JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—This revision is filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code1) against the order passed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Karsog, District Mandi, on November 11, 1998 in Execution Petition No. 19-X of 1995. 2. The petitioner is the original judgment debtor and respondent is the original decree-holder. It appears that a Civil Suit was filed by the respondent and a consent decree was passed by the learned Sub Judge on July 11, 1992. The operative part of the said decree reads as under : "As per statement of the counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant recorded separately, the suit of the plaintiff is decreed for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defend- ants from digging a pit and from making any construction as well as from discharging the water of the septic tank in the suit land in any manner whatsoever with no order to the cost. In view of the fact that suit of the plaintiff has been decreed, the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC has become infructuous and which is, therefore, dismissed. Decree sheet be drawn. File be consigned to record-room. A PERIOD OF 15 MINUTES SPENT." 3. It was the case of the respondent decree holder that in spite of the decree passed in his favour and against the present petitioner/ judgment-debtor, the decree had not been complied with by the judgment debtor and accordingly execution application was filed by decree-holder in the competent court on September 30, 1995. In the application, it was alleged that the judgment-debtor had agreed not to construct septic tank or to make any other construction nor to discharge filthy water of the septic tank in the land comprised in Khewat Khatauni No. 95/172, Khasra Nos. 1453, 1242, 828, Kitas 3, admeasuring 0-10-2 bighas, situate in Mohal Karsog, District Mandi, HP. As per the averment made by the decree-holder, despite decree and undertaking, the judgment-debtor wilfully, knowingly and intentionally violated them. Hence, an appropriate action is required to be taken against him in accordance with the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2A, of the Code. According to the decree-holder, judgment-debtor constructed septic tank and filthy water used to pass through the land of the decree-holder. 4. The judgment-debtor contested the application by filing a reply. Hence, an appropriate action is required to be taken against him in accordance with the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2A, of the Code. According to the decree-holder, judgment-debtor constructed septic tank and filthy water used to pass through the land of the decree-holder. 4. The judgment-debtor contested the application by filing a reply. In the counter, he stated that it was true that a decree was passed in favour of the decree-holder and against the judgment-debtor (him). However, it was his case that he had constructed tank on his own land arid water of septic tank does not flow towards the land of the decree-holder, He also contended that it was not true that he had disobeyed and/or wilfully violated the decree passed by the competent court and the decree-holder has no right to make grievance against the legal act of the judgment-debtor. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the executing court framed two issues as to whether the judgment-debtor had wilfully and intentionally disobeyed the undertaking given in the decree and thereby violated the decree and, if so, to what extent relief should be granted in favour of the decree-holder. 6. The Executing Court examined decree holder himself as AW-1. The decree-holder examined Inder Pal, Patwari, AW-2, as his witness. The decree-holder has stated in his substantive evidence that a decree was passed in his favour and thereafter the judgment-debtor has constructed a latrine tank, bath room and water was converted towards his side. He also stated that judgment-debtor constructed Dhara and Chajja and thereby violated the undertaking. In spite of the request made by him, the judgment-debtor did not remove such illegal construction. He, therefore, prayed that appropriate action be taken against the judgment-debtor. He was cross-examined on behalf of the judgment-debtor. A suggestion was put to him that it was not true that filthy water used to pass through the land of the decree-holder, but it was denied by him. 7. AW-2 Inder Pal, Patwari, who had prepared Tatima Ex. DH-1/A after demarcation on the spot, which was conducted by him on July 14, 1995, along with Surinder Singh, Kanungo, stated that he had prepared the Tatima. He had also stated that upon the disputed land, judgment-debtor has constructed a Pucca wall of the latrine and also diverted filthy water towards Khasra No. 492/453. DH-1/A after demarcation on the spot, which was conducted by him on July 14, 1995, along with Surinder Singh, Kanungo, stated that he had prepared the Tatima. He had also stated that upon the disputed land, judgment-debtor has constructed a Pucca wall of the latrine and also diverted filthy water towards Khasra No. 492/453. He further stated that a wall of Kachha Dhara and roof was constructed by the judgment-debtor. In cross-examination, he admitted that Dhara and latrine is not mentioned in the Tatima, but he deposed that the same was nearby the line mentioned in the Tatima. 8. The executing court, on the basis of statement of two witnesses, observed in the impugned order that looking to map as well as record, it appears that the judgment-debtor had made construction on the land in question, though it was denied by him. 9. The judgment-debtor, who had examined himself as only witness deposed that he had constructed latrine and septic tank near his house and there is no outlet by the septic tank and his septic tank also would not over-flow. According to him, septic tank did not touch the land of the decree-holder and there was no side flow because there was no out-let. The Executing Court after considering the evidence observed as under : "Now by this judgment and decree sheet it is crystal clear that present J.D. is restrained from making any construction or digging on or about the suit land. Though the judgment and decree is upon this point but still while appearing as RW-1 Babu Ram J.D. he had not said anything in examination-in-chief, the allegations regarding the construction of the wall of Kachha Dhara and roof thereof about 2 feet, towards or about the land of the D.H. By this non deposition the allegations which is alleged and proved by the D.H. while appearing as witness and supported by the Tatima Ex. DH2/ A this allegations remained unshutted and unrebuttable as no where respondent/J.D. denied about the alleged encroachment while appearing as witness. Further it is argued by DH counsel that as per the statement of DH and witness he categorically proved his allegations upon the demarcation report. But as per the case of J.D. and his statement, he constructed the septic tank etc. Further it is argued by DH counsel that as per the statement of DH and witness he categorically proved his allegations upon the demarcation report. But as per the case of J.D. and his statement, he constructed the septic tank etc. upon his land but J.D. has miserably failed to produce any report from the revenue official or any other report from the department by which the J.D. can prove his case that demarcation was conducted and he was within his boundary constructed the septic tank. Thus, the D.H. counsel prayed that adverse inference be also drawn against the J.D. though the chances has been granted to him to lead the evidence after evidence of D.H. is over. But, J.D. has not either demarcated the land through the revenue agency or produce a report from any agency by which, it can ascertain that he construct wall dhara, septic tank etc. upon his own land. By these arguments of D.H. Counsel, it is crystal clear that once the allegations alleged and proved by documentary record it is upon the J.D. to rebut the same. Despite opportunity granted to the J.D. He failed to adduce any demarcation or even failed put application in this court so that demarcation can be conducted thus, the report and Tatima Ex. DH-2/A and statement of D.H. and his witnesses corroborated the case and the same is proved that J.D. has constructed upon the line measuring 11 karam x 5 karam i.e. disputed boundary line between the D.H. and J.D. Keeping this discussion the arguments of D.H. Counsel is acceptable and further the D.H. has categorically corroborated the case to the extent that the J.D. has constructed the wall of the latrine and also diverted the flow of the water from the septic tank towards khasra number 1492/1453 and also constructed a wall of kachha Dhara and cast roof thereof towards the land of the ,D.H. Further the aforesaid allegations is also proved by the Tatima Ex. DH-2/A which also revealed the encroachment as discussed above. Now D.H. has proved the encroachment and as per decree, he was restrained by permanent prohibitory injunction not to digging a pit or make any construction as well as from discharging the water of the septic tank in the suit land in any manner whatsoever with no order as to the cost. Now D.H. has proved the encroachment and as per decree, he was restrained by permanent prohibitory injunction not to digging a pit or make any construction as well as from discharging the water of the septic tank in the suit land in any manner whatsoever with no order as to the cost. In view of the fact that suit of the plaintiff has been decreed. Thus, it appears from the aforesaid discussion that J.D. is not obeying the decree passed by this Court. Hence this issue is decided in favour of the D.H. and against the J.D./respondent." 10. In the operative part, the executing court passed the following order : "Keeping in the light of aforesaid discussion on issue No. 1, I direct the J.D./respondent to remove all the encroachment as mentioned in Tatima Ex. DHZ/A and the same is part and parcel of the direction and also to remove the latrine and also stop the flow of water towards the land of the D.H. within a period of one month from today upon his own cost. Failing to not obeying the aforesaid directions of this Court, he will liable to be civil imprisonment for a period of one month on depositing substances allowances etc. and D.H. has right to remove the encroachment with the help of police at the costs of J.D. Accordingly this application/execution under Order 21 Rule 32 is hereby allowed. It be consigned to record room after completion or compliance." 11. It is, this order, which is challenged in the present revision. 12. I have heard Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the petitioner-judgment-debtor and Mr. R.L. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent-decree-holder. 13. Mr. K.D. Sood submitted that an execution application has not been filed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of Order 21 and it is liable to be dismissed on that count alone. He also contended that since the decree was passed in July, 1992, and execution application was filed in September, 1995, i.e. after more than two years, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 22 of Order 21, notice ought to have been issued by the Executing Court. His further grievance was that the decree-holder could not have invoked the provisions of Rule 32 of Order 21 and such an action was illegal and unlawful. His further grievance was that the decree-holder could not have invoked the provisions of Rule 32 of Order 21 and such an action was illegal and unlawful. He submitted that when there was dispute regarding boundary, as per the procedure laid down in High Court Rules and Orders relating to Hadd Shikni, the same was required to be followed and as it was not done, the order was vitiated. The counsel submitted that a composite order directing judgment-debtor to comply with the order or to suffer imprisonment is illegal, unlawful and could riot have been passed. Sending a person to jail for non-compliance with decree is in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings and unless the court is satisfied that despite an opportunity being extended to the judgment-debtor, he had not complied with the decree, the action is uncalled for. On all these grounds, it was submitted that the order passed by the Executing Court deserves to be quashed and set aside by directing the Court to hear the matter afresh and decide it according to law. 14. Mr. R.L. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the Court. He submitted that though the application for execution was not made in the form prescribed by the Code, at the most, it is an irregularity and will not vitiate the action. So far as the notice is concerned, submission of the learned Counsel is that notice was already issued and it was not that directly a warrant was issued. The judgment-debtor was asked to remain present and to state what he was to say. Then an order was passed after hearing him and no grievance can be made by the judgment-debtor against such an action. Similarly, provisions of Rule 32 of Order 21 were complied with by the Executing Court and in the operative part of the order, it was stated that the judgment-debtor will comply with the decree within one month failing which he will suffer imprisonment. The order is thus according to law. It was finally submitted that when the Executing Court is satisfied that the terms and conditions of the decree have not been complied with and were violated by the judgment-debtor, such a finding of fact will not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. It was finally submitted that when the Executing Court is satisfied that the terms and conditions of the decree have not been complied with and were violated by the judgment-debtor, such a finding of fact will not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. He, therefore, submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 15. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, in my opinion, it cannot be said that by passing the impugned order any error of jurisdiction has been committed and the case is covered by any of clauses (a) or (b) or (c) of Section 115 of the Code. It is not seriously disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the application for execution preferred by the decree holder was not in prescribed form. Now, Rule 11 of Order 21 provides for filing of application for execution. Sub-rule (1) enables a decree holder to file oral application in case of decree fro payment of money; sub-rule (2) requires the decree-holder to make an application in writing wherein the particulars mentioned in the said sub-rule are to be stated. Appendix E’ to the Cod£ specifies Forms under which such applications are made. An application under Rule 11 of Order 21, according to said Appendix, should be in Form No. 6. 16. In my opinion, the submission of learned Counsel for the decree-holder is well founded that such a requirement is necessary with a view to give particulars and to extend opportunity to the judgment debtor about the decree passed against him so as to enable him to know the execution, which is sought to be taken against him. In Sm Ashalata Debi and others v. Sri Jadu Nath Roy and others, AIR 1954 SC 409, an execution application was filed under Rule 11 of Order 21. One of the contentions, raised before the Court was that the application was not in the prescribed form. The contention, however, was negatived, inter alia on the ground that the application was "in truth and in substance", application for execution and the application could not be dismissed merely on the ground that it was not in the prescribed form. 17. In the instant case, the suit was compromised between the parties and consent decree was passed. The contention, however, was negatived, inter alia on the ground that the application was "in truth and in substance", application for execution and the application could not be dismissed merely on the ground that it was not in the prescribed form. 17. In the instant case, the suit was compromised between the parties and consent decree was passed. The decree-holder as well as judgment-debtor both, therefore, were aware that a decree, which was passed on the basis of settlement arrived at between the parties was to be executed. Hence, even if an application for execution in the prescribed form as per Form No. 6 of Appendix E was not submitted, it cannot be said that such an irregularity would vitiate the action and the application for execution was liable to be dismissed on that ground. I am of the opinion that the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor cannot be upheld and is hereby rejected. 18. Regarding the two contentions, namely, non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 22 as well as Rule 32 of Order 21, I am of the view that even they are ill conceived. No doubt, an application for execution was preferred after more than two years, but the learned Counsel for the decree holder is right that if an Executing Court directly issues a warrant for possession, demolition or of arrest of judgment-debtor without issuing notice, without calling for any explanation from the judgment-debtor or without affording an opportunity of hearing, the judgment debtor could have made a grievance. In the instant case, however, it was not so. As soon as the application for execution was submitted by the decree-holder, the Executing Court issued notice to the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor remained present before the Court, he was also represented by a counsel and after hearing the parties, the Executing Court was satisfied on the basis of the evidence, oral and documentary, that there was disobedience of decree on the part of the judgment-debtor. Accordingly, the Executing Court directed him to demolish the offending structure and to obey the decree. At the same time, the Executing Court has passed the order that if within the stipulated period (one month), the judgment-debtor would not comply with the terms of the decree, he would be liable to suffer imprisonment for a period of one month on depositing subsistence allowance to be paid by the decree-holder. At the same time, the Executing Court has passed the order that if within the stipulated period (one month), the judgment-debtor would not comply with the terms of the decree, he would be liable to suffer imprisonment for a period of one month on depositing subsistence allowance to be paid by the decree-holder. 19. In my opinion, such order cannot be held to be illegal or contrary to law. It is true as held by the High Court of Patna in Kedarnath khetan v. Jainarain Ram Lundia, AIR 1954 Patna 497, that the proceedings of sending a person to jail for refusal to obey the decree arquasi criminal proceedings and they must be construed strictly. It is also true that if two views are possible, the Court would not grant the prayer of sending the person to jail nor a direct order be passed in such cases without affording opportunity of satisfying the decree by the judgment-debtor. But in the instant case, the Executing Court has not committed that error. In fact, reading paragraph 4, extracted hereinabove, it is clear that in the earlier part of the order, the executing court has directed the judgment-debtor to remove all encroachment. It is only if the judgment-debtor fails to remove the offending structure, he is directed to suffer civil imprisonment. Such order is neither illegal nor contrary to law. 20, Regarding non-compliance with the provisions of High Court Rules and Orders relating to boundary dispute and procedure to be followed in Hadd-Shikni cases, I am of the view that it is a question of fact and in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, this Court is unable to reappreciate the evidence on the basis of which the trial Court has recorded a finding. Once on the basis of documentary evidence as also after considering the allegations and counter-allegations by the decree-holder and by the judgment-debtor if the court has held that there was non-compliance with the terms of the decree and offending structure has been made by the judgment-debtor and he has violated the terms of the decree, this Court will proceed on the basis of such finding. 21. 21. Finally, exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is discretionary in nature and this Court is not bound to interfere even if the case is covered by any of the three clauses under Section 115 of the Code. In the leading case of Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497, the apex Court indicated that the High Court is not obliged to exercise its jurisdiction even where the case is covered by clause (a), (b) or (c) of Section 115 of the Code. Exercise of jurisdiction is discretionary and the High Court will interfere if it is satisfied that such interference is necessary in furtherance of substantial justice between the parties. In the case on hand, a consent decree was passed and as per the finding recorded by the Executing Court, the judgment-debtor has not complied with it and an order was passed extending opportunity to him to comply with the same failing which he was asked to undergo civil imprisonment for a period of one month. It cannot be said that there is miscarriage of justice and hence, in my opinion, no interference is called for in the instant case. 22. For the foregoing reasons, I see no ground to interfere with the order of the Executing Court. The revision petition deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Interim stay granted earlier stands vacated. 23, Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the order was passed by the Executing Court on November 12, 1998 and it has been over since long and the revision petition was pending. He, therefore, prayed that the time may be extended to comply with the order passed by the Executing Court and/or to take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law against this order. In my opinion, the prayer is reasonable. In the facts and circumstances of the case three months time is granted to comply with the order of the executing court. Revision dismissed. -