JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed against the Award dated 1.9.2000 (Annx. 6), by which the claim of the petitioner-workman has been rejected. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner claims that he had worked with the respondents from 25.7.1967 to 21.1.1982 when he went for Haz to Macca-Madina on a three months' leave, which was sanctioned to him vide order dated 25.1.82 and he was not allowed to join the service after coming from Haz and his application for medical leave was illegally rejected by the respondents. Petitioner raised an Industrial dispute and the Appropriate Government, vide order dated 4.12.89, made a reference to the Labour Court as to whether the removal of petitioner-workman by the respondent University was in accordance with law and if not, to what relief he was entitled for? The Labour Court considered the entire evidence led by the parties and their submissions and recorded the finding of fact that the petitioner over- stayed for more than five years in a foreign country without getting the leave sanctioned and disbelieved the case up it forward by the petitioner that he remained ill for such a long time and a disbelieved the medical certificate dated 17.2.87 in which petitioner had been shown ill with effect from 25.4.82. The Labour Court held that it was not a case of retrencement/termination rather it was a case of abandonment of service. Hence this petition. 3. In M/s. Jeewan Lal Ltd., Calcutta v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 1567 , the Apex Court held as under : " if an employee continues to be absent from duty without obtaining leave and in an unauthorised manner for such a long period of time that an inference may reasonably the drawn from such absence that by his absence he has abandoned service, then such long unauthorised absence may legitimately be held to cast a break in continuity of service We would like to make it clear that there would be the class of cases where long unauthorised absence may reasonably give rise to an inference that such service is intended to be abandoned by the employee." 4. Similarly, in Shahoordul Haque v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar & Anr., AIR 1974 SC 1890 , the Apex Court observed as under : "The undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post or duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient ground for his absence, is so glaring that giving him further opportunity to dis-prove what he practically admits, could serve no useful purpose. It could not benefit him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him. On the view we have adopted on the facts of this case, it is not necessary to consider the further question whether any notice for termination of service was necessary or duty given on the assumption that he was not published. We do not think that there is any question involved in this case which could justify an interference by us". 5. For the purpose of termination, there has to be positive action on the part of the employer while abandonment of service is a consequence of unilateral action of the employee and the employer has no role in it. 6. In the State of Haryana v. Om Prakash & Anr., (1998) 8 SCC 733 , the Hon'ble Apex Court explained the distinction between `retrenchment' and `abandonment' from service, observing as under : "Retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) means termination by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, it contemplates an act on the part of the employer which puts an end to service to fall within the definition of the expression `retrenchment' in Section 2 (oo) of the Act. There was nothing of the sort in the instant case. It was the workman who ceased to report for duty therefore, this is a case in which the employer has done nothing whatsoever to put an end to his employment and hence, the case does not fall within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. Therefore, the case does not attract Section 2 (oo), nor does it satisfy the requirement of Section 25- F." 7. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Vijay Singh Charan v. Management, Shri Swetamber Nakoda Parshwnath Tirth Mewa Nagar & Anr., 1999 (1) RLW 314 . Therefore, the case does not attract Section 2 (oo), nor does it satisfy the requirement of Section 25- F." 7. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Vijay Singh Charan v. Management, Shri Swetamber Nakoda Parshwnath Tirth Mewa Nagar & Anr., 1999 (1) RLW 314 . In Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association & Anr., (2000) 5 SCC 65 ; and Aligarh Muslim University & ors. v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that if a person is absent beyond the prescribed period for which leave of any kind can be granted, he should be treated to have resigned and ceased to be in service. In such a case, there is no need to hold and enquiry or to give any notice as it would amount to useless formalities. 8. I find no force in the submissions made by Mr. Chaudhary that even for a long absence of seven and half years, service could not be terminated without holding an inquiry. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court in Jai Shenker v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 492 is not the authority applicable in the instant case. The facts thereof are distinguishable. 9. The Apex Court has reiterated time and again that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straitjacket of a rigid formula and its application would depend upon the scheme and policy of the statute and relevant circumstances involved in a particular case. (Vide Union of India v. PK. Roy & ors., AIR 1968 SC 850 ; Channabasappa Basappa Happali v. State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 32 ; and Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girija Shankar Pant & ors., (2001) 1 SCC 182 . 10. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jag Mohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that where on admitted or undisputed facts, only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue the writ to compel the observance of the principles of natural justice as it would amount to issuing a futile writ. Similarly, in State of U.P. v. O.P. Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 679 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Courts have to seen whether non-observance of any of the principles enshrined in statutory rules or principles of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. Thus, it can be hold that even if in a given case there has been some deviation from the principles of natural justice but which has not resulted in grave injustice or has not prejudiced the cause of the delinquent, the Court is not bound to interfere. This Court does not function as a Court of Appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority, rather it has limited power of judicial review to the departmental proceedings in which appreciation of evidence is not permissible. The Court can review only to correct the error of law or fundamental procedural requirements which lead to manifest injustice or Court can interfere with the impugned order if the same has bean passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh & ors., AIR 1997 SC 1908 .Thus, in this case, I fail to understand as what could have been the defence of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners for his long absence for seven and half years and what was the material in his possession to justify such a long absence. Even before this Court, petitioners have not submitted any cogent reason for his remaining absent for such a long period. Thus, in the said case even if enquiry had been held, it could have been is meaningless. 11. Mr. Chaudhary has submitted that what is being canvassed before this Court by the other side would amount to automatic termination. The question of automatic termination has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again and it has categorically been held that any rule, providing for automatic termination, is ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Punjab Land Development Area Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & ors., (1990) 3 SCC 682 ; Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Punjab Land Development Area Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & ors., (1990) 3 SCC 682 ; Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. v. Muluamra, AIR 1994 SC 112 ; D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 ; Scooters India Ltd. v. Vijay E.V. Eldred, (1998) 6 SCC 454 ; and Uptron India Ltd. v. Smt. Shammi Bhan, (1998) 6 SCC 538 , categorically held that imposition of such a condition was effect but the facts, in the instant case, are quite distinguishable. There is no rule providing for automatic termination after a particular period of absence. Thus, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in those cases is not applicable herein. 12. In case of Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 614 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : "Under Article 141, the law declared by it is of a binding character and as command full as the law made by the legislative body or an authorised delegate of such body. Their Lordships' decision declare the existing law but do not enact any fresh law, is not in keeping with the plenary function of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, for the Court is not merely the interpreter of law as existing but much beyond that. The Court, as a wing of the State, is by itself a source of law. The law is what the Court says it is." 13. The present case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Jeevan Lal Ltd. (supra) and Shahoordul Hague (supra), wherein continuous absence for very long time, would give as rise to presumption that the employee himself has abandoned the service and the same being not a misconduct, no inquiry is required. 14. In view of the above, I find no force in the petition and it is accordingly dismissed.Writ Petition dismissed. *******