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2001 DIGILAW 831 (MAD)

A. Rajangam v. Mohammed Hani and another

2001-07-31

N.K.JAIN, P.THANGAVEL

body2001
N.K.Jain, C.J.: This writ appeal is filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 2.12.1999 in W.P. No.16835 of 1999 wherein the learned single Judge had dismissed the petition upholding the order of the learned Principal District Judge, Cuddalore dated 4.10.1999 in O.P. No.15 of 1999. 2. The appellant was elected as the Chairman of the Vridhachalam Municipality in 1996. The first respondent filed a petition in O.P. No.15 of 1999 under Sec.51(1) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred as Act) to decide about the disqualification of the appellant under Sec.50(1)(d) of the said Act on the ground that the undivided son and mother of the appellant were registered contractors of the said Municipality on and from 25.10.1996, when the appellant was elected as the Chairman, due to which, the appellant had acquired the subsisting contract with the Vridhachalam Municipality and so, he is liable to be disqualified. 3. After trial, the trial Court allowed the petition holding that the appellant is disqualified from holding the post of Chairman of the Vridhachalam Municipality because he has right in the joint family business. 4. The appellant filed writ petition challenging the order of the trial Court. 5. A learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition as stated above. Hence, this writ appeal. 6. This Court, while admitting the appeal granted status quo on 3.4.2000 and it was made absolute by order dated 26.4.2001. 7. The Acting Chairman of the Vridhachalam Municipality has come forward with impleading petition in C.M.P. No.5568 of 2000 contending that the appellant had wrongly assumed office though he had lost the right on 4.10.1999 and hence, she has to be impleaded as a respondent in this petition. This C.M.P. is allowed and the petitioner is impleaded as the third respondent in the writ appeal. 8. Mr.K.Alagirisamy, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contended that the learned single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground different from the one arrived at by the trial Court. He also submitted that the observation of the learned single Judge on sharing of common kitchen by the son and the father is contrary to the evidence adduced before the lower Court. He also submitted that the observation of the learned single Judge on sharing of common kitchen by the son and the father is contrary to the evidence adduced before the lower Court. Ultimately, he submitted that the writ petition ought to have been allowed when there is no evidence about the interest of the appellant in the business of his son that too when the trial Court had not adverted to the contention of the appellant that he was elected by the resolution of the Municipality, to which the first respondent was the signatory and thereby, estopped from questioning his election as the Chairman. 9. On the other hand, Mr.K.Vijayan, learned senior counsel for the first respondent, submitted that the learned single Judge was right in dismissing the petition as both the son and father had shared common interest. He contended that when both of them are living together, it cannot be said that the father had no interest in the son. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the writ appeal. 10. The trial Court had come to the conclusion as stated above that the appellant is liable to be disqualified because of his right in the family business. However, though the learned single Judge upheld the order of the trial Court, he did so on the ground that the appellant had interest in the business. In his order, the learned Single Judge had observed that a person holding the public office should be above suspicion and the argument that he had no interest in the business of his son, cannot be accepted and relied the decisions of the Apex Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 236: 1954 S.C.J. 315 and Konappa v. Vishwanath, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 447. Moreover, merely because the first respondent before the trial Court had been a signatory in the resolution electing the appellant as Chairman, he cannot be prevented from challenging the election, as he might not have been aware about the appellant’s interest at the time of passing resolution. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 12. The question that the appellant’s son had contractual relations with the Municipality is not disputed. 13. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 12. The question that the appellant’s son had contractual relations with the Municipality is not disputed. 13. The only question to be considered in this appeal is whether the trial Court and the learned single Judge have committed error in holding that the contractual relations would attract the provisions of Sec.50(1)(d) of the Act. 14. It is settled law of interpretation of Statute that a provision of the Act should be read as a whole and to be construed with reference to other provisions of the Act to make the Act, a consistent one. On such a reading, any construction, which would bring any inconsistency or repugnancy between different Sections, rather between different sub-sections, should be avoided. It is also settled that if the language used in that particular section is clear, explicit and unambiguous and a bare reading of it conveys the simple and direct meaning, in undisputed form, the Court must give effect to it, for the words of a Statute speak the intention of the legislators who legislated it. Keeping that in mind, if we analyse the provisions of the Act, it could be seen that Sec.50(1)(d) of the Act reads that a Chairman or Councillor shall cease to hold his office if he acquires any interest in any subsisting contract made with or work being done for the council except as a shareholder. Sec.49(2)(c) of the Act reads that a person shall be disqualified for election as a Chairman or election as a Councillor if such person is, at the date of nomination or election, interested in subsisting contract made with or any work being done for, the Municipal Council, except as a shareholder. 15. The gist of the argument advanced before us is that there is no fact finding that the father has no interest even in a HUF business and in the absence of any such evidence, it cannot be held so. On a cursory perusal of the Act, as discussed, we are of the view that the main object of the Act is to check that an elected person should not have any subsisting interest in the contract. On a cursory perusal of the Act, as discussed, we are of the view that the main object of the Act is to check that an elected person should not have any subsisting interest in the contract. So, from the simple meaning, it is clear that the person, who is in HUF, cannot say that he has no interest despite the fact that it is a coparcenary business. Further, in the absence of any evidence or material that the father, who is the Chairman or the Councillor, is a sleeping partner and has nothing to do with the HUF business, the argument that holding disqualification is bad in the absence of material with different finding, cannot be accepted. The provisions of the Act cannot be read that an elected person having subsisting right can take advantage and to continue in the post. 16. In the facts of the given case, as discussed, on consideration, we do not find any ground to differ from the result holding him disqualified. We do not find any error or illegality in the orders as discussed. This writ appeal is dismissed. Connected C.M.Ps. are dismissed and the stay is vacated.