V.S.Sirpurkar, J.: Appellant bankmen, herein challenge the judgment of the learned single Judge whereby the writ petition of the respondent, one R.Somasundaram, an employee of the bank, was allowed quashing the punishment awarded to him as a result of a departmental enquiry held against him. 2. The facts in short are that the petitioner was an employee of the appellant bank. While in bank service he availed a loan of Rs.15,760 for purchase of a motorcycle from that bank itself and as per the Rules the said vehicle was hypothecated to the bank and there was an endorsement on the registration certificate with the Regional Transport Office that this vehicle was hypothecated to the bank. When the bank came to know that the vehicle which stood hypothecated in its name was transferred in the name of someone else, it grew suspicious and started an enquiry through its vigilance cell. It seems that the Manager of the Sivaganga Branch of the bank wrote a letter dated 18.6.1987 pointing out that the concerned employee had raised a loan for the purchase of a new bullet motor cycle and that the instalments were not being paid from the month of April, 1987. It is then pointed out by the said Manager that when he enquired with the office of the Regional Transport Office the Bank was informed that the hire purchase agreement with the bank was cancelled on 7.4.1986 itself and a fresh agreement was entered with one Venkatachalam of Madurai. This was done on the basis of a ‘no objection certificate’ purported to have been issued by Mr.S.P. Ramanathan, the Manager working in the branch on 7.4.1986. It was further stated that when Mr.S.P. Ramanathan was accosted with regard to that letter he denied the signature on that letter. Therefore, an enquiry was instituted and a charge sheet dated 16.3.1988 was served alleging gross misconduct under Clauses 17(5)(d) and 17(5)(j). After the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that both the charges were proved and that the employee had in fact acted to the prejudice of the bank. Ultimately, by an order dated 19.6.1989, the respondent was directed to be dismissed from service. He filed an appeal against this order of dismissal dated 19.6.1989. However, the appellate authority dismissed the said appeal by the order dated 2.12.1989. Ultimately, by an order dated 19.6.1989, the respondent was directed to be dismissed from service. He filed an appeal against this order of dismissal dated 19.6.1989. However, the appellate authority dismissed the said appeal by the order dated 2.12.1989. He, therefore, sought to challenge these two orders by way of a writ petition before this Court. A learned single Judge, by his impugned judgment, has allowed the writ petition and directed the original petitioner, respondent herein, to be reinstated with full back wages quashing the initial order of dismissal as well as the appellate order. It is also directed that the original petitioner should be paid 12% interest on the backwages. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the management/ bank very vehemently attacked the order passed by the learned single Judge and pointed out that the learned single Judge had travelled outside the parameters of Art.226 of the Constitution in reappreciating the evidence and in viewing the facts entirely in an impermissible angle. Our attention was invited to the order where the learned single Judge has held that the transaction between the bank and its employee was that of the financier and the borrower and as such there was no necessity of “inflicting draconian charges on the matter which stood on a simple footing as borrower and creditor”. The learned counsel pointed out that once an elaborate enquiry was held and a clear finding given therein regarding the role played by the respondent in production of false document before the Regional Transport Officer suggesting that he had paid all the loan instalments and, therefore, the bank had ‘No Objection’ in cancelling of the hypothecation entry, there was no question of the interference in the factual finding by the learned Judge at the stage of a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel fervently argued that the findings of fact are fully supported by the evidence on record and yet the learned single Judge had chosen to upset those findings without even considering or discussing them. 4. The learned counsel fervently argued that the findings of fact are fully supported by the evidence on record and yet the learned single Judge had chosen to upset those findings without even considering or discussing them. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/ original petitioner substantiated the order pointing out that it was only that the bank employee had not returned Rs.1,800 and it was not proved that the letter which had been produced before the Regional Transport Officer was prepared or signed by him and, therefore, there was no question of the finding of the misconduct against the said bank employee. 5. On this backdrop we have to see and examine the findings and the ultimate order passed by the learned single Judge. But, before that it will be seen that it was an admitted position that the respondent raised a loan of Rs.15,760 on 14.2.1984 for purchase of a bullet motor cycle bearing Registration No.TDR 1918 and executed the documents in favour of the bank, creating an agreement of hire purchase. There was thus a charge of the bank on the vehicle which charge was reflected in the registration certificate. These factors cannot be disputed. It has also come out in the enquiry that there was an entry of hypothecation in favour of the bank and it was dated 20.2.1984. It is also an admitted position and established by the evidence, viz., by a letter dated 17.6.1987, that the said hypothecation agreement entry was cancelled with effect from 7.4.1986 and a fresh hire purchase agreement was entered in the records of the Regional Transport Officer, records. A witness was examined during the enquiry who was from the office of the Regional Transport Officer and who confirmed that the entry was cancelled on the basis of a letter of ‘No Objection’ dated 7.4.1986 purportedly issued and signed by the then Manager of the Bank Mr.S.P. Ramanathan. It was also an admitted position that thereafter this very vehicle was hypothecated in the name of P. Venkatachalam on 8.4.1986 and for that purpose Form No.15-A was signed by the registered owner namely R.Somasundaram, the respondent herein. It was also an admitted position that thereafter this very vehicle was hypothecated in the name of P. Venkatachalam on 8.4.1986 and for that purpose Form No.15-A was signed by the registered owner namely R.Somasundaram, the respondent herein. We have deliberately gone into the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and we find that the Enquiry Officer has very painstakingly discussed all the evidence let in before him to come to the conclusion that it was for the benefit of the respondent alone that the said "No Objection" letter was sent by the bank and as a result of the cancellation of the Hypothecation in favour of the bank only the respondent was able to again raise some loan and, for that purpose, hypothecate the vehicle in favour of Mr.Venkatachalam. In the enquiry report, there is a clear finding that the delinquent officer Mr.Somasundaram could not rebut the fact of availment of loan, hypothecation of the vehicle with the bank, the cancellation of the earlier hypothecation agreement in respect of the vehicle, the subsequent entry with the Regional Transport Officer and fresh hire purchase agreement in favour of Mr.Venkatachalam. Now, obviously, unless the respondent had paid back the whole loan, he could not have got the vehicle transferred and for that matter could not have put his signatures on the necessary forms namely HPN 15A. The Enquiry Officer concluded, "I have no other alternative but to conclude that the CSE, as a bank employee, got possession of a blank letter head by dishonest and fraudulent means, prepared the ‘no objection letter’ forging the signature of the bank official i.e. the manager Shri SP. Ramanathan. Shri SP. Ramanathan who was examined as management witness also ‘disowned’ the signature appearing in the no objection letter. Regional Transport Office also confirmed not only by means of their letter dated 17.6.1987 (ME-7) but also in the enquiry that as per the office ‘B’ Register was maintained and the hypothecation entry in favour of Indian Overseas Bank, Sivaganga was cancelled with effect from 7.4.1986 and the petitioner then entered into a fresh hire purchase agreement with Shri V.Venkatachalam, 13, Sarojini Street, Madurai. Thus, it is clear that the CSE got the hire purchase agreement entry for the bank, cancelled through the forged documents only with a view to avail second finance from Shri V.Venkatachalam of Madurai against the same Bullet Motor Cycle TDR 1918 which is already hypothecated to the bank as security. The above acts of Shri R. Somasundaram (CSE) as Shroff/ Godown Keeper of Sivaganga Branch were not only prejudicial to the interest of the bank but also caused damage to the property of the bank." We have also seen the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 19.6.1989 as also the appellate order dated 2.12.1989. In both these orders, there is total application of mind which is apparent from the orders. When, on this backdrop, we examine the order of the learned single Judge it seems that the learned Judge was much impressed by the contention raised that what happened between the bank and the petitioner was only a transaction like any other third party who availed such loans and the mere non-payment of the loan could not amount to an act so as to be viewed as causing damage to the property of the bank or an act prejudicial to the interest of the bank. The learned Judge in paragraph 6 paraphased the argument raised on behalf of the then petitioner and the respondent herein. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner before the learned single Judge that the authorities had failed to differentiate between the duty of the petitioner towards the bank as its employee and his liability to return the loan instalment. It was also tried to be suggested that the only act that could be complained of the petitioner was the non-payment of the dues to the bank and that could not be said to be a basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the employee. It was also tried to be suggested that the only act that could be complained of the petitioner was the non-payment of the dues to the bank and that could not be said to be a basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the employee. It seems that the learned Judge was also impressed by this argument inasmuch as the learned Judge observes, "The definition of gross mis-conduct which is stated in Sec.17(5) of the settlement indicates many prejudicial acts of employee as a matter of gross mis-conduct, but nowhere it is stated that the non-payment of loan amount could be a matter for disciplinary proceedings." The learned counsel for the appellant very heavily attacked these observations and contended that the learned single Judge has treated the whole matter to be a mere non-payment of the dues by the bank employee to the bank. There is also an observation that the important document which was necessary for conducting an enquiry had not been summoned or brought in original and that there could not be any unilateral finding to the effect that the petitioner was guilty of the gross mis-conduct. It seems that the learned single Judge has also commented on Sec.17(12)(c) and has found fault with the enquiry officer and the authorities for taking a view that the punishment of dismissal was warranted. The learned single Judge has expressed, "In the absence of any special reasons in the order it can be easily stated to the extent that the Disciplinary Authority has not taken into consideration at all in respect of the previous record or the lightness of the matter and had the respondent applied his mind in those aspects he would not have passed such an order at all." In paragraph 8 of the learned Judge has noted the argument that this could have at the most be a civil action. In paragraph 11 of his judgment, the learned single Judge has referred to two minor mis-conducts and has held that even if the past conduct was to be taken into consideration, then the petitioner was guilty only of very minor mis-conducts. We have deliberately quoted the various observations as the argument has throughout been that the learned single Judge has commented upon the facts throughout. 6. In our opinion the criticisms by the learned counsel for the appellant is well justified. We have deliberately quoted the various observations as the argument has throughout been that the learned single Judge has commented upon the facts throughout. 6. In our opinion the criticisms by the learned counsel for the appellant is well justified. When we see the judgment as a whole there is a finding recorded in paragraph 18 that the charges as framed against the petitioner have not been proved properly and that the impugned orders are vitiated and are not valid and that the petitioner has been victimized for the reasons best known to the authorities. We would, therefore, first advert to the aspect as to whether the learned single Judge was justified in making such a comment regarding the proof of charges. In so far as the proof of charge is concerned, we have already shown the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, which findings were accepted by the disciplinary authority and were ultimately confirmed by the appellate authority also. We have also pointed out earlier that the concerned authorities have made detailed references to the oral evidence as also the documentary evidence which was in plenty before the Enquiry Officer. We have also adverted to the fact that it is clearly held, and in our opinion rightly, that the then petitioner alone could be held responsible because he was the only person who was benefitted by the concerned letter. We must take stock of the argument that the charge was not proved. In our opinion, such could never be the case for the simple reason that the letter on the basis of which the Regional Transport Officer cancelled the hypothecation endorsement in favour of the bank was, in fact, held to have been procured and/or manufactured by the petitioner. In our opinion, the petitioner was the only person who was interested in wiping out that hypothecation entry in favour of the Bank. It was obvious because later on, almost immediately, the petitioner created a charge on that vehicle perhaps, by raising money on the basis of the fact that the hypothecation entry in favour of the bank has been wiped out. It was an admitted position that the petitioner had not made the complete payment of the loan and from April, 1987 onwards he had stopped making the payments altogether. Significantly enough the letter sent to the Regional Transport Officer is also of April, 1987. It was an admitted position that the petitioner had not made the complete payment of the loan and from April, 1987 onwards he had stopped making the payments altogether. Significantly enough the letter sent to the Regional Transport Officer is also of April, 1987. Therefore, there remains no doubt in our mind that it was the delinquent who was at the base of the whole story. As if that is not sufficient, then there is a clinching evidence that in the second hypothecation it is the petitioner’s signature on the prescribed forms viz., Form No.HPN 15A on the basis of which a charge has been created in favour of one Mr.Venkatachalam. If that is so, there would be no necessity of any further proof for petitioner’s delinquency. After all this is not a criminal prosecution. This was a departmental enquiry where the superfine questions of admissibility of the evidence etc. would not be available. We do not wish to comment as to whether the petitioner could have been held guilty on the basis of this evidence if a criminal charge had been framed against him. We only say that this was cse where there was obviously a delinquency on the part of the respondent herein, the original petitioner before the learned single Judge. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned single Judge should not have given a finding regarding the correctness or otherwise of the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer. As it is we do not find any discussion in the order of the learned single Judge which would, in any manner, affect the finding of the Enquiry Officer. There is hardly any discussion in relation with the oral evidence or the documentary evidence. Very strangely the learned single Judge has recorded a finding that no loss was caused to the bank or to its property or that the act of the petitioner was not prejudicial to the interest of the bank. It was undoubtedly the case of the bank all through that in wiping out the hypothecation endorsement in favour of the bank, the bank has undoubtedly been put to lawful loss and the delinquent has been able to make unlawful gain. We are unable to agree with the learned single Judge that this was a simple case of a borrowal and credit and the delinquent had merely failed to return the loan obtained by him. We are unable to agree with the learned single Judge that this was a simple case of a borrowal and credit and the delinquent had merely failed to return the loan obtained by him. Here was a case where the delinquent has acted calculatingly. He had managed to get an entry in favour of the bank wiped out by causing to send a fake letter. Not only that. Though he knew that he had not paid the remaining instalments and though he knew that he had not discharged the loan, he created another liability probably for raising some amounts, as against the motor cycle which was already hypothecated to the bank. We are completely, therefore, convinced that the approach of the learned single Judge was beyond the permissible limits of Art.226 of the Constitution and, therefore, we are unable to agree with the learned single Judge. We do not find any basis for the observations made in paragraph 19 and we are unable to agree with the said observations. There are no reasons given for the conclusions ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ drawn up by the learned Judge. It must be remembered in this behalf that it is not even the case of the original petitioner that he was victimized or that there was any unfair labour practice against them. At no point of time was it ever made out, much less substantiated, that the management was guilty of the basic error of violation of the principles of natural justice. That was not the complaint throughout the enquiry. We have already shown that the three conclusions had also not been substantiated as it cannot be said that the material before the authority were baseless or perverse. We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and would choose to dismiss the writ petition. There will be no orders as to the costs in the circumstances.