H. RANGAVITTALACHAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiff's second appeal. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated the facts giving rise to the filing of this second appeal as gathered, from records are as under: ( 3 ) PLAINTIFF filed a suit O. S. 6/75 on the file of the Civil Judge,bijapur for a declaration that alienation made by defendant No. 6 to the suit in favour of defendant Nos. 1, 4 and 5 is not binding, and declare him as the owner of suit properties and for consequential relief of possession; suit properties are 2 items of agricultural lands bearing sy. No. 94/2 of Yelwar Village, Basavanabagewadi Taluk measuring 15 acres 24 guntas, 21 acres and 34 guntas of land in sy. No. 3 of Mannur Taluk. ( 4 ) THE suit properties originally belonged to one Hanumatharaya. He had 3 sons Ramchandrappa, Saheb Gowda, Shivasang-appa. Plaintiffs are the children of Shivasangappa. After the death of Saheb Gowda, his widow adopted Basavanagowda Saheb Gowda - defendant No. 6 in the present suit (since deceased by his legal representatives ). ( 5 ) THE said Basavanagowda Sahebgowda (defendant No. 6 in the present suit) had originally filed the suit O. S. 67/48 against the present plaintiffs and others on the file of the Civil Judge, Bijapur, for a declaration that he is the adopted son of Saheb Gowda and for partition and separate possession of his 1/3rd share in the property of Hanumantharaya and obtained an ex parte preliminary decree of partition on 12-12-1949. Subsequently, he filed a suit special DAR No. 40/53 for drawing final decree which was allowed and the matter was sent to the Special Deputy Commissioner for effecting partition u/s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 6 ) THIS ex parte decree came to be challenged by the present plaintiffs 3, 4 and 5 by filing a suit O. S. 12/56 against defendant No. 6 and others before the Civil Judge, Bijapur for declaring that the ex parte decree in O. S. 67/48 is a nullity. ( 7 ) DURING the pendency of the suit O. S. 12/56, defendant No. 6 under registered sale-deed dt. 31-10-1956 sold properties bearing block No. 4 i. e. , lands in Mannur Taluk in sy. No. 3 to defendant No. 1 who in turn sold it to defendant No. 2; Similarly, he sold properties bearing sy. ( 7 ) DURING the pendency of the suit O. S. 12/56, defendant No. 6 under registered sale-deed dt. 31-10-1956 sold properties bearing block No. 4 i. e. , lands in Mannur Taluk in sy. No. 3 to defendant No. 1 who in turn sold it to defendant No. 2; Similarly, he sold properties bearing sy. No. 94/2 in favour of defendant No. 4 under a registered sale-deed dt. 12-9-1962, who inturn sold to defendant No. 5 on 17-1-1968. ( 8 ) THE suit O. S. 12/1956 came to be dismissed. The dismissal of the suit was challenged by the present plaintiffs 2, 3 and 5 by filing a Regular First Appeal in R. A. 23/65. This appeal ended in a compromise under which, the plaintiffs recognised the adoption of 6th defendant Saheb Gowda and his right to 1/3rd share in the joint family. However the suit properties that was allotted to the share of defendant No. 6 in the suit O. s. 67/48 was re-allotted to the share of the plaintiffs, as a mode of effecting partition and a compromise decree was accordingly drawn on 11-7-1966; this compromise decree was filed in the suit O. S. 67/48 and a final decree was accordingly redrawn in terms of the compromise decree by the Civil Judge on 19-4-1974. ( 9 ) PLAINTIFF contended on the basis of the above facts that they have acquired title to the suit properties as per the compromise. The alienations made by defendant No. 6 in favour of defendants 1, 4 and 5, having taken place during the pendency of ths suit O. S. 12/56,was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, u/s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; Since defendant No. 6 by then had expired, his l. r. s. were brought on record. They supported the case of the plaintiffs. ( 10 ) THE purchasers of the suit properties defendants 1, 4 and 5 contested the suit. They defended the alienations made in their favour by defendant No. 6, by contending that the compromise decree obtained in R. A. 23/65 was a collusive one between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 and hence the doctrine of lis pendens has no application. They defended the alienations made in their favour by defendant No. 6, by contending that the compromise decree obtained in R. A. 23/65 was a collusive one between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 and hence the doctrine of lis pendens has no application. It was also contended that the preliminary decree in O. S. 67/48 having culminated in drawing of the final decree and effecting a partition u/s. 54 of CPC, the Civil Court had become functus-officio and it could not have amended the preliminary decree in O. S. 67/48. ( 11 ) THE learned Civil Judge who tried the suit accepted the case of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. He has held that the compromise decree in O. S. 67/48 establishes the fact that plaintiffs have acquired title to the suit properties. Since the alienations were made by defendant No. 6 during the pendency of the suit O. S. 12/66, the same is hit by the doctrine of Lis-pendense, therefore the alienations are not valid in law. ( 12 ) THE said judgment and decree was challenged by defendant no's. 1 and 2 by filing R. A. 16/79 and defendant 4 and 5 filing another appeal R. A. 17/79. ( 13 ) THESE two appeals were heard by the learned Addl. Dist. Judge, Bijapur and by his judgment and decree dtd. 20-1-1984 has reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Judge and consequently dismissed the suit. He has held that whenever an alienation is made during the pendency of suit, the burden is on the person who takes benefit of the section to show that the compromise was not collussive. On facts, learned Appellate Judge has held that the compromise decree entered into between the parties in R. A. 23/56 was a collussive one. He has relied on the following circumstances to reach the said conclusion. According to him, the circumstances being: (I) In the compromise decree, one of the clauses mentions "during the pendency of the suit O. S. 12/56, the plaintiffs have alienated other properties, and defendant No. 6 has alienated some properties. These alienations are not binding on the non-alienating parties", which clause demonstrates that the plaintiffs even being aware of the alienations made by defendant No. 6 still insisted that these alienated properties should be allotted to their share. These alienations are not binding on the non-alienating parties", which clause demonstrates that the plaintiffs even being aware of the alienations made by defendant No. 6 still insisted that these alienated properties should be allotted to their share. (II) The compromise decree, does not indicate the shares allotted to each of the branches when essentially the suit of the 6th defendant in O. S. 67/48 was a suit for partition. (III) Even though the compromise decree was passed by the District Court in R. A. 23/56 on 15-8-1956, the said decree was not presented for necessary action before the Civil Judge in O. S. 67/48 for a period of 4 years which certainly raises a doubt in the mind of the Court about the genuiness of the compromise. (IV) That in pursuance to the alienations made, necessary mutations were effected in favour of defendants 1, 2, 4 and 5 and they were exercising all acts of ownership for a considerable period of time i. e. , from 1956 in one case and 1962 in another case and the compromise petition was filed by the parties after an inordinate delay eventhough the parties were fully aware of such situations. ( 14 ) LEARNED Dist. Judge also rejected another argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs that in order to attract the provisions of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the collusion referred to in the section should be at the inception of filing of the suit and not later by holding that if collussion is established in obtaining a decree that is also enough compliance of S. 52 of the T. P. Act. ( 15 ) THIS judgment and decree of the Appellate Judge is challenged by the plaintiffs in this appeal. ( 16 ) AT the time of filing the appeal, this Court admitted the appeal to consider the following substantial questions of law : (1) Is the lower Appellate Court having held that the sale of suit properties in favour of the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 being subsequent to the filing of O. S. No. 12 of 56 and having held that the suit properties were the subject matter or litigation in O. S. No. 12 of 56 rights in holding that the sale of the suit properties not hit by the provisions of S. 52 I. P. Act? 1 to 5 being subsequent to the filing of O. S. No. 12 of 56 and having held that the suit properties were the subject matter or litigation in O. S. No. 12 of 56 rights in holding that the sale of the suit properties not hit by the provisions of S. 52 I. P. Act? (2) Is the lower Appellate Court right in holding that the suit is barred by limitation in view of Articles 65 of the Limitation Act through the suit O. S. 12/56 and O. S. 67/48 were pending till 19-4-1974?though the appeal was admitted to consider the above two questions, but the arguments were addressed only on the substantial question of law at No. 1 i. e. , regarding the application of the doctrine of lis pendense to this case. Hence only substantial question of law at No. 1 is considered. ( 17 ) THE submission of Sri C. B. Srinivasan learned counsel for the appellant being that in order to escape the rigour of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, it must be shown that the suit filed by the parties was at its inception collusive. If a suit filed at the inception is not collusive, even if the compromise decree passed is collusive in character, then the provisions of Sec. 52 of the Act is applicable in all its force. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 . ( 18 ) PER contra, Sri Jayavittala Rao Kolar and B. S. Patil learned counsels appearing for the respondents defended the order of the District Judge and submitted that it is not necessary for the doctrine of lis pendense to apply that the collusion referred to in Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act must be only at the inception of filing the suit. Even where a decree is obtained by the parties by colluding with each other to defeat the rights of bona fide purchasers by a compromise or otherwise such decrees also are hit by the doctrine and they relied on the following decisions :- (I) Ram Narain v. Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan, AIR 1946 Oudh 99 (ii) Lakshmi Gnanapakiam v. Thynes Nadar Ponnian Nadar, AIR 1955 Tra Co 3 (iii) Maran Mar Nasselious Gheevarghese v. Most Rev Paulose Mar Athanasius, AIR 1952 Tra Coch 308 (iv) Mallamma v. B. S. Venkataram, 1991 (4) KLJ 526 (v) Sat Narain Singh v. Badri Prasad Singh, AIR 1928 Ondh 146. ( 19 ) IN order to appreciate the said contentions it is necessary to refer to Sec. 52 of the T. P. Act. Sec. 52 of the Act reads as under : sec. 52 : Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto : During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose". ( 20 ) THIS section is an expression of the principle "pendente-lite nihil innovetor" meaning "nothing is to be changed during the dependence of the suit". It embodies an 'equitable principle' and should be so construed as to effactuate its purpose; As held by the Supreme Court, in Jayaram Mudaliar v. I. A. Swamy, AIR 1973 SC 569 . "the purpose of Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not to defeat any just and equitable claim but only to subject them to the authority of the Court which is dealing with the property to which claims are put forward". ( 21 ) SEC. "the purpose of Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not to defeat any just and equitable claim but only to subject them to the authority of the Court which is dealing with the property to which claims are put forward". ( 21 ) SEC. 52 of the Act will not wipe out the effect of a sale validly executed by the person who has the authority to sell pendente lite but it is only to sub-ordinate the rights based on the decree in the suit. As between the seller and the purchaser, the transaction is perfectly valid and operates to vest a title in the purchaser. ( 22 ) IN order for application of Sec. 52, it is clear that a suit must be pending and it should be non-collussive in character and involves any right to immovable property and there must be a transfer by a party to the suit who has some right under the decree in the suit. ( 23 ) THUS one of the important ingredients for application of the principle of lis pendense is that the suit should be non-collusive in character; but then the further question is whether the element of collussiveness must be present necessarily at the inception of the suit or subsequently, it begins to operate resulting in a decree obtained either by compromise or otherwise, though the institution of the suit at the inception was honestly done. On this question, various High Courts have taken the view that even when the suit is honestly instituted but during trial or later if parties, enter into a compromise collusively and obtain a decree which affects the transaction of transfer of immovable property, then the doctrine of lis pendense has no application evidently on the principle of equity. Sufficient for my purposes to refer to few of the decisions sited at the Bar. The Trivancore and Cochin High Courts in the case of Gnanapakiam v. Nadar Ponian Nadar, AIR 1955 Trivancore-Cochin 3 has held :"the rule of lis pendense will apply to compromise decrees but will not apply only if the compromise was not result of fraud or collussion. A suit may be collusive in its very inception or a decree may be obtained by collussion in a suit which was honestly begun. A suit may be collusive in its very inception or a decree may be obtained by collussion in a suit which was honestly begun. When the parties to a suit enter into an agreement for the express purpose of defeating the rights of a transferee pendentility and a decree is passed in terms of the agreement, the doctrine of lis pendense will not apply to the case. " ( 24 ) THE Bombay High Court in Natha Dhojujholap v. Ramchand Balchand, AIR 1946 Bom 462 has also taken the view that the rule of lis pendense applies to the compromise decrees also provided, the compromise is honest and not fraudlent or collussive. It has also been held that since appeal is a continuation of a suit, Sec. 52 applies even to decrees obtained in appeal provided as stated they are not collusive. Similar is the view of the Patna High Court in the case of Juthan Tiwari v. Prashanth Singh, 1934 Pat 370 of the Oudh High Court, Satyanarayana Singh v. Badari Prasad Singh, 1928 Oudh 146. ( 25 ) I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts are the Doctrine of lis pendense being essentially a doctrine of equity, and fraud collussion being anti thesis of equity cannot be encouraged by Courts nor any decrees obtained by fraud or collusion can defeat the rights of the alienees of immovable property. ( 26 ) SRI C. B. Srinivasan has mainly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagu Bai's case in support of the contention. ( 27 ) I have gone through that decision in detail. That was a case where the Court was dealing the question whether there was any collussion between the parties at the inception of suit. This question viz. , that if the suit at the inception is honest but if a decree is obtained by collussion later whether the doctrine of lis pendense applies or not had not come up for consideration. Certainly the doctrine has no applications, in all cases where the very suit is instituted by collussion between the parties so also it does not apply to compromise decrees obtained by collussion or by fraud. Certainly the doctrine has no applications, in all cases where the very suit is instituted by collussion between the parties so also it does not apply to compromise decrees obtained by collussion or by fraud. ( 28 ) ON collussion, appellate Judge has in detail considered the evidence and has found as a matter of fact, collussion between the plaintiff and defendants to the appeal R. A. 16/79 and 17/79 in entering into the compromise and obtaining a decree thereunder. No arguments are advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as to how these findings are not based on evidence or against the evidence. Under the circumstances, the reasoning of the appellate Court on this finding cannot be faulted. ( 29 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the substantial question of law No. 1 is answered holding that the appellate Court was right in holding that the alienations made by defendant No. 6 in favour of defendant No. 1, 4 and 5 are not hit by the doctrine of lis pendense. ( 30 ) FOR the reasons stated above the appeal is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .