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2001 DIGILAW 798 (RAJ)

Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan

2001-05-07

H.R.PANWAR

body2001
JUDGMENT 1. - This Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482, Cr.PC. is directed against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rajsamand dated 2.1.98 passed in Cr. Revision Petition No. 68 of 1997 whereby the learned revisional court dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioners against the order dated 30.4.1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, Railmagra in Criminal Case No. 131 of 1997 whereby the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Section 147, 447, 427 and 379, IPC against the accused-petitioners. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Public Prosecutor and perused the order impugned. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there is a civil suit pending between the parties relating to the land in question and, therefore, criminal proceedings should not proceed and on this count, the petitioners sought quashing of the proceedings. He further contended that allowing to continue criminal proceedings would amount to gross abuse of the process of the court. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the petition and submitted that the petitioners have already availed the remedy of revision by filing criminal revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rajsamand and as such, under the garb of inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.PC. they cannot be permitted to go for second revision as it is specifically barred by the provisions of Sub-section (3) of section 397, Cr.P.C. Learned Public Prosecutor has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agrawal and others (1999 Cr.L.R. (SC) 677) , wherein, their Lordships observed thus : "Time and again this Court has been pointing out that quashment of FIR or a complaint in exercise of inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions. 5. Relying on the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme rendered in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ( 1999 (3) SCC 259 ) , their Lordships further observed that in the last referred case, this Court also pointed out that merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. 6. Undisputedly, the petitioners failed before the revisional court and in the garb of the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC., the petitioners came in second revision. 6. Undisputedly, the petitioners failed before the revisional court and in the garb of the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC., the petitioners came in second revision. In view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in case of Dharampal and others v. Smt. Ramshri and others (1993 Cr.L.J. 1049) , their Lordships observed as under : "The question that falls for our consideration now is whether the High Court could have utilised the powers under S.482 of the Code and entertained a second revision application at the instance of the 1st respondent. Admittedly, the 1st respondent had preferred a Criminal Application being Cr.R.No. 180/78 to the Sessions Court against the order passed by the Magistrate on 17th October, 1978 withdrawing the attachment. The Sessions Judge had dismissed the said application on 14th May, 1979. Section 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party. It is now well settled that the inherent powers under S.482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of 1st respondent. On this short ground itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside." 7. Similarly in Deepti alias Arati Rai v. Akhil Rai and others [ 1995 (5) SCC 751 ] , their Lordships observed thus : "The High Court also should have RAJASTHAN to verify the record before accepting the concession made by the learned Government Advocate. It should have also applied its mind to the aspect that second revision application, after dismissal of the first one by Sessions Court is not maintainable and that inherent power under Sec.482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code." 8. It should have also applied its mind to the aspect that second revision application, after dismissal of the first one by Sessions Court is not maintainable and that inherent power under Sec.482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code." 8. In Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, [( 1995(6) SCC 194 ] , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus : "We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare case; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint and that the extra-ordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 9. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and others ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ) , their Lordships observed as under : "In the following categories of cases, the High Court may in exercise of powers under Art. 226 or under S.482 of Cr.P.C. may interfere in the proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. However, power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases : (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under S.156 (1) of the Code except under an order of Magistrate within the purview of S.155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S.155(2) of the Code. (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 10. I have gone through the order impugned and material placed on record. In my considered opinion this case does not fall in the category of rarest of rare cases. Not only this the order impugned would not result in abuse of process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered opinion there is no substance in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Accordingly, this petition fails and it is hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******