ORDER S.R. Bannurmath, J.—This petition is filed under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings in CC. No. 4750 of 1998 on the file of II Additional C.M.M., Bangalore. The case in question in CC. No. 4750 of 1998 arises from registration of a case by Kumarswamy Layout Police Station in Crime No. 327 of 1996 for the offence under Section 395 Indian Penal Code. As the prosecution case discloses that on 5.11.1996 one Muter Ahmed S/o. Abdullah Basher lodged a report to the jurisdictional police against six accused namely Asia, Rizwan, Nasir, Anwar Pasha, Tanveer and Ali @ Mohammed Ali complaining that about a month prior to the date of lodging of the complaint that is 6.10.1996 there arouses a dispute between the aforesaid accused and himself in respect of purchase of a property and in this regard the accused took him to a place near Sarakki Gate and demanded a sum of Rs. 50,000/- from him and when the complainant questioned about the same, the accused Tanveer, Asif Pasha threatened him with his life by holding a knife at the complainant and as such being afraid of his life, Muneer Ahmed went to his house, brought the money and gave the same to the leader of the accused Tanveer. It is stated that being afraid of the notoriety of the accused he did not lodge any complaint immediately but thereafter on 5.11.1996 on coming to know that the leader Tanveer and his associates Asif @ Mohammed Ali @ Diwan Ali were arrested in another Dacoity case and on seeing them in jail he got the courage and lodged the complaint against the six accused. On the basis of this complaint the jurisdictional police registered a case in Crime No. 327 of 1996 and took up the investigation. After completion of the investigation they have filed a chargesheet on 30.3.1998 against all the six accused. The present Petitioner is shown as Accused No. 4 in the said chargesheet and he has been shown as absconding. As the other accused were apprehended and the fourth accused Rizwan was found absconding, in the chargesheet itself he was showed as absconding and as such the case against the said Rizwan-absconding accused was split up in CC. No. 4375 of 1998 and now numbered as 4756/98. It is to be noted that the case against other accused in SC. As the other accused were apprehended and the fourth accused Rizwan was found absconding, in the chargesheet itself he was showed as absconding and as such the case against the said Rizwan-absconding accused was split up in CC. No. 4375 of 1998 and now numbered as 4756/98. It is to be noted that the case against other accused in SC. No. 343/98 has ended in acquittal. 2. Now the grievance of the Petitioner is that neither he is the Accused No. 4 involved in the said case nor is he is any way connected with the complainant or the other accused. In this regard the learned Counsel brought to my notice the fact that the original Accused No. 4 Rizwan S/o. Abdul Khayam resident of No. 157, 9th Main, 34th Cross, Yarabnagar, Banashankari II Stage, Bangalore had infact on apprehending his arrest approached the Trial Court for releasing him on Anticipatory Bail under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure and on the same being rejected approached this Court in Crl.P. No. 1026 of 1997 which came to be allowed by this Court on 20.6.1997 and said Rizwan, S/o. Abdul Khayam was granted the relief by imposing certain conditions. It is submitted that when the investigating authority knew the fourth accused Rizwan S/o. Abdul Khyam (identified) and in view of the fact that certain stringent conditions while releasing him on Anticipatory Bail was granted there is no question of police reporting him as absconding while filing the chargesheet. It is submitted that absolutely no efforts have been carried out by the Police to search for the said Accused No. 4 Rizwan S/o. Abdul Khayum and simply absconding report as shown in the chargesheet has been filed. It is further submitted that taking disadvantage of the similarity of the name of the Petitioner being Muneer Ahmed Qureshi @ Rizwan the police are now making efforts to arrest the Petitioner and produce him in CC. No. 4750/98 and if he is the fourth accused named in the chargesheet. In this regard it is further contended that even though the alias name of the Petitioner is Rizwan, his full name is totally different that is Muneer Ahmed Qureshi and what is more important according to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is the father's name. No. 4750/98 and if he is the fourth accused named in the chargesheet. In this regard it is further contended that even though the alias name of the Petitioner is Rizwan, his full name is totally different that is Muneer Ahmed Qureshi and what is more important according to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is the father's name. It is brought to the notice that the name of the father of the Accused No. 4 as per the investigation material is Abdul Khayam and the name of the Petitioner's father is Muneer Ahmed Qureshi and his address is also totally different than what is implicated in the investigation material collected by the investigating agency. As such the learned Counsel submitted that this is totally a case of mistaken identity of the Petitioner and hence the proceedings and the investigation now carried out against the Petitioner are liable to be quashed. 3. Nextly it is contended that even if question of identity of the Petitioner as that of the Accused No. 4 can be a subject matter of evidence, nevertheless by taking into consideration the fact that the other co-accused of the Accused No. 4 who have been tried in Sessions Case No. 343/98 by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore have been given clean acquittal order. Taking me through the order of the learned Sessions Judge, it is contended that as the first informant Muneer Ahmed himself did not support the prosecution case and infact even denied such incident being taken place and also of his lodging first information. As such on appreciation of the other investigation material also the learned Sessions Judge found that prosecution has failed to prove the alleged offence against the accused and gave acquittal. It is admitted that the Judgment of the acquittal (which has become final as no appeal has been filed by the State). It is contended that even if the evidence of the complainant examined as PW-1 is considered and accepted as true and correct, then the entire evidence is inseparable evidence against all accused in the sense there cannot be any split up evidence so far as the acquitted accused are concerned and that against Accused No. 4 Rizwan @ Muneer Ahmed. It is contended that even if the evidence of the complainant examined as PW-1 is considered and accepted as true and correct, then the entire evidence is inseparable evidence against all accused in the sense there cannot be any split up evidence so far as the acquitted accused are concerned and that against Accused No. 4 Rizwan @ Muneer Ahmed. Hence relying upon pronouncements of this Court in unreported Judgment in Crl.P. No. 116/2001 dated 9.4.2001 which in turn relies upon the Judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Vs. State reported in 2000 (1) Crimes 73 , it is contended that as the evidence as adduced in the Sessions Case against all the accused persons being inseparable and indivisible the Accused No. 4 (Petitioner even assuming the identity as one and the same) in the split up case cannot be treated differently and as there is no prospect of conviction on such a material evidence and as such no purpose would be served by making the Petitioner to undergo the ordeal of the trial and at the end to get an order of acquittal. In this regard, the learned Counsel has also relied upon the observation of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, AIR 1977 SC 1489 and in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, AIR 1998 SC 128 . 4. On the other hand, Sri Prakash learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-Respondent vehemently argued that the filing of the petition for quashing the proceeding is pre-mature and not maintainable one. It is mainly contended that identity of the accused is subject matter of adducing evidence in the Trial Court and as the stage has not yet reached and as present investigation report and material discloses the Petitioner is the very person named as the Accused No. 4 in the case and as such on hair splitting considerations, it is not appropriate to quash the proceedings at the initial stage even before the commencement of trial by exercising inherent jurisdiction. It is also contended that exercise of inherent jurisdiction should be in exceptional case as laid down by the Apex Court in several decisions including Nagavva Vs. It is also contended that exercise of inherent jurisdiction should be in exceptional case as laid down by the Apex Court in several decisions including Nagavva Vs. Veeranna reported in 1976 SC 1947, State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal reported in 1992 SC 604 and the latest pronouncement of the Apex Court reported in 2001 SCW in the case of M. Krishnan Vs. Vijay Singh and Another. 5. I have heard the learned Counsels and perused the investigation material in detail. At the outset it is to be noted that prima facie there appears to be some confusion regarding the identity of Accused No. 4. If one peruses basically the first information report, the Accused No. 4 is simply shown as one Rizwan alleged to be associate by one Tanveer. Neither father's name is given no his usual place of residence is mentioned; similar is the case in respect of statements of other witnesses record. What is mainly striking is another person also bearing the same name Rizwan but father's name Abdul Khayam resident of Yarabnagar, Banashankari II Stage, has infact filed an application under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure seeking Anticipatory Bail, apprehending his arrest in the present case and who has been granted such relief by this Court on 20.6.1997 whereas the Petitioner's name is Muneer Ahmed Qureshi @ Rizwan S/o. Muneer Ahmed Qureshi resident of No. 12/1, Khazi Street, Basavanagudi. At this stage it has to be noted that the chargesheet in the present case has been filed on 30.3.1998 wherein the name of Accused No. 4 Rizwan @ Muneer @ Gaun Muneer. One fails to incident as to how the police machinery could simply and blindly say that the said accused is absconding especially when he was let on Anticipatory Bail by this Court with stringent conditions like giving attendance to the jurisdictional police everyday. If really the said Rizwan S/o. Muneer Ahmed Qureshi was the Accused No. 4 who is Rizwan S/o. Abdul Khayam who obtained Anticipatory Bail and did not adhere to the conditions imposed by this Court. The investigating agency should have taken appropriate steps of getting the Anticipatory Bail cancelled if really both Rizwans are one and the same. Surprisingly, it is not done. The investigating agency should have taken appropriate steps of getting the Anticipatory Bail cancelled if really both Rizwans are one and the same. Surprisingly, it is not done. On the other hand, having kept cool for almost a period of nine months one fine morning it appears that the investigating agency has only at filing chargesheet shown the present Petitioner as the said fourth accused Rizwan S/o. Abdul Khayam (S/o. Muneer Ahmed Quareshi) and the case thereafter got split up in CC. No. 4375/98 pending adjudication. I am constrained to hold that either this conduct of investigating agency is either negligent or totally deliberate attempt to either protect the original accused Rizwan S/o. Muneer Ahmed Qureshi or an attempt to involve the Petitioner whose name is totally different except the alias name. In this regard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner was asked to produce some documents to show what exactly the full name and address of the Petitioner and the learned Counsel has produced before the Court Cumulative Record of the Petitioner issued by the Department of Public Instructions as long back as in the year 1979. On perusal of the same the name of the Petitioner and his father name and the address shown in the cause title are one and the same and which in turn totally differs from the identity of the Accused No. 4 Rizwan S/o. Abdul Khayam. As such there is abundant doubt as to the identity of the Petitioner being one and the same as Accused No. 4 named in the case. Ofcourse, I hasten to point out at this stage itself that though normally question of identity has to be established during the trial but if one peruses the investigating material especially absence of any identification parade, total denial of lodging of complaint or even offence taking place by the first informant as deposed in the Trial Court. This in my view one of the grounds for doubting the correctness of the investigation itself. 6. Even otherwise, if for a moment it is held that the Petitioner is the same as the Accused No. 4 shown in the chargesheet and even then what is to be noted is the ultimate outcome of the case, even if the Petitioner is subjected to the trial. 6. Even otherwise, if for a moment it is held that the Petitioner is the same as the Accused No. 4 shown in the chargesheet and even then what is to be noted is the ultimate outcome of the case, even if the Petitioner is subjected to the trial. As pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and noted earlier, the case of the first informant Muneer Ahmed at the earliest point of time is that in respect of certain dispute over property-business. Tanveer and his five associates including one Rizwan accosted him on 6.10.1996 and demanded from him a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and in this regard he was threatened with his life by pointing knives by two of the accused. As such it is stated that being afraid of his life he went back to his house and gave the money demanded. On going through; the entire investigation material placed before the Court as well as the deposition of the first informer M.A. Qureshi as PW-1 recorded on 9.3.99 and the Judgment of the acquittal passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore in SC. No. 343/98 it is clear that the prosecution has totally failed in its attempt to bring home the charge against the four (1 to 3 and 5) accused who were tried before it. The Judgment of acquittal clearly shows that apart from the hostility on the part of the first informant (PW-1) there is absolutely no other material collected and produced by the investigation agency to connect all the accused with the very crime itself. The Trial Court has infact doubted as to whether such an incident took place at all. It is also not disputed by the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor that this Judgment of acquittal has not been challenged by the State by filing Criminal Appeal before this Court and as such it has become final. On perusal of the entire investigation material produced, I am of the view that the entire evidence and the case made out against group of accused when it is inseparable and indivisible and when the Court on full fledged trial holds majority of the accused as not guilty, case and evidence against the Petitioner even if he is subject to the trial cannot be different on the basis of the same evidence. In such a situation I am reminded of the observation of the Apex Court in the case State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy. The Apex Court while considering scope and jurisdiction of Sections 227 and 482 Code of Criminal Procedure has observed thus: In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. 7. The Apex Court in the land marked pronouncements in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal reported in 1992 SC 604 while considering in detail the scope and jurisdiction of Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure infact as though held that power under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly and in rare cases, nevertheless laid down certain guidelines under which the Courts can quash the proceedings under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. In my view the guidelines No. 1 and 5 are clearly attracted to the present case. The observation of the Apex Court in the case of Pepsi Food Limited (supra) in this regard are also worth noting. It is as under: Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. In my view the guidelines No. 1 and 5 are clearly attracted to the present case. The observation of the Apex Court in the case of Pepsi Food Limited (supra) in this regard are also worth noting. It is as under: Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal Law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. 8. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial. 9. In so far as the argument of the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor that merely because some of the accused are acquitted that does not mean that other accused should not be acquitted is concerned, the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Shri Sat Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1974 SC 294 is a guiding principle. In so far as the argument of the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor that merely because some of the accused are acquitted that does not mean that other accused should not be acquitted is concerned, the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Shri Sat Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1974 SC 294 is a guiding principle. It has been laid down that "there is no rule of law that if the Court acquits some of the accused on the evidence of a witness raising doubt with regard to them the other accused against whom there is absolute certainty about his complicity in the crime based on the remaining credible part of the evidence of that witness must be acquitted." Taking converse proposition of this in my view would be if the evidence alleged against the group of the accused is inseparable and indivisible one and if there is no individual complicity of an accused is shown prima facie then the Judgment of acquittal in respect of other accused in my view would certainly go to the rescue of the fourth accused also. 10. As noted the entire case of the prosecution as against the six accused is practically inseparable and indivisible one and especially when the Judgment of acquittal is passed when the complainant PW-1 himself has denied the entire incident itself or the role of the accused. This reasoning of acquittal would also definitely enure to the Petitioner. Even if the Petitioner is tried there cannot be any other material other than what is already produced and considered by the Trial Court. In such circumstances, it will be an exercise in futility to make the Petitioner to undergo the ordeal of crime and then to be acquitted as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pepsi Food Limited even assuming question of identity is established which is doubtful in my view. This would be practically an abuse of process of law. 11. After considering at length and giving my due consideration, in my view the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are to be accepted and proceedings are liable to be quashed. The proceedings in CC. No. 4750/98 (Crime No. 327/96) so far as the Petitioner is concerned are hereby quashed. In the result, petition is allowed.