JUDGMENT SUBHRO KAMAL MUKHERJEE, J. 1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree dated September 15, 1998 passed by a Learned Judge of this Court inter alia, decreeing the suit in part. 2. By a letter dated August 19, 1986, the Jute Corporation of India Limited (in short the Corporation) was inducted by Budge Budge Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company) as a tenant in respect of certain godowns, particulars of which have been mentioned in the plaint. The subject godowns are admittedly situated within the Mill premises of the Company for storage of raw jute stocks. Initially, the Corporation was inducted as a monthly tenant for a period of two years. One of the terms in the aforesaid was that the Company would make arrangement at their cost to ensure free movement of loaded lorries carrying on jute stock through the main gate of the Mill premises and also make arrangement for necessary repairs to the approach road connecting the Mill premises with the road outside besides the roads within the premises. A clause was also incorporated in the letter that the Company shall indemnify the Corporation in full against the loss, if any, which the Company might be called upon to incur if the labourers of the Corporation were not allowed to work inside the Mill premises. By a letter dated November 30, 1998, the Corporation intimated the Company that they had intended to release the godowns sheds on rent on and from February 28, 1989. On March 21, 1989 the Corporation addressed a letter to the Company indicating that it had learnt from Press Report that a lock-out was declared in the Mill premises and for that it was not possible for the Corporation to remove their materials stocked in their godowns and requested the Company to confirm in writing, if it was possible to carry out operations during the lock-out period. In reply to the said letter, the Company informed the Corporation by a letter dated March 28, 1989 that there was no lock-out but the production process of the Mill was suspended with effect from March 18, 1989. However, it was suggested by the Company that the Corporation might operate from the said godowns with help of police. In reply to the said letter, the Company informed the Corporation by a letter dated March 28, 1989 that there was no lock-out but the production process of the Mill was suspended with effect from March 18, 1989. However, it was suggested by the Company that the Corporation might operate from the said godowns with help of police. By a letter dated May 10, 1989 the Marketing Manager of the Corporation informed the District Magistrate, South 24 Paraganas that the Corporation's deposit and withdrawal operations at the Mill premises were suspended due to unrest created by the labourers of the Company and, therefore, sought for intervention of the District Magistrate and help to enable the Corporation to remove its stocks lying locked in the Mill premises without any resistance from the agitating labour force on or before May 31, 1989. In a letter dated July 4, 1989, the Chairman of the Company, however, admitted that there was a lock out in the Mill premises but at the same time requested the Corporation to ensure that the rents payable by them should be paid to the Company. Since the Corporation was not getting access to the godowns, on April 11, 1990, it requested the Officer-in-charge, Budge Budge Police Station to ensure that the law and order was maintained at the time of removing the materials from the Mill premises and to see that the lorries of the Corporation were not prevented from carrying out the job. Ultimately, the Corporation by a letter dated April 19, 1990 recorded that because of the declaration of lock out the operations of the Corporation in the Mill premises came to a hault and the Corporation could not lift its stocks and could not release the godown, earlier. The Corporation, therefore, denied its liability to pay rent with effect from March, 1989. On April 20, 1990, the representatives of the Corporation went to the Mill premises when the labourers of the Company prevented them from removing the raw jutes and that was recorded by a letter addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Budge Budge Police Station. Ultimately, a suit was instituted by the Corporation in this Court and a Receiver was appointed in the said suit and under the supervision of the Receiver, stored jutes were removed by the Corporation from time to time. Ultimately, a suit was instituted by the Corporation in this Court and a Receiver was appointed in the said suit and under the supervision of the Receiver, stored jutes were removed by the Corporation from time to time. Thereafter on November 30, 1992, the physical possession of the godowns was handed over the Company and the representatives of the Company accepted the possession of the godowns in good order and condition. 3. On January 15, 1993, the instant suit, out of which the present appeal arises, was instituted by the Company against the Corporation praying for a decree for Rs. 40,58,503.38/- towards arrears of rent for the months from December, 1989 to November, 1992 at the rate of Rs. 85,164.33/- per month with interest on the said accrued sums at the rate of 21% calculated upto January 15, 1993. In paragraph 10 of the plaint of the suit, it was admitted by the Company that since the rent for the months from March to November, 1989 became barred the Company had no claim in respect of such period. 4. The Corporation contested the suit by filing a written statement. In the written statement, it was inter alia, contended that the Corporation decided to release the tenanted godowns but when their representatives went to take out the raw jutes from the Mill premises, they found that the gate of the Mill was locked and a large number of employees of the Company were squatting in front of the gate and prevented the representatives of the Corporation from entering into the Mill premises and all attempts to enter into the Mill premises were frustrated and, therefore, the Corporation was not obliged to pay rent on and from March, 1989 as the Corporation already had surrendered their tenancy after February, 1989 but was prevented from vacating the godowns due to suspension of production process followed by lock out of the Mill of the Company. 5. The learned Trial Judge by the impugned judgment and decree, decreed the suit in part and granted the Company a decree towards arrears of rent from March, 1989 to April 20, 1990 at the admitted rate of Rs. 85,164.33/-. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the Company has filed a regular appeal whereas the Corporation has preferred a cross-objection. 85,164.33/-. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the Company has filed a regular appeal whereas the Corporation has preferred a cross-objection. In the cross-objection the Corporation seriously contended that they were not liable to pay rent whatsoever for the aforesaid period between December, 1989 to November, 1992 as claimed by the Company. 7. In so far as the decree for the arrears of rent for the period from March, 1989 to November, 1989 is concerned, the Learned Counsel for the Company conceded before us that since the Company had not pressed their claim in respect of rent for the aforesaid period on the ground of limitation, the question of passing such a decree in favour of the Company could not arise at all. Such being the stand taken by the Company could not arise at all. Such being the stand taken by the Company before us and as the Company had not claimed rent for the period from March, 1989 to November, 1989, on the ground of limitation, we must hold that the Trial Court was not justified in decreeing the suit for rent for the aforesaid period. 8. In the present appeal, therefore, we are required to consider whether the company was liable to pay rent for the months from December, 1989 to November, 1992 or the Corporation was entitled to suspension of rent in respect of the aforesaid period in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated heres in earlier. 9. Appearing on behalf of the Company, Mr. Pratap Chatterjee contended before us that since the actual physical possession of the tenanted premises was handed over only on November 30, 1993 to the Company, the Corporation was liable to pay rent at the admitted rate for the aforesaid period for their occupation in respect of the subject godowns. He submitted that the Learned Trial Judge ought to have decreed the suit in full with interest when there was no finding by the Learned Trial Judge that the Company had taken any unlawful means preventing the Corporation from using the subject godowns. Accordingly, Mr. Chatterjee contended that the Corporation was not at all entitled to claim suspension of rent as the Company had not taken any unlawful means preventing the Corporation from using the subject godowns. It was, also, urged by Mr. Accordingly, Mr. Chatterjee contended that the Corporation was not at all entitled to claim suspension of rent as the Company had not taken any unlawful means preventing the Corporation from using the subject godowns. It was, also, urged by Mr. Chatterjee that the Corporation had not willfully and deliberately paid the rent for the period aforesaid for which the Company can neither be responsible nor made to suffer. In support of this contention, Mr. Chatterjee relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Nirmalendu Basu & other vs. Shrimati Nilima Chatterjee, AIR 1975 Cal 418 , and also a decision in the case of Ramendra Nath Ganguly vs. Ashutosh Saha, ILR 1976(2) Cal 474. 10. This submission of Mr. Chatterjee was contested by Mr. Surajit Mitra, appearing on behalf of the Corporation. He submitted that the suit itself was liable to be dismissed as the Corporation was not at all liable to pay rent, for the said godowns, for the period mentioned in the judgment of the Trial Court. According to Mr. Mitra, it is now settled that actual physical dispossession was not sine qua non for application of doctrine of suspension of rent but a substantial interference by landlord with the enjoyment of the property by the tenant would amount to dispossession and would entitle the lessee to claim suspension of rent inasmuch as the covenant of rent also postulates enjoyment of the property with all amenities and without interruption. Therefore, Mr. Mitra argued that since Corporation was not at all allowed to remove their raw jutes for the purpose of handing over possession to the company and in view of the fact, representatives of the Corporation were not even allowed to enter into the said godowns for the purpose of removing their raw jutes and other stocks and materials from the said godowns and in view of one of the clauses which postulates the enjoyment of subject godowns by the Corporation with all amenities and without interruption, the Corporation was entitled to claim suspension of rent in its entirety. In support of this contention, Mr. Mitra relied on a decision of the Division Bench of the this Court in the case of P.K. Roy vs. Bimala Mukherjee, 80 CWN 939. 11. We have carefully considered the rival submissions of the Learned Counsels for the parties. In support of this contention, Mr. Mitra relied on a decision of the Division Bench of the this Court in the case of P.K. Roy vs. Bimala Mukherjee, 80 CWN 939. 11. We have carefully considered the rival submissions of the Learned Counsels for the parties. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, and in view of the principles laid down by various Courts, the appeal should be dismissed and the cross-objection filed by the Corporation must be allowed as we find that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Corporation was entitled to claim suspension of rent. The law is now well settled by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court that in India the principle of doctrine of suspension of rent is equally applicable, but such application would depend on the circumstances of each case. It is equally settled that the principles governing suspension of rent are based on justice, equity and good conscience and it would depend on facts of each case whether the tenant is entitled to suspension of the rent and, secondly it was the duty of the lessor to see that the lessee may hold the property during the time limited by lease without interruption and, thirdly, where the act of the landlord is not a mere trespass but something of a grave character interfering substantially with the enjoyment by the tenant of the property tenanted to him, there must be suspension of rent during such interference though there may not be an actual eviction. 12. From the discussions made hereinabove and in view of the principles laid down by the various decisions as noted herein earlier, we are, therefore, of the view that it cannot be held that only in case of dispossession of a tenant from a portion of his tenancy by the landlord by physical force, such tenant only can take advantage of suspension of rent. Therefore, the principle that emerges in view of the discussions made hereinabove is that in a case where the landlord dispossesses his tenant from any portion of the tenanted property by exercising physical force, coercion, threat or any other trick or means or any fraudulent or mala fide process against the wish or will or natural inclination of the latter or where the landlord connives with or assist others directly or indirectly to dispossess the tenant or does something which is responsible for the dispossession of the tenant from any portion of the tenancy or by his acts or omission leads the tenant to part with possession or any portion of the, property in lease against his will or consent or deprives him of the benefits or use of such property, the tenant so dispossessed or deprived shall be entitled to suspension of the entire rent so long as he does not get back the portion from which he is dispossessed. 13. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, let us now consider the materials on record to find out whether the Corporation was entitled to suspension of rent. At this stage, we may also keep it on record that the decision in the case of Nirmalendu Basu & other vs. Shrimati Nilima Chatterjee, AIR 1975 Cal 418 , was relied on by both the Learned Advocates for the parties in support of their respective cases. 14. In the letter dated August 19, 1996 it was confirmed that one of the terms envisaged that the Company would make all arrangement at their cost to ensure free movement of loaded lorries carrying jute stocks through main gate of the Mill premises and make arrangement for necessary repairs to the approach road connecting the Mill premises with the road outside beside the roads with the premises. It may be kept in our mind that it was expressly provided in the contract that the tenant shall be free to employ their own labourers for loading and un-loading of their raw jute stocks to be stored in the Mill premises and the landlord shall indemnify the tenant in full against loss, if any, which the tenant may be called upon to incur if the tenant's labourers are not allowed to work at the landlord's Mill premises. It is admitted by the plaintiffs witness that the Company was liable to indemnify the Corporation against the loss when laborures were not allowed to work. It is an admitted position that the letter of surrender of the tenancy of the Corporation was admittedly served on the Company. There is no dispute in the present case that since there was obstruction in the free movement of the raw jutes stored in the godowns of the Company and other machineries, physically the Corporation could not deliver possession to the Company before removing their goods and machineries from the subject godowns, that is, to say they were obstructed to do so because of suspension of production process at the Mill premises of the Company followed by a lock-out. It is in evidence that representatives of the Corporation attempted to approach their godowns, but were prevented by the labourers of Company. When letter of surrender was already given that the Corporation shall deliver possession of subject godowns from March, 1989, it must be presumed they had no intention to remain as tenant and they intended to vacate the suit premises but in view of the above admitted fact they were not permitted by the employees of the Company to remove their stocks of raw jute and other machineries, they could not deliver physical possession. Therefore, we have no hesitation in our mind to hold that this was an act of interference with the enjoyment of possession of the godowns by deliberate and tortuous act of the labourers of the Company which constitutes a fit case for application of the doctrine of suspension of rent. We are conscious of the fact that only after the institution of a suit and after obtaining an order of appointment of Receiver, the goods could be removed by the Corporation from the godowns under the supervision of the Receiver. We are conscious of the fact that only after the institution of a suit and after obtaining an order of appointment of Receiver, the goods could be removed by the Corporation from the godowns under the supervision of the Receiver. Although the letter of surrender was issued and served on the Company that the Corporation would vacate the subject godowns on February 28, 1989 and in view of the admitted fact that they could not remove their stocks and other materials lying in the godown and as the Corporation had to approach different authorities and the Court for the purpose of getting an entry to the godown to remove their stocks and machineries and deliver possession to the Company, in our view, the Corporation was not liable to pay rent from March, 1989. That apart, as noted herein earlier. One of the terms of the lease in question clearly postulates that the Company was to indemnify the Corporation in the event, the Corporation or its employees were not allowed to free access to their subject godowns for the purpose of free movement of their raw jute stocks and other machineries. Practically, it is an admitted position that the Corporation was not allowed to do so in view of the suspension of work by the Company which was followed by a lock out. Therefore, we must hold that due to lock out in the premises of the Mill and due to obstruction from the employees of the Company, there was substantial interference with the free movement of raw jute stocks and other materials of the Corporation. Such being the position, we must hold that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Corporation was entitled to suspension of rent for the period claimed by the Company. 15. Before we part with this question, we may, also, take into consideration a Division Bench decision of this Court, which was relied on by Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the Company, the case of Ramendra Nath Ganguly vs. Ashutosh Saha, ILR 1976(2) Cal 474. In that decision, the facts were like this; the landlord filed a suit for ejectment against the tenants on the ground of default in payment of rent. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the Company, the case of Ramendra Nath Ganguly vs. Ashutosh Saha, ILR 1976(2) Cal 474. In that decision, the facts were like this; the landlord filed a suit for ejectment against the tenants on the ground of default in payment of rent. The tenants filed an application under section 17(2) and another application under section 17 (2A) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act contending, inter alia, that the period during which the room was padlocked, the landlord was not entitled to get any rent for it. In the aforesaid back ground of facts, the Division Bench of this Court held there was no failure on the part of the landlord to give possession to the tenant of a part of the demised premises. The landlord had started distress proceedings in the Court of Small Causes and in the said proceedings in pursuance of the order for attachment passed by the Court the said room was locked by the Court Bailiff. In the aforesaid facts, the Division Bench held that the doctrine of suspension of rent cannot be regarded as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience in India in all circumstances. We do not think that this decision of the Division Bench of this Court helps the landlord (Company) to say that it was entitled to rent from the Corporation. Admittedly, as noted herein earlier, in this case, the Corporation was not at all allowed to free access to their godowns and was not allowed to lift their goods and stocks from their godowns and, therefore, was not allowed to vacate the premises before lifting such goods. In these circumstances, as we have already held, the tenant-Corporation was not liable to pay rent to the Company and, accordingly, was entitled to suspension of rent. 16. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge and dismiss this appeal and allow the connected cross-objection. 17. Before we part, we must take note of an order passed by a Division Bench of this Court on April 12, 1999 in the present appeal. The Division Bench of this Court stayed the execution of the decree subject to the respondent putting in with the Registrar, Original Side, a sum of Rs. 4,25,820/-. 17. Before we part, we must take note of an order passed by a Division Bench of this Court on April 12, 1999 in the present appeal. The Division Bench of this Court stayed the execution of the decree subject to the respondent putting in with the Registrar, Original Side, a sum of Rs. 4,25,820/-. It was, further, directed by the Division Bench that in the event the said amount was deposited, the Registrar, Original Side, should invest the same in a short term fixed deposit with any Nationalised Bank and should hold the fixed deposit receipt subject to further order of this Court. In view of the dismissal of the suit, we direct the Registrar, Original Side, of this Court to refund the said sum of Rs. 4,25,820/- with accrued interest thereon to the respondent forthwith. The aforesaid sum may be released by issuing an account payee cheque drawn in favour of the respondent and be handed over to the learned Advocate on Record for the respondent. Parties are directed to bear the respective costs throughout. 18. Let certified copy of the operative portion of the judgment be supplied to both the parties upon usual undertaking. I agree. Appeal dismissed. Cross-objection allowed.