ORDER 1. This Letters Patent Appeal, has been preferred by the unsuccessful petitioners of WP No. 17 11/99, decided on 20.11.2000, by learned Single Judge, whereby petition preferred by appellants under Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India, challenging notifications issued under sections 4 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter for short 'the Act') and subsequent award, passed by Land Acquisition Officer, has been rejected-During the course of hearing several grounds have been raised before this Bench challenging the said order passed by learned Single Judge. In nutshell learned counsel for the appellants submitted that (1) learned Single Judge has wrongly held that appellants had no locus standi to challenge the notifications issued by state under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. (2) Challenge could not have been made by appellants after passing of award. (3) Ignored the fact that possession had already been taken over by respondent No. 1 even prior to issuance of notifications by State Government under section 4 of the Act. (4) Pendency of MJC filed by present appellants under order 9 rule 13 of CPC, whereby challenge was made to ex parte decree passed in favour of respondent No.1, was under challenge, was of no consequence. It has lastly been contended that by efflux of time, the scheme had already lapsed. 2. To refute the contention as advanced by learned counsel for appellants on merits, respondents have further contended that petition filed by appellants deserved to be dismissed at the threshold as they had not approached the Court with clean hands and they had tried to mislead the Court, which is manifest by two affidavits filed by one of the appellants Vijay Kumar in the civil Court and the one filed in this Court which are contradictory to each other in contents and on facts. The other grounds which have been agitated in appeal, have also been refuted, to be without having any legal basis. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the record. It is not in dispute that civil suit had been filed by predecessors in title of respondent No. 1 Bheraji against the present appellants for declaration and injunction in the Court of 5th Civil Judge, Class 2. The said civil suit had been filed on 18.10.1975. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the record. It is not in dispute that civil suit had been filed by predecessors in title of respondent No. 1 Bheraji against the present appellants for declaration and injunction in the Court of 5th Civil Judge, Class 2. The said civil suit had been filed on 18.10.1975. After service of notices on appellants, they appeared, they filed their reply to the application filed by respondent No. 1 under order 39 rules 1 and 2, CPC duly supported by an affidavit on 25.2.1976. Subsequently they filed their detailed written statement denying the claim of respondent No.1. This was done by the present appellants on 4.8.1976. Matter was thereafter posted for recording of evidence, however, the present appellants remained absent on the date when the case was fixed by trial Court for recording of evidence. Consequently, they were proceeded ex parte. An ex parte decree thereafter came to be passed on 15.2.1983. 4. After passing of ex parte decree, appellants filed an application for setting aside of ex parte decree under order 9 rule 13 of CPC on 22.9.1984. We have been informed by the learned counsel appearing for parties that the said application which has been registered as MJC No. 48/84 is stilt pending for disposal on merits. 5. However, with an intention to appreciate the facts which ultimately resulted in passing of impugned order by learned Single Judge in the writ petition filed by appellants, they need mention in nutshell. 6. A fresh notification under section 4 (1) of the Act was issued on 26.6.1998. Parties were given opportunity to submit their objections as contemplated under section 5A of the Act. These objections were rejected by Land Acquisition Officer. As a necessary consequence thereof a notification under section 6 of the Act followed, which was issued on 11.6.1999. After completion of other proceeding as required under the provision of the Act, an award came to be passed by Land Acquisition Officer on 31.8.1999. Thereafter writ petition was filed by present appellants on 27.11.1999. As has been mentioned above, the writ petition has been dismissed on the grounds which have already been enumerated by us in preceding paras. We would first like to take up preliminary objection that has been taken by learned counsel for respondents with regard to the maintainability of petition. Thereafter writ petition was filed by present appellants on 27.11.1999. As has been mentioned above, the writ petition has been dismissed on the grounds which have already been enumerated by us in preceding paras. We would first like to take up preliminary objection that has been taken by learned counsel for respondents with regard to the maintainability of petition. It is not in dispute that present appellants had submitted their reply to the application filed under order 39 rule 1 and 2, by present respondents before civil Court. Alongwith the said reply an affidavit of one of the appellants Vijay Kumar was also submitted. In the said reply in para 6 it has been categorically stated by appellants that proceedings for restoration of possession have been taken out by present appellants before the Tahsildar, Indore in which they are confident of success. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application it has been contended by present appellants that possession of respondents is unlawful and is in the nature of trespassers, therefore they are not entitled to hold possession on the said land. It is not in dispute that this very land was sought to be acquired by State by issuance of notifications under section 4 followed by section 6 of the Act. In the writ petition filed by present appellants, after submission of reply by respondents, petitioners have submitted their counter affidavit on 25.9.2000. In this affidavit in para 6 a statement has been made that respondent No. 1 herein had never been in actual physical possession of disputed land therefore there was no question or occasion for the appellants to file a suit for possession against them. 7. In view of these two contradictory submissions made at two different stages in two different forums, contention of respondents is that the appellants have not approached the Court with clean hands. According to them, earlier they specifically mentioned that appellants were in possession for which necessary proceedings have been initiated for taking possession, whereas in the subsequent affidavit filed in this Court a statement has been made that respondents herein had never been in possession. According to learned counsel for respondent No.1, this amounts to contrary statements made by appellants, as a result, it would amount to misleading the Court. According to learned counsel for respondent No.1, this amounts to contrary statements made by appellants, as a result, it would amount to misleading the Court. To advance contention further in this regard reliance has been placed on a judgment reported in AIR 1951 Nagpur 16 in which it has been held that if facts have wrongly been stated in the affidavit filed in support of petition filed under Articles 226 of Constitution of India then in such circumstances the petitioner of the said petition would not be entitled for any relief. Relying on the aforesaid judgment [AIR 1951 Nagpur 16] the Division Bench of this High Court has also held in land acquisition proceedings that no relief can be granted to the petitioner who is held guilty of suppression of material facts. It has been held so in an unreported judgment passed in MP No. 400/87 [Jagdish v. State of M.P. and others] decided on 29.4.1987. Division Bench has held as under: "A person invoking the assistance of a Court by way of one of the high prerogative writs is required to exhibit complete candour and if he suppresses material facts, it would amount to lack of good faith on the part of petitioner. In these circumstances, therefore, the petitions are liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the conduct of the petitioners in suppressing material facts was improper." 8. After having gone through the aforesaid two affidavits filed by one of the appellants Vijay Kumar in two proceedings, we find that not only contradictory statements were made by him at two different stages but it also certainly amounted to suppression of material fact. As has been held by Division Bench in the matter of Jagdish (supra), a person approaching the writ court seeking invocation of jurisdiction under articles 226/227 of Constitution of India, is supposed to approach the Court with clean hands and also to place full and complete material facts before the Court, when only he would be entitled for grant of discretionary relief, not otherwise. 9. In the present case we are of the considered opinion that appellants had not approached the Court with clean hands; thus on this ground alone their writ petition filed under articles 226/227 of Constitution of India, deserved to be dismissed. However, leamed Single Judge instead of resorting to this, has still proceeded to decide the petition on merits. 9. In the present case we are of the considered opinion that appellants had not approached the Court with clean hands; thus on this ground alone their writ petition filed under articles 226/227 of Constitution of India, deserved to be dismissed. However, leamed Single Judge instead of resorting to this, has still proceeded to decide the petition on merits. Thus we shall now deal with the merits of the matter. 10. We have no doubt in our mind that in view of the fact that an ex parte decree has been passed in favour of respondents whereby the title of the suit property has been conferred on them, the petitioner have no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Even if, the application filed by them under order 9 rule 13 of CPC, had been pending, but that alone will not be sufficient to hold that on the date when notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued, they had any right to challenge the acquisition proceedings. However, despite this odd, the appellants had still filed their objections purporting to be one under section 5A of the Act, which was rejected by Land Acquisition Officer. If the appellants had really felt aggrieved by rejection of their objection and also by issuance of notification under section 4 of Land Acquisition Act then they could have filed writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India. Not having done so, they waited for award to be passed by Land Acquisition Officer on 31.8.1999 and only thereafter they preferred to challenge the whole of the acquisition proceedings. Thus the learned Single Judge has rightly placed reliance on a judgment of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 675 [State of Haryana and others v. Dewan Singh and others] (though wrongly mentioned as AIR 1975 SC 675 by learned Single judge). The said judgment, does not differentiate as to the person who has received compensation and the person who has not received the compensation, would alone be entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings. The ratio of the said judgment of Supreme Court fully applies to the facts of the present case. In the case in hand also the appellants have preferred to challenge the land acquisition proceedings, including the passing of the award by Land Acquisition Officer only after award has been passed. The ratio of the said judgment of Supreme Court fully applies to the facts of the present case. In the case in hand also the appellants have preferred to challenge the land acquisition proceedings, including the passing of the award by Land Acquisition Officer only after award has been passed. Thus, after an award had been passed they had no right to challenge the same. 11. There is yet another recent judgment of Supreme Court which holds that where award has already been passed, challenge cannot be made to the notifications issued under sections 4 and 6 of the Act and subsequent award, in a writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India. It has been held so in a case reported in AIR 2000 SC 671 [Municipal Council Ahmednagar and another v. Shah Hyder Beg and others]. In the said judgment several other earlier judgments of Supreme Court have been considered. 12. The contention of the appellants that in this case possession has been taken over prior to issuance of subsequent notification under section 4 of the Act, was sufficient to allow the petition, is not acceptable to this Court. This question has also been answered by Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in a case reported in AIR 1970 AP 262 [The Revenue Divisional Officer Guntur v. Vasireddy Rama Bhanu Bhupal and others]. In the said judgment of Full Bench it has been held that if possession has been taken prior to issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act on the strength of an agreement entered into between land owner and State then there cannot be said to be any infirmity and illegality in the same. Similar is the position of the said case where possession has been taken by IDA on account of triparte agreement entered into between respondent No.1, respondent No.4 and respondent No.7-Society. 13. As has already been held above that pendency of MJC has nothing to do with land acquisition proceedings, therefore, learned Single Judge has rightly not taken cognizance of pendency of MJC. Nothing more is required to be said with regard to pendency of MJC, as matter is still subjudice before the competent civil Court, which would decide the application of appellants on merits. 14. Nothing more is required to be said with regard to pendency of MJC, as matter is still subjudice before the competent civil Court, which would decide the application of appellants on merits. 14. Last question that the Scheme had already lapsed, as no steps were taken under the provision of M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 is also of no force because admittedly the respondents - State and IDA had initiated proceedings under sections 4 and 6 of the Act within the period prescribed under the Adhiniyam. Thus substantial progress towards implementation of scheme had already taken place. However, this question has also been answered by this Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1991 MP 72 [Sanjay Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti v. State of M.P.]. 15. It is pertinent to mention here that when the first notification under section 4 of the Act was issued, present appellants had not thought it fit to challenge the same. This only shows the callous attitude of appellants. It is also necessary to mention here that the lands already stood vested with State and subsequently were transferred to IDA long ago. After vesting of the lands with State and then handing it over to IDA, for whose benefits the same was acquired, there is no justification on behalf to appellants to challenge the same. Thus on the aforesaid ground also, their petition was not maintainable. 16. A reference to judgment of Supreme Court may also be made profitably to the facts of case where it has been held that scope of interference in this intra-Court appeal in limited. Kindly see 1996 MPLJ 1074 [Baddula Lakshmaiah and others v. Shri Anjaneya Swami Temple and others]. 17. Thus, considering the matter from all angles, we find that there is absolutely no scope for any interference in this LPA against the order passed by learned Single Judge, thus, this appeal is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.