Per A.S. AGUIAR, J.:---This civil revision application is placed before us pursuant to the reference made by a Single Judge of this Court by order dated 4th May, 2001 expressing doubts regarding the view taken by another Single Judge of this Court in the case of (Shri Rosario Salvador Liberado Carneiro v. Shri Devidas Ganoati Shirodkar and another)1, reported in 2000(1) Goa.L.T. 36, overlooking the well settled legal position enunciated in (Maria Christine de Souza Soddar and others v. Maria Zurna Pereira Pinto and others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1352. 2. This Civil Revision Application No. 64 of 2001 is filed against the order dated 19-6-2000 of the Additional District Judge II, Panaji, dismissing the Misc. Civil Appeal No. 120/99 of the petitioners as not being maintainable in view of the notification dated 18th August, 1998 amending section 22 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act, 1965 whereby the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court to hear appeals from orders of the trial Court is enhanced from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000/-. The appeal is directed against the order dated 12th March, 1998 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ponda confirming the order of ex parte injunction in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents herein. The said order was passed by the trial Court in suit filed by the respondents in the year 1991 wherein the subject matter of the suit was valued at Rs. 30,000/-. At the relevant time the forum for filing appeals against orders passed by the Civil Judge, S.D. in suits valued at more than Rs. 25,000/- was the High Court. The impugned order granting temporary injunction was passed on 12th March, 1998. By notification dated 18th August, 1998, the Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act was amended raising the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear appeals from suits valued upto Rs. 1,00,000/-. The appeal was filed by the petitioners against the said order on 6-11-1998 in the District Court. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the Additional District Judge by order dated 19th June, 2000 in view of the objection to the jurisdiction taken by the respondent that the impugned order having been passed prior to the amendment enhancing pecuniary jurisdiction, the appeal lay before the High Court and not the District Court. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the Additional District Judge by order dated 19th June, 2000 in view of the objection to the jurisdiction taken by the respondent that the impugned order having been passed prior to the amendment enhancing pecuniary jurisdiction, the appeal lay before the High Court and not the District Court. The respondents raised objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in the matter of Shri Rosario Salvador Liberado Carneiro v. Shri Devidas Ganoati Shirodkar and another, reported in 2000(1) Goa.L.T. 36. It was therefore contended by the respondents that the forum of appeal against the impugned order was the High Court and not the District Court. It was at that stage brought to the notice of the District Judge by the petitioners herein that the view of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the aforesaid case was not in accordance with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Maria Christine de Souza Soddar v. Maria Zurna Pereira Pinto and others (supra). The District Court however accepted the objection raised by the respondent on the ground that the decision of this Court in the matter of Shri Rasario Salvador Liberado Carneiro v. Shri Devidas Ganoati Shirodkar (supra) was binding on the District Court and that the same could not be said to be per incuriam since it makes reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (Garipati Vesnaya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary)3, reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540 and accordingly the District Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. 3. From the order dated 4-5-2001, it appears that the learned Single Judge felt it necessary to refer the matter to the Division Bench in view of the fact that the decision of the Apex Court in Maria Christine de Souza Soddar and others v. Maria Zurna Pereira Pinto and others (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Court in the matter of Shri Rasario Salvador Liberado Carneiro v. Shri Devidas Ganoati Shirodkar (supra). The Court in the matter of Maria Christine de Souza Soddar and others v. Maria Zurna Pereira Pinto and others (supra) had taken the view that the forum where the appeal should be lodged is a procedural matter and the right to file appeal is a substantive right. The Court in the matter of Maria Christine de Souza Soddar and others v. Maria Zurna Pereira Pinto and others (supra) had taken the view that the forum where the appeal should be lodged is a procedural matter and the right to file appeal is a substantive right. Substantive right can only be taken away by specific provision of the enactment or by necessary implication. 4. It is clear that the entire controversy resolves around the question whether the right of appeal which is vested in the parties at the time of filing the suit includes the right of choosing the forum for filing the appeal or whether the forum of appeal has to be decided by the procedural law in force at the time of filing the appeal. 5. The petitioners have contended that the right to file an appeal is a vested one while the forum of appeal being a question of procedural law, is not vested and may change and the petition at the time of appeal or hearing of appeal would decide it. The petitioners have contended that the parties could not be vested with the right of choosing the forum as on the date of filing of the suit but that the forum of appeal would be decided as per the procedural law. Hence it is submitted that the District Court erred in holding that the forum of appeal was not the District Court but the High Court. 6. The District Court in its impugned order dated 19th June, 2000, has placed reliance on the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Shri Rosario Salvador Liberado Carneiro v. Shri Devidas Ganoati Shirodkar and another (supra) wherein the Single Judge, after referring to the judgments of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the matter of (Taramani Dasi v. Kalidas Majhi)4, reported in A.I.R. 1977 Calcutta 43 and of the Apex Court in the matter of Garikapati Vesnaya v. N. Subbiah Choudhery, reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540 set out the legal position that the right to appeal is vested in the parties as soon as the suit is instituted and the forum of appeal would be determined with regard to the law as it existed on the date of commencement of the suit. 7. 7. Learned Single Judge of this Court (Khanwilkar, J.) in his order dated 4th May, 2001 has pointed out that the District Court was wrong in observing: This Court in the said case of Shri Rosario Salvador Liberado Carneiro v. Shri Devidas Ganoati Shirodkar (supra) noticed the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Maria Christine de Souza Soddar and others (supra). The perusal of the said judgment confirms that there is no reference made in the case of Rosario Carneiro this Court to the case of Maria Christine de Souza Soddar and others v. Maria Zurna Pereira Pinto and others (supra). Furthermore, the learned Single Judge seems to have mis-stated the legal position as set out by the Calcutta High Court in Garikapati Vesnaya's case. The Apex Court in Garikapati Vesnaya v. N. Subbiah Choudhery's case (cited supra) was concerned with right to file appeal and not forum to file appeal. The Apex Court in the case of Maria Christine de Sourza Soddar and others v. Maria Zurna Pereira Pinto and others (supra) has in paragraph 4 of the said decision observed as follows:--- "It is no doubt well-settled that the right of appeal is a substantive right and it gets vested in a litigant no sooner the lis is commenced in the Court of the first instance, and such right or any remedy in respect thereof will not be affected by any repeal of the enactment conferring such right unless the repealing enactment either expressly or by necessary implication takes away such right or remedy in respect thereof. This position has been made clear by Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to section 4 of the Central Act XXX of 1965 which substantially correspond to Clauses (c) and (d) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897." 8. The Apex Court has further noticed this position as being settled by the decisions of the Privy Council in the (Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving)5, 1905 A.C. 369 and Garikapatti Veerayya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, 1957 S.C.R. 488 : A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540. The Apex Court has further noticed this position as being settled by the decisions of the Privy Council in the (Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving)5, 1905 A.C. 369 and Garikapatti Veerayya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, 1957 S.C.R. 488 : A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540. However, on the question as to where the appeal could be lodged, the Apex Court was of the view that "the forum where such appeal can be lodged is indubitably a procedural matter and, therefore, the appeal, the right to which has arisen under a repealed Act, will have to be lodged in a forum provided for by the repealing Act". The Apex Court has further observed:--- "It is true that under Clause (c) of the proviso to section 4 of the Central Act XXX of 1965 (which corresponds to section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897) it is provided that a remedy or legal proceeding in respect of a vested right like a right to an appeal may be instituted, continued or enforced as if this Act (meaning the repealing Act) had not been passed. But this provision merely saves the remedy or legal proceeding in respect of such vested right which it is open to the litigant to adopt notwithstanding the repeal but this provision has nothing to do with the forum where the remedy or legal proceeding has to be pursued. If the repealing Act provides new forum where the remedy or the legal proceeding in respect of such vested right can be pursued after the repeal the forum must be as provided in the repealing Act." 9. Thus, the judgment of this Court reported in 2000(1) Goa.L.T. 36 holding that the right to appeal is vested in the parties as soon as the suit is instituted and the forum of appeal would be determined with regard to the law as it existed on the date of commencement of the suit is contrary to the ratio in the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above. 10. The learned Advocate for the respondents has drawn my attention to the case of Taramoni Dasi v. Kalidasi Majhi and others reported in A.I.R. 1977 Calcutta 43 in support of his contention that the vested right of preferring appeal in a particular forum could not be taken away by amendment. 10. The learned Advocate for the respondents has drawn my attention to the case of Taramoni Dasi v. Kalidasi Majhi and others reported in A.I.R. 1977 Calcutta 43 in support of his contention that the vested right of preferring appeal in a particular forum could not be taken away by amendment. In para 3 of the said judgment, the Calcutta High Court has observed as follows:--- "Though the appeal was filed before the District Judge, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the appeal was wrongly filed before the District Judge and the appeal ought to have been filed before the High Court as the suit out of which the present appeal arises was instituted long before the amendment of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. By such amendment the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain an appeal was raised from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 15,000. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that this amendment will not determine the forum in respect of the appeals arising out of such (sic suit) instituted before the commencement of the amendment. It was contended that the amendment had no retrospective effect and as such the vested right of preferring an appeal in a particular forum could not be taken away." It was further observed that:--- "An appeal is a mere continuance of the original proceeding initiated by the filing of the plaint, and the right to continue that proceeding cannot be affected by a new Act, unless it expressly says so." 11. The aforesaid case was referred to by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Shri Rasario Salvador Liberado Carneiro v. Shri Devidas Ganoati Shirodkar (supra) wherein he has relied upon the observations of the Calcutta High Court in the said judgment as setting out the position that the forum of appeal would be determined with regard to law as existing on the date of commencement of the suit. However, he has not noticed the further observations of the Calcutta High Court to the effect that the legislature can take away such vested right by way of amendment and if such vested right is taken away then the forum will be changed and the forum will be determined according to the provisions of the Amendment Act. 12. However, he has not noticed the further observations of the Calcutta High Court to the effect that the legislature can take away such vested right by way of amendment and if such vested right is taken away then the forum will be changed and the forum will be determined according to the provisions of the Amendment Act. 12. The question of right of appeal and the right to a forum for filing the appeal are two distinct concepts. While the right to appeal is a substantive right, the right to the forum for filing the appeal is a matter pertaining to procedural law. This would be clear from a passage appearing at page 462 of Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th Edn.) which is as follows:--- "Whether I have a right to recover certain property is a question of substantive law, for the determination and the protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice; but in what courts and within what time I must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate merely to the modes in which the courts fulfil their functions." 13. In the case of (Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra)6, reported in 1995(2) Bom.C.R. 491 , the Apex Court while considering the ambit and scope of the Amending Act and its retrospective operation with reference to certain clauses of TADA Act (28 of 1987) laid down the following principles:--- "(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation, unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible is presumed to be retrospective. ........... (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal, even though remedial, is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law, but no such right exists in procedural law. etc. etc." 14. In the case of (Tukaram Pandurang Gaikwad v. Smt. Hababi Eabumiya Shaikh others)7, reported in 2000 Vol. 102(1) Bom.L.R. 654, this Court was required to consider the maintainability of the appeal in view of the provisions of the Bombay Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 1998 (Act No. III of 1999). etc. etc." 14. In the case of (Tukaram Pandurang Gaikwad v. Smt. Hababi Eabumiya Shaikh others)7, reported in 2000 Vol. 102(1) Bom.L.R. 654, this Court was required to consider the maintainability of the appeal in view of the provisions of the Bombay Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 1998 (Act No. III of 1999). In the judgment dated 16th December, 1999 the Bombay High Court (Coram: J.A. Patil, J.) made reference to three previous amendments to section 26 of the Bombay Civil Courts (Amendment) Act raising the amount of valuation of the subject matter and pointed out "that in all the three cases the legislature had taken special precaution to provide for a saving clause. However, so far as the Bombay Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 1998 is concerned there appears to be no such saving provision" and "therefore in the absence of any such saving provision, the pending appeals arising out of the orders passed in suits by Civil Judges, prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act, cannot be saved from the application of the amended provisions of section 26". 15. In the present case, there is an amendment made to section 22 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act 1965, raising the amount of subject-matter of appeal from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 1,00,000/-. The subject-matter in the appeal herein is valued at Rs. 30,000/-. The appeal was filed on 6th November, 1998 while the Notification raising the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear appeals or suits upto Rs. 1,00,000/- is dated 18-8-1998. There is no saving clause provided. In view thereof, the appeal was filed before the District Court. The amendment required the appeal to be filed in the District Court. Although the right to appeal had vested in the parties at the time of filing the suit, the right to decide the forum of appeal is governed by the amendment to section 22 of the Goa Civil Courts Act, 1965 and, therefore the appeal had been rightly filed in the Court of the District Judge. 16. In view thereof, the application is allowed. The impugned order dated 19th June, 2000 is quashed and set aside. The Additional District Judge II, Panaji, is directed to hear Misc. Civil Appeal No. 120/99 on merits and dispose of the same within a period of two months. 17. Civil Revision Application accordingly disposed of. Application allowed. -----