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2001 DIGILAW 830 (PNJ)

Rajinder Kaur v. Sukhbir Singh

2001-08-09

R.C.KATHURIA

body2001
JUDGMENT R.C. Kathuria, J. - This revision petition has been filed by Smt Rajinder Kaur and Miss Surinder Kaur, petitioners, who were arrayed as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit, against the order of dismissal of their appeal bearing MCA No. 143 of 1998 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar affirming the order dated 9.2.1998 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jalandhar, who had dismissed their Miscellaneous Application No. 27 of 1997 moved under Order 39, Rules 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) against the respondent Nos. 1 to 12 out of which respondent No. 1 was the plaintiff in the main suit while respondents No. 2 to 12 were arrayed as parties to the application filed by the petitioners under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code. Along with the revision petition an application for condonation of delay in filing the revision petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 1963 Act) has also been filed. 2. In order to get a complete picture of the controversy involved, essential facts have to be noticed. Sukhbir Singh, respondent No. 1 in the present petition, had filed Civil Suit No. 186 of 1993 for permanent injunction restraining Smt. Rajinder Kaur and Miss Surinder Kaur, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from alienating more than their share and any specific portion out of the suit property situated in Revenue Estate of Village Dekoha, Tehsil and District Jalandhar fully described in the heading of the plaint. It was pleaded by him that the suit property was initially owned by their father-S. Raghbir Singh Dhillion and after his death, it devolved on his legal heirs i.e. plaintiff and his two sisters defendant Nos. 1 and 2 respectively in equal shares. In this manner, the parties had acquired 1/3rd share each in the suit property. The suit property had not been partitioned upto the date of filing of the suit and continued to be their joint property. 1 and 2 respectively in equal shares. In this manner, the parties had acquired 1/3rd share each in the suit property. The suit property had not been partitioned upto the date of filing of the suit and continued to be their joint property. On coming to know that defendants were bent upon disposing of not only their shares in the property but also specific khasra numbers of the land, which is more valuable than rest of the land because of its location, in order to injure the interest of the plaintiff, he called upon the defendants to desist from doing so but no heed was paid to his request which forced him to file the present suit against them. The suit was resisted by the defendants. They pleaded that they have every right to sell their property and as the plaintiff himself had been selling part of the property, he had no right to claim injunction against them in the suit. During the pendency of the said suit, the trial Court had directed the parties to maintain status quo with regard to the possession and alienation of the land in dispute as per order dated 3.11.1993. However, during the pendency of the suit Sukhbir Singh, plaintiff executed six sale deeds in June 1996 in violation and disobedience of the order of the trial Court to maintain status quo with regard to alienation and possession of the suit property. Aggrieved by the action of plaintiff, an application under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code was filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on 25.9.1997 for initiating of proceedings for breach of injunction order against Sukhbir Singh, which was resisted by him. It was also prayed by them that sale deeds should be declared null and void and they be paid Rs. 5 lacs as damages against the plaintiff, but before that application could be decided, the suit was finally decreed on 12.10.1996 in terms of the relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. 3. The learned trial Judge dismissed the application on the ground that with the passing of the decree dated 12.10.1996 in the suit, the order passed in the application filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code had come to an end and the application filed by the applicants under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code was not maintainable. The other prayer made in the application was also declined. Resultantly, the application was dismissed on 9.2.1998. In appeal against the said order, the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar came to the conclusion that no appeal lies against the order of the Court as the impugned order was not an order within the meaning of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code as with the dismissal of the suit, there was no disobedience of the injunction order passed by the learned trial Judge. Consequently, the appeal was held to be not maintainable and was dismissed on 8.9.1998. It is these orders, which have been challenged in this revision petition. 4. Along with the revision petition, an application under Sections 13, 14 read with Section 5 of the 1963 Act for condonation of delay in filing the revision petition was filled. It was stated therein that the petitioners bona fide believed that appeal lay against the order passed by the trial Court in an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code to the Court of District Judge, Jalandhar and after it was filed the same was entrusted to the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar which was decided on 8.9.1998. The petitioners applied for obtaining the copy of the order on 15.9.1998. The same was prepared on 28.9.1998 and was delivered on 12.10.1993. The counsel did not inform the petitioners with regard to the obtaining of copy of the order. Attorney of the petitioners Col. Baldev Inder Singh Cheema had been residing at Chandigarh. He could collect the copy of the order from the counsel on 13.1.1999 and thereafter two days time was taken by the counsel in preparing and filing the revision petition. Thus, it was prayed that delay of 36 days in filing the revision petition be condoned. Alternatively, it was also pleaded that if this Court takes a view that no appeal was maintainable before the appellate Court, then this petition be treated as revision against the order dated 9.2.1998 of the trial Court and the period spent in pursuing the appeal in the appellate Court be excluded along with the period in obtaining the copy and delay of 115 days in all be condoned. This application was also opposed from the side of the respondents. 5. I have heard counsel representing the parties at length. 6. This application was also opposed from the side of the respondents. 5. I have heard counsel representing the parties at length. 6. Before coming to the merits of the case, it is prefatory necessity to decide the application filed for condonation of delay by the petitioners. While accepting the stand of the petitioners that appeal against the order dated 9.2.1998 of the Civil Judge (Junion Division), Jalandhar lay before the District Judge, Jalandhar and the appeal was decided by the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar on 8.9.1998 and after excluding the period in obtaining the copy of the order, there has been delay of 36 days in filing the revision petition. It cannot be ignored that the petitioners are ladies though they are represented by Col. Baldev Inder Singh Cheema as their attorney who had been residing at Chandigarh. It is also admitted from the side of the petitioners that he could collect the copy of the order on 13.1.1999. These circumstances, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, show culpable negligence on the part of the petitioners and cannot be considered as an explanation or justification for condonation of delay. Rather, the circumstances stated in the application, according to the counsel representing the respondents, reveal the casual approach of the petitioners and for that reason, delay does not deserve to be condoned. Support was sought from the observations made in the case Ashis Kumar Hazara v. Rubi Park Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others, AIR 1997 SC 2724. The facts of the above reported case were entirely different from the facts of the present case. Though on principle, there cannot be any doubt with the observations made in the above mentioned case that unless proper explanation is given, the valuable right created in favour of the respondents under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. At the same time, the provisions of Section 5 of the 1963 Act have to be construed liberally where the bona fide of the petitioners in bringing the fact situation on record cannot be doubted. In the present case, there cannot be any dispute that attorney of the petitioners is based at Chandigarh and not at Jalandhar. The attorney in his affidavit had stated the factual position so detailed in the application. In the present case, there cannot be any dispute that attorney of the petitioners is based at Chandigarh and not at Jalandhar. The attorney in his affidavit had stated the factual position so detailed in the application. In the present case, the petitioners were not going to gain anything resulting from the delay in filing the revision petition while they had been prosecuting their cause for the last so many years. In the given circumstances of the case, the delay in filing the revision petition is condoned. 7. Coming to the controversy raised in this revision petition, the reasons which prevailed upon the trial Judge to dismiss the application of the petitioner filed under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code are stated in para 4 of the order and the same are as under :- "It is admitted fact in this case that parties were joint owner in the dispute property and a temporary injunction was passed restraining both the parties from alienating any specific portion of the suit property and from alienating the suit property in excess of their share and it is also admitted fact that the suit was decreed in favour of the present respondent No. 1 so it is clear that the order on injunction application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC came to an end on passing of the decree and after passing of the decree the application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC is not maintainable as held by our own Honble High Court in case Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh, AIR 1985 Punjab & Haryana 299 that no proceedings could be initiated or action taken against person guilty of disobedience or breach of ad interim injunction after its vacation. So application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC is not maintainable. The applicant has claimed that the sale deeds should be declared as null and void but the sale deeds can not be declared null and void in the present proceedings and in case the applicant feels aggrieved he should file regular suit to this effect. The applicant has also claimed as amount of Rs. Five lacs as damages which also cannot be awarded in the present proceedings and if the applicant feels aggrieved or respondent caused any damages to him then he can file a regular suit for the damages. The applicant has also claimed as amount of Rs. Five lacs as damages which also cannot be awarded in the present proceedings and if the applicant feels aggrieved or respondent caused any damages to him then he can file a regular suit for the damages. So I find no merit in the present application as such the same is hereby dismissed." 8. When the appeal was filed by the petitioners before the appellate Court, objection was taken from the side of the respondents about the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that no appeal has been provided against the order passed by the Court refusing to initiate proceedings for action under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code. This stand of the respondents was accepted by the appellate Court as is borne out from the following observations made in the order :- "The preposition of law has been discussed by his Lordship in Banamali Dey v. Satyendra Chanda and others (supra) [1990(2) Current Civil Cases 295] (Citation added) and it was held as under : "From a plain reading of Rule 2-A and the nature of the orders that a Court may pass thereunder, it is evident that an order passed by the Court holding that there was no disobedience or breach of injunction granted by it, is not an order within the meaning of Rule 2-A. The question of passing an order under Rule 2-A will arise only in a case where on consideration of the information received by it, the Court is satisfied that there was disobedience of the injunction granted by it I may be noted herein that Rule 2A(12) deals with punishment that can be awarded by the Court to a person guilty of disobedience or breach of injunction. The initiation of a proceeding for such an action, however, depends on the satisfaction of the Court in regard to the factum of disobedience or breach. The alleged disobedience or breach pertain on an order of the Court and it is for the Court to determine or decide whether any such disobedience or breach did in fact take place. If it is not so satisfied, it may refuse to proceed further and in that event the question of passing an order under Rule 2A would not arise. If it is not so satisfied, it may refuse to proceed further and in that event the question of passing an order under Rule 2A would not arise. If, on the other hand, the Court finds that there had been disobedience or breach of the injunction, it may pass any of the orders of the nature specified in the said rule. Such order would be an order under Rule 2A and would be appealable order under Order 43, Rule 1(r). But no appeal has been provided against an order passed by the Court refusing to initiate a proceeding for action under Rule 2A on the ground that in its opinion there was no disobedience or breach of the injunction order passed by it. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to a decision of the Orissa High Court in "Isha Bewa v. Bharmananda Choudhury, AIR 1988 Orissa 154" (Citation added) wherein it has been held that an order refusing to take action under Rule 2A of Order 39 is also appealable under Order 43 Rule 1(r). I have given careful consideration to the said judgment. With respect, I find it difficult to agree with the same. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the appeal in the instant case is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone." In the light of the above authoritative pronouncement, I have no hesitation that the present appeal is not maintainable and as such is dismissed." 9. Learned counsel representing the petitioners has challenged the correctness of the above view taken by both the Courts below on two grounds. Firstly, that order passed by the trial Court under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code is appealable as provided in Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code coupled with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code. Secondly, that disobedience of the order of the Court passed in an application filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code does not automatically lapse with the withdrawal, dismissal or decision of the suit and in this case the prominent circumstance is that suit was decreed and at no stage upto the date of decree i.e. 9.2.1998 the order of status quo with regard to possession and alienation of the land was vacated by the trial Court. He further submitted that the trial Court had wrongly construed the observations made in case Rachhpal singh v. Gurdarshan Singh, AIR 1985 Punjab & Haryana 299, which judgment has also been explained in the decision of this Court in Mohinder Kaur v. Smt. Harjit Kaur and others, 1990(2) Revenue Law Reporter 132. In the alternative, he had pleaded that the decision rendered in Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh (supra) being contrary to the observations of the Apex Court made in Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan, 1998(2) Revenue Law Reporter 245, would not hold the field. Reliance was also placed in support of the stand taken on the decision in Isha Bewa and another v. Bharmananda Choudhury, AIR 1988 Orissa 154. Controverting the stand taken from the side of the petitioners learned counsel representing the respondents justified the decision of the Courts below for the reasons recorded therein. It was also highlighted by him that in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, this Court should not interfere with the impugned order because no case has been made out from the side of the petitioners that the Courts below had exercised jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Reliance was placed by him in this regard on the decision in the The Managing Director (MIG), Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and another, v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, AIR 1973 SC 76 and Smt. Vidya Vati v. Shri Devi Das, AIR 1977 SC 397. 10. Dealing with the submission made in seriatim, in this case, order dated 3.11.1993 was passed by the trial Court in an application filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code which deals with the powers of the Court to grant temporary injunction. Act No. 104 of 1976 brought on the statute book the new Rule 2-A which reads as under :- "2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction. Act No. 104 of 1976 brought on the statute book the new Rule 2-A which reads as under :- "2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction. - (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison or a term not exceeding three months unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto." 11. These provisions were brought about in order to enlarge the power of the Court so as to embrace the disobedience of the order passed under Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code as well. Dealing with the right of appeal, notice has to be taken of the provision of Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code which has to be read conjointly :- "Section 104. Orders from which appeal lies. Dealing with the right of appeal, notice has to be taken of the provision of Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code which has to be read conjointly :- "Section 104. Orders from which appeal lies. - (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders :- (ff) an order under Section 35-A; (fa) an order under Section 91 or Section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in Section 91 or Section 92, as the case may be; (g) an order under Section 95; (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree; (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules : Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this Section." The provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code provider that an appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104 namely :- "xx xx xx xx xx (r) an order under rule 1, rule 2, rule 2-A, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIV;" 12. A plain reading of the above provisions leaves no manner of doubt that appeal shall lie from any order passed under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code and there is no limitation whatsoever in the rule itself as to the nature of the order passed under this rule. The restricted meaning sought to be given by the respondents that in case where the trial Court has refused to initiate action under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code does not flow from the provisions of the above noted rule. 13. The restricted meaning sought to be given by the respondents that in case where the trial Court has refused to initiate action under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code does not flow from the provisions of the above noted rule. 13. In case Isha Bewa and another v. Bharmananda Choudhury (supra), the Orissa High Court had construed that an order passed under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code "can partake either of the characters : taking action or refusing to take action. The language shall not be given a restricting meaning, see AIR 1914 Madras 141 (2) and AIR 1917 Madras 448. Hence, an appeal lies from an order passed under Rule 2-A of Order 39 whether the order is one of inflicting punishment or refusing to take action." 14. The restricted meaning given to the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code in Banamali Dey v. Satyendra Chanda and others (supra), by the Gauhati High Court, would be doing violence to the provisions stated therein and for that reason the view cannot be accepted. 15. Coming to the other facet of the controversy raised, no doubt in Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh (supra), it was held that no proceeding could be initiated or action taken against the person guilty of disobedience or breach of ad interim direction after it has been vacated. At the time, it was also observed that nothing said therein could debar taking of action or proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act in respect of the violation of the ad interim injunction against the person guilty of its breach during the period it remained in force. 16. Taking cue from these observation in Mohinder Kaur v. Smt. Harjit Kaur and others (supra), this Court observed as under :- "It is no doubt settled law now as held by the Division Bench in Rachhpal Singh v. Gurdarshan Singh that proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure are meant for enforcing an ad interim injunction and not for punishing the person guilty of such disobedience and no proceedings thereunder can thus be initiated or continued after the ad interim injunction has been vacated. It was also, however, observed that this would not debar the taking of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act in spite of the vacation of the ad interim injunction against a person guilty of its breach during the period it remained in force. No exception can thus be taken to the continuance of proceedings when, as observed by the trial Court, "the parties have yet to lead their evidence and it is yet to be seen whether the parties had given any undertaking before the court regarding the adherence to the ad interim injunction that was passed by the court during the proceedings of the previous suit, which was statedhy dismissed on 13th June, 1988. At this stage, therefore, the contempt petition filed by Harjit Kaur cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that the civil suit was dismissed and that therefore, the application under Order 39 Rule 2-A C.P.C. was not tenable, because it will have to be determined on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties as to what were the terms of the statements made by the parties in court on 13th June, 1988 on the basis of which the suit was dismissed. If the parties had undertaken to abide by the terms of the injunction order passed in this case, the said order cannot be deemed to have been vacated even if the suit was dismissed, as withdrawn. Moreover, there is a prayer made by the petitioner to punish the guilty under the provisions of law." 17. The controversy in this regard appears to have been settled by the Apex Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and another v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd etc., AIR 1997 SC 1240. The facts of the case were that Hind Rubber Industries Private Limited was the tenant of the ground floor in the suit house. On 25.8.1985, the said building was destroyed by fire. On February 11, 1991, the appellant filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay for a perpetual injunction restraining the first defendant from carrying on any construction in the suit premises. The case of the appellant was that the building which was subject matter of the tenancy between the parties has been destroyed by fire. The tenancy of the first defendant had come to an end. The case of the appellant was that the building which was subject matter of the tenancy between the parties has been destroyed by fire. The tenancy of the first defendant had come to an end. The Managing Director of the first defendant was also impleaded as the second defendant in the suit. The appellant applied for a temporary injunction restraining the first defendant from carrying on any construction. An ad interim injunction was granted by the Civil Court on 15.2.1991. The first defendant applied for vacating the interim injunction but his application was dismissed in February/March, 1991. The appeal filed by him was also dismissed on 24.7.1991. In the meantime, on 11.4.1991, the plaintiff moved the Civil Court for punishing the defendants under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code for flouting the order of interim injunction. While the said application was pending, the defendants moved an application under Section 9-A of the Code (Maharashtra Amendment) for determining the issue of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the said suit. On 29.11.1991, the Civil Court affirmed the temporary injunction and also held that it did possess the jurisdiction to try the said suit. On 2.12.1991, the Civil Court allowed the application of the appellant against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code and observed that construction activities had been carried on undeterred by the order of injunction and breach of the order had been substantiated. It also observed that defendant No. 2 had disobeyed the order of the Court acting on behalf of the first defendant. Consequently, the second defendant was committed to imprisonment for a period of one month. In July 1992, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed appeals in the Bombay High Court against the order punishing him and also against the order making the interim injunction absolute pending the suit. The High Court stayed the order punishing the defendant for contempt but did not stay the order granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. The High Court also appointed a Commissioner to ascertain whether the construction activity was still being carried on by the defendants. Taking into consideration the report of the Commissioner it came to the conclusion that the appellants were continuing to commit the breach of the order of the Court and for that reason they were not entitled to any restraint order. Taking into consideration the report of the Commissioner it came to the conclusion that the appellants were continuing to commit the breach of the order of the Court and for that reason they were not entitled to any restraint order. The civil appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs. The application moved by defendants No. 1 and 2 for setting aside the order dated 28.7.1994 was dismissed. On 3.7.1996, in the Civil revision application preferred by the defendants against the order of the Civil Court wherein it was held that application filed in the suit was allowed, the High Court came to the conclusion that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the provisions of Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act because the destruction of the house by fire does not put an end to the tenancy of the defendants. The plaintiffs filed Special Leave Petition against the said order which was dismissed on 3.9.1996. While dismissing the S.L.P., the Apex Court directed that the tenant shall make construction/alteration, if any in accordance with law and also with prior permission of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. Thereafter first defendant applied to the High Court for permission to occupy and carry on the business in the suit premises as before. It also sought direction to the Court Receiver to deliver possession of the suit premises to him. The prayer so made was accepted vide order of the High Court dated 13.9.1996. At the same time, it was pointed out from the side of the respondents that the petitioner is guilty of violating some ad interim orders passed in the suit and contempt proceedings were also pending but the prayer was not accepted and it was observed that it is immaterial and irrelevant for consideration of relief prayed by the petitioners, particularly when the original order passed was without jurisdiction. Consequential order thereafter was passed by the High Court. The order dated 13.9.1996 passed by the High Court was challenged in the Special Leave Petition in which direction was given that the respondents shall not be entitled to be put in possession of the premises till the appeal is decided by the High Court. The High Court was requested to dispose of the appeal or case in November 1996. The order dated 13.9.1996 passed by the High Court was challenged in the Special Leave Petition in which direction was given that the respondents shall not be entitled to be put in possession of the premises till the appeal is decided by the High Court. The High Court was requested to dispose of the appeal or case in November 1996. Pursuant to the order made by the Apex Court, the Bombay High Court disposed of aforesaid appeal on November 1, 1996. The appeal was allowed holding that the Bombay Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be punished for disobedience of the interim injunction made in the said suit for the reasons that said interim order must equally be held without jurisdiction. Against this order appeal was preferred in the Honble Supreme Court. Dealing with the issue raised it was observed in para 14 of the judgment as under :- "The first and foremost question in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in holding that since it has been found ultimately that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the interim orders made therein are non est and hence defendants 1 and 2 cannot be punished for their violation even if they had flouted and disobeyed the said interim orders when they were in force. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not right in saying so." 18. In para 16 of the judgment, it was further observed as under :- "Just because an objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the Court does not become helpless forthwith nor does it become incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. At the same time, it should also decide the objection to jurisdiction at the earlier possible moment. This is the general principle and this is what Section 9A reiterates. Take this very case. The plaintiff asked for temporary injuction. An ad interim injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward objecting to the grant of injunction and also raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court overruled the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal against the decision on the question of jurisdiction. An ad interim injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward objecting to the grant of injunction and also raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court overruled the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal against the decision on the question of jurisdiction. While that appeal was pending, several other interim orders were passed both by the Civil Court as well as by the High Court. Ultimately, no doubt, High Court has found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but all this took about six years. Can it be said that orders passed by the Civil Court and the High Court during this period of six years were all non est and that it is open to the defendants to flout them merrily, without fear of any consequence. Admittedly, this could not be done until the High Courts decision on the question of jurisdiction. The question is whether the said decision of the High Court means that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e., for violations and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High Court (on the question of jurisdiction), no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of rule of law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the Courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case where a suit was filed in wrong Court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove the suit was filed in the Civil Court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Courts decision on the question of jurisdiction." 19. As pointed out hereinabove the suit was filed in the Civil Court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Courts decision on the question of jurisdiction." 19. It was further observed in para 29 of the judgment as under :- "The correct principle, therefore, is the one recognised and reiterated in Section 9-A - to wit, where an objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the Court had no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim orders passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the Court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the Court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain institutions, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise : in such a case, the court should, while holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise : in such a case, the court should, while holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction." The above quoted observations of the Honble Supreme Court leave no manner of doubt that with the decision of the case, the violation of the orders does not come to an end and the Court would be justified in taking action for violation of the orders which had taken place during the period the suit was pending. 20. In other case Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan (supra), the position had further been clarified by the Honble Supreme Court in para 12 of the judgment which is as under :- "But the position under Rule 2A of Order 39 is different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside the disobedience does not get erased if may be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience may be turned down if the order is subsequently set aside." 21. The position of law that emerges from the above noted judicial pronouncements is that even though the case was decided on 9.2.1998, the proceedings initiated by the petitioners for violation of the order dated 3.11.1993 have to continue. There is no automatic termination of those proceedings as construed by the Courts below. The view taken by the trial Judge cannot be sustained in view of the position noted above. The reason which persuaded the appellate Court to dismiss the appeal primarily on the ground that no such appeal was maintainable has also to be set aside. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the revision petition is accepted. The impugned orders are set aside and the trial Court is directed to decide the application filed by the petitioners under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code in accordance with law. 23. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the revision petition is accepted. The impugned orders are set aside and the trial Court is directed to decide the application filed by the petitioners under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code in accordance with law. 23. As the matter has already considerably been delayed, the parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the trial Court on August 30, 2001. Petition allowed.