Judgment :- The Order of the Court is as follows :- The present writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, rejecting the revision filed under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act on the ground of limitation. Few facts would be necessary. 2.The petitioner, on 10-2-1987, was intercepted by the Intelligence Officials while he was travelling to Singapore from Madras on suspicion that he was concealing some Indian/Foreign currency and/or some semi-precious stones on his person or in his baggage which he was carrying. On further examination, some semi-precious stones were found to have been concealed in his rectum, which were ultimately recovered. On the basis of this, a prosecution was launched against him and during that an order came to be passed for confiscation of those semi-precious stones, weighing 240 gms. A penalty was also imposed. This obviously was done under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act. This order, which was passed on 26-10-1987, was challenged by the petitioner by way of an appeal under Sec. 128 of the Customs Act. That appeal came to be decided on 22-6-1988 by the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Customs House, Madras. The only relief that was granted to the petitioner in that appeal was that the penalty was reduced from Rs. 4, 500/- to Rs. 1, 500/-. However, the action of confiscation was not interfered with. This order was subsequently challenged by the petitioner before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (in short "CEGAT") by way of an appeal. However, by its order dated 5-1-1990, the Tribunal took the correct view that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the subject on account of the applicability of proviso to Sec. 129A of the Customs Act providing that if confiscation order related to any goods imported or exported as baggage, the Tribunal could have no appellate jurisdiction in respect of an order passed by the Collector (Appeals). The last sentence in the order of the Tribunal is very important. It reads under : "Since the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, the papers are directed to be returned to the party for presentation before the proper forum. (Pronounced in the open court.)." It is seen from the order that the party was represented by a Senior Advocate along with one other advocate. It reads under : "Since the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, the papers are directed to be returned to the party for presentation before the proper forum. (Pronounced in the open court.)." It is seen from the order that the party was represented by a Senior Advocate along with one other advocate. It seems that the petitioner thereafter chose to file a revision on 4-10-1990 before the Central Government under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act, which was the only remedy available to him and the Joint Secretary to the Government proceeded to reject this revision on the ground of limitation. The Joint Secretary has taken the view that the revision came to be filed with a delay of 820 days. The Joint Secretary further took the view that under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act, the revision could have been presented only within three months of the passing of the order and its presentation could be permitted after that period within a further period of three months thereof. Thus, the total limitation was six months. It is this order, which is challenged in the present writ petition. 3.Mr. Abdul Nazser, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the first respondent erred in rejecting the revision on the ground of limitation and, in fact, the application for condonation of delay was liable to be allowed and the revision was liable to be entertained. His argument is based on Sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. According to him, it was under a misconception of law that the matter went before the CEGAT in second appeal when it should have gone to the Joint Secretary to the Central Government under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act. He points out that the matter was disposed of by CEGAT only on 5-1-1990 though the appeal was filed before the CEGAT on 12-10-1988. He further points out that when the Tribunal took the view on 5-1-1990 that the papers were liable to be returned to the party for presentation before the proper forum, the petitioner did not have any idea about this order and he received the copy of this order of the CEGAT dated 5-1-1990 only on 16-4-1990. The learned Counsel then says that he waited, for the other papers to come. He could not get the papers till the month of September, 1990 as they were misplaced. The learned Counsel then says that he waited, for the other papers to come. He could not get the papers till the month of September, 1990 as they were misplaced. With the result, after the papers were received in the last week of September, 1990, the revision was posted on 27-9-1990, which was received by the first respondent only on 4-10-1990. According to the learned Counsel, therefore, the period upto 4-10-1990 was bound to be ignored as time spent in prosecuting the other remedy in abona fidemanner. 4.Mr. K. Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, contends that the advantage of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be had by the petitioner because this is a case under the "special law" and there is a specific provision excluding the operation of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act vide Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Learned Counsel points out that even if the advantage of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act is given, even then, there is no proper explanation of the time spent by the petitioner. 5.On this backdrop, it will be proper to see as to whether firstly Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act could be made applicable to the present case. Before we go to that, it will be better to see the Sub-section (2) to Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act, which reads as follows : "An application under sub-section (1) shall be made within three months from the date of the communication to the applicant of the order against which the application is being made : Provided that the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the application within the aforesaid period of three months, allow it to be presented within a further period of three months." 6.A plain reading of this provision would suggest that the limitation period of presentation of a revision under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act is only three months and the Central Government could condone the delay in filing the revision only up to a further period of three months. The language itself suggests that there is a specific exclusion of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. Sec. 14(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under : "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fidein court without jurisdiction.- (1) ... The language itself suggests that there is a specific exclusion of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. Sec. 14(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under : "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fidein court without jurisdiction.- (1) ... Not relevant .(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, to unable to entertain it. (3)................ Not relevant .....". It will be better to see to Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which reads as under : "(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply as if such periods where the periods prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." Now, it is clear that in limiting the power to condone the delay only to three months, the unrestricted operation of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act is specifically excluded. There can be no dispute that the Customs Act is a special enactment and, therefore, the provisions of Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act would clearly apply. This position was also not disputed before me by the learned Counsel appearing on either side. There can be no dispute that the Customs Act is a special enactment and, therefore, the provisions of Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act would clearly apply. This position was also not disputed before me by the learned Counsel appearing on either side. Therefore, it is clear that there is a specific exclusion of full operation of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act because of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act whereunder, the power to condone the delay is restricted only to specified period of three months and not more while under Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act such limitation would not be there and the court would be in a position to condone the delay even of a longer period than three months. 7.In support of the proposition that Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act will not be fully available to the petitioner as it stood excluded in terms of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act the learned Counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of the Supreme Court inThe Sales Tax Commissioner, Uttar Pradeshv.Parson Tools & Plants, Kanpur and more particularly to the following observations, which are to be found in paragraphs 17 and 18. ".... if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum only up to a specified time-limit and no further, then the Tribunal concerned has no juridiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due dilligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act." 8.The learned Counsel further pointed out that this was a case where the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Sec. 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the provisions of limitation in filing the revisions. There also, there was a specific ban for condoning the delay beyond a particular period. There also, there was a specific ban for condoning the delay beyond a particular period. The Supreme Court also observed as follows : "The three stark features or the scheme and language of the above provision, unmistakably show that the legislature has deliberately excluded the application of the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, except to the extent and in the truncated form embodied in sub-section (3-B) of Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act." 9.Learned Counsel further points out that in paragraph 11, the Supreme Court made it clear as under : "'Be that as it may, from the scheme and a language of S.10, the intention of the Legislature to exclude the unrestricted application of the principles of Sections 5 and 10 (Sec. 14) of the Limitation Act manifestly clear. These provisions of the Limitation Act which the legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the Sales Tax Act, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded 'according to the intent of them that made it'. 'The will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land and demands perfect obedience'. 'Judicial power is never exercised' said Marshall C.J. of the United States, 'for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judges: always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or in other words, to the will of the law.' 10.I have gone through the whole judgment only to realise that the Supreme Court in this case has very strongly eschewed the tendency to condone the delay where it is specifically impermissible to do so. The principles obtained from this case are clear and apply to the present situation on all fours. In the present situation also, this was a revisional power which is being exercised by the Central Government and the language of proviso to sub-section (2) to Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act is clear enough to suggest that the unrestricted scope of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act is specifically excluded. 11.To get over this judgment, Mr. In the present situation also, this was a revisional power which is being exercised by the Central Government and the language of proviso to sub-section (2) to Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act is clear enough to suggest that the unrestricted scope of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act is specifically excluded. 11.To get over this judgment, Mr. Abdul Nazeer, learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the Division Bench judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court inVijay Brothersand Othersv.Union of Indiaand Others. There, distinguishing the judgment in the above quotedParson Tools and Plantscase, the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the Indian Limitation Act could not be said to have been excluded in the similar provision under Sec. 128 of the Customs Act and, therefore, Sec. 14(2) of the Limitation Act was available where an appeal under Sec. 128 of the Customs Act was filed beyond the period of limitation. In paragraph 9, the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court pointed out that inParson Tools and Plantscase, the Supreme Court was of the view that Sec. 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluded the full applicability of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act on account of three features in the scheme of the Act and those three features were :(i)that no limitation has been prescribed for thesuo motuexercise of its jurisdiction by the Revising Authority; (ii)that the period of one year prescribed as limitation for filing an application for revision by the aggrieved party is unusually long; and (iii)that the revising authority has no discretion to extend this period beyond a further period of six months, even on sufficient cause shown. V. Ramaswami, C.J. (as His Lordship then was) proceeded to hold that the Supreme Court had held that on account of these three features, the provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act were excluded. However, in case of Sec. 128 of the Customs Act, this was not the case. The Division Bench pointed out that firstly Sec. 128 of the Customs Act was the appellate power while the Supreme Court was dealing with the revisional power and there was nothing extraordinary about the appellate power. However, in case of Sec. 128 of the Customs Act, this was not the case. The Division Bench pointed out that firstly Sec. 128 of the Customs Act was the appellate power while the Supreme Court was dealing with the revisional power and there was nothing extraordinary about the appellate power. The Division Bench held that the only point, therefore, for consideration was that whether there was anything in Sec. 128 of the Customs Act which expressly excluded the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to it. The Division Bench observed that the limitation of three months provided under the main part of Sec. 128 of the Customs Act was the normal provision for an appeal. Neither it was extraordinary nor could it be called as unusually a long period of limitation so as to make it unconscionable to think that time taken by the party in seeking the same relief in good faith in a different forum has to be excluded. Nor was there any provision in the Customs Act which enables a party to invoke thesuo motuappellate powers. The Division Bench observed :" We should also keep it in mind that Sec. 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act relates to the filing of a revision petition after a regular appeal is over and not to a case of a regular appeal as provided under Sec. 128 of the Customs Act which, in our opinion, is more material. None of the three features which were pointed out by the learned Judges in the Supreme Court judgment are available in this case under Sec. 128 of the Customs Act in order to come to the conclusion that that provision deliberately excluded the applicability of Sec. 14 of Limitation Act. We are, therefore, unable to agree that the judgment in is any way applicable to the interpretation of Sec. 128 of the Customs Actvis-a-visSection 29(2) of the limitation Act." Mr. Abdul Nazeer, learned Counsel very heavily relies on these observations and says that when it has been held already by the Divison Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court that Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable even in case of the appeals under Sec. 128 of the Customs Act, there is no reason why the same should not be applicable in case of a revision under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act. 12.I am unable to agree with the contention. If we see the reasons given by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, it will be seen that that judgment turned on the fact that they were dealing with an "appeal" under Sec. 128 of the Customs Act, which was of a regular nature. I am not dealing herewith an appeal. I am dealing herewith the revisional power, which remedy is available only after exhausting the two authorities below. There is an appeal already filed in the present matter which appeal came to be dismissed and it is only thereafter that there is a power to file a revision under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act. It will also be seen that under sub-section (4) of Sec. 129DD, there is asuo motupower in the Central Government to annul or modify any order referred to sub-section (1) of Sec. 129DD and the limitation there is of one year. There is a basic feature, which is a distinguishing feature, and that is the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was concerned with an appeal while I am concerned here with the revisional powers under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act. I am, therefore, unable to agree, that the observations made in paragraph 12 ofVijay Brotherscase, cited supra, as also the ultimate conclusion that the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act would be available to Sec. 128 of the Customs Act apply to our case. We are not concerned herewith Sec. 128 of the Customs Act and, therefore, I am of the clear opinion that Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act will not be fully available in the case of revisions under Sec. 129DD of the Customs Act. 13.Learned Counsel for the petitioner then tried to invite my attention to another decision of the Supreme Court inMadura Coats Ltd. v.Collector of Central Excise, Madurai. I am afraid that this decision is not at all apposite to the present controversy. 14.The next case relied upon by the petitioner was the one reported in where the Division Bench of Bombay High Court had held that though the explanation given by the petitioner for delay was not proper yet the High Court had given the opportunity to judge their claim on merits in the revision application by inflicting some costs. 14.The next case relied upon by the petitioner was the one reported in where the Division Bench of Bombay High Court had held that though the explanation given by the petitioner for delay was not proper yet the High Court had given the opportunity to judge their claim on merits in the revision application by inflicting some costs. The learned Counsel wanted me to charter the same course as was done by the Bombay High Court in that case. I am afraid, I cannot agree to charter the some course particularly in the wake of the decision of the Supreme Court inParson Tools and Plantscase, cited supra. That apart, the Supreme Court has cautioned against taking such course of condoning the delay even where the Act specifically prohibits such condonation. I cannot, therefore, persuade myself to take the same course which was taken by the Bombay High Court. 15.Be that as it may, even if it is considered that Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act was available to the petitioner, even then the petitioner must fail because the order of the CEGAT was pronounced in the open court on 5-1-1990. In fact, from 5-1-1990 the petitioner, who was represented by two Advocates, should have started moving to file a revision if he was so interested. The petitioner waited for the order to be posted to him on 16-4-1990. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the period between 5-1-1990 and 16-4-1990 because the order of the Tribunal was declared in the open court and the petitioner was represented by two advocates. Further, the petitioner has not offered any explanation as to why he waited till 27-7-1990 to post the revision to the Central Government. The only explanation which was tried to be given during the course of the arguments is that the petitioner kept on searching the records and the records were not to be traced in the office of the Tribunal. I am afraid, this explanation is not be found in the affidavit filed by the petitioner either before me or before the Central Government for condonation of delay. This is clearly an afterthought. Therefore, the petitioner also cannot get the advantage of the period between 16-4-1990 and 4-10-1990 when the revision reached the Central Government. I am afraid, this explanation is not be found in the affidavit filed by the petitioner either before me or before the Central Government for condonation of delay. This is clearly an afterthought. Therefore, the petitioner also cannot get the advantage of the period between 16-4-1990 and 4-10-1990 when the revision reached the Central Government. Therefore, the whole period between 5-1-1990 and 4-10-1990 of nine months is a colossal waste of time and it cannot be said that the petitioner during this time was prosecuting in other proceeding with "due diligence" which is asine qua nonfor the application of sub-section (2) of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. Even the Central Government has taken the same view. I do not think that the view taken by the Central Government in rejecting the revision on the ground of delay and in refusing to condone the delay in filing the same is in any way unreasonable. 16.The writ petition has no merits. It is therefore dismissed but without any orders as to the costs. Connected W.M.P. No. 25178 of 1993 is closed.