 of Bengal Clauses Act, 1899 deals with revival of repeated enactment. Though these provisions can not be invoked in case of a temporary statute, yet if the principle can be borrowed to examine the effect of expiry of a temporary statute sought to be revalidated by subsequent enactment it has to be done expressly by stating reason. The reason that has been given in the 1997 amendment of the 1894 Act does not expressly refer to such validation of a lapsed notice nor it makes any express provision therefor. Fiction: 27. Section 11A of 1894 Act postulates making of award within 2 years from the date of issue of the notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. By reason of the proviso added to it by W.B. Act VII of 1997 in cases covered under sub-sections (3A) and (3B) of section 9 of the 1894 Act award is to be made within 2 years from the date of issue of notice under section 9 of 1894 Act. It is further provided that in case the award cannot be made within the period prescribed in that event the notification shall lapse. However, the time limit under section 11A of 1894 Act has no manner of application where possession is taken under section 17 of the said Act. In State of Tamil Nadu vs. L. Krishnan, 1995 AIR SCW 4390:1995(8) JT (SC) 1 and State of Tamil Nadu vs. Mahalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1996 SC 866, Abodh Behari Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 122 , U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow vs. Kalra Properties Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 1170 , it was held that where possession has been taken under section 17 the limitation of section 11A has no manner of application. In the present case, however, possession has not been taken under section 17 of 1894 Act. But possession was taken pursuant to section 3 of the 1948 Act. It was a requisition. Whereas notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was issued after such possession was taken. In the present case, however, possession has not been taken under section 17 of 1894 Act. But possession was taken pursuant to section 3 of the 1948 Act. It was a requisition. Whereas notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was issued after such possession was taken. Section 7A having been incorporated in the 1948 Act by reason of 1996 amendment of the said Act by the legislature with an intent to remedy the mischief of acquisition of a requisitioned property without payment of compensation for an indefinite period while the owners are deprived of possession, therefore, unless award is made within the time stipulated in section 7A of 1948 Act it was only the requisition which was sought to be revalidated for the purpose of acquisition through issue of a notice under sub-section (3A) or (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act as amended in 1997 by West Bengal Amendment Act. But such revalidation cannot revive a lapsed notice in view of section 7A when the 1948 Act stood effaced. The fresh statute being the 1997 West Bengal Amendment of 1894 Act can revalidate the requisition for acquisition but it cannot revive a lapsed notice on the effacement of a temporary statute in respect whereof section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act or section 7 of the General Clauses Act does not apply. A notice which stood lapsed even before the effacement of the statute could not be revived by a fresh statute unless it is specifically provided for. There having been nothing specifically provided in the 1997 amendment, the notice under section 4(1a) of the lapsed statute could not be revived. It is only the requisition which is revalidated for acquisition on the issue of such notification under section 9(3A) or (3B) of 1894 Act to treat such requisition as a fait accompli for compliance of certain provisions of the 1894 Act or in other words to avoid compliances of such provisions which would other wise take a long time and as such is sought to be dispensed with. Fiction: Proviso to section 11A: 28. The principle that once possession is taken the acquisition is compulsory, flows from section 48 of the 1894 Act. The possession of 1894 Act is taken either section 17 or under section 16. Fiction: Proviso to section 11A: 28. The principle that once possession is taken the acquisition is compulsory, flows from section 48 of the 1894 Act. The possession of 1894 Act is taken either section 17 or under section 16. Thus, even though section 11A prescribes lapse of the proceeding unless award is made within the time limited, does not apply to cases where possession is taken. Under the 1948 Act the taking of possession has a different characteristics. Such possession does not confer title of the property to or upon the Government. The title continues with the owner. The Government can only use the property. By reason of section 4 (1a) of 1948 Act land can be sought to be acquired under the 1948 Act. The proceedings is altogether different from the one contemplated under the 1894 Act. Section 7A introduced in 1948 Act through 1996 W.B. amendment prescribed lapse of proceedings despite the requisition having ended and the property having vested in the State. Inasmuch as 1948 Act does not contain any provision similar to that of section 48 of 1894 Act. Thus, the impact or implication of the provision of section 4(1a) of 1948 Act has to be read in the context different from the 1894 Act in view of section 7A incorporated therein by 1996 Act. Whereas section 11A is to be read in the context of section 48 of 1894 Act. The possession that is taken either under section 17 or under section 16 are altogether for different purpose. Such possession confers title to the property upon the Government. Title, then, does not continue with the owner. Under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act no possession is taken. It is by fiction the property vests in the Government on the issue of such notice. But by reason of section 7A of 1948 Act such vesting has been made subject to lapse on the expiry of the period and happening of the contingency contemplated in section 7A. Therefore, the principle with regard to taking of possession and the implication of section 11A of 1894 Act, thereof, cannot be borrowed in respect of section 4(1a) of 1948 Act. The scheme of the two Acts are altogether different. 29. Then again section 16 postulates taking of possession only after the award is made. The vesting takes place on the taking of possession. The scheme of the two Acts are altogether different. 29. Then again section 16 postulates taking of possession only after the award is made. The vesting takes place on the taking of possession. Thus, unless the award is made the possession cannot be taken and the property can not vest in the Government under section 16. Under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act no question of award before taking possession is contemplated. Once possession is taken after the award under section 16 of 1894 Act by reason of section 48 the Government cannot withdraw from the acquisition. But then in such a case section 11A has no manner of application since it postulates declaration of award, only after which, section 16 comes into play. The exception to section 11A where award has not been declared within the time stipulated flows from section 17 of 1894 Act. Where there are urgency the Collector may take possession even before the award is declared. But such possession can be taken only after expiry of 15 days from publication of notice under section 9(1) of 1894 Act. Without such notice section 17 cannot be resorted to for the purpose of taking possession. Publication of notice under section 9(1) of 1894 Act is a pre-condition for taking possession under section 17. Sub-section (3A) of section 17 of 1894 Act postulates tendering of 80% of compensation as estimated before taking possession. Thus, the possession under section 17 has an effect or semblance of an award in the form of an estimation of compensation, 80% of which is to be tendered before taking possession. Thus, there is not much difference in the taking of possession either under section 16 or under section 17 of 1894 Act in respect of the principle that before taking possession compensation is to be secured. Under section 16 of 1894 Act by passing an award the compensation is secured. Whereas under section 17 of 1894 Act by tendering 80% of estimated compensation before taking possession stands almost in the same footing. Whereas section 4(1a) of 1948 Act does neither contemplate of taking possession after declaration of award nor tendering of 80% or any part of the compensation. Such vesting, therefore, under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act having been made subject to section 7A of that Act the question of vesting contemplated under the said provision stands altogether on a different footing. Such vesting, therefore, under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act having been made subject to section 7A of that Act the question of vesting contemplated under the said provision stands altogether on a different footing. In the absence of any provision in the 1948 Act similar to those of section 48 of the 1894 Act, the Government is free to withdraw from acquisition sought to be made under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act. Then again section 48A of the 1894 Act as amended in West Bengal and certain other States provides for a provision of countervailing. Section 48A postulate payment of damages suffered by the owner in consequence of the delay in declaring the award while calculating compensation under section 23 in a proceedings under 1894 Act. The delay is also one of the factor for which damages are to be included in the award. Thus, the owner of the land is adequately protected. It is these reasons for which section 11A was made non-applicable in a case where possession is taken under section 17 of 1894 Act. 30. Whereas compensation is calculated in respect of acquisition under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act under section 7 of that Act. Section 7 of 1948 Act was a complete code in itself. The compensation though is to be calculated in the manner provided under section 23 of 1894 Act yet it has to be confined within the scope and ambit as are provided in section 7 of the 1948 Act. Section 48A of the 1894 Act would not be attracted when section 23 of that Act is resorted to for the purpose of calculation of compensation under section 7 of the 1948 Act. In the absence of any provision similar to section 48A of 1894 Act in section 7 of 1948 Act such benefit cannot be available in an award made under section 7 of the 1948 Act. On the other hand though possession is taken the title to the property remains with the owner. In the absence of any provision similar to section 48A of 1894 Act in section 7 of 1948 Act such benefit cannot be available in an award made under section 7 of the 1948 Act. On the other hand though possession is taken the title to the property remains with the owner. With the issue of notification under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act without the tendering of 80% of estimated compensation as contemplated in, under section 17(3A) of the 1894 Act and without being countervailed under section 48A of that Act, the vesting that takes place under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act could not be equated with that contemplated under section 16 or 17 of the 1894 Act. Thus, section 7A of 1948 Act cannot be treated to be at par with section 11A of 1894 Act in relation to section 4(1a) of 1948 Act, though possession continues with the Government. 31. Therefore, the principle of exception to section 11A of 1894 Act is not applicable in such a case. As such this expiry of time provided in section 7A of 1948 Act results in the lapse of the notice under section 4(1a) of that Act. This again is to be considered having regard to the fact that the 1948 Act, a temporary statute, stood effaced. The vesting, therefore, cannot continue on the lapse of the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act. Fiction: Sections 9(3A) and 9 (3B): 32. This has also to be looked into having regard to the provisions contained in sections 9(3A) and (3B) of 1894 Act. Section 9 thereof requires a public notice in sub-section (1) stating the intention of the Government to take possession and inviting claims for compensation. The manner and mode in which such-notices are to be issued and other matters are provided in sub-section (2). Sub section (2) requires service of such notice to the same effect contemplated under sub-section (1) and is to be served on the occupier or upon persons interested. Similarly, section 9(3A) postulates a notice within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 9 to all interested persons in respect of land requisitioned under 1948 Act. Upon such issue of notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act, such land vests absolutely in the Government only upon the award being made under section 11 of 1894 Act. 33. Similarly, section 9(3A) postulates a notice within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 9 to all interested persons in respect of land requisitioned under 1948 Act. Upon such issue of notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act, such land vests absolutely in the Government only upon the award being made under section 11 of 1894 Act. 33. On the other hand sub-section (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act requires same notice contemplated under section 9(1) to be served upon all persons interested in the land, the possession whereof is already taken on requisition under section 3 of 1948 Act and where notice under section 4(1a) of that Act has been published. In every such case where a notice under section 9(3B) of 1894 Act is issued the provisions of sections 4(1), 5, 5A, 6, 7, 8 and 16 of that Act shall be deemed to have been complied with. But, however, the basic date for determining the value of the land would be the date of publication of notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act and the Collector is to make an award under section 11 of 1894 Act only for the purpose of payment of compensation. The second proviso to sub-section (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act provides that upon Collector taking possession the land has already vested absolutely in the Government. Thus, section 4(1a) of 1948 Act also postulate taking of possession by the Collector. In such a case the Collector might have taken possession under section 3 of the 1948 Act. But such possession or vesting has to be a continued one. The fictional possession ending requisition and vesting with the issue of notice as contemplated under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act would continue for the purpose of section 9(3B) of 1894 Act only if the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act remained valid on 31st March, 1997. Such possession of the Collector for the purpose of acquisition could not be continued after the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act is lapsed. Similarly with the lapse of the notice under section 4(1a) 1948 Act by reason of section 7A of that Act the vesting also cannot continue. Such possession of the Collector for the purpose of acquisition could not be continued after the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act is lapsed. Similarly with the lapse of the notice under section 4(1a) 1948 Act by reason of section 7A of that Act the vesting also cannot continue. The possession of the Collector on the issue of notices under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act is a fictional possession or a symbolic or a notional possession, different from the possession under section 3 of that Act. Whereas sections 16 and 17 of 1894 Act contemplates actual possession. There is nothing in 1894 Act postulating symbolic possession. In Jethmull Bhojraj vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 1363 : 1972(1) SCC 714 , it was held that the Government becomes the owner of the land notified for acquisition only after the Collector has taken possession of the land under section 16 or under section 17(1) of the 1894 Act. The possession contemplated under the 1948 Act cannot be equated with that under 1894 Act. In the said decision Jethmull Bhojraj (supra) it was further held that possession under section 17(1) of 1894 Act can be taken after expiry of 15 days from the publication of the notice under section 9(1) of 1894 Act and the vesting takes place only after such possession. In Balwant Narayan Bhagat vs. M.D. Bhagat, AIR 1975 SC 1767 , it was held that those possession contemplated under section 17 of 1894 Act is neither a possession on paper nor a symbolical possession as generally understood in civil law. Interpretation: Mischief Rule: 34. In order to interpret a particular provision of a law when such law stands changed certain principles of interpretation are required to be followed. In the present case in order to remove certain mischief section 7A was inserted in 1948 Act and then the 1948 Act itself was allowed to be effaced. At the same time without those mischiefs the purpose of acquisition is sought to be achieved through a fresh legislation of 1997 West Bengal Amendment of 1894 Act. 35. The court while interpreting the provisions of an amending Act has to apply the principles laid down in Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, p. 7b:76 ER 637, which is also known as 'purposive Construction' or 'Mischief rule'. 35. The court while interpreting the provisions of an amending Act has to apply the principles laid down in Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, p. 7b:76 ER 637, which is also known as 'purposive Construction' or 'Mischief rule'. The court has to consider four matters in construing such provision: (i) what was the law before making of the Act, (ii) what was the mischief for which the law did not provide, (iii) what is the remedy that the Act has provided, and (iv) what is the reason of the remedy. The rule then directs that Courts must adopt that construction which "shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy". The rule was explained in the Bengal Immunity Co. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 . In the words of S.R. Das, C.J. "It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case was decided."• The Heydon's case was followed in various decisions of the Apex Court vide Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray vs. Mr. Justice B. Lentin, AIR 1988 SC 2267 , CIT Patiala vs. Shahzada Nand & Sons, AIR 1966 SC 1342 and M/s. Goodyear India Ltd. vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781 . The mischief: 36. The above mischief Rule may be examined having regard to the mischief contemplated to be removed by the incorporation of section 7A in the 1948 Act and the effacement of the 1948 Act itself. The mischief that was sought to be removed was to hold property depriving possession of the owner without payment of compensation for an indefinite period which were being frowned upon by various decisions of different High Courts and the Apex Court. In Satish Kapoor vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1982 P & H 276, it was held that after issue of Notification under sections 4 and 6 of 1894 Act, the appropriate Government would not be justified in allowing the matters to drift and to take in hand the proceedings for assessment of compensation whenever they think it proper to do. The Notification under section 6 of 1894 Act must be followed by a proceeding for determination of compensation without any reasonable delay. The Notification under section 6 of 1894 Act must be followed by a proceeding for determination of compensation without any reasonable delay. In Ambalal Purushottam vs. Ahmedabad Municipality, AIR 1968 SC 1223 , the Apex Court had held that the delay in the completion of the acquisition proceedings or the passing of the award was undoubtedly unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. The Notification could not be issued for the purpose of pegging down or freezing the prices and then wait for a convenient and opportune time to pass an award. In Ratanchan Barman vs. Chairman, Calcutta Improvement Trust, AIR 1991 Cal 282 , it was held that though unexplained and inordinate delay may not be a conclusive factor in determining colourable exercise of power in the context of Land Acquisition proceeding but if the Government freezes the property of the citizen for 26 years and even then it is uncertain how to propose to achieve the public purpose further continuance of such acquisition proceeding must be held to be unfair and arbitrary. The principle that weightage should be given to public interest should not be given so that if would make it oppressive vis a vis the individual right of a citizen to freely deal with his property. In Pillayya Nagamengala Venkatappa vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1969 Mysore 240, it was laid down that the acquisition proceeding can be quashed on the ground of delay since it would be unreasonable to allow the acquisition proceeding to go on. However, such question of quashing is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. In Radha Shyam Gupta vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1882 P & H 519, delay was considered to be a motivation to peg down the prices by issue a notification under section 4 of 1894 Act and thus hold the citizens at ransom for years at the whims and caprice of the State to finalise the acquisition proceedings when it chooses (if at all it is done) is a factor for establishing the colourable exercise of power. In Omprakash vs. State of Haryana, (1984) 86 PLR 115 , the delay was held to suffer from the vice of mala fides. In Omprakash vs. State of Haryana, (1984) 86 PLR 115 , the delay was held to suffer from the vice of mala fides. In Sree Vengeeswarar Alagar Perumal Devasthanam vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1984(2) MLJ 427 the delay was held to be a colourable attempt to freeze prices forthwith for an acquisition years later when the value will be double or Treable of the existing prices. For a welfare State to do so at the cost of a citizen who does something which would be fraud on the power conferred by the statute it was this delay which was sought to be compensated by incorporating section 48A in the 1894 Act and by an amendment of section 17 while taking possession, by incorporating sub-section (3A) therein and the proviso to section 11A of the 1894 Act. Whereas in the 1948 Act only section 7A similar to the proviso to section 11A of 1894 Act was incorporated without incorporating the principle of section 48A of 1894 Act in section 7 of the 1948 Act while legislating 1996 Act. 37. The mischief that was sought to be removed is to held or acquire property by the Government without payment of compensation. The ommission of section 3 of 1948 Act by 1994 amendment Act and introduction of section 7 A in 1948 Act and non-extension of the validity of that Act through 1996 amendment Act, were intended to remove such mischief. In case the provision of section 9(3B) of 1894 Act is applied in a case where notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act stood lapsed by reason of section 7 A of that Act in that event the same mischief would be allowed to continue. Therefore, the purpose of effacement would be rendered redundant and ineffective. It would defeat the purpose for which 1948 Act was amended and intended to be effanced. Therefore, the lapse of the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act has to be recognised and interpreted to be pursuive and effective. Otherwise the mischief or the ills would not be removed. The 1997 W.B. amendment of 1894 Act had taken care of the ills or mischief sought to be revoved by effacement of 1948 Act, by seeking to acquire the property under the 1894 Act by amending sections 9, 11A, 23 and 54 respectively. Otherwise the mischief or the ills would not be removed. The 1997 W.B. amendment of 1894 Act had taken care of the ills or mischief sought to be revoved by effacement of 1948 Act, by seeking to acquire the property under the 1894 Act by amending sections 9, 11A, 23 and 54 respectively. The legislature had never intended to perpetrate the same mischief for the purpose of removal whereof the 1948 Act was effaced after insertion of section 7A in that Act and 1894 Act amended. Therefore, subsection (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act has to be interpreted having regard to the principle enunciated in Heydon's case since followed by our courts as referred to above. 38. Admittedly, the land was requisitioned under the 1948 Act pursuant to case No. L.A.-II/74 of 1975/76 under section 3(1) of the 1948 Act, and possession was taken. Subsequently, the Notification under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was issued on 7th March, 1981. In this background this case has to be considered on the basis of the fact that a Notice under section 9(3A) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended in West Bengal was served on the petitioner on 18th March, 1999, (p-6). Thereafter a notice under section 9(3B) of 1894 Act was issued on 17th August, 2000 which is Annexure P-7 to this petition. Sections 9(3A) and (3B): Contingencies: 39. Sub-section (3A) and sub-section (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act postulate two contingencies emanating from the cessession of Act II of 1948. We are not on section 9(3A) so far as the present case is concerned. Section 9(3B) provides that in a case where notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 was issued, in such a case a notice under sub-section (3B) of section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act is required to be issued. On the issue of such notification, the provisions of section 4(1), section 5, section 5A, section 6, section 7, section 8 and section 16 of the 1894 Act shall be deemed to have been complied with. In the second proviso to section 9(3B) it is provided that in such cases Collector shall make an award under section 11 of 1894 Act in respect of such land only for the purpose of payment of due compensation to the persons interested. In the second proviso to section 9(3B) it is provided that in such cases Collector shall make an award under section 11 of 1894 Act in respect of such land only for the purpose of payment of due compensation to the persons interested. By reason of the said provision the moment the possession was taken of by the Collector, the land shall be treated to have already been vested absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Therefore, it is only the payment of compensation that is awaiting and it cannot be said that by reason of cessession of Act II of 1948, where notice under section 9(3A) or (3B) the acquisition has lapsed simply because the award has not been made within two years. In this case notice under section 9(3A) was issued on 18th March, 1999. The two years contemplated in section 11A lapsed on 18th March, 2000. By reason of the fiction created by the 1997 Amendment it would not lapse. Possession: Distinction: 40. In this case the possession was taken under section 3 of the 1948 Act. It was a possession on requisition. After the issue of notice under section 4(1a) of Act no fresh possession was required to be taken. Such notice was issued when possession was already taken. Even after the issue of notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act, which has the effect of ending the requisition and converting into an acquisition, yet it could not remain an acquisition unless the said notice remains valid. By reason of section 7A, inserted in 1948 Act through amendment, the notice stood lapsed. The special provision incorporated in a special statute for a special purpose namely to remedy the ills of the statute stands altogether on a different footing. Thus, it cannot be said that possession as contemplated under section 17 of 1894 Act was taken. In the present case section 17 has not been invoked. The possession on requisition can not be treated to be a possession within the meaning of section 17 of the 1894 Act. As such the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act having stood on a different footing, stood lapsed if the award could not be made within the time limit specified in section 7A of the 1948 Act as amended by 1996 Act. 41. The revalidation has the effect of reviving the requisition for acquisition. As such the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act having stood on a different footing, stood lapsed if the award could not be made within the time limit specified in section 7A of the 1948 Act as amended by 1996 Act. 41. The revalidation has the effect of reviving the requisition for acquisition. As such it is only on the issue of notices under sub-section (3A) or (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act, the revalidation takes, effect. The requisition having ended on the effacement of the statute the property is to be restored to the owner. It could also be treated to have been ended for acquisition where notices under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act stood lapsed before 31st March, 1997. By reason of 1997 Amendment in West Bengal of 1894 Act a fiction is created. By reason of such fiction the requisition would stand converted into acquisition with the issue of notice under section 9(3A) of the 1894 Act, as amended in 1997 in West Bengal. As soon section 9(3A) is resorted to, the possession, if continued after requisition and not restored, shall be deemed to be a possession revalidated under the Land Acquisition Act which then would be a possession for acquisition on the issue of the notification/notice under section 9(3A). Even though the award is not made before the expiry of time limit provided under section 7A of the 1948 Act, the possession then would become a possession under the 1894 Act attracting the application of section 48 of that Act. But in a case where the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act is valid as on 31st March, 1997 on the issue of notice under section 9(3B) the possession would be revalidated under 1894 Act form the date of issue of the notice/notification under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act. As soon the possession becomes a possession under the 1894 Act attracting the application of section 48 of that Act the limitation provided in section 11A of that Act would not be render the acquisition invalid on its expiry. The moment notice under section 9(3A) or (3B) of 1894 Act is issued, the provisions of section 48 of that Act becomes applicable. As such when the case comes under the provisions of the said section the State Government has no authority to withdraw. The moment notice under section 9(3A) or (3B) of 1894 Act is issued, the provisions of section 48 of that Act becomes applicable. As such when the case comes under the provisions of the said section the State Government has no authority to withdraw. Therefore, expiry of limitation lapse of two years provided in section 11A of 1894 Act, from 10th March, 1999 namely, the date of issue of the notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act, will not be operative in a case where possession as hereinbefore stated, has already been takes. Thus, there is no scope for treating the proceeding as lapsed. 42. In the circumstances in this case the notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act was rightly issued. The notice under section 9(3B) was incompetent and misconceived. As such the compensation should be calculated on the basis of the notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. The compensation is to be calculated on the basis of the date of issue of the notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. Decisions Operating the Field: 43. In Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) this court has held that by reason of the 1997 West Bengal Amendment in the Land Acquisition Act the requisition of the land was validated. But it did not discuss the impact of revival of the notice when such a notice had lapsed in view of the 1996 Amendment of the 1948 Act. 44. In the above decision the Court was considering the question of validity of the acquisition proceeding initiated under section 9(3B) of 1894 Act. It has not looked into the question with regard to section 23 vis a vis section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. Inasmuch as even where after requisition no notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 was issued by fiction the acquisition could be made under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act with the same effect as is envisaged under section 9(3B) of that Act. It is not the question of validity of proceedings. It is the question as the basis of calculation of compensation. In cases covered under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act the basis is the date of issue of the said notice. Whereas under section 9(3A) of that Act it is the date of issue of the notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948. It is the question as the basis of calculation of compensation. In cases covered under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act the basis is the date of issue of the said notice. Whereas under section 9(3A) of that Act it is the date of issue of the notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948. Thus, in respect of such cases when the notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 had lapsed or deemed to heave lapsed, the position is same as envisaged under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. If the notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 is valid, then section 9(3B) of 1894 Act is applicable. But in cases when notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 is issued or where it is lapsed by reason of proviso contained in section 7A as amended by Act XXV of 1996, section 9(3A) of 1894 Act will be applicable. By reason of the fiction the validity of the acquisition remains intact in both the cases. It is only the basis for calculation of the compensation that differs. The purpose of insertion of section 7A in 1948 Act was to grant certain relief to the owner in the matter of expediting payment of compensation. The object can not be frustrated. Though, however, by fiction the validity of the acquisition of a requisition property is not affected. 45. In cases where notice under section 9(3A) or (3B) of the 1894 Act as amended 1997 Act, is not issued, whether the notice under section 4(1a) is serving or not on 31st March, 1997 by reason of lapse of 1948 Act not only the requisition but also the acquisition would lapse irrespective of the principle once vested cannot be divested. Once a temporary statute provides a particular manner, after the temporary statute expires, the same cannot be revived by a fresh statute unless expressly provided for a saving clause. Sections 9(3A) and (3B) of 1894 Act are steps for acquisition under 1894 Act creating legal fiction which has to be interpreted having regard to the provisions of General Clauses Act vis a vis a temporary statute. 46. Where no notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was issued the requisition can be validated for acquisition by issue of a notice under section 9 (3A) of 1894 Act applying the principle of legal fiction and logical conclusion. 46. Where no notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was issued the requisition can be validated for acquisition by issue of a notice under section 9 (3A) of 1894 Act applying the principle of legal fiction and logical conclusion. Where notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act stood lapsed by reason of section 7A of that Act as incorporated by 1996 amendment of 1948 Act, by fiction lapse of acquisition does not have the effect of cessation of requisition. The requisition remains. Thus in such case it remains a case of no notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act governed by section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. Reference to notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act in section 9(3B) of 1894 Act means a notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act surviving on 31st March, 1997. 47. Thus, though in principle I subscribe to the ratio decided in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) with regard to the validity of the proceeding but I am unable to agree that this decision has laid down the preposition that even in a case where, by reason of section 7A of Act II of 1948, the notice under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 stood lapsed, section 9(3B) of 1894 Act would be attracted instead of section 9(3A) of the 1894 Act. Inasmuch as by a fresh statute actions taken under a lapsed temporary statute can be revived or revalidated only to the extent as it was permissible in the lapsed statute and not otherwise unless there was a saving clause in the lapsed statute or it is expressly so provided in the fresh statute. Admittedly, there was no saving clause provided in the lapsed statute, nor it is expressly so provided in the fresh statute. 48. It appears that the decision has not actually dealt with the proposition that has been raised here. Since the notice under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act stood lapsed it could not be revived by implication through the 1997 W.B. Amendment Act. It has revalidated the proceedings. But it could not have revalidated a lapsed notice pursuant to a lapsed provision of an effaced statute that too a temporary one without express provision made therefor, particularly in view of the discrimination that is being effected in respect of two categories of cases. It has revalidated the proceedings. But it could not have revalidated a lapsed notice pursuant to a lapsed provision of an effaced statute that too a temporary one without express provision made therefor, particularly in view of the discrimination that is being effected in respect of two categories of cases. Inasmuch as in one case it proceeds with a valid notice, and in the other it would be proceeding with the case of lapsed notice. It is a right to property which is otherwise protected under Article 300A which is being affected. Such right can be affected only by a valid piece of legislation. If the legislature validated an invalid provision of statute of an effaced law then it would not be a due course of law but would be a fraud on statute. 49. The decision in Starling S. Brekers (supra) has proceeded in a case where no notice under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act was issued and as such the ratio decided therein cannot be attracted in the present case. Furthermore, it has proceeded on the basis that there was a void since the 1997 Act did not postulate retrospective effect but contemplated an appointed date to be fixed by the executives, as observed in paragraph 107 of the said decision: "We are also unable to agree with the learned Advocate General that there was no vaccum between the lapse of Act II of 1948 and the enactment of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997. Since the latter Act was necessarily retrospective in character. In our view, had the legislature intended the 1997 Act to have retrospective operation, it would have incorporated such intention in the Act itself in clear and unambiguous terms instead of leaving it to the State Government to appoint a date for the Act to come into force, which necessarily meant that the Act was to be given prospective effect, although, by the official notification dated 22nd May, 1997, an attempt was made to give it retrospective effect." 50. In the said decision section 9(3A) of 1894 Act was held to be of no effect in respect of the given situation on which the said judgment was rendered. A judgment is to be read having regard to the context of the case and the question the court was called upon to decide. In the said decision section 9(3A) of 1894 Act was held to be of no effect in respect of the given situation on which the said judgment was rendered. A judgment is to be read having regard to the context of the case and the question the court was called upon to decide. Thus, in view of the distinguishing features the said decision has no manner of application in the present case. Inasmuch as the Act was amended by incorporating the date of coming into force as on 1st of April, 1997, removing the void by express legislation. 51. The unreported decision in Ideal Sunrise Properties Put. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 23477 (W) of 1997 disposed of on 10th November, 1998 also does not help us in the facts and circumstances of the case. Inasmuch as it has also not answered the question in the situation with which we are concerned. 52. In Ideal Sunrise Properties (supra), the learned Single Judge had taken a view that the notice under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act stood lapsed by reason of section 7A of the 1996 amendment Act and therefore, it had directed issue of a fresh notice/notification under section 4(1) of 1894 and for calculation of compensation on the basis of the valuation as on the date of issue of notification. In the said judgment it was observed that it was a beneficial legislation and by reason of such legislation the owner is deprived of its right to enjoy the fruit of the award for a long time which is the mischief since being sought to be removed and that the vesting of land absolutely without payment of just compensation is a deprecated legislative action. Relying on the decision in Dr. Nirmal Kumar Sarkar vs. The Collector of Hogghly and Additional Magistrate, Hooghly and Ors., in C.O. No. 6585(W) of 86 disposed of on 17th September, 1998, it was held that such proceeding has since lapsed. The right accrued to the owner cannot be taken away, and therefore, the provisions of section 9(3A) or (3B) of 1894 Act, can not have any application. However, in the said case no notice under section 9(3A) or 9(3B) of 1894 Act had ever been issued. The right accrued to the owner cannot be taken away, and therefore, the provisions of section 9(3A) or (3B) of 1894 Act, can not have any application. However, in the said case no notice under section 9(3A) or 9(3B) of 1894 Act had ever been issued. On account of such non-issuance of notice under section 9(3A) or (3B) of 1894 Act, it was held that the State Government cannot withhold issue of notice for an indefinite period. The Decision: Conflict: 53. Mr. Bera had pointed out that there is an apparent contradiction between the decision in Ideal Sunrise Properties (supra) and Samarendra Nath Pal (supra). 54. In Ideal Sunrise Properties (supra) no notice under section 9(3A) or (3B) of 1894 Act was issued. Thus, the apparent contradiction is not a real one. Inasmuch as unless such notices are issued there is no question of application of the said provision. It was so held having regard to the facts and circumstances of the said case where no such notices were issued. Since sub-sections (3A) and (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act was not issued therefore, the Court did not actively or consciously deal with the said proposition. The direction to issue of notification under section 4(1) of 1894 Act in effect accepted the position that even after lapse of requisition it could be acquired. Virtually, it is the same thing which could be done under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. There is no apparent distinction in the application of the said provision except that certain provisions of 1894 Act was taken to have been complied with, with the issue of notice under sub-section (3A) of section 9 of 1894 Act where the property remained in the possession of the Government on account of requisition. There is a distinction between a fresh acquisition and an acquisition of a requisitioned property. Since the possession has already been taken through requisition therefore, certain formalities appears to have already been dispensed with. Otherwise it would be a case of starting de novo when the same very thing were fait accompli. The direction to issue a notice under 1894 Act in effect accepts the proposition of section 9(3A) of that Act. The court had directed issue of such notice without leaving it to the authority to take a decision to acquire the property. Otherwise it would be a case of starting de novo when the same very thing were fait accompli. The direction to issue a notice under 1894 Act in effect accepts the proposition of section 9(3A) of that Act. The court had directed issue of such notice without leaving it to the authority to take a decision to acquire the property. Thus, virtually in the said decision court has accepted the position as is contemplated requiring issue of notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. Thus, it virtually does not come in conflict with the decision in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra). In any event the effect of sections 9(3A) and 9(3B) of 1894 Act was not really gone into, neither the Court was called upon to do so, in the absence of any such notice. Thus, observation, if any, in this regard can be treated to be an obiter. 55. Then again in Samarendera Nath Pal (supra) the attempt was based on logical conclusion relying on the decision in P.E.K. Kalyani Amma vs. K. Devi, AIR 1996 SC 1963 . It has relied on paragraph 78 thereof. But the said decision was not dealing with a temporary statute. At the same time the provision that was under consideration began with a non-obstante clause on the basis whereof the said observation was made in paragraph 78 which requires to be examined having regard to the context in which it was so decided. 56. Here it is not a question of the validity of the requisition for the purpose of acquisition by fiction of law, with regard to which there cannot be any two opinion. The question is as to whether section 9(3B) of 1894 Act can be attracted in a case where the notice under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act stood lapsed by reason of section 7A of the 1996 Amendment or it would be confined only to the cases where the notice under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act remained or remains valid on 31st March, 1997. If, it is made applicable in either of the two category of cases in that event it would directly be in conflict with the decision in Ideal Sunrise Properties (supra). Whereas in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) it had not made any such distinction. Thus, in this regard there might be a conflict between the said two decisions. If, it is made applicable in either of the two category of cases in that event it would directly be in conflict with the decision in Ideal Sunrise Properties (supra). Whereas in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) it had not made any such distinction. Thus, in this regard there might be a conflict between the said two decisions. Though, however, it can be explained away on facts, as is apparent from Ideal Sunrise Properties (supra) where no notice under section 9(3A) or (3B) of 1894 Act was ever issued, whereas such notices were issued in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) as well as in the present case. But then such explanation can not altogether explain the situation. Inasmuch as if such notification is issued after the lapse of the notice under section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act in that event the question would remain the same. 57. In Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) also the question of temporary statute and the effect of section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act (section 6 of the General Clauses Act) has not been considered having regard to the decisions on the subject. The Distinction: 58. Then again paragraph 78 of P.E.K. Kalyani Amma (supra) stressed on the purpose for which the fiction is created. In the said case without such fiction the provision of section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (H.M. Act) would be creating unreasonable classification in the matter of legitimacy of the children born out of void marriages. Inasmuch as the children born out of void marriages which were not so declared by a Court would be bustardised. Whereas those born out of void marriage so declared by the Court would be legitimised. This was subsequently amended by Act XLVII of 1976. It is in this context the implication of section 16 of H. M. Act in respect of cases which existed before 1976 Amendment, was under consideration and the principle of fiction was applied, by reason of such amendment, to all cases. As observed earlier, P.E.K. Kalyani Amma (supra) was dealing with a provision of law in a regular statute (not being a temporary statute) since amended with an object to remove this discripancy as was pointed out by the High Court at Madras in T. Ramayammal vs. T. Mathummal, AIR 1974 Madras 321. As observed earlier, P.E.K. Kalyani Amma (supra) was dealing with a provision of law in a regular statute (not being a temporary statute) since amended with an object to remove this discripancy as was pointed out by the High Court at Madras in T. Ramayammal vs. T. Mathummal, AIR 1974 Madras 321. In this judgment the lacuna of section 16 of H.M. Act was pointed out and it was expressed that the legislature should take steps. Therefore, the amendment was legislated. The fiction that was created was with a particular purpose for removing the lacuna as pointed out by the said decision. 59. Whereas in the present case the object and purpose was to acquire the property by keeping the requisition valid even after 31st March, 1997. So far as the application of sub-section (3B) is concerned, it does not make any discrimination having regard to the situation as existed on 31st March, 1997. The fiction, in this case, is created only for the purpose of allowing acquisition of the property dispite lapse of the temporary statute without undergoing the whole process once again, by issuing a notice under sub-section (3A) or sub-section (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act, by reason whereof the relevant provision of the 1894 Act would be deemed to have been complied with. So far as the basis for payment of compensation namely the date on the basis whereof the valuation is to be made has been classified into two different categories. In one category where the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was issued. In the other category where such notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was not issued. Thus, it had accepted the distinction with regard to the date being the basis for calculation of valuation in two different cases. Thus, if a notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act is lapsed then it would be a case where no notice exists or in other words it would be a case where no notice is issued. Nothing turns on the reference to the date for calculation of compensation or being the basis therefor. Inasmuch as the object and purpose is to acquire the property without undergoing the whole process contemplated under, 1894 Act, which would definitely be achieved. Nothing turns on the reference to the date for calculation of compensation or being the basis therefor. Inasmuch as the object and purpose is to acquire the property without undergoing the whole process contemplated under, 1894 Act, which would definitely be achieved. But it is only the question of compensation having regard to the relevance of the date forming the basis of the valuation is to be ascertained. Thus even if the cases where notices under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act have lapsed are brought under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act it would not defeat the purpose or object of the legal fiction created by the enactment of legislation. Thus, I am unable to agree with the proposition laid down in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) to that extent where the date of issue of a lapsed notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act is expected to form the basis of valuation which in my view should be a case covered under section 9(3A) and not under section 9(3B) of the 1894 Act. 60. The decision in Nripati Ghosal, First Land Acquisition Collector vs. Premabati Kapoor, AIR 1996 SC 2586 , deals with a case where the public purpose continues where the land was requisitioned under the West Bengal Premises Requisitioned and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947. The legality whereof was questioned before the High Court. The said decision was confined to the question with regard to the subsistence of the public purpose. While dealing with the date being the basis for calculation of valuation while processing compensation has nothing to do with the subsistence of the public purpose, the object with which the decision in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) proceeded. The decision in Nripati Ghosal (supra) does not threw any light with regard to the distinction which is being now made in this petition specifically that this is a case covered under section 9(3A) and not under section 9(3B) of 1894 Act. 61. The decision in State of West Bengal vs. Samarendra Nath Pal, AIR 1997 SC 2995 , dealt with the relevance of section 3 of the 1948 Act with regard to requisition for construction of housing for the community as public purpose. The said decision does not throw any light with regard to the present question with which we are concerned. The decision in State of West Bengal vs. Samarendra Nath Pal, AIR 1997 SC 2995 , dealt with the relevance of section 3 of the 1948 Act with regard to requisition for construction of housing for the community as public purpose. The said decision does not throw any light with regard to the present question with which we are concerned. It might support the validation of the requisition for the purpose of acquisition by issuing a notice under section 9(3A) or 9(3B) resulting into compliance of some of the provisions of the 1894 Act as fait accompli. 62. The decision in East End Dwelling Company Ltd. vs. Finna Berry Borough Council, 1951-52 All. ER 587, supports creation of fiction with regard to which there is no two opinion. By reason of such fiction the validity of the requisition for being continued for acquisition is accepted. The Situation: 63. The 1997 Amendment itself postulated two situations where notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was issued and where it was not so issued. If the validation is accepted it is only a question as to under which sub-section the case would be attracted. Would section 9(3B) of 1894 Act be attracted where notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act stood lapsed. The simple answer is 'no'. It will attract section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. There cannot be any distinction in a case where no notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act was issued and a case where after having been issued it had lapsed by reason of section 7A of 1948 Act. In both the cases the situation is same. It would only make a difference where such notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act remains valid on 31st March, 1997. The validation takes effect on the date when it creates the fiction, so long the 1948 Act survived there was no necessity of creating fiction. The necessity of creating fiction arose only when the law was effaced namely on the expiry of 31st March, 1997. Thus, a fiction so created on 1st April, 1997 cannot travel beyond the date when 1948 Act was surviving. It cannot retrogate the provisions of a valid legislation till it remains operative. The fiction has to be accepted as it stood on 31st March, 1997 and such fiction would be prospective and not retrospective. Thus, a fiction so created on 1st April, 1997 cannot travel beyond the date when 1948 Act was surviving. It cannot retrogate the provisions of a valid legislation till it remains operative. The fiction has to be accepted as it stood on 31st March, 1997 and such fiction would be prospective and not retrospective. That it would not be retrospective and be prospective is apparent from the incorporation in section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. Thus, Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) having not actively and consciously dealt with the said question and such a question having not been raised and the court having been called upon to decide only the question of validation of the requisition for acquisition, the observation made in the said decision has to be confined to the context in it which was rendered and the question it was called upon to decide. Since it was never called upon to decide this particular question, therefore, the ratio laid down therein cannot be interpreted to mean that it includes all such situation which might be contemplated under sections 9(3A) and (3B) of 1894 Act when no such distinction were ever sought to be made and when the Court had never addressed itself to such a question. Thus, there appears to be no contradiction either with regard to its effect in relation to the decision in Ideal Sunrise Property (supra) or the present question which now this court is required to answer. Thus, the said decision in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) is distinguishable as pointed out above. Inasmuch as it is not a complete answer to the question now raised. 64. Relying on the principles of fiction laid down in the ratio in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra) the question can very well be examined in the present facts and circumstances of the case in which altogether a different question has been raised which was never dealt with in Samarendra Nath Pal (supra). Therefore, the contention of Mr. A.N. Benerjee that in case this Court is of different view in that event the matter has to be referred to larger bench does not seem to be of any substance. The reference to the Division Bench decision Starling S. Broker (supra) does not help us when it has proceeded on the basis that the date of operation of 1997 Amendment was appointed through delegation by executives. The reference to the Division Bench decision Starling S. Broker (supra) does not help us when it has proceeded on the basis that the date of operation of 1997 Amendment was appointed through delegation by executives. Since after the decision the Act itself was amended to make it operative retrospectively from 1st April, 1997. Thus, a legislation having come in between the decision of the Division Bench, it no more stand in the way. The Imagination: 65. The decision in East End Dwelling Company Ltd. (supra) deals with legal fiction created for imagining certain things. The imaginations which we are now required to imagine relate to a situation as to what should be the basis of compensation. In the present case the said ratio has application at two stages. The first stage relates to the validation of the requisition for acquisition. Therefore, by reason of imagery the validity can be perceived on the basis of the legal fiction created. The other stage comes after the validation for acquisition. It is the stage for payment of compensation which is to be calculated. Section 23 prescribes the basis for calculation of compensation meaning the date where notice under section 4(1) of 1894 Act is issued, is free from any doubt or dispute. In this case the situation of imagination is confined to the validation of the requisition for acquisition, so far as the compliance of some provisions as fait accompli. The other imagination is to be based on certain legal proposition when there some law exists. 66. The very imagination as was put forth by Lord Asquith in East End Dwelling (supra) related to the calculation of compensation. In the said case the property situated in the land was destroyed in war for which the owner was entitled to compensation. The building was subject to Rent Restriction Act. But before the damage could be compensated or the building could be reconstructed a notice to treat was issued under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. Section 53(1)(a) of the 1947 Act provided for assessment of compensation, the value whereof was to be taken if the whole of the damage had been made good before the day of the notice to treat. Section 53(1)(a) of the 1947 Act provided for assessment of compensation, the value whereof was to be taken if the whole of the damage had been made good before the day of the notice to treat. In such a situation a question arose whether the basis of the such valuation would be restricted by the rate of rent as it stood at the time of demolition of the building namely the old rate being the 1939 standard rents. Under War Damage Act, 1943 by reason of section 123(1) the assessing authority was bidden, in case of complete breach of identity, to imagine a replacement of the old by new building on the principle (subtutile) meaning made good. In this situation it was laid down that such imagination should be based as if such building has been constructed and let out at present rate without the restriction of 1939 standard. Thus, in the present case also the identity or continuity of the earlier enactment having totally effaced by legal fiction when certain things are to be imagined, it is to be on the date when such imagination for the first time can be made, namely only after 31st March, 1997. 67. Therefore, the imagination is to be made on the state of affairs as it stood on 31st March, 1997. In a case where the notice under section 4(1a) stood lapsed on 31st March, 1997 the imagination cannot relate back to a date prior thereto. Thus, the imagination is to be confined on the situation as it stood on 31st March, 1997 and thus the legal fiction cannot lead us to imagine to revive a lapsed notice and to continue the revival after the enactment stood effaced and that too in respect of a temporary statute. 68. Then again in the present case two imaginations having been contemplated by insertion of sub-sections (3A) and (3B) of section 9 of 1894 Act the imagination is to be made to the extent of exclusion of imagination under subsection (3A) only in respect of cases where the notice under section 4(1a) survived and had not lapsed on 31st March, 1997. The Circular: 69. Mr. Banerjee had relied on a circular dated 13th November, 1999 being No. 2825(21)/6-L.A. The said circular is only an opinion of the department with regard to the position in law. It is a circular issued by the executives. The Circular: 69. Mr. Banerjee had relied on a circular dated 13th November, 1999 being No. 2825(21)/6-L.A. The said circular is only an opinion of the department with regard to the position in law. It is a circular issued by the executives. Thus, it has no statutory force. As such it is not binding. Application of sections 9(3A) and 9(3B): 70. Therefore, in cases where the notices under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act stood lapsed on 31st March, 1997 the provision of section 9(3B) of amended 1894 Act will not be attracted. It will be attracted only in cases where the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act survived on 31st March, 1997. In all other cases section 9 (3A) of 1894 Act will apply. Conclusion: 71. In the facts and circumstances in this case as discussed above the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act having lapsed before 31st March, 1997, section 9(3B) of the 1894 Act as amended in West Bengal by the 1997 West Bengal Amendment Act is not applicable. It is a case where section 9(3A) is incompetent and could not be issued. The compensation is to be calculated on the basis of the notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act as was issued. Since the principle of section 11A of 1894 Act with regard to limitation cannot apply, therefore, the notice under section 9(3A) of that Act could not be invalidated even by reason of lapse of 2 years from the date of issue of the notice under section 9(3A) of the said Act. The order: 72. In the result the writ petition succeeds. The impugned notice under section 9(3B) of 1894 Act is hereby quashed. Let a writ of certiorari do issue accordingly. It is hereby declared that it is a case covered under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act. The respondents are directed to proceed in terms of the notice under section 9(3A) of 1894 Act, already issued. The compensation be calculated in terms of the notice/notification under section 9(3A) of the said Act as issued, as early as possible preferably within a period of 6 months from the date of communication of this order and the compensation be paid subject to section 18 of the 1894 Act within 3 months from the date of the award, which is to be determined in accordance with law. Let a writ of mandamus do issue accordingly. Let a writ of mandamus do issue accordingly. 73. There will be no order as to costs. 74. Xerox plain copy of the operative part of this order be given to the counsel for the respective parties on usual undertaking. Xerox certified copy of the order may be furnished to the parties if applied for within a fortnight from the date of making such application on usual terms. Later: Application allowed. W.P. No. 17107(W)/2000 January 16, 2002 Debayan Bera for the petitioner; A.N. Banerjee for the State. D.K. Seth, J. After the judgment was delivered on 24th December, 2001 Mr. A.N. Banerjee, learned Counsel for the respondent and Mr. Debayan Bera for the petitioner had pointed out that the decision in Sterling Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. (supra) by the Division Bench was challenged in Civil Appeal No. 6537/2001 before the Apex Court. The Apex Court disposed of the said Appeal along with several other appeals by an order dated 18th September, 2001. In the said order certain directions were given and ultimately the Apex Court observed that in view of such directions the impugned order passed by the High Court would not survive and the appeals were disposed of accordingly. Thus non-survival of the decision in Sterling Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. (supra) means to wipe out the decision altogether. Therefore this decision in no way affect the decision rendered on 24th December, 2001. On the other hand in the decision I had in fact sought to distinguish Sterling Stoch Brokers (P) Ltd. (supra). Whereas by reason of the Apex Court's decision the decision in the Sterling Stock Brohers (P) Ltd. (supra) has become non-est. Be that as it may it is not necessary to change the order dated 24th December, 2001 by reason of the said decision. Reference was also made to, the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1999 by which sub-section (1a) of section 23 of the principal Act was substituted. Section 3 of the amending Act runs- "3. Be that as it may it is not necessary to change the order dated 24th December, 2001 by reason of the said decision. Reference was also made to, the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1999 by which sub-section (1a) of section 23 of the principal Act was substituted. Section 3 of the amending Act runs- "3. For the proviso to sub-section (1A) of section 23 of the principal Act, the following proviso shall be substituted:- 'Provided that – (a) in respect of the acquisition of the land referred to in sub-section (3A) of section 9 in addition to the market value of the land the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on the value of the land for the period commencing on and from the date of taking possession of the land to the date immediately before the date of issue of the notice under sub-section (3A) of section 9 plus interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on the market value of the land from the date of issue of the notice under sub-section (3A) of section 9 to the date of award of the Collector; and (b) in respect of the acquisition of the land referred to in sub-section (3B) of section 9 in addition to the market value of the land, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on the value of the land for the period commencing on and from the date of taking possession of the land to the date immediately before the date of publication of the notice under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to in this proviso as the said Act) as re-enacted by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Re-enacting Act, 1977 plus interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on the market value of the land for the period commencing on and from the date of publication of the notice under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the said Act to the date of award of the Collector. Explanation.-For the purposes of this proviso the expression "value of the land" shall mean the market value of the land determined with reference to the date of taking possession of the land.''' In fact the said substitution shows that 12% interest per annum on the value of the land is to be paid for the period as mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) respectively in respect of cases covered under sections 9(3A) and 9(3B) respectively. But this has nothing to do with the reasoning given in the decision dated 24th December, 2001 since the said substituted sub-section (1A) of section 23 proceeds to explain the expression "value of the land" used in the substituted section. The explanation provides that the value of the land used in the said substituted section shall mean the market value of the land determined with reference to the date of taking possession of the land which relates to the date when the property was taken possession of on requisition. It has nothing to do with the valuation of the land either on the basis of the date of issue of the notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act nor on the basis of the date of issue of the notice under section 9(3A) of the principal Act. Therefore reasoning given in the order dated 24th December, 2001 survives and cannot be effected by reason of 1999 amendment referred to above. On the other hand this will enure to the benefit of the State even if valuation as calculated on the basis of the notice under section 4(1a) then also it would be a higher valuation on which interest shall be paid for the period also from the date of issue of notice under section 4(1a) of 1948 Act till the date of the award in case the case is covered under section 9(3B). Thus I do not find any reason to alter the judgment delivered on 24th December, 2001. Let plain xerox copies of this order duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Ct.) be given to the learned Advocates for the parties for the purpose of communication and compliance of the order passed by this court.