S. B. SINHA, CJ. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 3. 12. 1992 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the appellant-petitioner herein was dismissed. ( 2 ) THE appellant had joined the service of the State Bank of India in the year 1967 as a Clerk. During the period 1973 to 1975 when he was working as such in Kurnool bazaar Branch, Kurnool disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. He was placed under suspension on 11. 7. 1975 and a charge-sheet was issued on 23. 10. 1975 framing four charges. Criminal proceedings were also initiated in C. C. Nos. 151, 152 and 153 of 1978 on the file of the Additional judicial Magistrate of I Class, Kurnool in relation to charges 1,3 and 4. By reason of proceedings dated 3. 10. 1978, however, he was reinstated into service pending enquiry into the charges without prejudice to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. The petitioner was acquitted of all the charges by the criminal Court on 20. 3. 1981 and the appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed on 22. 12. 1982. In view of the acquittal recorded by the criminal Court and confirmed by the appellate Court, the respondents in respect of charges 1, 3 and 4 ordered no further enquiry. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER another charge-sheet dated 19. 10. 1985 was issued consisting of two charges of which charge No. 2 relates to the earlier charge-sheet dated 23. 10. 1975 and the petitioner was again placed under suspension w. e. f. 26. 10. 1985. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the appellant was appointed as Head Clerk on 5. 4. 1983 and the said appointment was regularised w. e. f. 25-10-1983. After the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, he was imposed the punishment of withdrawal of special allowance (Head Clerk allowance) as provided in Paragraph 521 (5) (f) of Sastry Award by order dated 31. 3. 1988 of the 1st respondent which was confirmed in appeal by the 2nd respondent on 2. 7. 1988. The appellant challenged the same in the W. P. No. 13011 of 1988 and the learned single Judge by the order impugned herein declined to interfere with the matter. ( 4 ) BY the charge-sheet dated 26. 10. 1985, the following two charges were framed against the appellant:"1. 7. 1988. The appellant challenged the same in the W. P. No. 13011 of 1988 and the learned single Judge by the order impugned herein declined to interfere with the matter. ( 4 ) BY the charge-sheet dated 26. 10. 1985, the following two charges were framed against the appellant:"1. It is alleged that you have surreptiously taken into your possession the draft bearing No. BB. 255680, dated 19. 2. 1973 for Rs. 500/- issued by Kurnool Bazaar branch on Hyderabad in favour of Syed abdul Quayyum Husandain Sahib and encashed the same on 2. 3. 1973 by forging the payee s signature 2. It is further alleged that during march, 1981, when you were working as a Clerk in the establishment section, you prepared the establishment register and included unauthorisedly three increments for yourself pertaining to the years 1976 to 1978, the period during which you were under suspension and drawn the increments although you are not entitled for the same as perk the reinstatement order served on you on 6th october, 1978. " ( 5 ) ON the 1st charge, the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the finding of the enquiry officer is based on no evidence. No appeal having been filed thereagainst by the Bank, the same had become final As regards the second charge, the learned single Judge upheld the finding of the enquiry officer and confirmed the punishment. The learned single Judge rejected the contention of the appellant that punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate. Aggrieved by that part of the order, the appellant preferred the present appeal. ( 6 ) EARLIER when this matter came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court, by order-dated 9. 10. 1996 it allowed the appeal in part in the following terms: considering the circumstances, we feel that when the authorities absolved the petitioner/ appellant from charge No. 1, it is needless to say that the petitioner is also entitled for full wages for the 1st suspension period. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part holding that the petitioner is entitled for full wages for the suspension period from 23. 10. 1975 to 3. 10. 1978 by excluding the subsistence allowance if any paid. It is also made clear that the period of first suspension shall be treated as duty period. In other respects, there is no interference. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part holding that the petitioner is entitled for full wages for the suspension period from 23. 10. 1975 to 3. 10. 1978 by excluding the subsistence allowance if any paid. It is also made clear that the period of first suspension shall be treated as duty period. In other respects, there is no interference. ( 7 ) THE appellant carried the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court in Civil appeal No. 3847 of 1999 and the Supreme court by order dated 16. 7. 1999 remanded the matter for disposal afresh on merits, which reads thus: briefly put, the facts are: the appellant was an employee of the State Bank of India. Two charges were levelled against him. An enquiry was held. He was found guilty of both the charges. The punishment imposed upon him was challenged by way of a writ petition. A learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the first charge was not proved, but that the second charge was proved. In regard to the second charge, he, however, upheld the punishment that had been imposed upon the appellant, namely, the withdrawal of special allowance (Head clerk allowance) as provided for in the shastri Award and the Desai Award. An appeal was filed by the appellant before the division Bench of the High Court. Necessarily what the Division Bench was required to consider was the correctness of the learned single Judge s judgment in relation to the second charge. However, the division Bench said: "the fact remains that the reversion of the petitioner pursuant to the charge No. 2 was confirmed by the learned single Judge and the same cannot be gone into in the present appeal. " (Emphasis supplied ). We are at a loss to understand why the only issue involved in the writ appeal could not be gone into and there is nothing in the impugned judgment to indicate why. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment and order are set aside and the writ appeal (Writ Appeal no. 256 of 1993) is restored to the file of the high Court to be heard and disposed of on merits. It is made clear that the wages that have been paid to the appellant shall not be disturbed. ( 8 ) MR. 256 of 1993) is restored to the file of the high Court to be heard and disposed of on merits. It is made clear that the wages that have been paid to the appellant shall not be disturbed. ( 8 ) MR. Srinivas learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, would submit that the learned single judge erred in holding that the allegations contained in charge No. 2 would amount to misconduct. Learned Counsel would contend that the appellant herein had proceeded on a reasonable basis that he was entitled to the increments for the three years as he had been reinstated into service. Mr. Srinivas would urge that even assuming that the appellant committed a mistake, the same does not constitute a misconduct particularly in view of the fact that the same was expressly or by necessary implication approved by the higher authorities. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Ram Singh Ex-Constable, (1992) 4 SCC 54 . ( 9 ) SRI Srinivasa Murthy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, on the other hand, would submit that the charges levelled against the appellant would come within the purview of Para 521 (4) (J) of Sastry award and as such a major punishment was imposed upon the appellant in terms of the said award as amended by memorandum of Settlement dated 1. 8. 1979, 31. 10. 1979 and 22. 11. 1979 cannot be said to be illegal. ( 10 ) THE enquiry officer in his report did not arrive at a finding that by reason of the aforementioned act on the part of the appellant herein any loss was caused to the respondent-bank. The finding of the enquiry officer is that the appellant has unauthorisedly drawn the increments for the period from 23. 10. 1975 to 3. 10. 1978 knowing fully well that he is not entitled therefor. ( 11 ) THE first question that arises for consideration in this appeal is, whether charge No. 2 would come within the purview of sub-paragraph (4) (j) of Para 521 of Sastry award. Sub-para 4 of Para 521 enumerates "gross misconduct". Clause (j) thereof reads thus: doing any act prejudicial to the interests of the bank, or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. Sub-para 4 of Para 521 enumerates "gross misconduct". Clause (j) thereof reads thus: doing any act prejudicial to the interests of the bank, or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. ( 12 ) A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision would clearly go to show that the expression "gross misconduct" principally refers to the act and omission on the part of an employee whose act is either prejudical to the interest of the bank or whose gross negligence or negligence would involve or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. In any event, the act of the employee must either be prejudical to the interests of the bank or the gross negligence or negligence on his part must involve or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. It is one thing to say that an employee has done something to which he is not entitled to do for his own benefit, but, it is another thing to say that by reason of such an act, the bank has seriously been prejudiced or suffered loss. The appellant herein had been allowed to continue to draw the increments. ( 13 ) HIS action may be unauthorised and would otherwise may constitute misconduct . But, having regard to the fact of the matter, we are of the opinion that the same does not come within the ambit of gross misconduct as mentioned in sub- paragraph 4 (j) of Para 521 of Sastry Award. It is not in dispute that in terms of sub- para (5) of Para 521 of the said award, an employee found guilty of gross misconduct may, inter alia, be imposed with a punishment of dismissal from service or warning or censure or have an adverse remark entered against him or fine or stoppage of increment or misconduct may be condoned and he may be discharged. The petitioner, therefore, was awarded a punishment for commission of gross misconduct. Gross misconduct having been enumerated as above, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent-bank to prove the same by adducing cogent evidence that his act of commission constitutes gross misconduct . In view of the facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the action on the part of the appellant does not amount to gross misconduct within the meaning of Para 521 of the Sastry Award. In view of the facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the action on the part of the appellant does not amount to gross misconduct within the meaning of Para 521 of the Sastry Award. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, we do not subscribe to the proposition putforth by Mr. Srinivas that the appellant had only committed a mistake, which does not amount to misconduct. The Enquiry Officer has clearly found that the action on the part of the appellant was wholly unauthorised and he committed the aforementioned irregularity knowing fully will that he is not entitled thereto. Such a unilateral act of drawal of increments in his favour to which he was not entitled to, in our opinion, would amount to misconduct. ( 15 ) IN State of Punjab v. Ram Singh ex-Constable, the Apex Court held: thus it could be seen that the word misconduct though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order. ( 16 ) THE aforementioned decision, therefore, runs counter to the submission of mr. Srinivas. Since the appellant was not authorised for such withdrawal of increments and particularly having regard to the fact that he did so knowing fully well that he was not authorised, the same, in our opinion, would amount to misconduct . ( 16 ) THE aforementioned decision, therefore, runs counter to the submission of mr. Srinivas. Since the appellant was not authorised for such withdrawal of increments and particularly having regard to the fact that he did so knowing fully well that he was not authorised, the same, in our opinion, would amount to misconduct . ( 17 ) FURTHER, in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 = (1996) 3 SCC 364 , the Apex Court referring to Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 Appeal Cases 40, and keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee enunciated, inter alia, the | following principles. (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this : procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under no notice , no opportunity and no hearing categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz. , whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. (4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived if, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar, 1994 AIR SCW 1050. The ultimate test is always the same viz. , test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action - the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and not adequate opportunity, i. e. , between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and not adequate opportunity, i. e. , between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing. " (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to ). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i. e. , in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem ). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the stand point of prejudice. ( 18 ) THE next question, however, which arises for consideration is as to whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner, can be sustained. The answer to the said question must be rendered in negative. Against the appellant two charges were framed. Charge no. 1 is very serious in nature and constitute a gross misconduct within the meaning of paragraph 521 of Sastry Award. The appellant could have been inflicted with the punishment of withholding of special allowance for the same. But the said punishment imposed upon him was by way of cumulative effect of both the charges 1 and 2. As noticed hereinbefore, admittedly, charge No. 1 had not been proved against the petitioner and the learned single Judge has recorded a categorical finding that the report of the enquiry officer is perverse. No appeal thereagainst had been preferred by the respondent herein. In this situation, we are of the opinion that the punishment imposed upon the appellant cannot also be sustained. ( 19 ) IN Binny Limited v. Their Workmen, air 1972 SC 1975 , the Apex Court held: although the enquiry officer found in fact that the respondent had behaved insolently towards the Warehouse Master, he did not come to the conclusion that this act of indiscipline on a solitary occasion was sufficient to warrant an order of dismissal. ( 19 ) IN Binny Limited v. Their Workmen, air 1972 SC 1975 , the Apex Court held: although the enquiry officer found in fact that the respondent had behaved insolently towards the Warehouse Master, he did not come to the conclusion that this act of indiscipline on a solitary occasion was sufficient to warrant an order of dismissal. He expressly recorded that the delinquent had been guilty of absenting himself without leave, that he had taken 25 days sick leave in a span of six months and that "much more than all this, he (the Warehouse Master) had let Kuppuswamy off only a month earlier for behaving insolently towards him purely because of request of the department workers representative" and it is in these circumstances that the Manager did not consider the delinquent to be a person fit to be retained in service. The language of the order leaves no doubt in our mind that it was the cumulative effect of the lapses on the part of the respondent that had resulted in the order of termination of service It was not a case where two separate charges had been framed against the delinquent and they were of such a serious nature that the finding of guilt on any one would warrant the dismissal of the delinquent from service. ( 20 ) AS the punishment was as a result of cumulative effect of finding the appellant guilty of both the charges, which are inseparable, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of punishment cannot be sustained. In any event, as the petitioner had not committed a gross misconduct within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 (j) of Para 521 of the Sastry Award, the punishment imposed upon the appellant must be held to be not sustainable. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the question of imposition of a minor punishment may be considered afresh by the disciplinary authority. ( 21 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is allowed in part and the judgment and order of the learned single Judge is set aside to the extent aforementioned. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.