BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) A revision and a Writ Petition raise same question of law. They have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. It is unfortunate that neither the State Government nor the Union of India filed any counter-affidavit to the writ Petition and the matter had to be heard without a counter on their behalf. The parties shall be referred to as they appear in the cause title of the Writ Petition. ( 2 ) THE petitioners filed O. S. No. 51/75 before Subordinate Judge, Razole seeking a declaration with respect to the title of the plaint schedule property. The suit property was a piece of land measuring Ac. 2-30 cents. Along with the declaration the petitioners sought a decree for possession and mesne profits as well. The suit was decreed on 12-12-77. The respondents 3 to 7 who were defendants in the suit filed an appeal being A. S. No. 115/78 against the judgment and decree. The appellate Court dismissed the appeal, confirmed the judgment of the trial Court on 18-6-86. It is contended in the Writ Petition that in october, 1982 when the Amin went to the suit schedule property for effecting the delivery of possession to the petitioners, some persons obstructed the delivery of possession. The petitioners thereafter filed e. A. No. 296/82 in E. P. No. 57/82 for removal of obstruction. The executing court on 23-2-87 dismissed the E. A. No. 296/82 and observed that only symbolic delivery of possession shall be given to the decreeholder. This order of the executing court was challenged in Civil Miscellaneous appeal No. 174/93 before the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal on 21-7-99. In between the petitioner filed i. A. No. 478/79 for ascertainment of profits from 1972 to 2-8-78. The profits were ascertained upto 2-8-78. The petitioners filed E. P. No. 1/83 and the property to an extent of Ac. 0-60 cents was attached for realization of mesne profits. One Makkapati ratnam filed E. A. No. 76/83 under Order 21 rule 58 of C. P. C. The Court allowed this application. That order was also challenged in the High Court in C. M. A. No. 637/93. The C. M. A was dismissed on 21-7-99. The high Court also dismissed two other c. M. As. One Makkapati ratnam filed E. A. No. 76/83 under Order 21 rule 58 of C. P. C. The Court allowed this application. That order was also challenged in the High Court in C. M. A. No. 637/93. The C. M. A was dismissed on 21-7-99. The high Court also dismissed two other c. M. As. 170 and 109 of 1993 which were filed against the orders of the executing court allowing the applications filed by the third parties for raising the attachment. Thereafter the petitioners filed I. A. No. 759/95 for ascertainment of mesne profits from 2-8-78 and for passing of final decree under Order 20 Rule 12 C. P. C. The lower Court by order dated 2-5-97 appointed an Advocate-Commissioner to conduct an enquiry with regard to the mesne profits relating to the schedule property from 2-8-78 till the filing of I. A. No. 759/95. This order has been challenged by way of C. R. P. No. 5197/97. This Court admitted this revision on 27-12-97 and granted interim order. ( 3 ) THE main ground of attack to the impugned order of the trial Court in the revision petition is that, in terms of Order 20 rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) of Code of Civil Procedure mesne profits could not be granted beyond three years from the date of decree having been passed. Order 20 Rule 12 of C. P. C. is reproduced;"12. Decree for possession and mesne profits. (1) Where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, the court may pass a decree (a) for the possession of the property; (b) for the rents which have accrued on the property during the period prior to the institution of the suit or directing any enquiry as to such rent; (ba) for the mesne profits or directing an inquiry as to such mesne profits; (c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until (i) the delivery of possession to the decreeholder; (ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment- debtor with notice to the decreeholder through the Court, or (iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, whichever event first occurs". After this revision was filed the petitioners filed the Writ petition challenging the vires of Order 20 Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) of the Code of civil Procedure. In this background both these petitions were heard together. ( 4 ) THERE was some argument with respect to interpretation of Order 20 rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) of Code of Civil Procedure but we are not going to deal with that argument because Order 20 Rule 12 (l) (c) (iii) has finally been decided by this Court and as well as by Supreme Court. It is true that there was a Division Bench Judgment of this court in C. Subbanna v. K. Subbanna in which this Court had held that if a decree is passed by the Court directing payment of mesne profits till the date of delivery of possession then Order 20 Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) would not apply, but on reconsideration of this judgment by Full Bench of this Court the Full Bench in Subbanna v. Subbanna ruled;"a decree providing for the ascertainment of mesne profits until delivery of possession of property should be so construed as to harmonise with the provisions of Order XX rule 12 (1) (c) (iii ). The Court, which made the decree, could not have contemplated that the date of recovery of possession would pass the statutory period of three years laid down by rule 12 (1) (c) (iii ). We should not interpret such decrees in a manner that would bring them into conflict with the statutory limitation imposed by the rule. We have to read it in the light of order XX, Rule 12 C. P. C. If it is not competent for a Court to allow profits for a longer period by reason of order XX Rule 12, C. P. C. , there is no reason why we should not construe such a decree as providing for the determination of mesne profits until the recovery of possession but for not more than three years from the date of the decree. While empowering a Court to determine mesne profits in interlocutory proceedings, without the necessity of filing a fresh suit, under order XX Rule 12, C. P. C. , the Code has also placed a limitation on that power with regard to the period for which a decree for future profits could be given and so it is not competent for a Court to allow profits for a term exceeding three years. That being the real position, there is no reason why we should think that the Judge, who passed the decree, intended to act in disregard of the statutory provisions. On the other hand, we should read it in consonance with Order 20 Rule 12, C. P. C. There is a large body of judicial opinion in favour of this view and this is the solitary cause that has taken the opposite view. For these reasons, we hold that 1959 andh L. T. 207 (AIR 1959 Andh Pra 607), was wrongly decided and that the right of the decreeholder to recover future mesne profits should be restricted to three years from the date of the decree in spite of the provision in the preliminary decree directing enquiry as to mesne profits till recovery of possession of the property by the decreeholder". This judgment of Full Bench was challenged before Supreme Court in Subbanna v. Subbanna and the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of Full Bench, however, the supreme Court held that the period of three years has to be counted from the date the decree became final. In Para-32 the Supreme court held;"32. We, therefore, hold that a decree under R. 12 O. 20, C. P. C directing enquiry into the mesne profits, however, expressed, must be constructed to be a decree directing the enquiry into the mesne profits in conformity with the requirements of r. 12 (1) (c) of O. 20 and that the decreeholder in this case cannot get mesne profits for the period subsequent to March 7,1941 when the three years period form the date of the high Court decree expired. "the question again came up before Supreme court in Lucy Kochuvareed v. P. Mariappa gounder. In para-43 of the judgment the supreme Court held;"43. The argument is certainly ingenious, but untenable, being founded on fallacious premises. "the question again came up before Supreme court in Lucy Kochuvareed v. P. Mariappa gounder. In para-43 of the judgment the supreme Court held;"43. The argument is certainly ingenious, but untenable, being founded on fallacious premises. The period of three years mentioned in sub- clause (iii) of clause (c) of Rule 12 (1) is to be computed from the date of the decree of this Court i. e. , from April 22, 1958, and it will expire on the date on which possession was delivered or relinquished by the defendant in favour of the decreeholder pursuant to that decree. In other words, the decree mentioned in sub-clause (iii) of the aforesaid clause (c), would be the appellate decree, dated April 22,1958, of this Court. The period of three years mentioned in the said sub-clause is, therefore, to be reckoned from April 22,1958. The words "whichever event first occurs" in sub-clause (iii) imply that the maximum period for which future mesne profits can be awarded, is three years from the date of the decree for possession and mesne profits, finally passed. The Courts below, therefore, while holding that defendant 3 was liable to pay mesne profits for a period of about 6 years commencing from March 5,1951 / March 21,1951 till the delivery of possession in september, 1958 (less the period during which the property was under the management of the Receiver), were acting in conformity with the law and the terms of the decree, dated April 22, 1958, of this Court. " ( 5 ) FOR these reasons and in view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Lucy Kochuvareed v. P. Mariappa Counder (supra) the petitioners in the present case would be entitled to receive mesne profits till June 1989 as the order of the trial Court was confirmed by the High Court in the appeal on 18-6-86, and as such the order passed by the trial Court did not suffer from any illegality even if it is examined in the light of Order 20 Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) as it exists to-day. True, that the petitioners shall not be entitled to any mesne profits from 18-6-86, but the case of the petitioners is that the possession has not still been given to them therefore they filed the present Writ petition challenging the vires of Order 20 rule 12 (l) (c) (iii) on the ground of unreasonableness. This is contested by respondents on the ground that since order 20 Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) has been interpreted by this Court as well as by supreme Court on various occasions therefore its constitutionality must be presumed. We are afraid, this cannot be accepted on the simple ground that the constitutionality of Order 20 Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) was never under challenge before any of the judgments referred to above, it was only the interpretation to be placed on various provisions of Rule 12 of Order 20 that was subject matter of the judgments referred to above. Now, to substantiate his argument the learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the provision is unreasonable as it can result in creating untold misery on decreeholder by the machinations of a dishonest judgment-debtor. With the permissive legal system a judgment-debtor can hold on to the possession against the decree for number of years and he will get a premium for his continued illegal possession of the decreed property. He further submits that, if a decreeholder fails to get the decree executed within a period of three years he will at the same time have no remedy in law to recover the mesne profits from the property illegally under occupation and use of judgment-debtor. In this connection he refers to section 47 of the c. P. C. which lays down;"47. Questions to be determined by the court executing decree. (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) Omitted by Amendment Act, 1976 w. e. f. 1-2-1977 (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. (2) Omitted by Amendment Act, 1976 w. e. f. 1-2-1977 (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. Explanation-I: For the purpose of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. Explanation-II: (a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (b) all questions relation to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section. "he also relies on Order 21 Rules 97 and 99 which lay down;"97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property. (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where nay application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. ""99. Dispossession by decreeholder or purchaser. (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. " ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of Section 47 and order 21 Rules 97 and 99 C. P. C. the petitioners have no remedy because their claim for mesne profits arising out of a decree cannot be agitated even by a separate suit. " ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of Section 47 and order 21 Rules 97 and 99 C. P. C. the petitioners have no remedy because their claim for mesne profits arising out of a decree cannot be agitated even by a separate suit. If a third party claims interest in the property as is claimed in the present case he has also remedies only under Order 21 rule 97 and the result in the present case is that the decreeholder has been denied possession for more than a decade and as a result he is getting neither possession of the property nor would be able to get mesne profits beyond three years from the date the decree was passed. He submits that rule 12 (l) (c) (iii) of Order 20 is erroneous, unreasonable and irrational. ( 7 ) WE are conscious that this rule is in existence for a very long period of time. We are also conscious of the fact that there is a presumption to the constitutional validity of the legislation. But, in order to test the constitutionality and reasonableness of a particular legislation the Court would be free to examine as to for what purpose such a legislation is made. Order 20 deals with judgment and decree and Rule 12 of Order 20 deals with decree for possession and mesne profits . The only object to be achieved by fixing a period of three years for claiming mesne profits appears to us is to make the execution of the decree possible within three years otherwise there is no reason as to why a genuine decree holder would be deprived of the mesne profits with respect to property which he has not been able to get in execution of the decree within three years. Therefore, in our view, perhaps the legislature wanted to make it sure that the possession to the genuine decree holders is delivered within a period of three years from the date the decree became final. So, in a way it was the outward limit for execution of the decree after it became final, but we are conscious that this interpretation we cannot place now on Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) of Order 20 because of the judgments of this Court and supreme Court referred to above. So, in a way it was the outward limit for execution of the decree after it became final, but we are conscious that this interpretation we cannot place now on Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) of Order 20 because of the judgments of this Court and supreme Court referred to above. Law is settled that, in terms of Order 20 rule 12 (l) (c) (iii) C. P. C mesne profits cannot be claimed by a decree holder beyond three years even if he was not able to get the possession of the property. This is on the face of it unreasonable. In the present case, admittedly the property is being enjoyed by somebody, the original judgment debtor claims that property is not in his possession and it is in the hands of a third party, that enquiry is also going on, but at the same time, because of the restriction imposed by order 20 Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) the petitioners are losing mesne profits of the property with respect to which decree in their favour has become final. We do not understand what other reason could have been there in making two different classes one for those who are able to get decree (sic executed) within three years and the other for those who are not able to get decree (sic. executed) within three years. This classification in itself is bad and cannot be sustained. In the terminology of the Supreme Court we believe that this is a overdo classification as the Supreme Court had held in Roop Chand v. Delhi Development Authority that "to overdo classification is to undo equality". ( 8 ) MANY judgments were pressed into service but ex facie the proviso (sic. provision) appears to be unreasonable and the only purpose which can be served by this provision is to do injustice to genuine and honest decreeholders by the dishonest judgment-debtors. Unreasonableness is a ground on which a provision of law can be declared ultra vires. Therefore, we are not referring to all the judgments produced. However, reference is made to Maneka gandhi v. Union of India in which Justice p. N. Bhagwati, as His Lordship then was, speaking for majority held:"now, the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of Art. 14: what is the content and reach of the great equalizing principle enunciated in this article. However, reference is made to Maneka gandhi v. Union of India in which Justice p. N. Bhagwati, as His Lordship then was, speaking for majority held:"now, the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of Art. 14: what is the content and reach of the great equalizing principle enunciated in this article. There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil nadu (1974) 2 SCR 348 ; ( AIR 1974 SC 555 ) namely, that "from a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14". Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrainess pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of article 21 would not be satisffed. " ( 9 ) FOR all these reasons, we allow the writ Petition, dismiss the revision petition and hold that Rule 12 (1) (c) (iii) of Order 20 of C. P. C is unconstitutional and ultra vires to article 14 of the Constitution of India. No costs.