Judgment 1. The Haryana Urban Development Authority had invited applications from the persons satisfying the prescribed criteria for allotment of school sites. The purpose was to establish more High Schools, Primary Schools, or Nursery Schools in zone area ear-marked for the schools in the Panchkula in the State of Haryana. Various persons had submitted the applications, and sites were allotted to different persons/trust and bodies for establishment of such schools. The process of selection adopted by the Haryana Urban Development Authority was challenged in a Writ Petition No. 1303 of 1992 and the petitioners therein prayed for cancellation of the allotment of sites. Learned single Judge of this Court, vide judgment dated 11-9-1992 (reported in AIR 1993 Punj and Har 71), accepted the writ petition and issued certain directions to Haryana Urban Development Authority in relation to fresh allotment of the site in question. 2. This judgment of learned single Judge was challenged before the Letter Patent Bench. The Letter Patent Bench, vide its order dated 1/03/1996, passed in Letter Patent Appeal No. 1368 of 1992 (reported in AIR 1996 Punj and Har 228) affirmed the judgment of the learned single Judge. However, the Bench also gave further directions to the respondents-authorities in regard to disposal of site. 3. The judgment of the Letter Patent Bench was assailed before the Hon ble Apex Court. The Hon ble Apex Court, vide its judgment dated 15-7-1996, in the case of New India Public School V/s. Huda, reported in (1996) 7 JT (SC) 103 , held as under :- "5. The Division Bench has doubted bona fides in the allotments in question as expressly found in the judgment. Since, the learned single Judge had accepted the averments, but the Division Bench was not inclined to accept the same and doubted the bona fides of the actions of the authorities and resultant allottees, due to absence of any strong material, we cannot lightly brush aside or disagree with the observations made by the learned Judges of the Division Bench. Under those circumstances, we are inclined to uphold the order of the Division Bench, subject to the following further directions. Under those circumstances, we are inclined to uphold the order of the Division Bench, subject to the following further directions. While accepting the directions, given by the Division Bench we further add that the Committee would, as suggested by the Division Bench, in evaluating the property, determine the market value of the sites allotted prevailing as on 11/09/1992 in the light of the directions issued in the judgment. After the determination so made, an option would be given only to the petitioners i.e. Ajay Memorial School, Ashok Trehan Memorial Charitable Trust and Manav Mangal Society and Lt. Col. Y. P. Mahindru, for payment of the market price in lump sum. In the event of their accepting the offer the same shall be laid before the first Court of the High Court to obtain the approval thereof. The High Court, before giving approval, would consider the valuation and other relevant material. The HUDA also is directed to frame an appropriate scheme for allotment of the sites under discretionary power or other mode otherwise than by public auction and then place the scheme before the first Court of the High Court and obtain approval of the validity and correctness of the scheme and would thereafter proceed with the disposal of properties in future. As far as allotment to the petitioners, viz., Ajay Memorial School, Ashok Trehan Memorial Charitable Trust and Manav Mangal Society and Lt. Col. Y. P. Mahindru, in these special leave petitions is concerned, the same will be subject to the above directions and in the event of their non-acceptance, the properties should be put to public auction along with other sites and buildings. The plot allotted to the rest of the petitioners other than those cases where notices were issued, will be subject to the directions issued by the Division Bench. The other unallotted plots also should be put to public auction as ordered by the Division Bench." 4. As is apparent from the aforenoticed order, two directions for compliance by the Haryana Urban Development Authority were issued by the Court : A. In the event the petitioners accept the offer, the same shall be laid before the first Court of the High Court to obtain approval thereof. As is apparent from the aforenoticed order, two directions for compliance by the Haryana Urban Development Authority were issued by the Court : A. In the event the petitioners accept the offer, the same shall be laid before the first Court of the High Court to obtain approval thereof. (it related to approval of valuation) B. The Haryana Urban Development Authority was directed to frame appropriate scheme for the allotment of sites under the discretionary power or other mode otherwise than by public auction and then place the scheme before the High Court and High Court was to grant approval and see the validity and correctness of the scheme. 5. In furtherance to the direction issued by the Hon ble Apex Court, the Haryana Urban Development Authority has framed a policy for auctioning such public sites by public auction and as such that direction is not in question before the Court nor any aspect thereof has been challenged by any of the parties to the petition. 6. The Haryana Urban Development Authority had offered plots to some of the petitioners who had taken steps for opening the school and they had even given admission to the students. Such kind of petitioners were protected by order of High Court. 7. The Haryana Urban Development Authority had earlier offered plots to these petitioners on leasehold right. The Haryana Urban Development Authority had offered the site in question to the petitioner vide letter dated 17-11-1997 at the rate of Rs. 1200/- per square meter. This offer was not accepted by the petitioners and they had challenged the valuation fixed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority. The Division Bench of this Court vide its order dated 28-7-2000 declined to grant approval to the valuation fixed by the Haryana Development Authority. The said order of the Division Bench reads as under :- "After hearing counsel for the parties, we have impressed upon Shri Sharma, to ask the concerned authorities of HUDA to re-examine the issue of the price to be charged from the management of the schools and after the necessary exercise is done at the level of the competent authority, give an opportunity to the representatives of the schools to represent their cause before the concerned authority. This exercise is intended to find an amicable solution of the vexed problem which was created due to the action of the HUDA in making allotment of plots without keeping in view the basics of the doctrine of equality. The report which may be prepared on the basis of fresh consideration be placed before the Court at least 7 days before the next date. Advance copies of the report be made available to the counsel for the management of the schools. Put up on 6-10-2000." 8. In furtherance to the order of the Division Bench dated 28-7-2000, the Haryana Development Authority passed the following order :- "Minutes of the meeting held on 25-9-2000 under the Chairmanship of Administrator, HUDA, Panchkula in respect of the rates of land of school sites as per orders of the Hon ble High Court dated 28-7-2000 in L.P.A. No. 1368 of 1992 1. Sh. K. K. Bhugra, Chief Engineer, HUDA, Panchkula. 2. Sh. S. C. Kansal, C.C.F., HUDA, Panchkula 3. Sh. D. S. Chauhan, Accounts Officer, representative of Estate Officer, HUDA, Panchkula. Pursuant to the orders dated 28-7-2000 of the Hon ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the representative of the respective schools in LPA No. 1368 of 1992 titled as Seven Seas Educational Society V/s. HUDA were invited on 6-9-2000. The issue regarding fixation of rate of land of these schools prevalent on 11-9-1992 at Rs. 1200.00 per sq. mtr. was discussed at length. The representatives of the following schools attended this meeting. 1. The Manav Mangal Society, (Primary School), C/o Manav Mangal School, Sector-11, Panachkula. 2. Ajay Memorial School, (Nursery School), Sector 7, Panchkula. 3. M/s. Tiny Tot Nursery School, Sector 9, Panchkula. 4. Ashok Trehan Memorial Charitable Trust, (Nursery School, Sector 7, Panchkula). 5. Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, (High School), Sector 9, Panchkula. 6. Woodland House, (Nursery School), Sector 8, Panchkula. 7. Lt. Col. Y. P. Mahindru, (Nursery School), Sector 16, Panchkula. They contended that the rate of land @ Rs. 1200.00 per sq. mtr. computed on the basis of highest registry rate of Rs. 800.00 at that time plus 50% as commercial element is on higher side. Their plea was that HUDA took into consideration the highest rate of Rs. 800.00 per sq. mtr. whereas the minimum registry rate was ranging from Rs. 600.00 to Rs. 800.00 per sq. mtr. during the period. mtr. computed on the basis of highest registry rate of Rs. 800.00 at that time plus 50% as commercial element is on higher side. Their plea was that HUDA took into consideration the highest rate of Rs. 800.00 per sq. mtr. whereas the minimum registry rate was ranging from Rs. 600.00 to Rs. 800.00 per sq. mtr. during the period. Secondly, they argued that the land to their schools is allotted on leasehold basis which in no way can be compared to free-hold title. The committee discussed all the points with representatives of various Educational Institution as mentioned above, and, thereafter discussed in detailed and observed as under. While working out the rate of Rs. 1200/- per sq. mtr. the min. registry rate of land @ Rs. 800.00 per sq. mtr. for residential area was prevalent for majority of the sectors whereas the min. rate of Rs. 600.00 per sq. mtr. was for only a few sectors. Therefore, the committee took the basis of Rs. 800.00 per sq. mtr. as general rate of land. More-over, an educational institution located in a particular sector is not meant to cater to that particular sector alone but caters the need of the entire area in general and hence the rate of Rs. 800.00 per sq. mtr. taken in calculations for the township is considered reasonable. So far the adding of commercial element of Rs. 400.00 per sq. mtr. (50% of the residential rate) is concerned, it was observed that the minimum registry rates of purely a commercial property site in the year 1992 was ranging from Rs. 5000.00 to Rs. 6000.00 per sq. mtr. The element of Rs. 400.00 per sq. mtr. is only about 7%-8% of the commercial rate which has been added by the committee in view of the fact that privately managed schools definitely run on SOME COMMERCIAL LINES as is evident from their fee structure and other overhead charges realised at the time of admission to their schools. The committee also feels appropriate to point out that the rate of Rs. 1200.00 per sq. mtr. is worked out as applicable on 11-9-1992 on the basis of the direction of the Hon ble Apex Court conveyed in 1997. The committee reserve price of school sites in Urban Estate, Panchkula is around @ Rs. 2500.00 per sq. mtr. The committee also feels appropriate to point out that the rate of Rs. 1200.00 per sq. mtr. is worked out as applicable on 11-9-1992 on the basis of the direction of the Hon ble Apex Court conveyed in 1997. The committee reserve price of school sites in Urban Estate, Panchkula is around @ Rs. 2500.00 per sq. mtr. and the highest bid received during the auction held on 12-6-2000 for 3 sites in Sector 12-A, 15 and 18 was to the tune of Rs. 2523.00 per sq. mtr. If Rs. 1200.00 per sq. mtr. in 1992 is updated with interest @ 15% p.a., as per Policy of HUDA, it also works out to be Rs. 2500.00 per sq. mt. in the year 2000. With regard to the plea of the schools that the rates of land on leasehold and free-hold basis should be different, the committee observed that the long-term lease of 99 years is as good as free-hold. The committee was also informed that the rate of Rs. 1200.00 per sq. mtr. worked out for the year 1992 has not been demanded till date for want of approval of the rate by the Hon ble High Court. Having considered all the aspects of the case, the committee feels that the rate of land of the schools i.e. Rs. 1200.00 per sq. mtr. worked out as applicable on 11-9-1992 is quite genuine and realistic. This is subject to the simple interest @ 15% per annum till date of payment as per policy of HUDA which is in consonance with the provision of the Land Acquisition Act also." 9. Vide present CMs, the petitioners/objectors have challenged the said determination of the Haryana Development Authority on various grounds. After the respondents determined the price payable by the petitioners, as noticed above, they have again challenged the same on various grounds by filing the C.M. aforenoticed. 10. Firstly, the matter was placed before the Division Bench, which, vide its order dated 15-12-2000, directed the matter to be placed before the first Court of the High Court. Then vide order dated 29-6-2001, the Division Bench prescribed over by Hon ble the Chief Justice directed that this application is to be placed before an appropriate Bench, as per roster. This is how the matter has been placed before this Court. 11. The Hon ble Apex Court has used the expression"approval by the High Court". Then vide order dated 29-6-2001, the Division Bench prescribed over by Hon ble the Chief Justice directed that this application is to be placed before an appropriate Bench, as per roster. This is how the matter has been placed before this Court. 11. The Hon ble Apex Court has used the expression"approval by the High Court". Thus, in order to avoid unnecessary complication of the matter and to put an end to this litigation, as far as this Court is concerned, the learned Counsel for the parties were directed to seek instructions whether the expression"approval" would mean to determine the value of land prevalent as on 11-9-1992, on the basis of the material placed before this Court. 12. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in various petitions contended that in the event the petitioners succeed before this Court, they be not required to go before the respondent-authority again and the Court may itself determine the reasonable price payable by the petitioners. 13. Learned Counsel appearing for the HUDA placed on record letter dated 14-5-2001 in this regard, relevant portion of the letter reads as under :- "...Market rate determined by committee is reasonable, therefore, HUDA reiterates its earlier stand and unable to negotiate with the parties on this account. Hon ble High Court may be requested to approve the same, and order dated 15-7-1996 of Hon ble Supreme Court may also be high lighted. Further Hon ble High Court may be requested to determine the market value as it may deem fit, which will be accepted by HUDA subject to right of appeal etc. in the matter." 14. I am of the considered view that the expression"approval" would obviously include decision on the issue regarding determination of the market value of the land, on the basis of the material placed before the Court. In any case, now this controversy is of no consequence, in view of the consent/concession made by the learned Counsel appearing for various parties. Thus, the following two questions fall for consideration before this Court : 1. Whether the valuation fixed by the Haryana Development Authority vide its minutes dated 25/09/2000, is reasonable and should be approved by this Court (i.e. price of the land as well as demand of interest). 2. Thus, the following two questions fall for consideration before this Court : 1. Whether the valuation fixed by the Haryana Development Authority vide its minutes dated 25/09/2000, is reasonable and should be approved by this Court (i.e. price of the land as well as demand of interest). 2. If the above question is answered in the negative, then what should be the value of the land as on 11-9-1992 which the petitioners/applicant should be called upon to pay for acquiring the leasehold rights in the site in question. 15. In order to find a reasonable solution and equitable answer to the afore-referred questions, it will be necessary to examine in details various facets of basic principles required to be examined for determination of such land value. INTEREST ELEMENT 16. In furtherance to the order of Hon ble Apex Court dated 15/07/1996, the Haryana Urban Development Authority had constituted a Committee, which, vide its report dated 8-7-1997, had demanded the market price of the school site at the rate of Rs. 1200.00 per square meter. On the basis of the report of the Committee, demand was raised by the Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and afforded opportunity to the petitioners to exercise their option in terms of the orders of Hon ble Apex Court. 17. This report-cum-determination was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court, vide its order dated 1/03/1996, more particularly on the ground that they were not granted any hearing. 18. The Haryana Urban Development Authority, after granting an opportunity of hearing to the applicants, issued a fresh demand, vide its minutes-cum-demand letter dated 25-9-2000. Therein, the Haryana Urban Development Authority, demanded the market value of the land at the rate of 1200/- per square meter along with interest at the ratte of 15% per annum from 1992 till the date of payment. This demand of interest has been assailed by the petitioners, being totally without any basis and contrary to the settled canons of law. 19. On the other hand, the Haryana Urban Development Authority has contended that the interest is payable in terms of their policy and also keeping in view the fact that the petitioners have not made any payment of the demanded amount for all this period. 20. 19. On the other hand, the Haryana Urban Development Authority has contended that the interest is payable in terms of their policy and also keeping in view the fact that the petitioners have not made any payment of the demanded amount for all this period. 20. Much less no justification not even a reference has been made as to why Haryana Urban Development Authority did not demand any interest nor its committee recommended charing of interest in the previous report dated 8/07/1997. There is no dispute to the fact that the applicants had paid the entire amount in regard to leasehold right of the property at the relevant time. In fact, the arbitrary action of the Haryana Urban Development Authority, has been set aside by the High Court and the Hon ble Apex Court while affirming the order of the High Court directed the Haryana Urban Development Authority to re-auction the plots in accordance with the policy to be laid down and also directed that the applicants be given option to retain the site by paying fair market price. In the two judgments of the High Court and the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court, there is no reference to the payment of interest. It was for the Haryana Urban Development Authority to file an application during the pendency of the proceedings before the Courts or at least before the Letter Patent Bench for leave to demand such interest. Even interim orders passed by the Courts were not conditional or subject to payment of interest. Once, the lis is pending before the Court, the rights and obligations of the parties pendente lite shall be normally controlled by the order of the Court. If the Court has not passed any specific direction with regard to payment of interest and it was even so understood between the parties, as Haryana Urban Development Authority did not demand any interest in its first report, it will not be fair for the Court to direct payment of interest, that too at the rate of 15% per annum for all this period i.e. from 1992 till the date of payment. No fault is attributable to the applicants, as they have already paid the total sum for which they had given a bid or were allotted the leasehold right of the property in question. No fault is attributable to the applicants, as they have already paid the total sum for which they had given a bid or were allotted the leasehold right of the property in question. It must also be noticed that originally the plots in question were allotted by Haryana Urban Development Authority in terms of the allotment letter dated 12-12-1988. As per the terms and conditions of the allotment letter, 75% of the amount was to be paid within the prescribed period which has admittedly been paid by the applicants. The interest, if any, is payable only on the defaulted amount. It is even conceded before me that in regard to payment of the original amount, which the applicants were liable to pay, the applicants have not committed any default. The liability of the applicants to pay the amount now will only arise if the demand put forward by the Haryana Urban Development Authority, is approved by the Court. If the applicants commit default thereupon, they may be rendered responsible to pay the interest. The Haryana Urban Development Authority, who on its own had allotted site to the applicants after considering its scheme, its liability to pay compensation to the landowners, which obviously includes element of interest, now cannot be allowed to earn premium for their own fault and more particularly in view of the fact that arbitrary action of the Haryana Urban Development Authority has been set aside. There being no stipulation of payment of interest, nor its demand being made before any Court of competent jurisdiction, I am of the considered view that the Haryana Urban Development Authority cannot demand interest on the amount, which still has to be approved by the Court. The Haryana Urban Development Authority has not demanded interest right from the year 1997. Probably a direction by the Court to reconsider the matter more fairly has led to the unauthorised inclusion of interest by Haryana Urban Development Authority in the current demand. MARKET VALUE OF LAND 21. The committee constituted by Haryana Urban Development Authority, in its report dated 8-7-1997, had demanded the market value of the land by adding commercial element at the rate of 50% of the value and demanded Rs. 1200.00 per square meter from the applicants prevalent as in the year 1992. To the report/demand dated 25-9-2000, the applicants have raised the following objections. 1. 1200.00 per square meter from the applicants prevalent as in the year 1992. To the report/demand dated 25-9-2000, the applicants have raised the following objections. 1. They were not given reasonable opportunity of hearing for explaining their objections, which have been filed by them before the committee; 2. The merits of their objections (containing 12 pages) dated 13-7-2000 have not been considered much less appropriately dealt with; 3. The inclusion of component of commercial element is totally unjustified; 4. The price of the leasehold rights demanded by the Haryana Urban Development Authority is ex facie incorrect as it is based upon the sale instance of free-hold property. 5. Even in the recent times, the Haryana Urban Development Authority cannot get the market price what is being demanded from the applicants that too for the land allotted in the year 1992. 22. According to the applicants, they are liable to pay the value of land only 270/- per square meter. The computation is based on the price of Rs. 600.00 per square meter for the free-hold property by the Haryana Urban Development Authority, 50% being reduced on account of leasehold rights and further 10% deduction on account of bigger size of the property being allotted to the applicants. Resultantly, they would be liable to pay Rs. 270.00 per square meter only. 23. On the other hand, on behalf of the Haryana Urban Development Authority, copy of the report dated 4-6-1992 has been filed on record showing price of different kinds of properties in different sectors. The brochure published by Haryana Urban Development Authority for free-hold residential property in Sector 25, Panchkula was also filed on record, in support of such valuation. Another document showing the average value of commercial and residential land allotted by Haryana Urban Development Authority during the year 1990-1992 was also filed on record. On the strength of these documents, the learned Counsel appearing for the Haryana Urban Development Authority contended that to run a school is a commercial activity and therefore, additional component of commercial element is fully justified. The applicants are liable to pay the demanded market value of the site in question. According to the counsel for the Haryana Urban Development Authority the applicants were heard by the Committee and even their presence has been recorded in the minutes so prepared by the Committee. 24. The applicants are liable to pay the demanded market value of the site in question. According to the counsel for the Haryana Urban Development Authority the applicants were heard by the Committee and even their presence has been recorded in the minutes so prepared by the Committee. 24. In light of the above facts and circumstances of the case, I would now proceed to discuss the merits of the rival contentions raised by the parties before the Court. POINT NOS. 1 AND 2 25. The question of granting reasonable opportunity in its absolute terms does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the case. There were written objections filed by the petitioners. It was not necessary for the department to grant them an oral hearing, unless they needed some clarifications, but, in any way, in the meeting dated 25-9-2000, the petitioners were present and as such, there was sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice or audi alterem partem. 26. The objections filed by the applicants were detailed one. They contain facts, figures as well as reference to the law, which govern the subject-matter in issue. However, the authorities concerned have not discussed the merit or demerit of those contentions and rather proceeded to determine the market value, as per its own valuation report and computation. Reference has been made to the sale of commercial properties even for the year 2000. Though the objections raised by the petitioners have been partly considered by the authorities, but merely because it did not specifically deal with in detail every objections, probably cannot be a ground for this Court to set aside the valuation report in its entirety. More particularly, when the parties before this Court have commonly conceded that expression"approval", as mentioned by the Hon ble Supreme Court would also include determination in accordance with law. Certainly, it would have been more appropriate for the committee to deal with all the contentions raised by the petitioners to make it an effective decision. However, I would prefer to leave the matter at that (sic). POINT NO. 3 27. No doubt the schools of the petitioners cannot be equated to the Government schools or other institutions run by the State. These schools certainly involved in serving the public, but they are not the schools who are imparting education to the students free of costs or at a very reasonable fee. POINT NO. 3 27. No doubt the schools of the petitioners cannot be equated to the Government schools or other institutions run by the State. These schools certainly involved in serving the public, but they are not the schools who are imparting education to the students free of costs or at a very reasonable fee. The fee charged by these schools comparably is on the higher side. The brochure placed on record also indicate that the very basis of running such schools and imparting education to children are different in its form and manner. Some (commercial) element is implicit in private or semi-private institutions or schools. This is a fact which even the Court can take a judicial note of. 28. The respondents have added 50% of the determined price on account of commercial component. According to the respondents, taking the land value at Rs. 800.00, 50% whereof was added as commercial element and assessed the total value being Rs. 1,200.00 per square meters. There is a clear distinction between the properties which are entirely commercial in their nature and concept like office buildings, shops, Cinema halls etc. These sites certainly cannot be compared to the sites where schools are required to be located. The size of the plots meant for such schools are of bigger sizes than that of the commercial sites. The brochure, which was published by the Haryana Urban Development Authority, in the year 1992 for allotment of free-hold residential plots in Sector 25, declare the value of the plot at the rate of Rs. 797 to 900 per square meter. These were fully developed plots. The demand raised by Haryana Urban Development Authority at the rate of Rs. 1,200.00 per square meter is not well founded. If such small developed properties were being sold at the above given rates during the same period, the demand raised by the Haryana Urban Development Authority at such exorbitant rate can neither stand to any valid reasoning nor can be justified on any principle. However, this cannot be said about the addition of 50% of the value sought to be added on account of commercial component. 29. As already noticed, these schools are not run purely on commercial basis, though they have element of profits and lining of commercial elements. However, this cannot be said about the addition of 50% of the value sought to be added on account of commercial component. 29. As already noticed, these schools are not run purely on commercial basis, though they have element of profits and lining of commercial elements. The respondents were justified in introducing 50% of the commercial element to the market value, otherwise computed by them, the merits of which I will shortly proceed to discuss. 30. It is true that schools or colleges run by the private societies etc. cannot be said to be commercial institutions, more particularly because education has been held to be a fundamental right and, as such, schools are partly performing the duty of the State and/or are its instrumental in imparting education. In this regard, reference can be made to the case of Unni Krishnan J. P. V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645 . POINT NOs. 4 AND 5 31. It has rightly been contended on behalf of the petitioners that instances relied upon by the respondents, which are basis of the determination of the value of the land fixed in the meeting dated 25-5-2000, are relating to the free-hold property, whereas, the petitioners have been granted leasehold right in the property in question. It is a settled principle of law that leasehold rights in the property cannot be equated to a free-hold property, in fact and in law both. There are numerous restrictions on the holder of leasehold property, while title holder of free-hold property has no such restrictions and can deal with the property in the manner he/she considers it appropriate. While, noticing clear distinction between the nature of two kinds of the properties, the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Commr. of Wealth-tax, New Delhi V/s. P. N. Sikand, AIR 1977 SC 1657, held as under : "Held that in determining the value of the leasehold interest of the assessee in the land for the purpose of assessment to wealth-tax, the price which the leasehold interest would fetch in the open market were it not encumbered or affected by the burden or restriction contained in the lease deed, would have to be reduced by 50 per cent. of the unearned increase in the value of the land on the basis of the hypothetical sale on the valuation date. 1975 Tax LR 380 (Delhi), Affirmed." 32. of the unearned increase in the value of the land on the basis of the hypothetical sale on the valuation date. 1975 Tax LR 380 (Delhi), Affirmed." 32. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioners that the value of the plots should be reduced, particularly keeping in view the fact that the sites allotted to them are of a much bigger size, while the sale instances relied upon by the respondents re late to the plots of smaller sizes. In this regard reliance was placed on the case of K. Vasundara Devi V/s. Revenue Divisional Officer (LAO), (1997) 10 JT (SC) 566 . 33. There is substance in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. The respondents have admittedly taken instances of small sizes of plots into consideration while fixing value of large sites allotted, to the petitioners. The respondents determined the value on the basis of the record whatever was available with them. It is clear that the residential plots were sold for a different prices, while commercial plots were sold for much higher value. The respondents have determined the market value of the land in question at the rate of Rs. 800.00 per square meter and then added 50% commercial component. Certainly, on this value some benefits should have been given to the petitioners on account of leasehold rights in contrast to free-hold sites. The respondents should also have given some benefits to the petitioners for larger size plots and also keeping in view the fact that they were not being used purely for residential or commercial purposes. Resultantly, the value of Rs. 800.00 fixed by the respondents is liable to be reduced on these scores. In the facts and circumstances of the case, certain guess work has to be applied for appropriate determination of the matter in controversy. Thus, it will be just fair and proper to reduce the value to Rs. 500.00 of which the commercial element of 50% should be added to give it a correct appreciable market value of the land in question as in 1992. It may be noticed that the petitioners certainly have advantage over the others as they were protected, as per the order of the Division Bench of this Court and the order of the Hon ble Apex Court, despite the fact that allotment of plots was held to be bad and arbitrary. It may be noticed that the petitioners certainly have advantage over the others as they were protected, as per the order of the Division Bench of this Court and the order of the Hon ble Apex Court, despite the fact that allotment of plots was held to be bad and arbitrary. They are keeping perfect title in the property as of date on the value of 1992. The equity and fairness demand that the respondent should also not be put to avoidable losses as they are dealing with public money and public properties. The liability ought to be shared by them to some extent. 34. Therefore, the applications/objections filed by the petitioners are partly accepted. The petitioners are liable to pay market value of the site in question, at the rate of Rs. 750.00 per square meter. As already held, the petitioners are not liable to pay interest pendente lite or future, provided they make the payment within a period of 30 days from the date of pronouncement of the judgment. In the event of the petitioners failing to comply with the said terms, the respondents will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law and terms of the lease deed. Further it is made clear that the petitioners after 30 days will not be entitled to advantage given to them under this judgment. Order accordingly.