P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Petition is filed aggrieved by the order passed in E. A. No. 37/2000 in E. P. No. 19/2000 in R. C. No. 638/95 on the file of Principal Rent controller, Hyderabad. ( 2 ) THE facts in brief are as follows:- the respondent in the present Revision filed E. A. No. 37/2000 in EP. No. 19/2000 in r. C. No. 638/95 on the file of Principal Rent controller, Hyderabad under Section 47 c. P. C. r/w Rule 23 (7) of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1961 and Section 15 of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 and Section 151 C. P. C. for restoration of possession of the demised premises no. 22-6-1984, Pattargatti, Hyderabad. The respondent in the present Revision Petition is also respondent in the main R. C. No. 638/95 and the Judgment-debtor in E. P. No. 19/2000 and the Revision Petitioner-landlady filed r. C. NO. 638/95 against him (sic. her) and it was allowed on 22-4-1998 and subsequent thereto the respondent-tenant preferred rent appeal in R. A. 202/98 on the file of Hon ble chief Judge, Hyderabad Against the orders passed in R. C. No. 638/95 and after passing of eviction order both parties had entered into a fresh rental agreement on 21-7-1998 which was duly registered and as per the registered lease deed it was executed for a period of five years commencing from 1-7-1998 and it was also agreed that the same may be renewed further on mutual consent of both the parties and the rent is rs. 800/- per month and as per the terms of the fresh rental agreement there is a specific undertaking mat the eviction order will not be executed and thus the fresh rental agreement had been acted upon and as per the understanding the Revision Petitioner shall withdraw the eviction case and in view of the aforesaid facts, the respondent herein did not prosecute R. A. No. 202/98 which was dismissed on 31-12-1999. It was also stated that on 8-8-1998, the Revision petitioner filed a memo through her Counsel in r. C. No. 638/95 intimating that she had undertaken not to initiate any E. P. proceedings in view of the fresh rental agreement. It was also stated that on 8-8-1998, the Revision petitioner filed a memo through her Counsel in r. C. No. 638/95 intimating that she had undertaken not to initiate any E. P. proceedings in view of the fresh rental agreement. Further it was stated that the revision petitioner not only collected the rents at the enhanced rates, but she had also received Rs. 2,00,000. 00 from the respondent by way of cheques and subsequent thereto, the Revision petitioner had engaged another counsel and by playing fraud upon the court, had proceeded with the execution and had dispossessed the respondent from the schedule property on 6-4-2000 through the court bailiff. In the light of the said facts, since fraud had been played, the entire proceedings are vitiated by fraud and hence the respondent filed the application specified above seeking the relief of restoration of possession of the schedule premises. The respondent (sic. petitioner) filed a counter admitting certain aspects. But it was stated that on a wrong advice of the Counsel she had executed the document and after receipt of summons in the E. A. proceedings she came to know about the fraud played on her and thereafter she had cancelled the prior document on 14-8-2000 and it was further stated that the prior document was not acted upon and the document was obtained under undue influence by taking advantage of the innocence of the Revision petitioner. It was also stated that on the date of the document, r. A. No 202/98 was very much pending and inasmuch as the appellate Court had not recorded the alleged compromise the case put-forth by the respondent-tenant cannot be believed. Several other aspects also have been pleaded narrating the details to the effect that the payments were made not in the present context as contended by the respondent-tenant. ( 3 ) IT is pertinent to note that no oral evidence was let in by the parties and the documents were marked by consent i. e. , exs. P-1 to P-23, Ex. R-1 and Ex. C-1. ( 4 ) THE learned Principal Rent Controller, hyderabad after considering the documentary evidence Ex. P-1 to P-23, ex. C-1 and Ex. R-l came to the conclusion that fraud was played by the Revision petitioner-landlady and since fraud vitiates the E. P. proceedings a direction was given to restore possession of the schedule premises to the respondent-tenant. C-1. ( 4 ) THE learned Principal Rent Controller, hyderabad after considering the documentary evidence Ex. P-1 to P-23, ex. C-1 and Ex. R-l came to the conclusion that fraud was played by the Revision petitioner-landlady and since fraud vitiates the E. P. proceedings a direction was given to restore possession of the schedule premises to the respondent-tenant. Aggrieved by the said order the present Revision is filed. ( 5 ) C. M. P. NO. 13149/2001 is filed in the present Revision by one Syed Tajuddin to come on record as 2nd respondent in the c. R. P. , since he claims to be the purchaser by virtue of an agreement of sale dated 10-12-1999. The proposed party who intends to come on record is claiming some interest in the schedule premises and it is also brought to my notice that even before the Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad e. A. NO. 113/2000 and E. A. No. 114/2000, to reopen the matter and to implead him as a party were filed, but however the learned rent Controller had not passed any order. On the aspect whether the agreement holder should be brought on record or not, the counsel representing the proposed party sri Srinivas Reddy and the Counsel representing the respondent-tenant Sri Vilas v. Afzulpurkar, had made elaborate submissions. In fact, a detailed counter affidavit was filed opposing the application filed by the third party. The learned Counsel representing the proposed party had relied upon T. Gopal Reddy v. Shaik Shafi Saheb wherein this Honourable Court has observed that a purchaser of a premises in a rent control petition can be brought on record on an application by him to be impleaded as a party under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C. P. C. since he has sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation. In the present case, the proceedings arise out of execution. Order 1 rule 10 (2) C. P. C. is applicable to suits etc. , and not to execution. Be that as it may, since it is contended by Mr. In the present case, the proceedings arise out of execution. Order 1 rule 10 (2) C. P. C. is applicable to suits etc. , and not to execution. Be that as it may, since it is contended by Mr. Srinivas Reddy, that by virtue of the agreement of sale in fact the proposed party-third party has taken possession of the property and he has been running the business, I am of the opinion that he is a necessary party to these proceedings and hence the proposed party is impleaded as the 2nd respondent in the present Civil revision Petition. ( 6 ) FOR the purpose of convenience the parties in this litigation will be referred to as landlady - Revision Petitioner, tenant - 1 st respondent and proposed party - 2nd respondent. ( 7 ) SRI Niranjan Reddy, the learned counsel representing the landlady had made elaborate submissions taking me through several of the factual aspects in detail. The learned Counsel had contended that the lease deed Ex. P-1 was obtained by playing fraud on the landlady and it was executed on the incorrect advice given by the Counsel and it was not acted upon. Even otherwise, by the date of filing the memo Ex. C-1 there was no proceeding pending before the Rent controller. In that view of the matter, the rent Controller became functus-officio and even by that time the rent appeal alone was pending and nothing has been recorded in the rent appeal relating to the alleged compromise. It was also pointed out that in the memo wrong date of Ex. P-1 was given and there are certain interpolations, a portion of the memo being in hand-writing. It was also further contended that the amount of rs. 2,00,000/- paid by the tenant had been specifically denied. It was also contended that Rule 23 (7) of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1961, for short the Rules does not contemplate an objection by the third party. Further it was contended that Section 47 c. P. C. is not applicable to the Rent Control proceedings. Further it was contended that ex. P-1 agreement was not recorded as a compromise before the Court and at best it may be deemed to be an independent transaction and the Court below erred in looking into Ex. P-1 for the purpose of ordering the restoration. Further it was contended that ex. P-1 agreement was not recorded as a compromise before the Court and at best it may be deemed to be an independent transaction and the Court below erred in looking into Ex. P-1 for the purpose of ordering the restoration. Further it was pointed out that though there are several disputed questions relating to facts, no evidence was let in by the respondent-tenant to establish those facts. It was also contended that in the light of the complicated facts involved in the matter, the Court below should have directed the parties to agitate their rights in an independent civil proceeding and the remedy is a misconceived one. The learned Counsel also had strenuously contended relying upon the decision in Lakshmi Narayana v. S. S. Pandian, that since the alleged compromise memo was not recorded by the court, it is of no consequence. It was also contended that the power under Section 47 c. P. C. is a substantive power and the Rent controller exercising the powers under the a. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1960, for short the Act , is governed by the Act as such, which is a self- contained Code and hence the Rent controller as a persona-designata cannot exercise the powers under Section 47 C. P. C. ( 8 ) SRI Srinivas Reddy, the learned counsel representing the 2nd respondent (hereinafter called the proposed party ) had submitted that the proposed party, as the agreement holder had taken delivery of the property on 6-4-2000 in pursuance of the agreement dated 10-12-1999 and the panchanama also is filed to establish the said fact. The learned Counsel also further contended that in pursuance of the delivery the proposed party is carrying on business in the schedule premises and if any order is passed at this stage without giving him an opportunity, his rights will be prejudiced. The learned Counsel also had contended that rule 23 (7) of the Rules contemplates an enquiry into an objection or resistance occasioned to any person other than the person against whom an order of eviction was passed. The learned Counsel also had contended that Rule 23 does not contemplate any notice and no notice need be given in this regard and reliance was placed on a. P. Transport Co. v. Ghanshyamdas thshniwal. The learned Counsel also had contended that Rule 23 does not contemplate any notice and no notice need be given in this regard and reliance was placed on a. P. Transport Co. v. Ghanshyamdas thshniwal. The learned Counsel also had contended that the scheme of the Act is that it is a self-contained Code and the power under Section 47 C. P. C. is a substantive power, which cannot be exercised by the rent Controller. Further, it was contended that neither the Act nor the Rules empower the Rent Controller to restore possession and thus the tenant as such has no say at all in the execution proceedings and the proceedings initiated by the tenant are totally misconceived The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on Gantala Eswara Rao v. Gundini Somasekahar, Patel Narshi thakershi and others v. Pradyumnasinghji and Gajula v. R. Co-operative Society. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel Sri Vilas V. Afzulpurkar, representing the tenant had contended that the very execution itself is a fraudulent execution and the registered lease deed Ex. P-1 created a fresh tenancy and in fact the rent was enhanced and the tenant even till the date of dispossession had been continuing to pay the rents at the enhanced rate and the conduct of the parties clearly goes to show that Ex. P-1 was acted upon. This aspect is amply established by the rent receipts Exs. P-2 to P-20. The learned counsel also had contended that the fresh tenancy created by Ex. P-1 is protected by the act and the tenant can be thrown out only in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not otherwise. The learned Counsel also had contended that the element of fraud vitiates everything and the Rent Controller being the executing Court, had rightly allowed the application seeking restoration of possession. The very fact that the memo was filed and subsequently the Counsel was changed and E. P. was filed and the tenant was dispossessed and also as against an order of status quo, C. R. P. No. 2958/2000 was filed and it was dismissed as withdrawn, clearly go to show that absolutely there are no bona fides on the part of the landlady and deliberately and intentionally she had proceeded with execution and with a view to create complications she intends to induct a third party. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to several portions of the pleadings of the parties to substantiate his submissions. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to Badugu Venkata durga Rao v. Surneni Lakshmi and had contended that the unilateral cancellation of ex. P-1 by the landlady is of no consequence and in fact it supports the case of the tenant. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on several decisions to substantiate his contention that the power to recall or the power to order restitution or restoration is an inherent power in every Court. The learned counsel also had relied upon the passages from The Interpretation of Statutes by Sir benson Maxwell and had drawn ray attention to the following passages:-" Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea equoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuil. Thus, an Act which empowered justices to require persons to take an oath as special constables, and gave them to inquire into an offence, impliedly empowered them to apprehend the persons who unlawfully failed to attend before them for those purposes. Otherwise, the jurisdiction could not be effectually exercised. Where an inferior Court is empowered to grant an injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by commitment is impliedly conveyed by the enactment, for the power would be useless if it could not be enforced. And it is laid down that where a statute empowers a justice to bind a person over, or to cause him to do something, and the person, in his presence, refuses, the justice has impliedly authority to commit him to jail till he complies. An act which authorises the making of by-laws, impliedly authorises the annexation of a reasonable pecuniary penalty for their infringement, recoverable (in the absence of other provision) by action or distress. ""in the same way, when powers, privileges, or property are granted by statute, everything indispensable to their exercise or enjoyment is impliedly granted also as it would be in a grant between private persons. " ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel also had strenuously contended that the alleged recording or non-recording of compromise has no effect at all on these proceedings. " ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel also had strenuously contended that the alleged recording or non-recording of compromise has no effect at all on these proceedings. Since even de hors the recording of compromise since the material on record clearly establishes the element of fraud, the executing Court has power and authority to undo the injustice caused to the tenant by action of the landlady which is in fact a clear abuse of process of Court and also process of law. The learned Counsel further contended that since the powers of execution are specified under the Act in Section 15, it should be taken that the executing Court is having all other implied and incidental powers also to do substantial justice between the parties. It was further contended that the question relating to the execution, discharge and satisfaction can be decided by the Rent controller and hence Section 47 C. P. C. is definitely applicable to the Rent Control proceedings. The learned Counsel also had submitted that the third party cannot be put on a higher pedestal when compared to the tenant and hence to interpret Rule 23 (7) of the Rules as contended by the opposite parties will be defeating the very object and the purpose of the Act. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on United India insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sanjay Singh and others, M/s. Kavita Trehan and another v. Balasara Hygiene Products Ltd. , b. V. Patankar and others v. C. G. Sastry, m/s. Sitaram Srigopal v. Union Carbide india Ltd. , Nandi Bala Dassi v. Bibhupi bhusan Mukherjee, and Soni @ Bhuthulasi and others v. Kunda Nageswara Rao and another. ( 11 ) HAVING heard the elaborate submissions made by the respective parties, i now proceed to deal with the contentions raised by the parties in the present Revision petition. It is no doubt true that Rule 23 (7) of the Rules deals with resistance or obstruction occasioned to any person other than the person against whom an order of eviction was passed claiming in good faith to be in possession of the building on his own account or on account of some person other than the person against whom the order of eviction was passed. Here in the present case, the tenant had raised an objection and hence the application filed by the tenant under Rule 23 (7) of the Rules in literal sense may not be maintainable for want of locus standi. But at the same time, in the facts and circumstances of the case like the present one, a serious thought has to be given where in such circumstances the tenant who is dispossessed in this manner, has no remedy at all? If remedy is available, what is the remedy available to such a tenant who has been thrown out? ( 12 ) IT is ho doubt true that there are several factual aspects involved in the matter and it would have been proper and desirable for the learned Rent Controller to record the necessary evidence and the learned Rent controller while ordering restoration also should have taken care to see that proper findings are recorded relating to the element of fraud played also since both the parties in a way alleged fraud. In a matter of this nature having serious consequences, the rent Controller should have been careful while deciding an application of this nature and should have afforded an opportunity to all the parties, the landlady, the tenant and also to the proposed party, for adducing necessary evidence for the purpose of recording proper findings in this regard. ( 13 ) COMING to the facts on hand, it is pertinent to note that the landlady by executing Ex. R-1, had in fact admitted the execution of Ex. P-1. It is also a matter to be considered as to what is the legal effect of ex. R-1 in the present facts and circumstances. But however, it cannot be said that it is a pure question of law only, and it is a mixed question of fact and law, which may have to be gone into by the learned Rent controller. ( 14 ) COMING to Ex. C-1 memo filed by the landlady, it is only an intimation to the Court and whether in pursuance of it a compromise is recorded or not, may not be of any consequence since under Ex. P-1 what had been created is a fresh tenancy between the parties and hence the non-recording of the memo by the Court may not have much impact as far as the rights of the parties in the present case are concerned. P-1 what had been created is a fresh tenancy between the parties and hence the non-recording of the memo by the Court may not have much impact as far as the rights of the parties in the present case are concerned. ( 15 ) IT may not be out of context if I state that wherever fraud is detected the Courts repeatedly had observed that perpetration of such fraud cannot be permitted by Courts and the Courts have inherent power either to recall or to rectify such acts of the parties who intend to take advantage of such acts perpetrated by them by exercising the method of fraud. In the case cited supra, the Apex Court had observed that where an order was obtained by practising fraud, every Court or Tribunal has power to recall such an order by exercising power under section 151 C. P. C. In the case cited supra, the Apex Court observed that the restitutionary jurisdiction is inherent in every court. ( 16 ) IT is also pertinent to note the relevant observations made in S. P. Chengalvaraya naidu (dead) by L. Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and others:- 1. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to Court with a true case and prove it by true evidence. " The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 8. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the Court auction on behalf of Chunnilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Exhibit b-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid that the total decretal amount to his master chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the ptyon his own behalf and not on behalf of chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial tantamounts to playing fraud on the Court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Exhibit B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. In Gandham Satynarayana v. Sirangam it was held that wherever there was no conflict and wherever the Act is silent the provisions of C. P. C. can be made applicable. Section 47 c. P. C. deals with the power of the Court to decide the execution, discharge and satisfaction of a decree in execution proceedings. In Gandham Satynarayana v. Sirangam it was held that wherever there was no conflict and wherever the Act is silent the provisions of C. P. C. can be made applicable. Section 47 c. P. C. deals with the power of the Court to decide the execution, discharge and satisfaction of a decree in execution proceedings. In fact, in the cases (10), (11) and (12) cited supra, the view expressed was that Section 47 C. P. C. is applicable even to the Rent Control proceedings. In the light of the above decisions, I am also of the view that since it cannot be said that under section 15 of the Act all powers relating to execution are comprehensive, Section 47 c. P. C. cannot be invoked. Section 47 C. P. C. in my opinion, whether it is treated as a substantive power or as a mere procedural provision, can be made applicable even in rent Control proceedings and at any rate the principles underlying Section 47 and sec. 151 C. P. C. always can be applied even in Rent Control proceedings and wherever a proceeding is vitiated by fraud, the Rent controller also is having power to rectify such acts, if any committed by a party in pursuance of such acts of fraud. ( 17 ) BEFORE concluding, I may also point out that in a matter of this nature, the way in which the proceedings had been dealt with by the parties, is not at all satisfactory and in the light of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that all the parties must be given an opportunity to let in evidence about their respective contentions and the Court below after affording such an opportunity to all the parties can decide the dispute afresh and for this purpose the matter is to be remitted back to the Court below in the interest of justice. ( 18 ) HENCE, for the foregoing reasons, the civil Revision Petition is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the Court below for the purpose of giving opportunity to all the parties to adduce evidence and also to place further material if any, for the purpose of substantiating their contentions. ( 18 ) HENCE, for the foregoing reasons, the civil Revision Petition is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the Court below for the purpose of giving opportunity to all the parties to adduce evidence and also to place further material if any, for the purpose of substantiating their contentions. In view of the urgency involved in the matter, I deem it fit to direct the learned Principal Rent controller, Hyderabad to dispose of the matter within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the circumstances, each party to bear their own costs. Both parties to maintain status quo as it is existing as on to-day.