A. K. Sikri ( 1 ) BY this order I propose to dispose of this petition filed by the petitioner under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 seeking setting-aside of the impugned Award dated 25. 5. 2000 rendered by Respondent No. 2 in the Arbitration Case no. DSE/arb/36. The relevant facts for the purpose of these objections may be first recapitulated. ( 2 ) THE Respondent No. 1 who is doing the business of Stock Broker is also a Member. of Delhi Stock exchange Association Ltd. (hereinafter to be referred as dse ) with SEBI Registration No. INB050701232. An agreement dated 26. 2. 1998 was executed between respondent No. 1 and the petitioner for trading in respect of those securities admitted for dealing with the DSE. Agreement was for investing, trading, Badla financing in securities in DSE as per its bye-laws. Another Agreement of even date was entered into between the petitioner and the Respondent No. 1 for dealing on the National Stock Exchange of India Ltd (NSE ). The respondent No. 1 claimed that the petitioner owed him an amount of Rs. 9,57,905. 27p in respect of various dealings on the basis of aforesaid Agreement and sent legal notice dated 16. 1. 1999 for this purpose. It also demanded Rs. 1,00,000. 00 towards dishonour of cheque no. 232464 dated 31. 12. 1998 drawn on Corporation Bank, bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi. The petitioner disputed this liability and replied by his communication dated 30. 1. 1999 in which he made a counter-claim in the sum of Rs. 12,48,129. 50 from the respondent No. 1 towards the amount against sale of 2600 SBI shares refund security deposit of Rs. 5 lakhs, refund of Badia Finance and towards the cost of non-delivery of 1000 shares of satyam Computers. ( 3 ) AS disputes arose between the parties, the respondent No. 1 approached the machinery of arbitration as provided under the bye-laws of the DSE. On the respondent No. 1 approaching DSE, the respondent No. 2 was appointed as Arbitrator who sent notices to the parties after registering the case as DSE/ ARB/36. These arbitration proceedings have resulted into an award dated 25. 5. 2000 as per which the petitioner was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 716898. 37p to the respondent No. 1. This is an ex-parte Award. The petitioner has challenged this award by means of present petition. These arbitration proceedings have resulted into an award dated 25. 5. 2000 as per which the petitioner was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 716898. 37p to the respondent No. 1. This is an ex-parte Award. The petitioner has challenged this award by means of present petition. ( 4 ) THE principle contentions raised by the petitioner are the following: 1. The bye-laws as per arbitration proceedings started are dated 27. 11. 1998 whereas agreements in question between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 are dated 26. 2. 1998 i. e. before these bye-laws, particularly bye-laws 268 came into existence. Therefore, on the date of contract there were no such bye-laws in existence and thus arbitration as per these bye-laws could not take place inasmuch as the parties never agreed for settlement of disputes as per these bye-laws on 28. 2. 1998 when these bye-laws were not in existence. 2. Both the agreements dated 28. 2. 1998 clearly stipulate that these were subject to Rules and regulations of DSE. There is no mention of any bye-laws. Thus there was no arbitration agreement and the entire proceedings initiated by the respondent No. 2 are without jurisdiction. 3. Reliance on Recital No. 3 of the agreement was placed which reads as under: "whereas the client has satisfied itself of the capability of the Member to deal in securities and wishes to execute his orders through him and the client shall continue to satisfy itself to such capability of Member before executing orders through him". It was submitted that in para-1 of the impugned award it is mentioned that the respondent No. 1 had installed trading terminal at petitioner s premises for trading purposes which was allotted by DSE for this purpose. Such installation of terminal at petitioner s premises was clearly unauthorised as no such thing was mentioned in the contract. The learned counsel also urged that even in the arbitration proceedings dated 10. 9. 1999 it was highlighted by the Arbitrator himself questioning the act of installation of this terminal by the respondent No. 1 at the petitioner s premises which was no permitted under the rules, regulations and bye-laws of the Stock Exchange. 4. Counsel further submitted that the petitioner could not attend the hearings before the respondent No. 2 as the notices in respect of most of the hearings were received late. 4. Counsel further submitted that the petitioner could not attend the hearings before the respondent No. 2 as the notices in respect of most of the hearings were received late. Therefore, the petitioner was denied proper opportunity to represent him before the Arbitrator who has passed the award ultimately on conjectures and surmises. ( 5 ) BEFORE dealing with these submissions, it would be appropriate to give a hurried look on the proceedings before the arbitrator. On the appointment of the respondent No. 2 as arbitrator the first hearing fixed by him was 10. 9. 1999 for which he gave notice to both the parties. It stands admitted by the petitioner that notice for this date was duly received by him. However, the petitioner did not appear on 10. 9. 1999. Proceedings on that date were conducted against the petitioner ex-parte. Some directions were given to the respondents including the direction to produce certain documents. Next date fixed was 1. 10. 1999. On this date also the petitioner did not appear. Thereafter the proceedings were adjourned to 22. 11. 1999. On this date the petitioner appeared and even signed the attendance record. Proceedings of this date show that both the parties had made their respective submissions - the parties were directed to submit certain more documents such as contract, notice, bills, statement of account and details of payments made and in support of transactions executed between them. They were also directed to submit details of DE MAT transactions. The appearance of the petitioner on this date before the arbitrator shows that he had the knowledge about the proceedings and even he participated on this date. However, thereafter the petitioner stopped appearing and did not appear on 14. 2. 2000 and 3. 3. 2000 on which dates the Arbitrator noted the continuous absence and non-cooperation-of the petitioner and after hearing the representatives of the Respondent No. 1 concluded the arbitration proceedings and reserved the matter for award which was ultimately pronounced on 25-5. 2000. ( 6 ) FROM these proceedings it is clear that the petitioner was duly notified about the hearings. If he appeared only on one date and chose not to appear on subsequent dates, it is only the petitioner who is to be blamed for his non-appearance. The grievance made by the petitioner is only in respect of notice dated 25. 9. 1999 for hearing on 1. 10. If he appeared only on one date and chose not to appear on subsequent dates, it is only the petitioner who is to be blamed for his non-appearance. The grievance made by the petitioner is only in respect of notice dated 25. 9. 1999 for hearing on 1. 10. 1999 which was received on 8. 10. 1999. There is no grievance about the receipt of notice of other dates as mentioned above. In fact after 1. 10. 1999 the next date fixed was 22. 11. 1999 on which date the petitioner had appeared and not only participated in the proceedings, he presented his version of the case and made his submissions also. If thereafter he stopped again he did so at his own peril. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not given any opportunity to represent himself before the Arbitrator or the Arbitrator conducted the arbitration proceedings in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. ( 7 ) INSOFAR as the argument of the petitioner to the effect that terminal installed by the respondent no. 1 at petitioner s office was not permitted under the rules etc. of DSE and therefore unauthorised, nothing turns on such an argument. No doubt in proceedings dated 10. 9. 1999 the Arbitrator had recorded this apprehension and in order to satisfy himself the arbitrator directed the respondent No. 1 to produce various documents to substantiate its case. Proceedings dated 1. 10. 1999 show that these documents were filed and the respondent No. l tried to convince the arbitrator on this issue. Although in proceedingsdated 14. 2. 2000 the Arbitrator again recorded that from the documents submitted by respondent No. 1 it was unable to establish that the petitioner had done trading from the terminal installed at his premises, proceedings on the subsequent date i. e. 3. 3. 2000 record that the respondent No. 1 substantiated the fact that trading had taken place from the said terminal. At this stage the Arbitrator had asked the respondent no. 1 to produce the statement of account of the respondent No. 1 in their books co-relating to payments made to and received from the petitioner. Needful was done by the respondent No. 1. At this stage the Arbitrator had asked the respondent no. 1 to produce the statement of account of the respondent No. 1 in their books co-relating to payments made to and received from the petitioner. Needful was done by the respondent No. 1. This shows that the respondent No. 1 was ultimately able to satisfy the arbitrator about the transactions having taken place from the terminal installed by the respondent No. 1 at petitioner s premises. Even otherwise various proceedings recorded on various dates show the doubts raised by the Arbitrator at that time and it is the award rendered by the Arbitrator which would be seen as to what were the findings arrived at by the Arbitrator ultimately. A reading of the Award shows that the arbitrator was satisfied from the documentary evidence produced before him that the terminal installed by the respondent No. l at petitioner s premises was for trading purposes and trading had taken place from this terminal. This would be clear from the reading of para-3 of the Award which is as under: "m/s. M. G. CAPITAL Services Ltd, produced before me documentary evidence to substantiate their stand that the terminal installed was for trading purposes and trading has taken place from this terminal. Further, to establish the fact that there was relation of client and member between the parties, the complainant submitted a copy of member-client agreement entered into between the parties along with copy of statement of accounts, contract note and proof of payment received and payment made between the parties". ( 8 ) FURTHERMORE the objections are to be examined on the touch stone of Section 34 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act,1996 and such a contention raised by the petitioner is not covered by any of the provisions contained in Section 34 of the said Act. The arbitrator was best Judge to adjudicate upon the merits of the case and this Court is not supposed to fathom the mind of the Arbitrator or to arrive at its own conclusion on merits or to sit as an Appellate authority over these findings of the Arbitrator. ( 9 ) THIS leaves us with the last contention of the petitioner dealing with the jurisdiction of the arbitrator as per bye-laws. ( 9 ) THIS leaves us with the last contention of the petitioner dealing with the jurisdiction of the arbitrator as per bye-laws. Here it would be relevant to point out that para-1 of both the Agreements clearly stipulates that the petitioner agreed to deal with the respondent No. l as per the bye-laws of the DSE. Thus he agreed to abide by the bye-laws. Furthermore, arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 lays down the proceedings for challenging the appointment of the arbitrator which are contained in Section 12 and section 13 thereafter. As per Section 12 the petitioner was supposed to object the appointment or jurisdiction of the respondent No. 2 to act as an arbitrator and further he was supposed to call upon the arbitrator to decide about his jurisdiction. He did not do so. At least On one date i. e. 22. 11. 1999 he appeared before the Arbitrator. Proceedings of this date makes it abundantly clear that he did not raise any specific objection about the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. He rather submitted to his jurisdiction and by taking part in the proceedings and advancing his arguments on the merits of the case. Respondent No. 1 had initiated the arbitration proceedings on the basis of Agreement dated 26-2-1998 as per which parties had subjected themselves to DSE Bye-laws and Rules. There is no dispute, that bye-laws of DSE envisage the mechanism for settlement of disputes to cover disputes arising not only between members and members but also between members and non-members. The petitioner not having challenged the appointment of Arbitrator under section 13 is now estopped from raising such a contention in his application under Section 34 of the act. One may also press into service Section 4 of this act which reads as under: 4. The petitioner not having challenged the appointment of Arbitrator under section 13 is now estopped from raising such a contention in his application under Section 34 of the act. One may also press into service Section 4 of this act which reads as under: 4. Waiver of right to object.- A party who knows that- (a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may derogate, or (b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement, has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay or, if a time limit is provided for stating that objection, within that period of time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to so object" ( 10 ) THUS I am of the opinion that the Arbitrator had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute between petitioner and respondent No. 1 (see 2001 (61) drj 150 and 2001 (1) RAJ 170 Bombay ). ( 11 ) THE result of the aforesaid discussion is that this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.