Judgment :- E. PADMANABHAN, J. The Management of Kavarakkal Estate is the petitioner herein. The petitioner-management prays for the issue of a certiorari calling for the record relating to the award, dated May 8, 1995, passed by the first respondent Labour Court, Coimbatore, in I.D. Nos. 306/1993, 66/1994, 265/1994 and quash the same. Heard Sri Ravindran for T. S. Gopalan and Company for the petitioner. None appears for respondents Nos. 2 to 4, who are the contesting respondents. The petitioner, a tea estate in Valparai framed charges against 11 plantation labourers on September 19, 1991 as they refused to apply manure and were idling till twelve noon and left the field. On September 20, 1991, the petitioner issued a show-cause notice to all the eleven workers setting out the details of misconducts as well as commissions and omissions on their part, committed by them on September 19, 1991 and calling upon them to show cause as to why apart from non payment of wages for the period when they were away from duty, disciplinary action should not be initiated. The 11 workmen submitted their explanation, which were found to be not satisfactory. An enquiry was held. In the enquiry, the charges framed have been substantiated and the enquiry officer submitted a report. The disciplinary authority accepted the enquiry officer's finding and after affording further opportunity, the suspension for thirty days as substantive punishment was imposed on the said workmen. Out of the 11, two of them expressed written apology and the suspension period was reduced to the period already undergone. The respondents Nos. 2 to 4 herein took up the cause of workman and challenged the punishment by raising an industrial dispute. The matter was referred for adjudication before the first respondent in I.D. Nos. 306/1993, 66/1994 and 265/1994. All the three disputes were consolidated and disposed of by a common award. Before the Labour Court, the petitioner-management marked Exhibits M1 to M17, while the workers have not chosen to place any evidence. The matter was referred for adjudication before the first respondent in I.D. Nos. 306/1993, 66/1994 and 265/1994. All the three disputes were consolidated and disposed of by a common award. Before the Labour Court, the petitioner-management marked Exhibits M1 to M17, while the workers have not chosen to place any evidence. The first respondent-Labour Court while holding that the enquiry conducted was fair and proper, and further held that in the enquiry the charges were proved, and the enquiry officer is well justified in reporting that the plantation labourers are guilty of the charges, the Labour Court held that the petitioner-management is well justified in imposing punishment.Though such a finding has been rendered, the Labour Court ultimately reduced the quantum of punishment of suspension from 30 days to 15 days as in its view, the punishment is shocking, harsh and excessive. Being aggrieved by the said reduction of punishment the present writ petition has been filed. The workers have left the matter at that stage. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the first respondent-Labour Court has acted in excess of jurisdiction and acted with illegality in interfering with the quantum of punishment, of suspension for a period of 30 days as Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, has no application at all nor it could be invoked. Nextly it is contended that the suspension for 30 days cannot be held to be arbitrary or excessive and interference would definitely demoralise and the employer may lose its control and supervision. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment of suspension. The sole reason assigned to interfere with the quantum of punishment by the Labour Court is that the punishment is excessive and disproportionate and it cannot be sustained at all. On facts, there is no doubt that Section 11-A will have no application to the facts of the case. Nor the Labour Court could invoke Section 11-A as this is a case of discharge or removal or dismissal or imposition of such punishment which confers jurisdiction with the Labour Court under Section 11-A except those punishment enumerated in the Section and in no other case the Labour Court could interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed. Nor the Labour Court could invoke Section 11-A as this is a case of discharge or removal or dismissal or imposition of such punishment which confers jurisdiction with the Labour Court under Section 11-A except those punishment enumerated in the Section and in no other case the Labour Court could interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed. In Pandian Roadways Corporation v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 2000-II-LLJ-1350 (Mad), V. S. SIRPURKAR, J., while examining the scope of interference even under Section 11-A held thus at p. 1353 : "Once, the Labour Court has to give a finding regarding the quantum of sentence, then the Labour Court must appreciate the nature of misconduct, its effect, the attendant circumstances under which the misconduct has been committed and other allied factors, like whether the misconduct has been done out of ordinary human weakness. It is then that the question of severity of the punishment has to be considered in strict comparison with the misconduct. Such a comparison is nowhere to be found in the judgment. What is found is a bare opinion on the part of the Labour Court that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate. Even the reliance on the ruling in 1984 (2) LLN 607 is of no consequence particularly because, the factual phenomena of the case is neither discussed nor bothered to be considered by the Labour Court. In the case in Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Basudeo Chaudhary, while considering question of nature of punishment the Apex Court has specifically observed that having regard to the misconduct that has been found especially, against the petitioner, it is not possible to say that the Corporation in removing from service, has imposed a punishment which is disproportionate to the misconduct and therefore set aside the judgment of the High Court." This pronouncement is being relied upon by Sri Ravindranath in support of his contention as to what are the matters which have to be taken into consideration by the Labour Court while interfering with the quantum of punishment. In Cashew Development Corporation v. Labour Court, Kollam, reported in 1999-I-LLJ-1031, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held thus at p. 1034 : "The Labour Court already held that the enquiry was properly held and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the findings are not perverse. In Cashew Development Corporation v. Labour Court, Kollam, reported in 1999-I-LLJ-1031, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held thus at p. 1034 : "The Labour Court already held that the enquiry was properly held and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the findings are not perverse. We have already held that the vitiating facts found by the Labour Court against the enquiry are erroneous and are liable to be set aside. If enquiry is fair and proper in the absence of any allegations of victimisation or unfair labour practice, Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act gives ample power to the Labour Court to reappraise the evidence adduced in the enquiry and also sit in appeal over the decision of the employer in imposing punishment. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly mentioned in the Section itself. Before the introduction of Section 11-A, in Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. Their workmen 1958-I-LLJ-260, the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the management. There is no allegation of unfair labour practice, victimisation, etc., in this case. The powers of the Labour Court in the absence of Section 11-A is illustrated by the Supreme Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (Private), Ltd. v. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (Private) Ltd. 1973-I-LLJ-278. When enquiry was conducted fairly and properly, in the absence of any of the allegations of victimisation or mala fides or unfair labour practice, Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Since Section 11-A is not applicable, Labour Court has no power to reappraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the enquiry officer are correct or not or whether the punishment imposed is adequate or not." This Division Bench pronouncement of the Kerala High Court squarely applies to the facts of the case and I am in respectful agreement with the said Division Bench. The first respondent-Labour Court had not given reasons to interfere with the quantum of punishment of suspension for a period of 30 days as substantive punishment. Had the Labour Court applied its mind, and given at least farce of a reason probably this Court may not be inclined to interfere. The Labour Court had on mere surmises held that the punishment is excessive or harsh for such conclusion or surmises or interference, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction as Section 11-A has no application. It is true that apart from Section 11-A, the Labour Court has powers as well to interfere as has been held by the Apex Court in Firestone case (supra). However, in the absence of any victimisation or unfair labour practice or discrimination or malicious or arbitrary exercise of power, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to interfere de hors Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case it is not the finding of the Labour Court that it is an act of victimisation or the punishment is so harsh or shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct or the workers being illiterate have, without knowledge and understanding the consequences, had flouted orders or they belong to particular class where it is difficult for them to understand or their mental capacity is so. In the absence of such factors, which warranted consideration, the Labour Court has fancifully branded the punishment of suspension for 30 days as excessive and had reduced the same of 15 days. This action of the Labour Court is in excess of jurisdiction vested in it as the imposition is neither mala fide nor it is an act of victimisation. In that Section 11-A has no application at all to the facts of this case and, hence interference by the Labour Court is not called for.It is true that few other workers did not contest the proceedings and few others accepted the punishment and in respect of some of them, the management had, while accepting the apology tendered had reduced the punishment to the period already undergone. It is not so in respect of the contesting four workmen. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. The award of the Labour Court is set aside and the industrial dispute raised by the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 will stand dismissed, but without costs. It is not so in respect of the contesting four workmen. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. The award of the Labour Court is set aside and the industrial dispute raised by the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 will stand dismissed, but without costs. However, this Court will be justified in directing the writ petitioner-management to give equal treatment to all the workers by reducing the period of suspension to 15 days provided if they tender unconditional apology. The petitioner-management may give a notice in this respect, afford an opportunity to the four workers and in case within the time stipulated by the management, if the workers tender unconditional apology, the management may act with magnanimity so that mutual confidence is created to maintain cordiality. If no reply is received tendering unconditional apology, the suspension already imposed will stand. The writ petition is allowed with the above direction but without costs.