G. Srinivasan v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board represented by its Chairman, Madras and others
2001-07-24
P.D.DINAKARAN
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER: Aggrieved by the proceedings dated 30.4.1994 of the second respondent rejecting the request of the petitioner for alteration of the date of birth as 26.5.1937 instead of 21.6.1936, based on the extract of the registration of date of birth enclosing along with his application dated 17.8.1993 and other evidences enclosed therewith; and the consequential refusal to permit the petitioner to continue in service till 31.5.1995, the petitioner seeks a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the entire records of the second respondent comprised in his proceedings in Memo. (Permanent) No.085263/671/C2-2/93-2, dated 30.4.1994, quash the said proceedings and consequently, restrain the respondents from in any way interfering with the rights of the petitioner to continue in service till 31.5.1995. 2.1. According to Mr.M. Venkatachalapathy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the alteration of date of birth of the petitioner, as referred to above, is specifically governed by Regulation 110 of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as "Service Regulations), which is amended by Board’s proceedings dated 13.8.1993. 2.2. Referring to Regulation No.110 of the service Regulations. Mr.M.Venkatachalapathy, learned senior counsel, contends that an application for alteration of date of birth, in normal course, should be made within a period of five years from the date of entry into service; but if there is any delay after five years, the same could be entertained provided the reasons for such delay are explained. In either case, such application to alter the date of birth, as entered in the records of the Board shall be enquired into by an authority prescribed under Regulation 110 of the Service Regulations, and based on such report of the enquiry, a decision shall be taken by the Board, which shall be final. 2.3. Mr.M. Venkatachalapathy, learned senior counsel, complains that in the instant case, no such enquiry was conducted by the second respondent, as contemplated under Regulation 110 of the Service Regulations and therefore, the decision taken in the impugned proceedings dated 30.4.1994 is not based on the report of the enquiry said to have been conducted as per Regulation 110 of the Service Regulations. 2.4.
2.4. Mr.M. Venkatachalapathy, learned senior counsel, also contends that even though by an amendment dated 13.8.1993, the employees should apply for alteration of the date of birth atleast one year prior to the date of retirement, the same is not applicable in the instant case, as the said amendment was brought into force within a period of one year, prior to the date of retirement of the petitioner. 2.5. In any event, Mr.M. Venkatachalapathy, learned senior counsel, contends that since the amendment itself provides to apply for alteration of date of birth within a period of one year prior to the date of retirement in a genuine matter, the respondents/ Board are obliged to give an opportunity to the petitioner, conduct an enquiry and take a decision on merits. As no such opportunity was provided to the petitioner nor any such enquiry was conducted, the impugned proceedings is arbitrary and unreasonable. 3.1.Per contra, Mr.V. Radhakrishnan, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, contends that the petitioner, having applied for alteration of the date of birth belatedly, does not deserve any consideration. 3.2. He further contends that since the petitioner himself, in his application dated 17.8.1993, relies on the proceedings of the Board dated 22.8.1990, which requires the employees to apply for alteration of the date of birth within a period of five years from the date entry into service, there is no justification for the petitioner to apply, after the period of five years, that too at the fag end of his retirement. 3.3. Placing reliance on the decision in Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others v. Dinabandhu Majumdar and another, (1995)4 S.C.C. 172 , Mr.V. Radhakrishnan, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents, contends that the date of birth entered in the service records, on the basis of the voluntary declaration made by the petitioner/ employee at the time of entry into service cannot be altered, as the same was never objected by him till he makes request at the fag end of service, which is liable to be rejected on account of laches on the part of the petitioner. 4. I have given a careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. 5.
4. I have given a careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. 5. The Apex Court in Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department and others v. R.Kirubakaran, (1994)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 155, has repeatedly pointed out that correction of the date of birth of public servant is permissible, but that should not be done in a casual manner. Any such order must be passed on materials produced by the public servant from which irresistible conclusion follows that the date of birth recorded in the service book was incorrect. While disposing of any such application, the Court or the Tribunal, has first to examine whether the application has been made within the prescribed period under the relevant rule or administrative order. If there is no rule or order prescribing any period, then the Court or Tribunal has to examine, why such application was not made within the reasonable time after joining the service, prescribed for the same. 6. The Apex Court in Kirubakaran’s case, (1994)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 155, has further held that whenever an application for alteration of the date of birth is made on the eve of superannuation or near about that time, the Court or the tribunal concerned should be more cautious because of the growing tendency amongst a section of public servants to raise such a dispute, without explaining as to why this question was not raised earlier. 7. In the instant case admittedly, the application for alteration of the date of birth of the petitioner is governed under Regulation 110 of the Service Regulations, as per which, even though the application for alteration of the date of birth could not be made within a period of five years from the date of service, in the normal course, such application could be entertained, if the reason for such delay is explained. In any event, after the amendment dated 13.8.1993 even in a case where the employees failed to apply for alteration of the date of birth within a period of five years from the date of entry into service, where material evidence is available, they can apply for alteration of the date of birth, one year prior to the date of retirement. The said amendment dated 13.8.1993 itself was brought within the crucial period of one year prior to the date of retirement of the petitioner, viz., 30.6.1994. 8.
The said amendment dated 13.8.1993 itself was brought within the crucial period of one year prior to the date of retirement of the petitioner, viz., 30.6.1994. 8. Therefore, in my considered opinion, what is relevant under the facts and circumstances of the case, is to see whether the materials produced by the petitioner are irresistible to justify the request for alteration of the date of birth and to decide. Even as per Regulation No.110 an enquiry has to be conducted and a decision has to be taken on the basis of the report of the enquiry, which shall be final. 9. In the impugned proceedings dated 30.4.1994, the second respondent rejected the request of the petitioner for alteration of the date of birth on the following three grounds: (i) the enquiry conducted by the concerned Executive Engineer revealed that no one was available in that area to speak about the birth of male child on 26.5.1937 in the address mentioned in the birth extract relied upon by the petitioner. (ii) when the entries in S.S.L.C. book remain without any change, the alteration of the date of birth without the corresponding change in S.S.L.C. book would not arise, and (iii) the request of the petitioner is belated even though the same is based on the birth extract. 10.1. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Kribakaran’s case, (1994)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 155, no doubt, is applicable to the instant case, as the claim of the petitioner appears to be belated and the relief sought for amounts to stretching beyond his power to allow him to continue in service even after superannuation, as per the existing entry in the records maintained by the respondents Board, based on his own declaration.
But, when the Rule specifically requires the authorities to hold an enquiry, submit a report, giving a finding on the claim of the applicant and thereafter, to take a decision based on the report, in my considered opinion, it may not be, either logically or prudentially, acceptable to reject the birth extract produced by the petitioner, merely on the basis of the enquiry report of the concerned Executive Engineer that no one in that area is available at this distant point of time to speak about the birth of a male child on 26.5.1937 in the address mentioned in the birth extract, even without giving a notice to the petitioner or providing an opportunity to him to substantiate his case. 10.2. Secondly, the reason that merely because a wrong entry, as claimed by the petitioner, exists in the S.S.L.C. book, cannot be a ground to reject the entries in the public record, namely, the birth extract, even without holding an enquiry in that regard. 10.3. Thirdly even as per Regulation No.110 of the Service Regulations, rejecting the claim of the petitioner on the ground of laches notwithstanding the production of the birth extract certificate produced by the petitioner to justify the reasons for the delay, in my considered opinion, is very much unreasonable. 11. Therefore, finding that all the reasons that weighed the respondents in passing the impugned order dated 30.4.1994 are devoid of merits, I am obliged to quash the same, and remit the matter to the second respondent to give an opportunity to the petitioner and pass appropriate orders on merits within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the result, the impugned proceedings are quashed with directions stated above. This writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs.