E.Padmanabhan, J.: This writ appeal has been preferred by the unsuccessful petitioner in W.P. No.5854 of 1981 being aggrieved by the dismissal of the said writ petition on 22.7.1988. 2. Heard Ms.Hema Sampath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr.Karthick, for M/s.T.S. Gopalan & Co., for the first respondent and Ms.Kalaiselvi, Special Government Pleader for the 2nd respondent. 3. The appellant filed W.P. No.5854 of 1981 under Art.226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for and quash the proceedings of the first respondent in his office R.C.No.8463/A1/79, dated 27.6.1981 and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as Manager (Selection Grade) in the Tamil Nadu Tourism Development Corporation with backwages and other emoluments from 18.7.1979. 4. The writ petition was contested by the first respondent by filing a detailed counter. The learned single Judge by order dated 22.7.1988 allowed the writ petition in part holding that the dismissal shall take effect from the date of order, namely 27.6.1981 and not from 18.7.1979 and to that extent modified the order of dismissal passed by the first respondent. Being aggrieved in so far as the learned single Judge had dismissed the writ petition, the present appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioner. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant in this writ petition contended that the punishment is highly disproportionate, that the orders have been passed by an incompetent authority, that punishment of dismissal is not warranted as the charges are not grave and that there is no evidence to sustain the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the order of the learned single Judge is liable to be reversed in this appeal. 6.Per contra, the learned counsel for the contesting respondent contended that no interference is called for with respect to the order passed by the learned single Judge and if at all this Court comes to the conclusion that there is an irregularity in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings of imposition of punishment, there could be a direction to pay compensation as has been ordered by the Apex Court in O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation, (1986)2 L.L.J. 509 . 7. 7. Before the learned single Judge, as has been pointed out by Mr.Karthick, the appellant herein on whose behalf a senior counsel argued the matter confined himself to the following five points, while challenging the impugned proceedings: “(1) The copies of documents and statements furnished to the petitioner were not attested. (2) The Department failed to give a list of witnesses to be examined on his side till the commencement of the enquiry on 22.4.1980. (3) One Raju, Commercial Manager, Hotel Division, was enimically disposed towards the petitioner and the said Raju has been nominated as the presenting officer by the Corporation and the petitioner is prejudicial thereby. (4) The second notice calling upon the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment is bad in law. (5) The final order of dismissal is not in consonance with the punishment proposed in the second notice.” 8. While referring to the said contentions or grounds advanced, Mr.Karthick, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent rightly pointed out that it is not open to the appellant to advance new contention at the stage of appeal and the appellant shall not be allowed to raise or advance new contentions for the first time in Letters Patent Appeal. We find there is force in time contention advanced by Mr.Karthick. 9. As regards the first ground of challenge advanced before the learned single Judge, the learned Judge had rightly negatived the same as the appellant had been furnished with true copies of the statements, which he required and repelled the contention holding that there is no illegality in furnishing true copies of statement and documents. 10. On the second point, the learned single Judge, after elaborate discussions held that there was no justification on the part of the writ petitioner to withdraw himself or walk away from the enquiry and he ought to have participated in the enquiry and asked for time for cross examination of the witnesses, besides holding that the writ petitioner had not chosen to do so and, therefore, it is not open to him to contend that there is a failure to furnish the list of witnesses prior to the commencement of the enquiry. On merits also, the said contention has been repealed by the learned single Judge holding that the petitioner had sufficient opportunity and that there was no failure to furnish a list of witnesses before the commencement of the enquiry. 11. On the third point, the learned Judge rightly took the view that the Management representative who had been assigned to assist the proceedings, even assuming that he had some axe to grind, and for which there is no basis, it will not vitiate the domestic enquiry proceeding, because it is the enquiry officer who conducts the proceeding and submit the report and not the representative of the Management. 12. On the fourth point also, the learned Judge held that the second show cause notice is not liable to be assailed. 13. On the fifth point, the learned Judge sustained the contention and held that retrospective dismissal is bad and modified the dismissal to be effective from the date of the impugned order of dismissal. 14. Excepting the fourth point, all other points sought to be advanced in this appeal are new contentions, which cannot be permitted to be advanced at the appellate stage in this writ appeal nor we are persuaded to permit the petitioner to raise such contentions nor are we justified in allowing the appellant to raise new contentions at this stage. As regards the 4th point, namely, whether the second show cause notice issued by the Accounts Officer is valid or not, is the only question that requires examination. 15. Admittedly, the disciplinary authority is the General Manager. The General Manager had not initiated action. It is only the Managing Director, the appellate authority, who had initiated action right through. The second show cause notice has not been issued even by the Managing Director, but by the Accounts Officer, who had referred the authority in the proceeding as the competent authority. We find there is force in the contention advanced by Ms.Hema Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant as the Accounts Officer was only in-charge Managing Director in the absence of the Managing Director. We find there is force in the contention advanced by Ms.Hema Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant as the Accounts Officer was only in-charge Managing Director in the absence of the Managing Director. The disciplinary proceedings being quasi-judicial, it is the competent authority, who alone could apply his mind, consider and decide as to whether he agrees with the findings reported by the enquiry officer and as to what is the quantum of punishment he proposes to impose on the said findings reported by the enquiry officer. The Accounts Officer is not certainly the Managing Director. The Disciplinary Authority is the General Manager and the fact that the post of General Manager was in existence and it was not vacant is not disputed. But for reasons best known to the first respondent, the Accounts Officer had arrived at the conclusion, while issuing a show cause notice, accepting the findings reported by the enquiry officer and arriving at the prima facie conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the charges and proposing the punishment. 16. Assuming that the Accounts officer is in-charge Managing Director, there is no reason at all for bypassing the General Manager, who is the disciplinary authority as per the regulations and denying an opportunity to the petitioner, who is under the control of the General Manager. The Accounts officer was only in-charge Managing Director and he has signed for the Managing Director. We called upon the counsel for the first respondent to place materials and files to show that the Accounts Officer was full in-charge of the Managing Director during the material period by placing the resolution if any, or orders of the Government if any, in this respect. The learned counsel for the respondent is unable to produce any material in this respect and the learned counsel pleaded inability. This compels us to infer that there is defect in the procedure as well as the very authority of the Accounts officer is doubtful. 17. All that Mr.Karthick could place is that during the interregnum period, there was no Managing Director on the material date. No one was holding the office of Managing Director during the interim period and there is no order making the Accounts Officer in-charge as the Managing Director as it is a Government undertaking. 17. All that Mr.Karthick could place is that during the interregnum period, there was no Managing Director on the material date. No one was holding the office of Managing Director during the interim period and there is no order making the Accounts Officer in-charge as the Managing Director as it is a Government undertaking. That does not mean the Accounts Officer could exercise all the powers of the Managing Director including the power of dismissal or removal. Nothing has been placed before the Court to show that the Accounts Officer has been conferred with full powers of the Managing Director including the power to dismiss or remove the employees of the first respondent, Tamil Nadu Tourism Development Corporation. This aspect of the matter, which is an illegality, pointed out by Ms.Hema Sampath, which we are persuaded to sustain. The Accounts Officer, who is in additional charge is not the Managing Director himself. In this it is not shown that he has been authorised to exercise all the functions of the Managing Director at the relevant point of time. 18. The Accounts Officer is not the disciplinary authority nor he is the appellate authority, who has been conferred all the powers of the Managing Director by the Board of Directors of the first respondent- Corporation or by orders of the State Government. Unless the powers have been conferred on the Accounts Officer to exercise the powers of the Managing Director by conferment of necessary power by the competent authority the Accounts Officer, in our considered view, will not have the authority to issue orders on the report submitted by the enquiry officer or accept the same and also propose the punishment of dismissal from service. This is an irregularity as the Accounts Officer is not the Managing Director nor he is the disciplinary authority. At the most, if at all the Accounts Officer was an in-charge Managing Director for the time being to attend to the day-to-day work and it has not been shown that he has been conferred with all the powers of the Managing Director. 19. At the most, if at all the Accounts Officer was an in-charge Managing Director for the time being to attend to the day-to-day work and it has not been shown that he has been conferred with all the powers of the Managing Director. 19. Even assuming that there has been a delegation and assuming that full powers have been conferred on the Accounts Officer to pass orders, it is also an irregularity in that the disciplinary authority with respect to the appellant is admittedly the General Manager, who has not initiated action or taken proceedings and there is no reason for the said authority avoiding to initiate action, if the alleged misconduct warrants an action. That being so, the denial of opportunity of appeal in this case as has been held by the Supreme Court in Electronics Corporation of India v. G.Muralidhar, (2001)2 L.L.N. 855 also to a larger extent supports the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and it vitiates the proceedings. In this context, the Supreme Court held thus: "The order of termination from service of the delinquent respondent was assailed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court by filing a writ petition. The said order of termination had been passed not by the disciplinary authority but by the appellate authority. The leaned single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that by taking recourse to such a procedure, a right of appeal was denied to the delinquent and, therefore, the order of termination is vitiated by application of the decision of this Court in Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others, (1995)1 L.L.N. 840. That order of the learned single Judge was assailed before the Division Bench by filing an appeal. The Division Bench, however, upheld the order of the learned single Judge and did not interfere with the same. Necessarily, therefore, the direction of the learned single Judge for reinstatement and backwages remained to be implemented. 2..... It is however conceded before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General that under the rules governing the conditions of service of the corporation, the CMD is not the disciplinary authority in respect of the respondent and, in fact, he is the appellate authority and, therefore, undoubtedly a right of appeal which was otherwise available to the respondent, has been denied. It is also stated to us that there is no general provision which confers a power of review or revision to the Board against any order passed by the CMD. In that view of the matter, even if the Board may be a superior authority to the CMD, to hold that an appeal would lie against an order of termination passed by the CMD, it would tantamount to a fresh legislation which we are not inclined to adopt. Necessarily therefore, a valuable right of appeal having been denied to the delinquent respondent in view of the judgment of this Court in Surjit Ghosh case, (1995)1 L.L.N. 840, the order of punishment gets vitiated and the employee respondent is entitled to a direction for reinstatement and back wages though the back wages could be limited depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case." 20. Even the administrative order, which involves civil consequence, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice as well as per the regulations and the rules framed by the first respondent-Corporation. When the regulations prescribe that the General Manager is the disciplinary authority who is competent to impose the punishment of dismissal, removal, etc., including all major punishments, it is not known as to how the Accounts Officer, who is not even the appellate authority and who has not been conferred with the powers of the Managing Director and even according to the rules when the Managing Director alone is the appellate authority, it is rather extraordinary on the part of the Accounts Officer to have come to the prime facie conclusion accepting the findings reported by the enquiry officer and issue a second show cause notice proposing the punishment of dismissal. Before the issue of second show cause notice also, the competent authority should apply its mind, assess the findings and arrive at an independent conclusion that it agrees with the findings and it comes to the conclusion that a penalty has to be imposed as the facts of the case or the gravity of the misconduct warrants. This irregularity pointed out by the counsel for the appellant, deserves to be sustained. 21. This irregularity pointed out by the counsel for the appellant, deserves to be sustained. 21. At the same time, in view of the passage of time and as more than two decades have rolled by now from the time of the incident, as well as initiation of disciplinary proceedings, this is not a fit case where we would be justified in setting aside the order of dismissal on this ground and direct reinstatement of the appellant, but, however, we deem it just and fair to apply the pronouncement of the Apex Court in O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation, (1986)2 L.L.J. 509 instead of setting aside the order of dismissal and ordering reinstatement, as such direction is not also warranted on the facts. Hence, while taking into consideration of the entire matter, passage of two decades and conduct of the appellant in not extending co-operation desired but was adopting a delaying attitude, and admittedly the writ petitioner/ appellant is also employed in various hotels from time to time and there is no justification to order reinstatement at this point of time, we direct the first respondent-corporation to pay in all the sum of Rs.51,000 (Rupees fifty-one thousand only), towards lump sum compensation in full quit of all his claims and in lieu of reinstatement. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed as above. Parties shall bear their respective costs throughout. After the delivery of the order, learned counsel for the appellant represents that some time may be granted for the first respondent to pay the sum of Rs.51,000. Mr.Karthick, learned counsel for the first respondent submits that three months time be granted to pay the said sum. Accordingly, three months’ time is granted to the first respondent to pay the said sum of Rs.51,000.