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2001 DIGILAW 812 (PNJ)

Ram Gopal v. State of Punjab

2001-08-06

G.S.SINGHVI, M.M.KUMAR

body2001
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J. - The petitioners, who were allotted land in 1977 out of the surplus area of respondent No. 4 Raja Ram Partap Singh, have invoked jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing order dated 16.6.1993 vide which Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala directed Collector, Agrarian, Barnala to re-determine permissible and surplus area of respondent No. 4 under the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter described as the Punjab Act and indirectly set aside the order passed by Special Collector, Punjab under Section 30-D(2) of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1955 (hereinafter described as the Pepsu Act). They have also prayed for quashing consequential order dated 10.6.1994 passed by the Collector, Agrarian, Barnala. 2. The facts necessary for deciding the writ petition are that by an order dated 4.8.1969 passed under the Pepsu Act, Special Collector, Punjab declared 54.70 standard acres of land belonging to respondent No. 4 - Raja Ram Partap Singh as surplus area. Appeal filed by him was dismissed by Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala on 4.11.1969 and revision was dismissed by Financial Commissioner, Punjab vide order dated 22.3.1971. He challenged orders dated 4.8.1969, 4.11.1969 and 22.3.1971 by filing civil suit which was dismissed by Sub Judge Ist Class, Barnala vide judgment and decree dated 7.3.1975. The same was upheld by Additional District Judge, Barnala while dismissing appeal of respondent No. 4. Thereafter, the State Government got possession of surplus land which was allotted to the petitioners and others in pursuance of order dated 28.6.1977 passed by Collector, Agrarian, Barnala. In the meantime, respondent No. 4 filed return under Rule 5 of the Punjab Land Reforms Rules, 1973 for selecting permissible area under the Punjab Act by claiming that he had two adult sons and they were entitled to separate units. That case was finalised by Collector, Agrarian, Barnala vide order Annexure P8 dated 28.9.1978. The relevant extract of that order is reproduced below :- 3. "After hearing the counsel for the parties and going through the record, it is found that the land which has been sold by the land owner before the commencement of the Act, the vendees are in possession of the same according to record. The vendees do not appear to be related to the land owner or his family. "After hearing the counsel for the parties and going through the record, it is found that the land which has been sold by the land owner before the commencement of the Act, the vendees are in possession of the same according to record. The vendees do not appear to be related to the land owner or his family. The sale deeds which are mentioned in the list Ex PB have been executed between 24.1.1971 and 24.1973. These sale deeds are declared as bonafide and the land comprised in the list PC regarding sales after 2.4.1973, should be included in the holdings of the land owner. Besides this the area in possession of the old tenants measuring 0-75-14 is not under cultivation of the land owner. It is not appropriate to include this land within the holding of the land owner. The report made by Patwari Pritam Singh has been placed on record. According to the report of the revenue staff, this land and his family has below mentioned area :- Sr. No. Name of owner Village Total area Total Area A quality. K. M 1. Raja Ram Partap Singh Patti Deep Singh Bhadaur 1289 - 9 27-06-39 2. Kharak Singh Beeli Teh, Barnala Ghair maroosi 24 - 9 2. Smt. Surinder Kaur W/o Raja Ram Partap Singh 1. Bire Kauli Teh. Patiala Bigh Bis 101 -14 4-38-39 The land acquired after 24.1.71. 1481 - 12 31-45-78 1. Total land with the land owner and his family as on 24.1.71 1437 - 4 31-45-78 2. Area declared as surplus under the PEPSU Tenancy and Land Agricultural Act. 741 - 17 14-43-45 17-02-33 3. Area sold between 24.1.71 and 2.4.73 and declared as bonafide. 10-42-44 4. Area with old tenants 0-75-76 5. The remaining area which is with the land owner. 5-74-13 From the above facts it is clear that the owner of the land and his family has 5-74-13 area under self cultivation and the family have 9-89 Hects of A class area. The land is less than permissible limit. The return is therefore filed and consigned to record. Order announced." 4. 5-74-13 From the above facts it is clear that the owner of the land and his family has 5-74-13 area under self cultivation and the family have 9-89 Hects of A class area. The land is less than permissible limit. The return is therefore filed and consigned to record. Order announced." 4. After more than 14 years of the finalisation of his surplus area case under the Pepsu Act and more than 5 years of the order passed by the Collector, Agrarian, Barnala under the Punjab Act, respondent No. 4 filed application dated 25.10.1983 before Collector, Agrarian, Barnala for re-determination of his surplus area on the ground that on the appointed date i.e. 24.1.1971, he had two adult sons and in view of the decision of the High Court in Ranjit Ram v. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab and others, 1981 PLJ 259, he was entitled to reserve two units for them in addition to one unit for himself. By order dated 22.2.1985, Collector, Agrarian, Barnala referred the case to Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala, but the latter returned the same with the observation that in view of the stay order passed by the Supreme Court, Financial Commissioner, Punjab had issued directions for keeping such cases pending till the decision of the Supreme Court. At the same time, he observed that the question of review of order dated 4.8.1969 would be taken up after the judgment of the Supreme Court. However, on an application filed by respondent No. 4 on 12.1.1993, Shri S.K. Sinha (respondent No. 2), who had, in the meantime, taken over as Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala, took up the case and passed order dated 16.6.1993. Paragraphs 5 to 8 of order dated 16.6.1993 are reproduced below :- "5. It has been argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the learned Financial Commissioner issued general instructions to keep such like cases pending and inspite of that the High Court and even the learned Financial Commissioner have been deciding the cases for redetermining permissible and surplus area of the landowners on the basis of Ranjit Rams case. He has relied upon 1982 PLJ 492 which was a case under Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and inspite of the instructions of Learned Financial Commissioner, the Honble High Court ordered re-determination of surplus area. He has relied upon 1982 PLJ 492 which was a case under Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and inspite of the instructions of Learned Financial Commissioner, the Honble High Court ordered re-determination of surplus area. Similarly even the Learned Financial Commissioner, vide judgment reported as 1984 PLJ 177 held that the area of the landlord be re-determined in accordance with Ranjit Rams case. This case was decided on 9.3.1984. Again the learned Financial Commissioner vide judgment cited as 1993 PLJ 192 ordered re- determination of surplus area of the landowner following Ranjit Rams case. In this case it was held that revisional powers could be exercised without limitation as to time and powers were unfettered. In this case the landower did not claim any area for his adult son, rather the vendees of the landowners claimed benefit on the ground of adult sons of landowner and it was held that affected party would be vendee or the State and in that case the landowner in State and vendee were allowed to prove that the landowner had adult sons on 24.1.1971. A reference was also made by the learned counsel to 1988 PLJ 317 and 1988 PLJ 54. 6. The counsel for the State has raised objection that the area cannot be redetermined now as the State has taken the possession of the land and the lands have been allotted. To which the counsel for the petitioner has replied that the allotment is not a bar and only criteria for re-determination is to see whether the possession of land was taken after the appointed day of Punjab Land Reforms Act, if the possession is taken after 24.1.1971, then Ranjit Rams case fully applies and allotment of land does not stand in the way of re-determination of permissible and surplus land of the landowner in accordance with Ranjit Rams case. 7. 7. As from the report on the file it is evident that the possession of land in this case was taken on 23.5.1977, therefore, Ranjit Rams case fully applies to it and as the learned Financial Commissioner, and Honble High Court have been deciding the cases in accordance with Ranjit Rams case even during the pendency of appeal against Ranjit Rams case pending in Supreme Court, therefore, in view of 1993 PLJ 299 and other authorities I am inclined to order for the re-determination of permissible and surplus area of the landowner after making enquiry if the landlowner had two adult sons on 24.1.1971. It is observed here pendency that as the proceedings were kept pending and the stay by virtue of my learned predecessors order dated 12.6.1985 whatever further proceedings have been taken in this case with regard to the allotment etc. they suo-moto go away when the order of surplus dated 4.8.1969 is set aside. 8. It has been again also pressed by the counsel for the petitioner that the land of the petitioner is a Military Jagir and is exempt from the provision of Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 Section 51-A. The counsel for the petitioner has attached a photostat copy of the order in re: Satjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, A.O.R. No. 357 of 1977-78 decided on 24.1.1985 by Shri R.P. Ojha, Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab. In this case it was ordered that the area of landowner can be redetermined and while re- determining the area it can also be seen whether the land of the landower was exempt under the above provision. Therefore, the Collector is also directed to determine both permissible and surplus area of the landowner in accordance with Ranjit Rams case as well as to see if the land of the landlowner Raja Ram Partap Singh was a Military Jagir and was exempt under Section 51-A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. Therefore, I accept the appeal and remand the case to Collector with the observations given above." 5. In compliance of the direction given by respondent No. 2, Collector, Agrarian, Barnala passed order dated 10.6.1994 proposing cancellation of the allotment made in pursuance of the order dated 4.8.1969. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of that order are also reproduced below:- "8. Therefore, I accept the appeal and remand the case to Collector with the observations given above." 5. In compliance of the direction given by respondent No. 2, Collector, Agrarian, Barnala passed order dated 10.6.1994 proposing cancellation of the allotment made in pursuance of the order dated 4.8.1969. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of that order are also reproduced below:- "8. After hearing the learned counsel for Raja Ram Partap Singh and Naib Tehsildar Agrarian, Sangrur, I hold that the learned Commissioner vide his order dated 16.6.1993 has set aside the order dated 4.8.1969 so the surplus area of Raja Ram Partap Singh has to be assessed afresh in the light of the aforesaid order under the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972. A perusal of the record shows that some of the allottees were sitting tenants before the land was declared surplus while the remaining allottees were not so. The following persons were sitting tenants as per records and they were allotted the same land which was under their occupation or their predecessor occupation before the land was actually declared surplus in the year 1969 :- 1. Partap Singh s/o Gurdit Singh 105//18/2/2 (2-0, 19/1-2 (8-0). 2. Amin Chand s/o Sant Ram 93//7/3 (4-0), 8/2 (1-18), 13/1 (1-11). 3. Bhola Ram s/o Sant Ram 93//1/2 (1-18). 4. Amar Kaur d/o Sunder Singh 56//10/2 (0-7), 57//6//1(2-16). 9. It will be in the interest of justice that a show cause notice is issued atleast to all the aforesaid allottees explaining them that the original allotment has been called and re-determination of the same is to take place de-novo and that they should submit their respective objections, if any, within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice as has been held by the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1970 PLJ 402. The remaining allottees who were not sitting tenants need not to be issued any such notice and warrant of possession of the remaining land be issued so that possession could be taken by State from them and further handed over to the landlord Raja Ram Partap Singh. The remaining allottees who were not sitting tenants need not to be issued any such notice and warrant of possession of the remaining land be issued so that possession could be taken by State from them and further handed over to the landlord Raja Ram Partap Singh. As the basic order declaring the land as surplus has been set aside by worthy Commissioner so the landlord shall be entitled to get the mutation of the land in question entered in his name but at the same time, it is made clear that he shall not be at liberty to alienate in any manner any portion out of the total land declared surplus till the proceedings of re- determination of his land to be declared surplus under new Act are completed by this Court. The landlord is hereby directed to file a fresh return and the evidence in support of his claim on or before 4.7.1994 so that proceedings of the surplus area could be completed." 6. The petitioners have challenged the impugned orders on the following grounds :- (1) Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala did not have the jurisdiction to review order dated 4.8.1969 passed by Special Collector, Punjab under Section 30-D(2) of the Pepsu Act or to entertain application dated 25.10.1983 filed by respondent No. 4 for re-determination of the surplus area under the Punjab Act because order dated 4.8.1969 had become final and surplus area case of respondent No. 4 under the Punjab Act had also been finalised by the Collector, Agrarian, Barnala vide order dated 28.9.1978. (2) Order dated 16.6.1993 is vitiated due to male fides of respondent No. 3, who wanted to favour respondent No. 4 due to extraneous reasons. (3) Order dated 16.6.1993 is violative of the principles of natural justice in-as-much as, notice and opportunity of hearing had not been given to them. (4) The consequential order dated 10.6.1994 passed by Collector, Agrarian, Barnala is also without jurisdiction and vitiated due to violation of rules of natural justice. 7. Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have filed separate written statement. In his written statement, respondent No. 2 has denied the allegation of mala fides levelled against him and has averred that he had passed order dated 16.6.1993 keeping in view the law laid down in Ranjit Rams case. 7. Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have filed separate written statement. In his written statement, respondent No. 2 has denied the allegation of mala fides levelled against him and has averred that he had passed order dated 16.6.1993 keeping in view the law laid down in Ranjit Rams case. In the written statement of respondent No. 3 filed through Shri G.R. Bansal, Collector, Agrarian, Barnala, it has been averred that order dated 10.6.1994 had been passed in compliance of the direction given by respondent No. 2 and consequential action has been taken because order dated 4.8.1969 had been set aside by Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala. 8. In his written statement, respondent No. 4 has raised the following preliminary objections :- (1) The petitioners are guilty of concealing material facts relating to civil suits filed in the Court of Sub Judge Ist Class, Barnala on the same cause of action and for the same relief. (2) The petitioners do not have the locus standi to challenge orders dated 16.6.1993 and 10.6.1994 because they were not entitled to be heard in the proceedings relating to re-determination of his surplus area. (3) They have failed to avail alternative remedies under the Punjab Act. 9. On merits, respondent No. 4 has averred that order dated 16.6.1993 passed by the Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala is consistent with the law laid down by the High Court in Ranjit Rams case and he is entitled to re- determination of surplus area in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab Act. Along with the written statement, respondent No. 4 has placed on record copies of the plaints filed by the petitioners in the Court Sub Judge Ist Class, Barnala, statements made by them for withdrawal of the suits and orders passed by the trial Court dismissing their suits. 10. In their replications, the petitioners have averred that some of them i.e. petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 were in possession of the land as tenants before the commencement of the Punjab Act and their names were recorded in khasra girdawaris. They have further averred that respondent No. 4 cannot seek re- determination of his surplus area under the Punjab Act because the proceedings under that Act had been finalised vide order annexure P8 dated 28.9.1978. They have further averred that respondent No. 4 cannot seek re- determination of his surplus area under the Punjab Act because the proceedings under that Act had been finalised vide order annexure P8 dated 28.9.1978. With regard to the allegation of suppression of facts, the petitioners have averred that they had decided to file writ petition in view of the objection raised on behalf of the State and respondent No. 4 to the maintainability of suits on the ground of lack of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and lack of jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits and there has been no deliberate concealment of facts. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Shri M.L. Sarin, Senior Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 argued that the writ petition should be dismissed because the petitioners are guilty of concealing a material fact i.e. filing of civil suits along with applications for injunction and pendency thereof on the date of filing of writ petition. He submitted that the petitioners had first invoked jurisdiction of the civil Court for grant of a declaration that orders dated 10.6.1993 and 10.6.1994 and notice dated 22.6.1994 were void and also applied for temporary injunction, but having failed to persuade the trial Court to accept their prayer, they filed writ petition and got interim orders by concealing the fact that civil suits filed by them were pending in the Court of Sub Judge Ist Class, Barnala. He further argued that the suits were dismissed by the trial Court without leave to pursue the remedy of writ petition and, therefore, the Court should apply the principle contained in Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable. Learned counsel also pointed out that after hearing of the case had concluded at one stage, C.M. No. 11700 of 1995 was filed on behalf of petitioner Nos. 17 to 22 for permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file fresh petition, but the same was dismissed on 22.11.1995 and in view of that order, the present petition should be dismissed. 17 to 22 for permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file fresh petition, but the same was dismissed on 22.11.1995 and in view of that order, the present petition should be dismissed. In support of this argument, Shri Sarin relied on the following decisions :- (1) Chiranji Lal v. Financial Commissioner, 1978 P.L.R. 582; (2) S.K. Mittal v. State of Haryana, 1997 Cur.L.J. 581; (3) Chancellor v. Baijanand Kar, AIR 1994 S.C. 579; (4) Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1974(5) S.L.R. 73. 12. Shri Sarjit Singh, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners argued that respondent No. 4 cannot object to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of non-disclosure of the facts of the civil suits because he had himself challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suits filed by the petitioners. Learned counsel invoked the doctrine of estoppel and argued that after having questioned the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suits filed by some of the petitioners, respondent No. 4 cannot turn around and challenge the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the facts relating to civil suits have not been mentioned in the writ petition. He submitted that on-disclosure of the facts relating to the pendency of civil suit filed by petitioner Nos. 1 to 16 cannot be treated as such a misconduct on their part which may justify dismissal of the writ petition notwithstanding the fact that the impugned orders are without jurisdiction and ex-facie violative of the rules of natural justice. 13. We have given serious thought to the respective arguments. It cannot be disputed that power vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue orders, directions or writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, quo-warranto, prohibition and habeas corpus is very wide and pervasive. This is meant to be exercised for redressal of the grievance of the person aggrieved by the arbitrary actions of the State and public authorities and also for declaring as unconstitutional and ultra vires the legislative enactment and subordinate legislation. This is meant to be exercised for redressal of the grievance of the person aggrieved by the arbitrary actions of the State and public authorities and also for declaring as unconstitutional and ultra vires the legislative enactment and subordinate legislation. This power can be exercised in all cases in which the cause of action arises, wholly or partly, within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court subject to the constitutional bar contained in Articles 243 and 243-O and laws enacted by the Parliament under Article 323-A or 323-B of the Constitution of India. The technical rules of procedure which govern the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the English Courts do not apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur and others, AIR 1966 S.C. 81. However, in the last 50 years, the Courts have evolved several rules of self-imposed restraint for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and by now, it must be treated as a settled proposition that the High Court may refuse to entertain a petition or grant relief to the petitioner on any of the following grounds :- "(i) delay and laches in filing of the writ petition; (ii) contumacious conduct of the petitioner i.e. where the petitioner is found to have suppressed material facts from the Court or has made a statement with a view to mislead the Court or where an attempt has been made to abuse the process of the Court; (iii) where the order under challenge has been passed to rescind/rectify an earlier order which was passed in violation of the provisions of law or the Constitution; and (iv) where the issue of writ would amount to directing the State or public authorities to violate the provisions of the Constitution or any other statutory provision." The above listed grounds on which the High Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner are not exhaustive and there may be other grounds on which the Court may decline relief depending on the facts of the particular case. 14. In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether the petitioners should be non-suited on the ground that they have not approached the Court with clean hands. 14. In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether the petitioners should be non-suited on the ground that they have not approached the Court with clean hands. The facts brought on record show that on 25.6.1994, petitioner Nos. 1 to 16 had filed suits in the Court of Sub Judge Ist Class, Barnala for grant of declaration that they are entitled to retain possession of the land allotted to them and orders dated 16.6.1993, 10.6.1994 and notice dated 22.6.1994 are illegal and without jurisdiction. They also applied for temporary injunction. The State of Punjab and the Collector, Agrarian, Barnala contested the applicaitons for temporary injunction by asserting that the suits filed by the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) were liable to be dismissed due to non-compliance of the mandatory provision contained in Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Respondent No. 4 also contested the applications for temporary injunction by asserting that the civil court did not have the jurisdiction to hear the suits. He also averred that the allotments made in favour of the plaintiffs had been cancelled by Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala, but subsequently they fraudulently obtained allotment on 13.5.1992 from Collector, Agrarian which were cancelled by the Commissioner vide order dated 16.6.1993. Thereafter, petitioner Nos. 1 to 16 jointly filed this petition with petitioner Nos. 17 to 22. To us, it appears that in view of the objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the maintainability of the suits and the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suits, the petitioners were advised that they may not be able to get relief from the civil court and, therefore, they invoked Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this context, we can take notice of the provisions contained in Section 47 of the Pepsu Act and Section 21 of the Punjab Act which bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Section 47(1) of the Pepsu Act declares that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any matter which is under that Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority. Section 47(1) of the Pepsu Act declares that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any matter which is under that Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority. Section 21(1) of the Punjab Act lays down that validity of any proceedings or any order taken or made under that Act shall not be called in question before any Court or any other authority. It is, thus, clear that the suits filed by petitioner Nos. 1 to 16 were not maintainable and if they had pursued that remedy, they would not have got any relief. Therefore, we are inclined to agree with Shri Sarjit Singh that the petitioners cannot be held guilty of contumacious conduct of concealing material facts with a view to mislead the court and on that ground, they should be denied the right of seeking adjudication of their plea on merits. We are also inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that after having raised objection to the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suits filed by petitioner Nos. 1 to 16, respondent No. 4 can seek dismissal of the writ petition by accusing them of not mentioning the facts relating to the pendency of the civil suits. 15. The argument of Shri Sarin that the writ petition should be dismissed because the suits filed by petitioner Nos. 1 to 16 were withdrawn without permission to avail the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also merits rejection. In our opinion, grant or refusal of leave by the Sub Judge Ist class to those petitioners to pursue the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must be treated as inconsequential because it is for this Court to examine the issue of maintainability of the writ petition and even if Sub Judge Ist Class, Barnala had declined leave to the petitioners to pursue the remedy of writ petition, this Court could have entertained the writ petition. That apart, it is to be seen that the writ petition had been filed on 6.7.1994 and the suits were dismissed on 15.7.1994 and, therefore, the learned Sub Judge Class, Barnala did not have the occasion to grant or refuse leave to the petitioners to avail or pursue the remedy by filing writ petition. 16. That apart, it is to be seen that the writ petition had been filed on 6.7.1994 and the suits were dismissed on 15.7.1994 and, therefore, the learned Sub Judge Class, Barnala did not have the occasion to grant or refuse leave to the petitioners to avail or pursue the remedy by filing writ petition. 16. We also do not find any merit in the submission of Shri M.L. Sarin that dismissal of C.M. No. 11700 dated 25.11.1995 should be treated as a bar to the entertaining of this petition. A persual of the record of that application shows that the same was filed after the arguments had been heard. The Court rejected it on 22.11.1995 with the following observations :- "We have heard learned counsel for the applicants. It our opinion, the application is misconceived because till the arguments were heard on the main petition, the petitioner Nos. 17 to 22 did not make any application for permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file fresh despite the fact that a specific objection had been raised by the respondents regarding the suit filed by the petitioner Nos. 1 to 16 for securing the similar relief. The application is dismissed." 17. In our opinion, the application filed by petitioner Nos. 17 to 22 was clearly ill-advised and, therefore, the dismissal thereof cannot be made a ground to deny relief which may be admissible to the petitioners. 18. We shall now deal with the question as to whether order dated 16.6.1993 passed by respondent No. 2 for re-determination of the permissible and surplus area of respondent No. 4 is vitiated due to violation of the rule of audi alteram partem. Shri Sarjit Singh argued that the impugned order should be declared void and quashed because notice and opportunity of hearing were not given to the petitioners despite the fact that they were in possession of land allotted to them out of surplus area of respondent No. 4. He further argued that the allotments made in pursuance of order dated 28.6.1977 passed by Collector, Agrarian, Barnala had created a valuable right in favour of the petitioners and they could not have been deprived of the said right without being heard. He further argued that the allotments made in pursuance of order dated 28.6.1977 passed by Collector, Agrarian, Barnala had created a valuable right in favour of the petitioners and they could not have been deprived of the said right without being heard. Learned counsel pointed out that respondent No. 2 had not only entertained application dated 25.10.1983 filed by respondent No. 4 for re- determination of his surplus area, but had also reviewed order dated 4.8.1969 and submitted that before passing an order adversely affecting the right of the petitioners to hold and occupy the land, respondent No. 2 was duty-bound to comply with the rule of audi alteram partem and his failure to do so should be treated sufficient to vitiate the impugned order. Shri M.L. Srain countered the arguments of Shri Sarjit Singh and submitted that the petitioners do not have the locus standi to challenge the direction given by respondent No. 2 for re-determination of the surplus area of respondent No. 4 under the Punjab Act because on the appointed date i.e. 24.1.1971, they had not acquired any right in the surplus land. He relied on the decision of the Davision Bench in Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 P.L.J. 72 and argued that in their capacity as tenants of the surplus area, the petitioners cannot complain of the violation of rule of hearing. 19. We have given serious thought to the arguments of the learned counsel. It is not in dispute that the appeal and revision filed by respondent No. 4 against order dated 4.8.1969 passed by Special Collector, Punjab under Section 30-D(2) of the Pepsu Act were dismissed by Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala and Financial Commissioner, Punjab respectively. Therefore, by virtue of Section 30-D(5) of the Pepsu Act, order dated 4.8.1969 will be deemed to have become final. The suit filed by respondent No. 4 for setting aside orders passed by Special Collector, Punjab; Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala and Financial Commissioner, Punjab was dismissed by Sub Judge Ist Class, Barnala and appeal filed against the judgment and decree of the trial Court was dismissed by Additional District Judge, Barnala. Thereafter, surplus land of respondent No. 4 was allotted to the petitioners. In this manner, they acquired substantive right in the land in question. Thereafter, surplus land of respondent No. 4 was allotted to the petitioners. In this manner, they acquired substantive right in the land in question. However, without giving them notice or opportunity of hearing, respondent No. 2 entertained the application filed by respondent No. 4 and passed order dated 16.6.1993 for re-determination of his permissible and surplus area under the Punjab Act. Not only this, he indirectly nullified order dated 4.8.1969 which constituted the foundation of the allotments made to the petitioners. That order (i.e. order dated 16.6.1993) could not be implemented because of the pendency of litigation, but as and when the same is given effect to, the right of the petitioners to occupy the land is bound to be adversely affected. Therefore, we do not have any hesitation to hold that respondent No. 2 could not have passed order nullifying the allotments made in favour of the petitioners without hearing them and his failure to comply with this fundamental rule has the effect of vitiating the impugned orders. 20. The rule of saudi alteram partem is an integral part of the concept of rule of law enshrined in our Constitution. It has been applied by the courts in different situations for invalidating judicial, quasi-judicial orders and even administrative orders/actions. In one of the celebrated decisions on the subject - State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, AIR 1969 SC. 1269, their Lordships of the Supreme Court enunciated the rule in the following words :- "An order by the State to the prejudice of a person in derogation of his vested rights may be made only in accordance with the basic rules of justice and fairplay. The deciding authority, it is true, is not in the position of a Judge called upon to decide an action between contesting parties, and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedures may not be insisted upon. He is, however, under a duty to give the person against whom an enquiry is held an opportunity to set up his version or defence and an opportunity to correct or to controvert any evidence in the possession of the authority which is sought to be relied upon to his prejudice. For that purpose, the person against whom an enquiry is held must be informed of the case he is called upon to meet, and the evidence in support thereof. For that purpose, the person against whom an enquiry is held must be informed of the case he is called upon to meet, and the evidence in support thereof. The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed; it need not be shown to be super-added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particularly case." 21. In Sayeedur Rehman v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1973 S.C. 239, a three-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court emphasised the need for insisting rigorous compliance of the rule of hearing by making the following observations :- " We are, however, clear that if the order dated April 22, 1960 is to be reconsidered then the appellant must be afforded adequate opportunity of hearing and presenting his case. This unwritten right of hearing is fundamental to a just decision by any authority which decides a controversial issue affecting the rights of the rival contestants. This right has its roots in the notion of fair procedure. It draws the attention of the party concerned to the imperative necessity of not overlooking the other side of the case before coming to its decision, for nothing is more likely to conduce to just and right decision than the practice of giving hearing to the affected parties." 22. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 S.C. 597, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue of impounding of passport, considered the issue relating to the applicability of the rules of natural justice where the statute is silent. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 S.C. 597, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue of impounding of passport, considered the issue relating to the applicability of the rules of natural justice where the statute is silent. Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was) with whom other members of the Bench concurred, observed as under :- "Now, it is true that there is no express provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that the audi alteram partem rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the question, if the statute makes itself clear on this point, then no more question arises. But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J., in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, 1863(14) C.B. NIS. 180; "A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. Netleys case (1723) 1 Str. 557 and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature." xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx Now, if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, there can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for this purpose. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both." 23. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 S.C. 136, the Supreme Court considered and answered in the affirmative the question as to whether the notification issued by the government under Section 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 superseding New Delhi Municipal Committee was liable to be quashed on the ground of lack of notice. 24. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 S.C. 136, the Supreme Court considered and answered in the affirmative the question as to whether the notification issued by the government under Section 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 superseding New Delhi Municipal Committee was liable to be quashed on the ground of lack of notice. 24. The decision in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 S.C. 818, represents an extension of rules of natural justice even in a case, like emergent take-over of the undertaking under Section 18-AA of Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. Some of the observations made in that decision are extracted below :- 25. "Section 18-AA does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. The phrase "that immediate action is necessary" in Section 18-AA(a) does not exclude absolutely, by inevitable implication, the application of this cardinal canon of fair play in all cases where Section 18-AA(1)(a) may be invoked. Section 18-F has also not the effect of excluding the rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing." 26. Another extension of this principle is to be found in the Constitution Bench judgment in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 S.C. 180 in which their Lordships held that hawkers and pavement-dwellers were entitled to be heard before they could be removed. Some of the observations made in that decision are worth-noticing. The same are reproduced below :- "There are situations which demand the exclusion of the rules of natural justice by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. A departure from audi alteram partem may be presumed to have been intended by the Legislature only in circumstances which warrant it. Such circumstances must be shown to exist, when so required, the burden being upon those who affirm their existence. It may be true to say that in the generality of cases, persons who have committed encroachments on pavements or on other public properties may not have an effective answer to give. It is a notorious fact of contemporary life in metropolitan cities, that no person in his senses would opt to live on a pavement or in a slum, if any other choice were available to him. It is a notorious fact of contemporary life in metropolitan cities, that no person in his senses would opt to live on a pavement or in a slum, if any other choice were available to him. But, though this is so the decision to dispense with notice cannot be founded upon a presumed impRegulation bility of the proposed action. The proposition that notice need not be given of a proposed action because, there can possibly be no answer to it, is contrary to the well recognized understanding of the real import of the rule of hearing. That proposition overlooks that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done and confuses one for the other. The appearance of injustice is the denial of justice. The instrumental facet of the right of hearing consists in the means which it affords of assuring that the public rules of conduct, which result in benefits and prejudices alike, are in fact accurately and consistently followed." 27. The scope of the expression civil consequences was considered by the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 1978 S.C. 851. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Bench, said :- "But what is a civil consequences, let us ask ourselves, by passing verbal booby-traps ? Civil consequences undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence". 28. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the issue in the background of supersession of New Delhi Municipal Committee and observed as under :- "A Committee as soon as it is constituted, at once, assumes a certain office and status, is endowed with certain rights and burdened with certain responsibilities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard from the public. To be stripped of the office and status, to be deprived of the rights, to be removed from the responsibilities, in an unceremonious way as to suffer in public esteem, is certainly to visit the Committee with civil consequences. To be stripped of the office and status, to be deprived of the rights, to be removed from the responsibilities, in an unceremonious way as to suffer in public esteem, is certainly to visit the Committee with civil consequences. In our opinion the status and office and the rights and responsibilities to which we have referred and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full terms of office would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee and their loss, if superseded, would entail civil consequences so as to justify an insistence upon the observance of the principles of natural justice before an order of supersession is passed." 29. An analysis of the above mentioned decisions shows that an order which adversely affects the rights of a person or visits him with civil consequences cannot be passed by a judicial or quasi-judicial or even an administrative authority without giving him effective notice and reasonable opportunity of hearing. This rule can be deviated only if the statute regarding the relations between the person passing the order and the affected person expressly excludes the applicability of the rule of audi alteram partem or there are compelling reasons to read the exclusion as implicit in its scheme. 30. In Tilak Raj v. Financial Commissioner, 1992 PLJ 142, a question similar to the one raised in this petition was considered and answered in favour of the tenants. The facts of that case were that after hearing land-owner-Kashmiri Lal, the Collector, Agrarian, Fazilka declared 42 standard acres of land as surplus. The appeal filed by him was allowed by the Commissioner and the case was remanded for fresh decision with the direction that the transfers made by the land-owner be taken into account. After remand, Collector, Agrarian, Fazilka declared 34 standard acres of land as surplus. In appeal, Additional Commissioner, Jalandhar reduced the surplus area from 34 standard acres to 33 standard acres. In the meanwhile, the land- owner had mortgaged a portion of the surplus area and the mortgagee sought review of the order passed by the appellate authority. The Additional Commissioner, Jalandhar reviewed the previous order. Appeal filed against that order was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. The land-owner then filed C.W.P. 438 of 1966 which was dismissed on 7.5.1975. During the pendency of the litigation, the Punjab Act came into force. The Additional Commissioner, Jalandhar reviewed the previous order. Appeal filed against that order was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. The land-owner then filed C.W.P. 438 of 1966 which was dismissed on 7.5.1975. During the pendency of the litigation, the Punjab Act came into force. Thereafter, the successor of the original land-owner filed application for ejectment of the tenants of surplus area. The Collector, Agrarian, Fazilka ordered their eviction. The Additional Commissioner, Ferozpur Division set aside the order of eviction. The successor of the land-owner challenged the appellate order before the Financial Commissioner, but could not succeed. In the writ petition, it was argued that the tenants did not have any right to contest the surplus area case and, therefore, they were not entitled to be heard. This plea was negatived by the Division Bench with the following observations :- "A resume of facts as have been re-produced above would, thus, show that the tenants had acquired a right for allotment of the land. Therefore, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that they had no locus-standi to challenge the orders vide which the earlier orders declaring surplus land in the hands of the original landowner was sought to be reviewed on the demise of Tilak Raj the original landowner. In "Bhikoba Shankar Dhuman (dead) by L.Rs. and others v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed and others", AIR 1982 Supreme Court 865 it has been held that any person who is entitled to grant of land under the provisions of Act may question an order which would have the effect of reducing the extent of total surplus land in any village." 31. In Bhikoba Shankar Dhuman v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed and others, AIR 1982 SC 865, the Supreme Court held that any person who is entitled to grant of land under the provisions of the Maharasthra Agricultural Land (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961 was entitled to question an order which would have the effect of reducing the extent of the total surplus land in any village. 32. We shall now advert to the decision in Bhupinder Singhs case (supra) relied upon by Shri Sarin. The facts of that case were that Bhuipinder Singh was a joint land-owner in village Goniana, Tehsil Muktsar, District Ferozepur along with his brother Sarupinder Singh in equal shares. 32. We shall now advert to the decision in Bhupinder Singhs case (supra) relied upon by Shri Sarin. The facts of that case were that Bhuipinder Singh was a joint land-owner in village Goniana, Tehsil Muktsar, District Ferozepur along with his brother Sarupinder Singh in equal shares. After the death of Sarupinder Singh, Bhupinder Singh inherited 1/2 of the Share of Sarupinder Singh and in this manner, he became the owner of 3/4th of the land. He made certain alienations in favour of his mother-in-law and his two minor sons. By order dated 27.2.1962, the Collector declared 95 standard acres of land out of his total land as surplus. The Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector and remanded the case for de novo decision. On remand, the Collector passed fresh order declaring 86 standard acres as surplus area. While doing so, he ignored all the alienations made by the petitioner. The apeal filed against the order of the Collector was dismissed by the Commissioner. In the revision filed before the Financial Commissioner, it was urged that re-settled tenants were not necesary parties and the alienees were necessary parties and they had not been heard. The Financial Commissioner dismissed both the revision petitions. The learned Single Judge, who heard the writ petitions filed by Bhupinder Singh and the alienees referred the case to the larger Bench for deciding the question as to whether resettled tenants were necessary parties at the time of surplus area is sought to be determined afresh after the order determining the suprlus area in the first instance was set aside. The Diviosn Bench held that those persons, who are already in possession of the land as tenants before the declaration of surplus area were necessary parties. As regards, the re-settled tenants, the Division Bench approved the judgment of the learned single Judge (P.C. Jain, J., who was also a member of the Division Bench) in Karnail Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana and others, 1971 P.L.J. 926 and over-ruled the decision of another learned Single Judge (Harbans Lal, J., who was the other member of the Division Bench) in Balwant Singh v. State of Haryana and others, 1978 P.L.J. 3 and held that re- settled tenants cannot claim right to be heard when the question of declaration of surplus area is to be re-opened and is to be determined afresh. The relevant extract of the judgment of the Division Bench reads as under :- "On deeper consideration, I am of the view, that the resettled tenants are not divested of their rights by any specific order to that effect as a result of the setting aside of the order declaring some area to be surplus in the hands of a particular landlord. Once the decision relating to the declaration of surplus area is set aside on account of any legal infirmity or any other valid matically and unless some area is declared surplus afresh, they have no right to be considered for allotment of the same after re- declaration of the surplus area. May be that while considering the question of surplus area de novo no area may be found surplus on account of any valid reason or the declaration of surplus area, if any, that right area by any eligible tenant or ejected tenant. Before that stage, any such person cannot be deemed to be a necessary party for the purpose of declaration of surplus area of a landlord. In view of this conclusion, I have no hesitation in holding that the view expressed by me in Balwant Singhs case (supra), should not hold the field. It is consequently held that for the purpose of declaration of surplus area fresh, after setting aside of the previous order, any person who was resettled on such surplus area before the seting aside of the same, is not a necessary party and it is not necessary to provide any opportunity of hearing to him under the provisions of the Act." 33. The true ratio of the above mentioned decision is that once an order for re-determining the surplus area is passed, resettled tenants are not entitled to be heard at the stage of re-determination and in our considered opinion, this has no bearing on the case in hand because what the petitioners are challenging is the order passed by the Commissioner, Patiala Divison, Patiala for re-determination of the surplus area case of respondent No. 4 under the Punjab Act and not the actual re-determination of the surplus area. 34. 34. We are further of the view that if the decision of Bupinder Singhs case is read as laying down a proposition that the persons to whom the surplus land has been allotted do not have the right of hearing, the same cannot be treated as good law in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove. 35. In view of the above discussion, we hold that order dated 16.6.1993 passed by respondent No. 2 is vitiated due to violation of rule of audi alteram partem and on that ground, it is liable to be quashed. Consequential order dated 10.6.1994 passed by Collector. Agrarian, Barnala is also liable to be quashed on that ground. 36. The next question which merits consideration is whether the impugned orders are liable to be invalided on the ground that respondent No. 2 did not have the jurisdiction to direct re-determination of the permissible/surplus area of respondent No. 4 under the Punjab Act. Shri Sarjit Singh argued that respondent No. 2 has exceeded his jurisdiction by directing re-determination of the surplus area of respondent No. 2 in the light of Ranjit Rams case (supra) because the proposition laid down in that decision was not applicable to the facts of the case in hand. He strongly relied on order dated 28.9.1978 passed by the Collector, Agrarian, Barnala under the Punjab Act and submitted that the application filed by respondent No. 2 should have been dismissed in view of that order. Shri M.L. Sarin supported the order dated 16.6.1993 under challenge and submitted that the direction given by respondent No. 2 for re- determination of the surplus area case of respondent No. 4 is not vitiated by any legal infirmity. He pointed out that the decision of the Full Bench in Ranjit Rams case has been approved by the Supreme Court is Ujagar Singh v. Collector, Bhatinda, JT 1996(6) S.C. 713 and submitted that respondent No. 4 has the right to seek re-determination of the surplus area under the Punjab Act because possession of the surplus land was with him on the appointed date i.e. 24.1.1971. 37. 37. In our opinion, it is not necessary to decide the question as to whether Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide application dated 25.10.1983 filed by respondent No. 4 for re- determination of his surplus area under the Punjab Act because in view of our conclusion that order dated 16.6.1993 is violative of rule of audi alteram partem, the case will have to be remanded to the Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala and the parties will be entitled to put up their respective points before the concerned authority so as to enable him to decide whether or not application dated 25.10.1983 filed by respondent No. 4 deserves to be entertained. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders are declared illegal and quashed with a direction to Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala to decide the application filed by respondent No. 4 for re- determination of his permissible and surplus area under the Punjab Act afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, respondent No. 4 and any other person, who may be affected by the final order. The parties are given liberty to raise all available points before Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala who shall decide the matter by passing a speaking order. Petition allowed.