P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal is filed against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge in a. S. NO. 1729/83 dated 28-7-1992 reversing the judgment in O. S. No. 190/72 on the file of additional Subordinate Judge Guntur dated 23-6-1983. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff in the suit and the respondent in the appeal is the appellant in the present Letters Patent Appeal and 2nd defendant-appellant is the 1st respondent and 1st defendant is the 2nd respondent and since the appellant died, in C. M. P. No. 10274/96, appellants 2 to 6 were brought on record. For the purpose of convenience the parties are referred to as arrayed in the suit. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff filed O. S. No. 190/72 on the file of Additional Subordinate Judge, guntur for partition of the plaint schedule properties into two equal shares and to allot one such share and a preliminary decree was passed on 14-2-1977 in respect of Item nos. 2 and 3 and the suit was dismissed as far as Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule is concerned. The 2nd defendant in the suit is claiming exclusive right, title and possession over Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule property. The petitioner carried the matter in appeal and the matter was remanded with a direction to decide the question whether the 2nd defendant had acquired title to Item no. 1 of the plaint schedule property by adverse possession and after remand, the trial Court decreed the suit on 23-6-1983 regarding Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule holding that the 2nd defendant is in permissive possession and hence the plea of adverse possession is not sustainable. The 2nd defendant filed A. S. No. 1729/83 and the learned Single Judge after considering the oral and documentary evidence allowed the appeal on 28-7-1992 and deleted Item No. 1 from the preliminary decree and aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed the present letters Patent Appeal. ( 4 ) IN the Court of first instance. P. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and D. Ws. 1 to 7 were examined on behalf of the defendants and Exs. A-1 to a-31, X-1, B-1 to B-15 were marked. The suit was decreed on the ground of permissive possession and the plea of adverse possession raised by the 2nd defendant was negatived. P. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined on behalf of the plaintiff and D. Ws. 1 to 7 were examined on behalf of the defendants and Exs. A-1 to a-31, X-1, B-1 to B-15 were marked. The suit was decreed on the ground of permissive possession and the plea of adverse possession raised by the 2nd defendant was negatived. ( 5 ) NOW, the only question that is to be considered is whether the 2nd defendant had acquired title to Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule property by adverse possession. In other words, since the exclusive possession of the 2nd defendant relating to Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule is not in dispute, the question is whether the plaintiff, under the guise of claiming the relief of partition, can eject or throw-out the 2nd defendant from item No. 1 of the plaint schedule property. ( 6 ) HEARD both sides. Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, the learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff had vehemently contended that the trial Court after elaborate discussion of both oral and documentary evidence recorded a finding that the possession of the 2nd defendant relating to item No. 1 is only permissive and permissive possession will never become adverse possession. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on V. Muthiah Filial (died) and others v. Vedambal and others, The State bank of Travancore v. Arvindan Kunj panicker and others. The learned Counsel also contended that in a Letters Patent appeal, the whole decree lies open and there can be re-appreciation of both fact and law and relied upon decision of Supreme Court in Smt. Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao and another. The learned Counse1 making elaborate submissions had taken us through the respective pleadings and also evidence and further had drawn our attention to the relevant findings 6f the trial Court and of the learned Single Judge. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that the learned Single judge had not adverted to certain of the aspects and had reversed the well-considered judgment of Court of the first instance. The learned Counsel also had contended that plea of adverse possession is a mixed question of fact and law and not a pure question of law and the appellate Court should have been slow in disturbing the fact finding relating to permissive possession given by the Court of first instance. The learned Counsel also had contended that plea of adverse possession is a mixed question of fact and law and not a pure question of law and the appellate Court should have been slow in disturbing the fact finding relating to permissive possession given by the Court of first instance. The learned Counsel also had placed strong reliance on Exs. A-1, 4 and 5 and had drawn our attention to the evidence of D. W. 1 and also the relevant paragraphs i. e. , paragraphs 4 and 5 of the written statement of the 2nd defendant, and had pointed out several inconsistencies and improbabilities in the defence of the 2nd defendant. ( 7 ) SRI Suresh, representing Sri Prasad, the learned Counsel for the 2nd defendant had contended that the plea of tenancy set up by the plaintiff was disbelieved. The learned counsel also had drawn our attention to the pleadings of the 1st and the 2nd defendants, as well and from the pleadings it appears that the 1st defendant in a way had supported the case of the 2nd defendant. The earned counsel also had contended that Kotaiah, the original owner was alive even till September 1972 and though he was alive by the date of institution of the suit deliberately he was not impleaded as a party. The learned Counsel also had submitted that the plaintiff and the 1st defendant did not get any sale deed in pursuance of Ex. A-1 and hence on the strength of such a document, by virtue of which no title passes in favour of the parities, the plaintiff cannot claim any right over Item no. 1 of the plaint schedule. The learned counsel also had pointed out that the possession is from the year 1936 onwards and the mother of the 2nd defendant died in 1941 or 1942 and thus the possession is uninterrupted, continuous and without any disturbance whatsoever to the knowledge of one and all including Kotaiah and also the plaintiff and the 1st defendant as well, and hence in the facts and circumstances of the case and also in the light of the oral and the documentary evidence, the plea of adverse possession by the 2nd defendant is well substantiated and the learned Single Judge had arrived at correct conclusion, which need not be disturbed by this Court while exercising the Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on K. V. Sreenivasa Rao v. Special court under A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and others with regard to the aspect of limitation and the question of adverse possession. ( 8 ) HAVING heard both sides at length and in detail, we now proceed to deal with a few facts, which may be relevant for the purpose of deciding the appeal. One Madisetti kotaiah is the original owner of Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule and he purchased this property along with Item No. 2 of the plaint schedule under a registered sale deed ex. A-5, dt. 16-9-1941. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant are the daughters-in-law of the said Madisetti Kotaiah. The 2nd defendant is the daughter s son of Madisetti Kotaiah. Tirupathamma was the wife of Kotaiah and her elder sister was one Pasupuleti nagaratnamma. The 2nd defendant s father sitaramaiah who was a resident of reddypalem near Chebrolu of Tenali Taluq died in the year 1936 and by then the 2nd defendant was only two years old and kotaiah brought his daughter venkatasubbamma and the 2nd defendant to his house in the year 1936 and kept them in his house and thereafter under Ex. A-5 he purchased the suit schedule Item No. 1 vacant site, on 16-9-1941 and the mother of the defendant died in the year 1942 and the wife of Kotaiah died in the year 1951 and tirupathamma, the elder sister of Pasupuleti nagaratnamma died in the year 1966 and madisetti Kotaiah died in the year 1972. It is the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff and the 1st defendant had purchased Item Nos. 1 to 3 of the plaint schedule from their father- in-law Kotaiah under an agreement of sale ex. A-1 having paid the total consideration and Kotaiah promised to execute a sale deed after discharge of certain debts specified in ex. A-1 and the debts also had been discharged in 1956 and under Ex. A-4 dated 20-1-1956 a delivery receipt also was executed by Kotaiah in their favour. The plaintiff also refers to certain proceedings to which the 2nd defendant is not a party. A-1 and the debts also had been discharged in 1956 and under Ex. A-4 dated 20-1-1956 a delivery receipt also was executed by Kotaiah in their favour. The plaintiff also refers to certain proceedings to which the 2nd defendant is not a party. It is the case of the plaintiff that both herself and the 1st defendant continued to be joint till 1969 and in the year 1969 some misunderstandings arose between them and on 28-1-1969 they effected partition of their properties and got executed a partition deed under Ex. A-7 and in the said partition, the plaint schedule properties were kept joint and they were not divided. Hence there was exchange of notices and the 2nd defendant gave a reply notice under Ex. A-10 setting up title to the property. The 1st and the 2nd defendants also filed written statements. It was specifically stated by the 2nd defendant that Kotaiah never executed the alleged agreement of sale and the 2nd defendant also denied the possession of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant over Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule, at any point of time and further stated that even otherwise he is not bound by such agreement. The plea of tenancy pleaded by the plaintiff also had been specifically denied and he had specifically stated that he had never paid rents to the 1st defendant at any point of time. It is his further case that his grand father brought him and his mother after the death of his father and he received rs. 250/- from his paternal uncle and his grandfather had undertaken to develop the said amount and offered the same after the 2nd defendant attaining the majority and the said amount was never paid to him. But on consideration of receiving Rs. 250. 250/- from his paternal uncle and his grandfather had undertaken to develop the said amount and offered the same after the 2nd defendant attaining the majority and the said amount was never paid to him. But on consideration of receiving Rs. 250. 00, the said kotaiah had given Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule which was a vacant site and put him in possession of the property through his mother and his mother had got a thatched house constructed and began living in it and pasupuleti Nagaratnamma who had no children also had been living in the same house looking after the 2nd defendant and his mother and since his mother died at early age, Nagaratnamma brought him up and in the place of the thatched house, in or around 1964, the 2nd defendant constructed a pucca tiled house removing the thatched house with his own earnings and he has been living with his family and his name was also mutated and he was recognized as the absolute owner of Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule property in Municipal property tax register and all this was to the knowledge of one and all, including the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, and at no point of time these parties have raised their little finger and at this distant point of time after he had perfected his title by adverse possession as well because of the long, continuous and uninterrupted possession, now the plaintiff intends to lay a false claim in pursuance of ex. A-1 dated 30-1-1954, certified copy of the sale agreement alleged to have been executed by Kotaiah. ( 9 ) IT is pertinent to note that the written statement of the 1st defendant is almost on the same lines as that of the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff is claiming interest in Item no. 1 of the plaint schedule property on the strength of Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-1 is only an agreement of sale and hence no title had passed either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the 1st defendant in respect of Item no. 1 of the plaint schedule. The plaintiff is claiming right of partition only in pursuance of Ex. A-1 and not de hors of it and not as a heir of Kotaiah. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant are also daughters-in-law of kotaiah. 1 of the plaint schedule. The plaintiff is claiming right of partition only in pursuance of Ex. A-1 and not de hors of it and not as a heir of Kotaiah. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant are also daughters-in-law of kotaiah. There is some material to show that ex. A-1 was brought into existence to avoid certain creditors. The plaintiff has no legal right to enforce partition on the strength of ex. A-1. At this juncture, it may be relevant to look into Section 53-A of the Transfer of property Act, which reads as follows:53-A. Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefore by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof. In Delhi Motor Co. and others v. U. A. Basrurkar (dead) by his L. Rs. and others, the Apex Court observed that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is available only as a defence and cannot be invoked for enforcing rights under an unregistered lease. Though the relief claimed in the suit is one of partition, as far as the 2nd defendant is concerned, though he is related, his status should be treated as that of a stranger to the family of Kotaiah. Though the relief claimed in the suit is one of partition, as far as the 2nd defendant is concerned, though he is related, his status should be treated as that of a stranger to the family of Kotaiah. The daughters-in-law also are claiming right over Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule on the strength of Ex. A-1. Virtually, the relief prayed for by the plaintiff is the relief of ejectment as against the 2nd defendant who claims exclusive ownership and possession, and it is needless to mention that the burden is always on the plaintiff to establish such a claim. This aspect is also relevant for the purpose of deciding the question of plea of adverse possession. ( 10 ) NOW, coming to the plea of adverse possession, the learned Single Judge after going through the oral and documentary evidence had given a finding that the plea of adverse possession is substantiated and the possession of the 2nd defendant cannot be termed as permissive possession. It is relevant to mention here that the possession of Item No. 1 from 1936, or at any rate from 1941, is not in dispute at all. It is also not in dispute that in the year 1964 or 1965 the thatched house was removed and the 2nd defendant constructed a pucca tiled house and since for thatched house, tax will not be collected, there cannot be tax receipts for such a house. In Ambika Prasad Thakur and others vs. Ram Ekbal Rai (dead) by his Legal representatives, the Apex Court held that if a thing or state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time, both forwards and backwards, may sometimes be drawn. In the present case, the possession of the 2nd defendant for a long time is not in dispute. The very fact that Nagaratnamma was living with the 2nd defendant or certain stray admissions made by the 2nd defendant in this regard, may not in any way alter the situation. It is no doubt true that permissive possession may not amount to dispossession and such possession may not become adverse unless adverse title is asserted by the opposite party. The very fact that Nagaratnamma was living with the 2nd defendant or certain stray admissions made by the 2nd defendant in this regard, may not in any way alter the situation. It is no doubt true that permissive possession may not amount to dispossession and such possession may not become adverse unless adverse title is asserted by the opposite party. In the "law of adverse Possession", 4th Edition, by sri P. S. Narayana, one of us at Page-51 the following opinion had been made on this aspect in the light of the relevant case law on the point. "permissive possession may not amount to dispossession nor such possession will become adverse unless adverse title is asserted by such person in possession to the knowledge of the real owners for more than 12 years. Where the origin of entry is permission there is a presumption that possession is permissive. The onus of proof of adverse possession is on the person setting up the plea. Where the defendant club claimed title over a portion of the suit property by adverse possession but failed to prove hostile animus for more than the knowledge of plaintiff or his predecessor in interest, possession of the defendant was presumed to be permissive in nature, permission possession will be never adverse unless it is proved that adverse title was asserted. The requirement that specific plea regarding adverse possession is to be raised and evidence to be lead is a requirement in law since all possessions are not adverse possession. A mere permissive possession is not adverse. A lessee continuing in possession after expiry of lease can be said to be in permissive possession of the property. Permission possession will be never adverse unless assertion of hostile title in open. Mere possession for a long time does not convert permissive possession into adverse possession unless it is established to be adverse. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession. "in the decision cited supra, it was held that permissive possession does not become hostile till there is an assertion of an adverse possession to the knowledge of the owner. The permissive character of the possession can be inferred from the attending circumstances even without direct evidence. "in the decision cited supra, it was held that permissive possession does not become hostile till there is an assertion of an adverse possession to the knowledge of the owner. The permissive character of the possession can be inferred from the attending circumstances even without direct evidence. If possession is found to be permissive at the inception, the possessor cannot prescribe or sustain title or claim adversely to the grantor of the possession. In Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, the Apex Court held that for proof of adverse possession, possession must be open and without any attempt at concealment, but it is not necessary however that possession must be so effective so as to bring it to the specific knowledge of the owner. It is no doubt true that normally permissive possession cannot be treated as adverse unless the possession is hostile. In the present case, the point for consideration is whether the long, uninterrupted and continuous possession of the 2nd defendant can be termed as only permissive possession in the facts and circumstances of the case or it falls under the concept of adverse possession by virtue of which it can be said that the 2nd defendant acquired title to the property and consequently his possession cannot be disturbed. ( 11 ) THE most crucial aspect is that the plaintiff had pleaded tenancy and though the 2nd defendant specifically denied the same, the plea could not be substantiated and both the Courts had concurrently disbelieved the plea of tenancy and it being a finding of fact arrived at by both the Courts below on the strength of both oral and the documentary evidence, we are not inclined to disturb that finding of fact in the present Letters Patent appeal. When the plaintiff failed to establish the plea of tenancy, can it be said that even then the possession of the 2nd defendant can be styled as permissive possession ? We are of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the possession of the 2nd defendant is only permissive possession and necessarily we have to concur with the finding of the learned Single Judge that the 2nd defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession. We are of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the possession of the 2nd defendant is only permissive possession and necessarily we have to concur with the finding of the learned Single Judge that the 2nd defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession. It is not in dispute that the mother of the 2nd defendant along with the 2nd defendant, and subsequent to her death, the 2nd defendant, has been in possession of the plaint schedule property from 1936 onwards, and at any rate from the year 1941 or 1942. The 2nd defendant had taken a categorical stand at paragraphs 5 and 6 of his written statement and had specifically stated that neither the plaintiff nor the 1st defendant have any manner of right or title or interest or possession in Item no. 1 of the plaint schedule property at any point of time and even otherwise this defendant has perfected his title over Item no. l of the plaint schedule property by adverse possession as well. This plea taken by him had been substantiated by both oral and documentary evidence. The 2nd defendant was examined as D. W-1 and had specifically stated how his family has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property for such a long time and how he had prescribed his title by adverse possession. The stand of the plantiff that since the construction of the tiled house was made in the year 1965 or 1966 and since the suit was instituted in the year 1972, it should be taken that the suit is within the period of limitation and it cannot be said that the 1st defendant perfected his title by adverse possession, cannot be accepted especially in the light of the evidence of D. Ws. 1 to 7 and also the specific stand taken by the 1st defendant in the written statement coupled with the documentary evidence Exs. B-3 to b-15. It is no doubt true that Ex. B-3 and the other documents are of the year 1968 and onwards. It is pertinent to note that as far as the prior period is concerned, since there was only a thatched house there is no question of collection of any tax as such. B-3 to b-15. It is no doubt true that Ex. B-3 and the other documents are of the year 1968 and onwards. It is pertinent to note that as far as the prior period is concerned, since there was only a thatched house there is no question of collection of any tax as such. But the fact remains that the possession of the 2nd defendant even prior thereto is not in dispute. The only contention is that he was continuing in the plaint schedule property as a tenant of the plaintiff and the 1 st defendant and the 1st defendant has been collecting the rents. As already stated supra, the concept of tenancy had been disbelieved. In the light of the said facts and circumstances, it can be taken that the possession of the 1st (sic. 2nd) defendant had commenced even from the year 1936 or at any rate from 1941 or 1942. In fact, the learned Single Judge while dealing with the evidence of P. W. 1 and certain other circumstances had observed as follows:". . . . . . . . . . THE evidence of P. W. I, the husband of the plaintiff, would show that no tax was imposed by the Gram panchayat for a thatched house and so the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that even though the mother of the second defendant constructed a thatched house even prior to 1941, there cannot be any evidence to show that they were paying house tax to the gram Panchayat. The facts that the second defendant and his mother constructed a thatched house some tie prior to 1941 and they were living in that house and after the death of the mother of the second defendant, the second defendant was living in that house along with one Nagaratnamma and her husband; later on the second defendant constructed a tiled house in place of the thatched house and paying house-tax in his own right, would show that the second defendant and his mother have been in possession of the suit property in their own right for over 30 years. Since the plaintiff case that the second defendant is a tenant of the property was disbelieved. I am unable to accept the contention that the second defendant and his mother were living in the suit house by way of permissive possession. Since the plaintiff case that the second defendant is a tenant of the property was disbelieved. I am unable to accept the contention that the second defendant and his mother were living in the suit house by way of permissive possession. Therefore I agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the second defendant and his mother prescribed title by way of adverse possession and the plaintiff is not entitled for partition of the Item no. 1 of the suit property. "thus, the learned Single Judge had given cogent and convincing reasons while arriving at the conclusion relating to the plea of adverse possession. Apart from it, ex. X-1, the entry in Public Demand Register also supports the case of the 2nd defendant. Here itself it is very relevant to note that kotaiah had never raised his little finger and even if the date of Ex. A-1 is taken into consideration, inasmuch as the plea of tenancy was disbelieved by both the Courts in view of the continuous and uninterrupted possession of the 2nd defendant, it can be said that his plea of adverse possession is substantiated. It is pertinent to note that the dispute is not between Kotaiah and the 2nd defendant. The dispute is raised by the daughter-in-law of Kotaiah in pursuance of ex. A-1 which does not create any enforceable right at all either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the 1st defendant. Further, the mere fact that there is no specific overt act of denying the title of the true owner for the commencement of the period to substantiate the plea of adverse possession may not be a relevant factor in view of the long and continuous possession and in the light of the overwhelming oral and documentary evidence on behalf of the 2nd defendant. The ratio of the decision cited supra in fact supports the view taken by us in this regard. It is again interesting to note that except P. W. 1 before remand and P. W. 2 after remand, i. e. , husband and wife, there is no other independent evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiff. This aspect also shows that absolutely the suit of the plaintiff claiming relief of partition relating to Item no. 1 of the plaint schedule is not a bonafide one. This aspect also shows that absolutely the suit of the plaintiff claiming relief of partition relating to Item no. 1 of the plaint schedule is not a bonafide one. Hence, for the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned single Judge had correctly arrived at the conclusion on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence that the 2nd defendant was able to substantiate his plea of adverse possession and consequently his prescriptive title relating to Item No. 1 of plaint schedule property is to be upheld. ( 12 ) THUS, for the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in the Letters Patent appeal and accordingly it is dismissed. But in view of the close relationship between the parties, each party to bear their own costs.