I. M. QUDDUSI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision has been filed against the order dated 1. 1. 2000 passed by Upper Civil Judge (Senior Division) Vth, Unnao in Regular Suit Wo. 420 of 1997, Amin Sons v. Shyam Transport, by which valuation of said suit had been made at Rs. 3,19,916. 00 and direction had been Issued to the plaintiff-revisionist to deposit court-fee according to the said valuation. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the revisionist is a limited company, which is registered under the Companies Act. A Regular Suit bearing No. 420 of 1997 was filed by the revisionist for mandatory injunction, in which the following reliefs were sought : (1) A decree of mandatory injunction be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant and the defendant, its officers, employees, agents and representatives may kindly be directed either to return the goods, description of which are given in para 4 of the plaint In the perfect condition within stipulated time fixed by this Court or they should be directed to pay costs of the said goods along with Interest @ 24% p. a. with quarterly rests along with damages, otherwise they should be compelled to comply the decree. (2) The costs of the suit may kindly be awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant. (3) Any other suitable and proper relief which this Court may deem/think fit and proper may kindly be awarded in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendant. ( 3 ) IT was alleged in the suit that leather was sent to the purchaser, namely, A. C. M. E. Fabrics plast Company, Gwalior through defendant-transport company on different dates, the total amount of which comes to 3,19. 916. 00 and it was the duty on the shoulders of the defendants to deliver the consignment to the person concerned only after obtaining original papers from the purchaser, but they have delivered the said goods without obtaining the original bills from the purchaser, and purchaser also did not pay the price of the goods to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had neither received the payment of the said consignment nor the defendant had returned the said goods to the plaintiff, but they had delivered the same to the said purchaser without any information to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had neither received the payment of the said consignment nor the defendant had returned the said goods to the plaintiff, but they had delivered the same to the said purchaser without any information to the plaintiff. Hence the defendant and his officers, representatives, agents are liable either to return the goods to the plaintiff which were sent through them or to pay the price of the said goods along with interest and damages caused to the plaintiff due to their negligence and mala fide acts. On behalf of defendant, objections were filed to the effect that the suit was undervalued. ( 4 ) THE learned court below has given its finding to the effect that the valuation of the said suit should have been made, in accordance with the suit property, but the plaintiff had only paid Rs. 500 which is not sufficient and the court fee is liable to be paid, as the valuation of the goods mentioned in plaint is Rs. 3,19,916. 00 in respect of which a prayer has been made for returning the goods of movable property or an alternative relief for payment of goods along with interest at the rate of 24% p. a. along with damages. ( 5 ) HEARD learned counsel for the parties for admission. ( 6 ) A perusal of the relief claimed in the plaint shows that the revisionist has prayed for a decree of mandatory injunction and for direction to the defendant to return the goods in perfect condition, description of which has been given in para 4 of the plaint, but the other relief claimed is that for payment of the value of goods, the cost of which as mentioned in para 4 of the plaint is rs. 3,19,916. 00. Hence there is no doubt that the relief has been claimed by the revisionist-plaintiff for payment of Rs. 3,19,916. 00 along with interest @ 24% p. a. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the revisionist has placed the following case laws : state of U. P. v. Ramkrishan Barman (dead) by his legal representatives and Ors. AIR 1971 SC 87 , in which it has been held by the Honble Apex Court : "a decree for declaration of title to money or other property is not a decree for money or other property. AIR 1971 SC 87 , in which it has been held by the Honble Apex Court : "a decree for declaration of title to money or other property is not a decree for money or other property. In our Judgment, the expression "decree for money or other property" means only a decree for recovery of money or other property. It does not Include a decree concerning title to money or other property. It was urged that in any event the plaintiff had sued for adjudging void or voidable an "instrument", security money or other property having market value. But a decree in invitum is not an Instrument securing money or other property such a decree is a record of the formal adjudication of the Court relating to a right claimed by a party to a suit. It does not by its own secure money or property. A consent decree in certain cases may be regarded as an instrument securing money or other property, where the decree proceeds upon a contract which had that effect but that is only because a consent decree is a record of the contract between the parties to which is superadded the seal of the Court in our view the High Court was right in holding that the court-fee paid on the plaint was proper. It may be pointed that the plaintiff had claimed nothing more than a declaration with regard to certain properties. " hanuman Oil Industries v. Kanpur Electric Supply Administrator, 1983 All CJ 648, in which it has been held by this Court: "whatever little scope may have been therefor, a contrary view was clearly negatived by the supreme Court in its decision in the case of Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Chief inspector of Stamps, U. P. , AIR 1968 SC 102 . in which the decision of this Court was reversed. In that case the plaintiff sugar works had gone to court with the allegation that for the various reasons mentioned in the plaint, the provisions of the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and purchase) Act, 1953, the Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956 read with the U. P. Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the U. P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, IX of 1961 were void in so far as they permitted the defendant State of U. P. to realize sugarcane cess. It was asserted that the defendant-State was not entitled to realize any amount it was seeking to recover from the plaintiff and that it be restrained by an injunction from doing so. The view taken by this Court was that in effect the plaintiff was seeking a declaration about the void character of the aforesaid act, which were instruments securing money within the meaning of that term under Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court-fees Act, and they were liable, therefore, to pay court-fee on the footing that they were seeking a declaration coupled with a consequential relief. The Supreme Court took the view that for the relief sought by the sugar works, court-fee payable was to be calculated in accordance with Clause (b) of Sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7. What the Supreme Court observed In paragraph 4 was : it is true that for purposes of the Court Fees Act, it is the substance and not the form which has to be considered while deciding which particular provision of the Act applies. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that the actual relief prayed for in the plaint was an injunction restraining the State and its authorities to realize from the appellant-company the aforesaid cess and the purchase tax. It is clear from the plaint when read as a whole that though the appellant company alleged that the Acts were void and therefore, non est for the reasons set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void. The plaint proceeds on the footing that the said Acts were void and that therefore, the State of U. P. or its authorities had no power to realize the said tax and the said cess. It may be that while deciding whether to grant the injunction or not, the Court might have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of the said Acts. But that must happen in almost every case where an injunction is prayed for. It may be that while deciding whether to grant the injunction or not, the Court might have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of the said Acts. But that must happen in almost every case where an injunction is prayed for. If for the mere reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a prayer for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the consequential relief is Injunction or where injunction is prayed for would have to be treated as falling under Clause (a) of Sub-sections (iv-A) of Section 7 and in that view Clause (b) of Sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7 would be superfluous. " buckeye Machines (P.) Ltd. v. Canara Bank and Anr. , 1999 (1) AWC 421 : 2000 (2) JCLR 223 (All), in which case learned counsel for the revisionist had placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamps. U. P. , AIR 1968 sc 102 . the operative portion of which has already been quoted above. Reference may be made to para 8 of the judgment of the 7 Judges Full Bench which Indicates that if only substantive relief is prayed for It is not open to Court to add or read a declaratory relief also into it and treat it as declaratory relief with consequential relief. The observations are quoted below : "for purpose of court-fee, the Court must look at the reliefs as prayed for in the plaint. In order to ascertain the real nature of the reliefs claimed, the substance of the plaint has to be considered. If a declaratory relief alone has been prayed for, the Court cannot superadd a consequential relief which it thinks the plaintiff ought to have prayed for and treat it as a consequential relief (see bishan Sarup v. Masa Mal, AIR 1935 All 817 (FB ). Likewise if only a substantive relief prayed for It is not open to a Court to add or read a declaratory relief also into it and treat It as a declaratory relief with a consequential relief. See the Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamps. V. P. , AIR 1968 SC 102 . court-fee has to be determined on the relief as prayed for in the suit. See the Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamps. V. P. , AIR 1968 SC 102 . court-fee has to be determined on the relief as prayed for in the suit. At the initial stage of determining court-fee on a plaint, the question whether a declaratory suit is liable to be dismissed either because it does not fall within the purview of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (now Section 34 of 1963 Act) or because the plaintiff has failed to sue for a further relief which was open to him or for some other reason does not arise nor does the question arise whether the suit can succeed because only a substantive relief has been prayed for. The question of the applicability of Section 7 (iv) (a) of the original Act or of Section 7 (iv) (a) of the amended Act arises only when a declaratory relief and another relief have been asked for either as one composite relief or as two distinct reliefs. " ( 8 ) IN the instant matter, a perusal of the relief claimed in the suit shows that only the decree for mandatory injunction has been sought for and not relief claimed for declaration has been sought. ( 9 ) THE provisions for relief of declaratory decree have been given under Section 40 of the specific Relief Act. 1963. while the provisions for relief of mandatory injunction have been given under Section 39 of the said Act. ( 10 ) SINCE the plaintiff-revisionist has not claimed for issuing declaratory decree, the provisions of Section 39 of the said Act is liable to be perused first, which is quoted as under: "39. Mandatory injunction.--"when, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the Court is capable of enforcing, the Court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts. " ( 11 ) THE provisions of Sections 34 and 35 of the Act are quoted as under: "34. " ( 11 ) THE provisions of Sections 34 and 35 of the Act are quoted as under: "34. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status of right.--Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may Institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief : provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. " 35. Effect of declaration.--"a declaration made under this Chapter is binding only on the parties to the suit, persons claiming through them respectively, and where any of the parties are trustees, on the persons for whom if in existence at the date of the declaration such parties would be trustees. " ( 12 ) IN so far as the first relief, i. e. , for declaration of mandatory Injunction for direction to return the goods is concerned, no question for payment of court-fees on the value of goods arises but In respect of the second prayer for relief which has been sought as an alternative to the first relief to the effect that the defendant should pay the costs of the goods along with interest @ 24% per annum, meaning thereby that the relief for direction of payment of Rs. 3. 19,916. 00 along with interest @ 24% per annum has been sought for with a prayer for recovery of money which was an efficacious relief. Hence, if it is not treated as a money decree, then Clause (3) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, would be applicable, according to which the amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits shall be computed for movable property having a market value other than money, where the subject-matter has a market-value, according to such value on the date of presenting the plaint. Where the relief sought is treated as money decree, then the amount of court-fees would be payable according to the amount claimed. In the instant matter, certainly the claim of the revisionist-plaintiff is of Rs. 3. 19,916. Where the relief sought is treated as money decree, then the amount of court-fees would be payable according to the amount claimed. In the instant matter, certainly the claim of the revisionist-plaintiff is of Rs. 3. 19,916. 00 along with interest @ 24% per annum and also for damages. ( 13 ) THE case laws cited by the learned counsel for the revisionist are in respect of the declaratory relief in which no prayer in respect of recovery of money or direction to pay the money was sought. There is difference between the declaratory relief to the effect that any act of the defendant is void in view of statutory provisions and the relief sought for, direction to pay costs of the goods valuation of which claimed is Rs. 3,19,916. 00 together with an interest @ 24% p. a. Therefore, title to right to the property either movable or immovable will be by way of declaration but in the matter where the relief has been claimed specifically for recovery of money along with Interest and damages, no such relief can be said to be the same in nature which was sought by way of declaratory relief. None of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the revisionist is of any help to him and are distinguishable. ( 14 ) IN view of the above mentioned facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the court below has not committed any manifest error of law in directing the revisionist-plaintiff to pay the court-fees, according to the valuation of goods, i. e. , Rs. 3,19,916. 00. Therefore, it is not a fit case even for admission and the same is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY, the revision fails and is dismissed. The interim order stands vacated. .