N. V. RAMANA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is the Secretary of Sri Vinayaka Varapu Santha Vyaparasthula Sangham, Madanapalli. According to the petitioner, the sangham consists of 60 members who are all petty businessmen doing business by running vegetable shops, kirana shops, coconut shops etc. , in the weekly santha (market) at Madanapalli, in an extent of 5-50 cents of land belonging to the Madanapalli Municipality, for the past several years. Every year, the Municipality conducts public auction of the right to conduct santha and the 2nd respondent was declared as the highest bidder for the present year. The members of the petitioner-sangham have been paying the fees regularly to the 2nd respondent-contractor. Petitioner claims that the weekly market covers about 600 villages and roughly ten thousand people will attend the santha. The complaint of the petitioner is that without issuing any notice and without observing principles of natural justice, in the first week of September 1999, the personel belonging to the first respondent-municipality attempted to dispossess/evict the members of the petitioner-sangham from the respective places in the market. The petitioner-sangham, therefore, filed this writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus to declare the action of the respondents in dispossessing evicting the members of the petitioner sangham from their respective places in the weekly market (santha) situate at Madanapalli as illegal and arbitrary and for a consequential direction to the respondents to forbear from depriving the members of the petitioner-sangham of their property without following due process of law. ( 2 ) ON 29-9-1999 this Court, while admitting the writ petition, in WPMP No. 25470 of 1999, granted interim stay of eviction until further orders. The 1st respondent-Municipality filed WVMP 720 of 2000 along with its counter-affidavit seeking to vacate the abovesaid interim order. In the counter, it is stated by the first respondent, inter alia, that the Municipality was allotted funds under the Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns (IDSMT) for construction of a market complex and so the municipality imposed a condition at the time of auction of leasehold rights of the weekly santha to the effect that the auction-purchaser should not object either for shifting the market to the new market yard or to the constructions that would be taken up. The Municipal Council also passed a resolution on 28-2-1998 to the effect that the weekly market shall be shifted to another place near Ramnagar colony, which is very nearer to the present weekly market, soon after issuance of the work order for construction of new market complex. It is stated that in between the proposed market and the present market, only the R. T. C. Bus stand is located. The auction-purchaser of the present year O. S. No. 373 of 1999 and also I. A. No. 812 of 1999 seeking injunction restraining the municipality from making any constructions in the present weekly market and it was dismissed on merits by the Junior Civil Judge, Madanapalli and the appeal thereon C. M. A. No. 50 of 1999 was also dismissed confirming the order of the trial Court. The first respondent contended that the members of the petitioner-sangham have no legal right to continue in possession of the Municipal property as their rights emanate from the rights of the contractor, whose rights, in turn, are governed by the contractual agreement. The shifting of the market to some other place is inevitable for construction of new shopping complex under the IDSMT scheme and it is only a temporary measure, and the market will be re-shifted to the present place after construction of new shopping complex. ( 3 ) SINCE the learned Counsel appearing on both sides submitted that this writ petition itself can be disposed of, it is accordingly taken up for hearing and disposal. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the action of the respondents is opposed to the principles of natural justice and the members of the petitioner-sangham will be put to serious loss if they are evicted from their respective places in the weekly santha (market) without providing them any alternative places to do business. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545 : ( AIR 1986 SC 180 ). That was a case, under public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, concerning forcible eviction and removal of hutments, erected by pavement and slum dwellers, by the Bombay Municipal Corporation. That was a case, under public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, concerning forcible eviction and removal of hutments, erected by pavement and slum dwellers, by the Bombay Municipal Corporation. In the factual background of that case, the Apex Court, apart from dealing with the question of maintainability of the writ petition by Olga Tellis, a Journalist, in the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution, dealt with several aspects, and ultimately held that the Government is obliged to act upon its assurance regarding provision of alternative accommodation to the evicted persons. The facts of that decision are entirely different from the case on hand. That decision is in no way helpful to the petitioner herein, because - the members of the petitioner-sangham are businessmen; the contractor, to whom the members of the petitioner-sangham are alleged to be paying the fee, agreed to the stipulation at the time of auction of leasehold rights (to conduct the market) that he shall not raise any objection for shifting the present market to some other place and he shall not also obstruct any constructions to be made in the market by the municipality. Moreover, it would be convenient for the petitioners as well as the municipality to shift the present market to some other place till completion of constructions in the present place of market. Otherwise, it would be difficult for the members of the petitioner sangham to carry on their business simultaneously when the municipality is going on with the construction work in the present place of market, and equally it would be difficult for the municipality to carry on and complete the constructions in the market if the members of the petitioner-sangham continue to do business simultaneously when constructions are going on in the market. ( 5 ) IN Grandhi Ramakoteswara Rao v. Govt. of A. P. (1996) 4 ALT 909 , this Court held that establishment of market at a particular place is within the discretion of the municipality and the Court will not interfere with the said discretion unless any provision of law is violated. ( 5 ) IN Grandhi Ramakoteswara Rao v. Govt. of A. P. (1996) 4 ALT 909 , this Court held that establishment of market at a particular place is within the discretion of the municipality and the Court will not interfere with the said discretion unless any provision of law is violated. ( 6 ) IT is the duty of the municipality to provide amenities to the public and while doing so if a little inconvenience or hardship is caused to the members of the petitioner-sangham, that too for a temporary period, this Court should not interfere with the genuine and bona fide action of the authorities keeping in view the larger interest of the public. From the material on record, it would appear that the intention of the municipality is to provide a municipal shopping complex with all facilities and amenities at one place, and that the contractor made an unsuccessful attempt to get an order of injunction to stall the constructions by approaching the civil Court. This is not a fit case for interference by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, moreso, to stall development activity, which is intended for the benefit of the public at large. Moreover, the members of the petitioner-sangham cannot legitimately make out any actionable grievance to maintain this writ petition. There is no merit in this writ petition. ( 7 ) FOR the aforementioned reasons, this writ petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Needless to state that the interim order granted on 29-9-1999 shall stand vacated. No costs. Petition dismissed.