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2001 DIGILAW 851 (MP)

Sagir Khan v. Anil Awasthy

2001-11-23

S.C.PANDEY

body2001
ORDER 1. A. preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the alleged contemners that this petition is liable to be dismissed as barred by time under section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (henceforth 'the Act'). 2. The petitioners had filed Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1998 and obtained an interim order dated 25.5.1998 requiring the respondent in that petition not to take coercive action to remove them from gumtis occupied by them until further orders. It was alleged in this petition for contempt that despite the fact that the aforesaid order remained operative and the petitioners had not vacated, the respondents-contemners took law in their own hands with full knowledge of the order passed by the Court and took coercive action on 25.5.1999 to vacate the gumtis. It was further alleged that the respondent No.2, the Collector of Hoshangabad alongwith other contemners Anil Awasthy, the President of Municipal Council, ltarsi, Ashok Verma, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, ltarsi and Shahjad Khan, the Town Inspector Itarsi were quilty of contempt of this Court for the reason they ejected the petitioners forcibly and dispossessed them of the gumtis occupied by them by demolishing them. The contempt petition was listed on 18.7.1999. The order sheet of this Court dated 18.7.1999 indicates that it was ordered that contempt petition be listed alongwith Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1999, whereas it should have been ordered that the case be listed alongwith Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1998. The mistake was discovered on 9.8.1999 when this Court found that owing to inadvertence, a wrong petition was called from the office. The correct order for calling the original Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1998 was, therefore, passed. It was directed that the record of Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1999 is not required. Thereafter, the contempt petition was listed on 16.8.1999 alongwith Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1999. On that date the following order was passed by this Court. "16.8.1999 Shri S.K. Gangele, counsel for the applicants. 1. He states that despite stay order was passed by this Court in W.P. No. 2078/98, which was already served upon the respondents. Nos. 1,2,3 and 4, they have removed coercively, the gumtis from the Itarsi Railway Station. 2. Issue notices to the respondents No.1, 2,3 and 4 returnable within 15 days, on payment of process fee by the applicants within three days from today. 3. Nos. 1,2,3 and 4, they have removed coercively, the gumtis from the Itarsi Railway Station. 2. Issue notices to the respondents No.1, 2,3 and 4 returnable within 15 days, on payment of process fee by the applicants within three days from today. 3. The W.P. No. 2078/98 be del inked from this case and listed for further hearing in usual course, before the appropriate Bench. 3. Before passing the order, the original record of Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1998 was called to verify as a matter of fact, that the order passed on 25.5.1998 was still in operation on 25.5.1999, when the coercive action was alleged to have been taken. It was necessary to do so because a year had elapsed since 25.5.1998. Secondly, it was 'necessary to verify the good faith of the persons filing the petition by finding from the record if the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1998 had paid the process fee. It was found that not only the process fee was paid on 3.6.1998, but the office had issued the registered. notices on 8.6.1998, to all the respondents in the petition for their appearance on 2.8.1998. The acknowledgments signed on behalf of the Municipal Council, Itarsi through Chief Municipal Officer dated 11.6.1998 and to the President, Municipal Council, Itarsi, dated 15.6.1998 were on record. There was no acknowledgment indicating service of notice to the Collector, Hoshangabad, but there was no reason to hold that service was not effected on the Collector, Hoshangabad which is not far away from Itarsi. In any case, the service to Municipal Council, Itarsi and to President of Municipal Council. Itarsi, was enough to apprise the Municipal Authorities that the Writ Petition No. 2078/98 was pending against them. Thus, having carefully verified the aforesaid facts the order dated 16.8.1999 was passed. 4. It may be noted that the order dated 16.8.1999 cannot be passed off as routine order of issuance of notice of contempt application. It records the statement of the counsel for the petitioners. It is a summary of the essence of the allegations made in the contempt petition which in effect stated that the gumtis were coercively removed by the respondents No.1 ,2,3 and 4 despite the notice of stay was served upon them by the petitioners. Thereafter, there is order to the effect to issue notice. It is a summary of the essence of the allegations made in the contempt petition which in effect stated that the gumtis were coercively removed by the respondents No.1 ,2,3 and 4 despite the notice of stay was served upon them by the petitioners. Thereafter, there is order to the effect to issue notice. It is an unusual order in the sense that it records the oral statement of the counsel for the petitioners and gives the summary of the accusation made in the petition of the petitioners. It is trite law that the position of a petitioner in a contempt petition is that of an informant or a relater and he cannot be said to be an aggrieved party or the complainant in the sense of a victim of an offence. The contempt jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court as an adjunct to the power of administering justice for upholding the rule of law. The order of the Courts are to be obeyed not because the Judges are always right, but for the reason, that they represent the orders of the authorities administering justice. If orders of a Court are not obeyed during their currency then the whole edifice of justice may collapse. Consequently, it is the Court that bears the responsibility of summoning a person for commission of contempt of Court. Pursuant to the duty imposed on the Court, the counsel who appeared on behalf of the petitioner was asked if he certified to the truth of the statements made in the petition and his statement was recorded. Thereafter, the order records issue notice to the respondents No. 1,2,3 and 4 on payment of process fee within three days. The purpose of recording the statement of the counsel was to give assurance to the Court that, in fact, the respondents No. 1,2,3, and 4 have violated the order dated 25.5.1998 and the counsel had taken care to ascertain the facts stated in the petition for contempt. Further, it was for the purpose of holding the responsibility for the information given to the Court. An advocate is an officer of the Court and he owes duty to the Court as much as to his client. This is more so when he appears on behalf of a relater. 5. Further, it was for the purpose of holding the responsibility for the information given to the Court. An advocate is an officer of the Court and he owes duty to the Court as much as to his client. This is more so when he appears on behalf of a relater. 5. The order dated 16.8.1999 served another purpose because it was the summary of the accusation against the respondents who were to be noticed. 6. As a matter of fact, initially the respondent did not contend that they were not served with notices or there was any defect in initiation the proceedings for Contempt of Courts Act. The relater or the informer and the Court too assumed that the contempt proceedings were initiated on 16.8.1999. The case could not be disposed of finally because it was adjourned for one reason or the other. Even some of the accused were required to be present on certain dates. In this way one year expired from date of alleged demolition, i.e., 25.5.1999. 7. Now a preliminary objection is being raised on behalf of the respondents by Shri A.D. Deoras and Shri R.N. Singh, counsel representing the respondents cumulatively that the contempt petition is bound to be dismissed because the Court did not initiate contempt proceedings within one year from the date of contempt committed on 25.5.1999 as provided by section 20 of the Act. The Court could not proceed to dispose of the contempt petition on merits and It may be dropped. It is difficult to fathom if this alleged defect in the proceedings was purposely kept hidden by the learned counsel for striking at the appropriate time, a course which they were legally entitled to adopt, or they became wise after noticing the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2000 SC 1136 (Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal). Be as it may, there cannot be any doubt that this Court has become wiser after the event when this ruling of the Supreme Court was brought to its notice. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the Court did not say in its order that it required each of the respondents/contemners to show cause why he be not punished for contempt Failure to do so amounted non-initiation of contempt proceedings. They became barred by time and Court lost its jurisdiction to take any action against the respondents. 8. They became barred by time and Court lost its jurisdiction to take any action against the respondents. 8. As against this, it has been argued on behalf of the petitioners by Shri Surendra Gangele, Advocate that the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal (supra) is not an authority for the preposition that in all cases the Court must express that the notice is being issued to show cause "why the contemner should not be punished for the contempt of Court"? It is urged that at the stage of initiation of contempt proceedings all that is necessary for the Court is to apply its mind to the facts and the nature of contempt. If there is prima facie satisfaction on the part of the Court then the contempt proceedings can be initiated by issuing notice to the opposite party. The counsel brought to the notice of the Court the steps that were taken by it. before ordering issuance of notice. It was pointed out that pursuant to the order dated 16.8.1999, the respondents were served with notices in form No. 1 framed under Rule 8(a) of The High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1980. (henceforth 'the Rules') Thus, according to the counsel, proceedings for contempt of Court stood initiated on 16.8.1999 itself. As to the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal (supra), it was argued that the decision of Supreme Court did not lay down as a matter of law that every order initiating contempt should be expressed in the words 'show cause why you should not be punished for contempt of Court' or words to the like effect. It was argued that the ratio of the Supreme Court decision was that the Court should apply its mind to the facts of the case and indicate in its order that it is initiating contempt proceedings. The order dated 16.8.1999 clearly indicated that the Court was issuing notices after application of mind. It was not a routine order. It was argued that categories mentioned in paragraph 14 of the judgment of Supreme Court were only illustrative and were not meant to be exhaustive. The order dated 16.8.1999 clearly indicated that the Court was issuing notices after application of mind. It was not a routine order. It was argued that categories mentioned in paragraph 14 of the judgment of Supreme Court were only illustrative and were not meant to be exhaustive. It was argued that the Supreme Court illustrated the matter by saying, that in case, the Court applied its mind to the facts of case and issued show cause notice why the contemner should not be punished for contempt of Court, then this act of the Court would show that the proceedings are initiated. That is what the category iii implied in paragraph 14. The category ii(a) illustrated the case where there was no application of mind and it was merely a routine order. The Categories ii(b) showed that there was application of mind but the Court was not sure if prima facie case existed, and therefore, issued notice asking the contemner to show cause why contempt proceedings should not be initiated ?Such an order was preliminary to issuance of initiation of contempt proceedings. It was argued that order dated 16.8.1999 should be read with rules. 9. In reply, Shri A.D. Deoras, half humorously, half reproachfully stated that this Court never passes an order without applying its mind. The learned counsel, faced with the order passed on 16.8.1999, could not contend that the mind was not applied. However, he argued that in absence of the words used as indicated in category (iii) it must be presumed that even after application of mind, the Court was not convinced about the facts. The learned counsel conceded that the order is not specifically in terms of category (ii)(b). However, this Court shall not go by mere concession of the counsel because the action of the Court involves serious question regarding the liberty of the citizens. If the mind was not applied then there is no question of initiation of contempt proceedings, the preliminary objection must be upheld without any demur. If contrary be the case, then the question would be because the order passed on 16.8.1999 fell short of test applied by Supreme Court in the shape of category (iii) as per paragraph 14 of the judgment in the case of Om prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal (supra) and consequently it would be deemed that the proceedings were not initiated. If contrary be the case, then the question would be because the order passed on 16.8.1999 fell short of test applied by Supreme Court in the shape of category (iii) as per paragraph 14 of the judgment in the case of Om prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal (supra) and consequently it would be deemed that the proceedings were not initiated. However, the learned counsel for respondents drew the attention of the Court to paragraph 15 of the judgment. It was argued that despite applying its mind to the facts of case, the Court wanted to ascertain the facts from respondents and therefore, order was to the effect that notices be issued. 10. The Court is conscious of the fact that the Article 141 of our Constitution provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all the Courts within the territory of India. This Article is based on the doctrine of precedents evolved by the common law lawyers and judges in Britain. The basis of this doctrine may be summed up in the Latin phrase stare decisis. It means standing by a former decision called precedent. "Apparently the Latin phrase may suggest fixedness which this principle in action does not have," in fact, the Judges try to find out the true principle behind a precedent. The judicial process of finding the true principle is matter of science as well as that of art. When logic is applied, it implies the method of science. However, experience plays its role. The latter takes the judges to the method of art. The competing claims of logic and experience have to be weighed in golden scales. The rules of law are the rules of degree. Cases of same degree occur only rarely. Even if they be identical, the times may have changed. The river may be same apparently but one does not step into the same river twice. A true devotion to the doctrine of precedents may require different results in apparently similar situations. A rigid insistence on repeating earlier decisions is in reality a denial of doctrine of precedents. 11. A little reflection may reveal that the common law doctrine of precedents is hardly a doctrine by rote. It was developed by judges when there was no formal law-making bodies like a Parliament. A rigid insistence on repeating earlier decisions is in reality a denial of doctrine of precedents. 11. A little reflection may reveal that the common law doctrine of precedents is hardly a doctrine by rote. It was developed by judges when there was no formal law-making bodies like a Parliament. The initial decision on a point must have been given according to sense of justice of the Presiding Judge. That decision became the beacon light for the subsequent decision on the point. It is in this way, with the speed of a glacier the entire common law was developed by the British lawyers and the Judges of the yore. It was subsequently systematized and classified by academic writers of law into different subjects. 12. It nay be baffling to a layman, as well as a student of law, why the judges are not free to follow their own conscience instead of looking for the precedents. Indeed even some jurists might like to do away with what is called as "tyranny of• the precedents". However, there is some justification for following a precedent. Firstly, there is deep requirement in human beings to look to the past events for guidance. There is an interesting episode in that great epic called "Mahabharat". King Yudhistira is required to answer fourteen test questions by a Yaksha, who is no other than Dharamraj. He asks the ultimate four questions. One of these requires him to point out to him the path of life. The answer given by the King bears reproduction, for it answers the philosopical question in the form of a beautiful sloka – ^^rdksZ çfr'B% _r;ks fofHkUuA uSdks _fi;ZL; xar çek.ke~AA /keZL; rÙoa fufgra xqgk;kaA egktuks ;su xr% l iUFkk%**AA Freely translated, this Sloka means "argument is futile' the scriptures differ no sage can tell us the whole truth' the truth of Dharma is hidden from our eyes. The only way is to follow the path tread by good men" 13. In short, the answer was that everyone is riddled with ignorance and the best way is to tread the path followed by good men. ^^egktuks ;su xr% l iUFkk%** This is nothing but an example of precedent applied selectively according to its value. This sloka lays down the principle of choosing appropriate precedent for conduct in life. In short, the answer was that everyone is riddled with ignorance and the best way is to tread the path followed by good men. ^^egktuks ;su xr% l iUFkk%** This is nothing but an example of precedent applied selectively according to its value. This sloka lays down the principle of choosing appropriate precedent for conduct in life. In law, this principle is applied by choosing an appropriate precedent in the shape of the previous decision appropriate to the problem at hand. Search for a previous precedent is a natural human activity. It puts a person at ease and saves his time. Therefore, it should not surprise anyone that legal world adopted this method. Apart from habit and economy of action, there is another reason why we search for a precedent. Desire for orderly growth and certain degree of stability is common to all human beings. Human nature abhors violent upheavals. All of us arc upset when nature is out of joint. We are appalled by a sudden untoward accident. We may die of doldrums of uncertainty if nature began to behave in a topsy-turvy manner. We have adopted our past experience of Nature in our system and subconsciously tend to gravitate to the past experience to ride its shoulders for experiencing the present. This desire for orderly growth, step by step takes us to the previous step which in legal world is known as a precedent. Further there is another reason which gives colour and value to the dotrine of precedent. A precedent is a rough and ready reckoner for lawyers and laymen alike, regarding the likely decision in a Court of law in a given circumstance. A precedent merely weaves a pattern which points the likely road a Court may take in future. This possibility of "predictability permits a person to arrange his affairs around the pattern of previous precedent and expect from the judges an uniform and orderly behaviour. Thus a precedent acts as a lodestar. There is yet another reason for following a precedent. A precedent provides for the deep-seated desire of human beings to be treated equally with those who are placed in a similar situation. A This is a strong reason which puts premium upon the doctrine of precedents. An average man is outraged when he feels that he is treated differently from others. A precedent provides for the deep-seated desire of human beings to be treated equally with those who are placed in a similar situation. A This is a strong reason which puts premium upon the doctrine of precedents. An average man is outraged when he feels that he is treated differently from others. He would resist it if he has enough power to do so. We may illustrate this tendency by taking an example from another epic of ours, "Ramcharitmanas" of Tulsidas. Bali, the king of Vanaras of Kishkindha. thought he was no different, if not superior, than his younger brother Sugriva. Ram struck him an arrow from behind, while he was embattled with Sugriva in order to kill him. When Ram approached him, the great King Bali asked him somewhat acidly: ^^/keZ gsrq vorjsgq xkslkb±A ekjsgq xksfg C;k/k dh ukbZA eSa cSjh lqxzho fivkjkA voxqu dou ukFk eksfg ekjkAA** The answer given by Ram is not appropriate to the occasion. Perhaps had Ram a precedent in favour of action, Bali would be satisfied. There was no appropriate precedent either way. Tulsidas, the great poet and bhakta that he was, therefore, relied upon the Thaumaturgic powers of Ram and gave transcendental reasons for justification of actions of Ram. There was no justification for shooting an arrow surreptitiously and Ram was supposed to be a just man like a fair judge. However, the judges are human beings and they are not above favouritism and nepotism. In fact, the major sins of judiciary are favouritism, nepotism and vengefulness. A precedent checks these tendencies, if not wholly, at least partially. A judge cannot avoid or ignore a procedent by giving flimsy reasons for he is likely to lose face among his peers. Thus, the doctrine of precedents promotes probity among judges and this is as good reason as another for supporting the doctrine of precedents. 14. This Court has briefly considered the foundation of doctrine of precedents and its advantages. It was already prevalent in our Courts when the Article 141 was enacted in our Constitution. It is now necessary to hark back on the phrase 'the law declared by the Supreme Court. What then is the law declared by a superior Court like the Supreme Court ? In fact, the Supreme Court is not the law-making body like Parliament. It was already prevalent in our Courts when the Article 141 was enacted in our Constitution. It is now necessary to hark back on the phrase 'the law declared by the Supreme Court. What then is the law declared by a superior Court like the Supreme Court ? In fact, the Supreme Court is not the law-making body like Parliament. Under the theory of Separation of powers, the bulk of this task is performed by the legislative wing of the State. The Supreme Court, in fact, is the final interpreter of law made by the legislature, whether it is made by Parliament for Union of India, or its counterpart in the State, the State legislature. However, the Supreme Court being the Supreme body interpreting the laws made by the appropriate legislature, is required to say that the effect of a particular statute in question should be read in the manner indicated by it in its judgment. This declaration of the law by the Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts. The question that often plagues the minds of the judges and the lawyers is: How to find out the law declared ? The doctrine of precedents provides an answer by saying that find out the ratio decidendi or simply ratio of a judgment. It is this principle of a decision that binds the Courts. It may be realised that the judges of the Supreme Court, while deciding a case do not expressly declare the law in the sense a law-making body does. They interpret a particular law while deciding a case and in this judicial process of delivering judgments, they apply a general principle which according to them should be applied to facts of the case. Whenever such a decision is cited as a precedent for an alleged general principle, it is the duty of the Court before whom it cited to find out the general principle or the holding before applying it as the law declared. This judicial process of finding out the true ratio of the Supreme Court has one feet in the realm of science and another in the field of art. In the field of science logic has to be utilized as of necessity. Its weapon is the razor of reason because science does know any other method. This method requires the process of reducing the precedent to its essentials by applying relentless logical process. In the field of science logic has to be utilized as of necessity. Its weapon is the razor of reason because science does know any other method. This method requires the process of reducing the precedent to its essentials by applying relentless logical process. A mass of facts stated in precedent have to be considered and sifted over and over again before discarding them or accepting them as essential to decision of the case. Then the true general principle or the ratio of the case is found. By this method, the subsequent Court finds what the earlier Court did on the basis of the facts which were essential to its conclusion. In fact, the true ratio is found when the subsequent Court determines what the earlier Court did, more than what it said. However, the subsequent Court cannot entirely disregard what the earlier Court said. The words used in earlier precedent are of importance because they are tools of expression of the decision of superior Court or that of a coordinate Court of same strength when it is considering its own decision. The words used in earlier precedent must be allied to what the Court did. Here lies an element of art and skill in the subsequent Court. The subsequent Court has to select the right size and shape of principle while dealing with a precedent. The general principle evolved by the aforesaid judicial process must not be too wide; it must not be too narrow. It must be just appropriate; in effect a balancing act done by subsequent Court. Sometimes this process may involve a value judgment. However, it may be noted that there are other subsidiary rules developed by Courts. It is often found that a Court while delivering a judgment and giving reasons for its conclusion, trespasses into territory which was not absolutely essential for it to do so while deciding the cases. This phenomenon is called obiter dictum as opposed to dictum of the case. While dictum of a . Court is binding, the obiter dictum does not have the same authority for the reason it is not essential to the decision of a precedent. However, since it comes from a superior or coordinate Court in the hierarchy, it is respected. It is usually treated as binding unless the subsequent Court finds it is wide off the mark. Court is binding, the obiter dictum does not have the same authority for the reason it is not essential to the decision of a precedent. However, since it comes from a superior or coordinate Court in the hierarchy, it is respected. It is usually treated as binding unless the subsequent Court finds it is wide off the mark. There are other rules which may be considered of relevance in the context of this case. Others need not be stated. Firstly the rule of per incuriam. A precedent is not binding when it is rendered in ignorance of the statute or rule having the force of a statute or a precedent binding on the Court. This is so because no Court is entitled to ignore the statute or a precedent to give its own judgment. Normally no Court does it deliberately. However, sometimes the judgments are rendered in ignorance of a statute or a precedent because the attention of the Court is not drawn to it. In others, the Court may have knowledge of the statute or the precedent but it did not refer to it in terms in the subsequent decision for coming to definite conclusion by interpreting it. It may be so because the judgment was based on certain presumptions and assumptions. Even otherwise it is possible that earlier Court did not appreciate the relevance of statute or precedent to the matter at hand. The Latin phrase per incuriam implies inadvertence or want of care on the part of the Court which is desired of it by the subject matter of the decision. The in-curia in a precedent is such a mistake that it vitiates its decision Even a lower Court can impugn the previous decision if the mistake appears in the previous decision and the concerned Judge is bold enough to say so. Often such inconvenient precedents are brushed aside by saying that they do not apply. This approach may breed a habit of dishonesty to the extent that a Judge may distinguish an inconvenient binding precedent by saying that it is distinguishable without there being any distinction. There is another rule regarding a precedent which erodes its authority. It is known as rule of sub-silentio or the matter not truely argued. This approach may breed a habit of dishonesty to the extent that a Judge may distinguish an inconvenient binding precedent by saying that it is distinguishable without there being any distinction. There is another rule regarding a precedent which erodes its authority. It is known as rule of sub-silentio or the matter not truely argued. Sir John Salmond in his book of Jurisprudence has illustrated this rule by saying that earlier decision rendered in favour of a party involved points A and B but the judge gave decision on point A alone without mentioning point B. It is logically possible to say in a given case that if point B was to be argued, the Court would have ruled in an opposite direction. It is said that in such cases the earlier decision which was passed sub silentio is not binding. More often than not, the Courts subordinate to Supreme Court have not applied either the doctrine of per in curiam or sub silentio because they demand rigorous analysis and true independence of mind. obiter dictum have been held to be binding though same time contrary to statutory law. As already stated, the easiest way to brush aside an inconvenient decision is by saying that it is "distinguishable" without saying why. It is said of the Chief Justice Edward Douglas white of USA that he used to dismiss a valid argument by saving "To state the question is to answer it". In one of his opinions, Justice John. J. Clark referred subsequently. to this way of answering a difficult question in the following manner: "Accepting the risk of obscuring the obvious by discussing:" By parity of reasoning it may be stated that it can be said that only an intellectually honest judge shall take the risk of "obscuring the obvious by discussing" a decision declared by another judge as obvious. 15. It is necessary to find out now what the Supreme Court did while deciding the case of Om Prakash v. D.K. Mittal (supra). The High Court of Allahabad had issued notice stating that why the proceedings for contempt be not initiated for alleged contempt on 11.1.1987. Subsequently, found as a matter of fact, that the High Court formed an opinion after applying its mind to the facts of the case that there was good case for initiating contempt proceedings on 6.1.1988. The High Court of Allahabad had issued notice stating that why the proceedings for contempt be not initiated for alleged contempt on 11.1.1987. Subsequently, found as a matter of fact, that the High Court formed an opinion after applying its mind to the facts of the case that there was good case for initiating contempt proceedings on 6.1.1988. Following the formation of that opinion, it was directed by order dated 6.1.1988 that contemners shall be required to show cause why they should not be punished for the disobedience of order dated 9.12.1986 on 11.1.1987. It was held that the contempt proceedings were initiated on 6.1.1988. Thus, the contempt proceedings were within time as per section 20 of the Act. This conclusion can be best expressed in the words of their Lordships in paragraph 18 at page 1141 of the report as follows: " ......But the order dated 6.1.1988 issuing notices to the opposite parties to show cause why they be not punished for disobeying the order dated 9 .12 .1986, shows it will be assumed that the Court had applied its mind to the facts and material placed before it and had formed an opinion that a case for initiating proceedings for contempt was made out. Need for issuance of such notices was conceded to by the Advocate General as also by the counsel for the respondents. That is why it directed the respondents to be called upon to show cause why they be not punished for disobedience of the order of the Court. The proceedings were therefore initiated on 6.1.1988 and were within the limitation prescribed by section 20 of the Act......." 16. The Supreme Court was called upon to interpret section 20 of the Act in that case. In paragraph 10 at page 1138, it referred to dictionary meaning of the word initiate and came to the conclusion the word meant to 'start,' "begin" or commence, to call the simplest or the words mentioned in that paragraph. However, the Supreme Court wanted further to say that the word initiate qualifies any proceedings for contempt. Therefore, it was concluded that the proceedings initiated must be proceedings of contempt as distinguished from any other proceedings. However, the Supreme Court wanted further to say that the word initiate qualifies any proceedings for contempt. Therefore, it was concluded that the proceedings initiated must be proceedings of contempt as distinguished from any other proceedings. This conclusion was necessary in the context of the words employed in section 20 of the Act and there can be no doubt whatsoever that this is the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court and the law declared within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution and it is binding upon this Court. The Supreme Court, in this connection, relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Baradkanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, C.J reported in AIR 1974 SC 2255 and first line of the quotation reproduced in paragraph 11 of that judgment shows how the contempt proceedings started. The first line is as follows "It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt". The Supreme Court, in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra), thus followed its earlier decision because it was bound by its earlier decision in the case of Baradakanta Mishra (supra) which was rendered by a Three Judge Bench whereas the Bench which decided the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra) was a Two Judge Bench, Thereafter, it approved one decision of Gujarat High Court in Dineshbhat A. Parikh v. Kripalu Cooperative Housing Society, reported in AIR 1980 Guj. 194 and two decisions of Andhra Pradesh High Court. It would be proper to refer to the case of Dineshbhat A. Parikh (supra) at this juncture for the sake of convenience. It appears from the facts stated in the order of Gujarat High Court that for breach of ad interim injunction, the contempt proceedings were taken up, which was in force between 26.5.1978 to 5.5.1979. On 5.5.1979 the ad interim injunction was vacated. The petition for contempt was filed on 20.11.1979 and notice was issued on 23 .11.1979. It appears that Gujarat High Court assumed that 20.11.1979 was the date of initiation of action and held that the bar of section 20 would be operative prior to 20.11.1978. It held that if the breach of ad interim injunction committed between 26.5.1978 and 20.11.1978 (sic) section 20 would bar the jurisdiction of the Court. It appears that Gujarat High Court assumed that 20.11.1979 was the date of initiation of action and held that the bar of section 20 would be operative prior to 20.11.1978. It held that if the breach of ad interim injunction committed between 26.5.1978 and 20.11.1978 (sic) section 20 would bar the jurisdiction of the Court. It was further of the view that in case the breach of ad interim injunction was committed between 20.11.1978 and 5.5 .1979 (the date of vacation of ad interim injunction), section 20 of the Act would not bar jurisdiction. The assumption made by the learned judges that the date of initiation would be 20.11.1979 may be stated in the words of the Division Bench itself as follows: ".......When we say so, we are assuming that information supplied by the petitioner by filing the present petition amounted to institution of an action against the respondents." (paragraph 6 at page 197 of the report). Since the petitioner had not given the date of the breach of ad interim injunction and, therefore it was held that he had not discharged the burden of showing that the contempt proceedings were instituted within one year of its commission, the case was dismissed on the particular facts of the case. However, on account of assumption on the part of the learned Judges of Division Bench that the date of institution sufficed for counting of limitation, this case cannot be taken to be an authority for the proposition for which purpose it appears to have been cited in paragraph 12, page 1139 in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra). It is apparently contrary to what is concluded by Supreme Court. However, the decision of Division Bench is an authority for the proposition that section 5 of Limitation Act does not apply to contempt proceedings. It appears that in all probability, the Supreme Court agreed with this view and for this purpose the decision of Gujarat High Court was approved. This conclusion follows from decision in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra). In the last lines of paragraph 15 at page 1140 it was stated as follows: ".......Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. This conclusion follows from decision in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra). In the last lines of paragraph 15 at page 1140 it was stated as follows: ".......Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate any proceedings for contempt" Perhaps, paragraph 15 would be appropriate place where the decision in the case of Dineshbhat A. Parikh (supra) should have been approved. 17. The two cases of Andhra Pradesh High Court may now be considered. The first case is that of Advocate General v. Koteshwara Rao A. reported in 1984 CrLJ 1171 (AP). It was alleged in that case that the action of the respondent on 16.4.1982 and 4.5.1982 amounted to contempt of the stay order granted by the High Court on 15.4.1982 in Cr. M.P. No. 835/82 and Cr. M.P. No. 834/82. The contempt application was filed on 2.11.1982. However, the case remained pending for one reason or the other till 19.8.1983 when Hon 'ble Shri Justice J. Rao (as he then was) issued notice before admission. The respondent invoked the bar of section 20 of the Act. The learned Single Judge decided two questions as stated by him in paragraph 2. Firstly, if the bar of section 20 of the Act is applicable to contempt proceedings which are initiated by the High Court. It was held 'it was applicable'. It was further held that the date of initiation of proceedings for contempt is not the date of filing of the contempt petition (a view contrary to the assumption of Gujarat High Court) in the case of Dineshbhat A. Parikh (supra). Since the contempt proceedings were not initiated within one year from the date of alleged contempt on 4.5.1982, the petition was dismissed. While deciding this point J. Rao. J. held in paragraph 30 at page 1179 as follows: "The Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice Galikrusha Misra ( 1975 CrLJ 1 ) supra, and Pursholam Dass Goel v. Hon 'ble Mr. While deciding this point J. Rao. J. held in paragraph 30 at page 1179 as follows: "The Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice Galikrusha Misra ( 1975 CrLJ 1 ) supra, and Pursholam Dass Goel v. Hon 'ble Mr. Justice B.S Dhillon ( 1978 CrLJ 772 ) supra, has clearly held that initiation of a contempt proceeding is the time when the Court applies its mind to the allegations in the petition and decides to direct under section 17, the alleged contemner to show cause why he should not be punished. In that view, the date of filing of the petition is not the date of initiation of a contempt proceeding. This view is also followed by various High Courts. The Gujarat High Court in Dineshbhat v Kripalu Coop. Housing society ( AIR 1980 Guj. 194 ), the Karnataka High Court in N. venkataramanappa v. K. Naikar ( 1978 CrLJ 726 ) supra, the Allahabad High Court in Gulah Singh v. Ramji Das ( AIR 1975 All 366 ). the Punjab High Court in Court v. Kasturlal (AIR 180 Punj. & Har. 72 = (1980 CrLJ NOC (3) (FB) and the Rajasthan High Court in Mohd. Vamin v. Om Prakash (1982 CrLJ 322) supra, rejected contempt applications on account of their being barred by section 20 by the time of initiation of the proceedings by the Court. It follows from the case that ratio of this case is that the date of the filing the petition for contempt is not the date of initiating the contempt. The emphasis here appears to be on the application of the mind on the part of the Court prior to initiation rather than the manner of issuance of notice. The mention of section 17 would be appropriate only to a criminal contempt and not to a civil contempt. 18. The other case decided by the Andhra Pradesh High Court which has been approved by the Supreme Court, was that of Kishan Singh v. Hon 'ble Mr. T Anjaiah, Chief Minister, reported in 1985 CrLJ 1428 (AP). This case involved the breach of an injunction order dated 27.2.1981 passed by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in W.A. No. 509177 arising out of the order dated 31.12.1977, passed by the learned Single Judge of that Court in W.P. No. 4250/75 allowing the petition. The District Collector. This case involved the breach of an injunction order dated 27.2.1981 passed by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in W.A. No. 509177 arising out of the order dated 31.12.1977, passed by the learned Single Judge of that Court in W.P. No. 4250/75 allowing the petition. The District Collector. Hyderabad and the Board of Revenue had preferred the appeal, registered as W.A. No. 509/77. It appears that at the instance of Kishan Singh who filed the application for injunction in W.A. No. 509/77, registered as W.A. M.P. No. 142/81, the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court directed four persons -- (1) Shri T. Anjaiah, the former Chie£: Minister, (ii) Smt. Sanjana Pulla Reddy, (iii) Shri Arjuna Rao, Special Officer, Municipal Corporation. Hyderabad and (iv) Shri B.V. R.K. Murthi, District Collector, Hyderabad, not to interfere with the possession of Kishan Singh. In contempt petition filed by Kishan Singh, these four persons were arrayed as respondents. The contempt petition was dismissed against Shri Anjaiah arid Smt. Pulla Reddy on 12.8.1981 who were the respondents No.1 and 2, respectively, in the petition for contempt. The contempt case was not admitted against the remaining two respondents, i.e. Shri Arjuna Rib and Shri B.V.R.K. Murthi. The case was adjourned on 12.8.1981 directing the counsel for the petitioner for filing a better affidavit. Thereafter, the case was not listed and when the case came up for hearing before Division Bench in the year 1984, an objection was raised on behalf of the remaining respondents-contemners that section 20 of the Act became operative. In this connection, the following observations made by Jagannadha Rao, J. (as he then was) in paragraph 7 at page 1429 are of importance : "7. Whatever be the reason. the fact remains that the contempt petition has not been admitted by this Court so far as against respondents 3 and 4. In this connection, the following observations made by Jagannadha Rao, J. (as he then was) in paragraph 7 at page 1429 are of importance : "7. Whatever be the reason. the fact remains that the contempt petition has not been admitted by this Court so far as against respondents 3 and 4. It is admitted that there is no such order in the contempt case so far." Thereafter, the learned Judge considered section 20 of the Act and mentioned certain authorities and quoted partially his order at page 1430, paragraph No.9 from the earlier decision rendered by him in the case of Advocate General v. A.V Kateswara (Supra) : "Initiation of the contempt proceeding is the time when the Court applies its mind to the allegations in the petition and decides to direct, under section 17, of the alleged contemner to show cause why he should not be punished." It appears from the report in this second decision, the learned Judge supplied emphasis to the words applies its mind. It appears from the two quotations made above that view of the Division Bench appeared to be that it was prepared to assume application of mind if the Division Bench had "admitted" the contempt petition on 12.8.1981 as within one year from the date of alleged contempt on 5.7.1981. Otherwise, there appears to be no reason to observe in paragraph 7 as their Lordships of the Division Bench did. In fact, within one year the notice was not issued and, therefore, the objection was that the contempt petition could not be admitted as is clear from paragraph 89 at page 1429. The facts of the case were plain and, therefore there was no occasion to say more than that the proceedings for contempt were not initiated at all and consequently, the petition was liable to be dismissed. However, section 20 of the Act was interpreted in terms of the earlier decision and the case was decided on the question that there was no application of mind. However, in absence of underlining, it appears that the Division Bench appears to have laid down that in each case notice has to be issued under section 17 to alleged contemner to show cause why he should not be punished. However, in absence of underlining, it appears that the Division Bench appears to have laid down that in each case notice has to be issued under section 17 to alleged contemner to show cause why he should not be punished. With great respect to the Division Bench, which decided the case, it is pointed out that section 15 of the Act deals with criminal contempts other than referred to in section 14 of the Act. It enables a Court to take action of its contempt on its own motion or on a motion made by the persons mentioned in sub-section (1) of that Act or by Advocate General or on a reference made by subordinate Court for its contempt under sub-section (2). The sub-section (3) requires that the motion or the reference shall specify the contempt of which a person is charged. It appears from the headnote that section 15 deals with the procedure prior to taking cognizance of criminal contempt. Section 15 in terms does not use that notice issued should be a notice to show cause why the contemner should not be punished in so many words. It may be further noted that section 17(1) refers to every proceeding under section 15. It does confine to motion for criminal contempt. It requires personal service on the contemner unless the Court directs otherwise. Section 17(2) provides that what documents shall accompany the notice. The sub-section (5) of section 17 requires the Court to determine the matter of charge after the alleged contemner files his affidavit in defence either on the basis of evidence or after taking further evidence as may be necessary. It appears to this Court that the words used by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court "notice to show cause why the alleged contemner should not be punished" are not found in the statute either section 17 or section 15 of the Act. Moreover, the aforesaid two sections arc confined to issuance of notice on criminal contempt. So far as civil contempt is concerned, there appears to be no provision in the Act itself like section 15 or section 17. It is possible the words "to show cause why he should not be punished" were subconsciously borrowed from the Form No.1 framed under Rule 18 of Contempt of Court Rules. 1980 made by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 19. It is possible the words "to show cause why he should not be punished" were subconsciously borrowed from the Form No.1 framed under Rule 18 of Contempt of Court Rules. 1980 made by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 19. After considering the three decisions of the High Courts referred to in the decision of the Supreme Court it is now necessary to consider the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra). It may be noted that in the aforesaid case, the case of Kishan Singh (supra) was cited. However, the quotation was reproduced by the Supreme Court without the under linings supplied for emphasis in Kishan Singh's case. This is clear from paragraph 13 page 1139 of the case of Om prakash Jaiswal (supra). The paragraphs 14 and 15 of the decision arc being quoted in extenso for consideration: "14. In order to appreciate the exact connotation of the expression 'initiate any proceedings for contempt' we may notice several situations or stages which may arise before the Court dealing with contempt proceedings. These are: (i) (a) a private party may file or present an application or petition for initiating any proceedings for civil contempt; or (b) the Court may receive a motion or reference from the Advocate General or with his consent in writing from any other person or a Specified Law Officer or a Court subordinate to High Court; (ii) (a) the Court may in routine issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against or (b) the Court may issue .notice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause why the proceedings for contempt be not initiated; (iii) the Court may issue notice to the person sought to be proceeded against calling upon him to show cause why he be not punished for contempt. "15. In the case contemplated by (i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any proceedings for contempt have been initiated. "15. In the case contemplated by (i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any proceedings for contempt have been initiated. Filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the Court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings by Court; On receiving any such document, it is usual with the Courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as 'admit', 'rule', 'issue notice' or 'issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated' in all such cases the notice is issued either in routine or because the Court has not yet felt satisfied that' a case for initiating any proceeding for contempt has been made out and therefore the Court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating the proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in-spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the material placed before it the Court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such option. It is only when the Court has formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the respondents or the alleged contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished then the Court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is- the result of a conscious application of the mind of the Court to the facts and the material before it. Such initiation of the proceedings for contempt based on application of mind by the Court to the facts of the case and the material before it must take place within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed failing which the jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for contempt is lost." It is apparent from the decision aforementioned in which the Supreme Court says that (i) and (ii) would not mean initiation of a proceedings for contempt. The categories i(a) and i(b) refers to mere presentation or receipt of the application of contempt proceedings or motion from Advocate General or reference from contempt of Court from any subordinate Court. Mere filing of motion or receiving of contempt application would not be deemed to be initiation of proceedings for contempt. Nor is routine issue of notice on admission covered by categories (ii) (a) would amount to initiating proceedings for contempt. It is obvious when the Court issues notices in terms requiring the contemner to show cause why contempt proceedings should not be initiated is not issuing notice of contempt proceedings within the meaning of section 20 of the Act. Here unlike (ii) (a) the Court appears to have applied its mind but was not satisfied with the material placed before it. Hence it required the opposite party to give further facts in order to formulate its opinion for initiating proceedings for contempt. This is category (ii) (b). This does not present any problem. However, the category (iii) presents a problem because it is urged that the Supreme Court indicated that notice of initiating proceedings for contempt should be in form indicated by it in this category and no others. It appears that this conclusion can be drawn only by superficial reading of the words employed. The Supreme Court was not concerned so much with the form of notice but with the interpretation of section 20 of the Act. The form mentioned in category (iii) appears to have been borrowed from the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court. On the other hand, the Supreme Court itself in earlier decision in the case of Baradakanta Mishra (supra) has employed different language by saying, "It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt." "quoted by the Supreme Court itself in Om Prakash Jaiswal 's case (supra). It may be noted that section 15(1) of the Act employs similar language, i.e., "High Court may take action". The true ratio of the case appears to be that the Supreme Court was emphasizing the fact that the proceedings for contempt can be said to be initiated only when the Court applies its mind to the facts of the case to take an action for contempt of Court. The true ratio of the case appears to be that the Supreme Court was emphasizing the fact that the proceedings for contempt can be said to be initiated only when the Court applies its mind to the facts of the case to take an action for contempt of Court. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the aforesaid decision to take an action is contra indicated in categories (i) (a) and (i) (b), (ii) (a) and (ii) (b). However, it may be presumed in the case of category (iii) that the Court took action. In the paragraph 15 quoted above, the portion underlined refers to category (iii). In the opinion of this Court, there is no magic in the words "show cause why' he be not punished for contempt of Court". It appears that these exact words were not employed by the High Court of Allahabad in the order dated 6.1.1988. Therefore, finding of the Supreme Court itself in paragraph 18 of its decision is referred to show that the High Court of Allahabad had applied different words in order dated 6.1.1988. A true votary of doctrine of precedent would not hold to the rigid position that the contempt proceedings are not initiated unless the words indicated by category (iii) are employed on the order issuing notice. The real substance of the matter is that the proceedings, for contempt are initiated when the Court applies its mind to facts of the case with a view to start proceedings for contempt• of Court. The Supreme Court says the fact of application of mind should be indicated in the order initiating contempt proceedings so that it cannot be said that other proceeding were started. It categorized other proceedings as category (ii) (b). Here the tenor of notice indicates that proceedings other than the proceedings for contempt mentioned in section 20 were being issued. In fact, the words "show cause why you should not be punished" stand for the words "initiate any proceedings for contempt" used in section 20 of the Act. 20. There is another reason for holding that the Supreme Court was not considering the form in which the notice for proceedings of contempt of Court should be issued. It was concerned with interpretation of section 20 of the Act. The sections 14, 15 and 17 of the Act deal with criminal contempt. 20. There is another reason for holding that the Supreme Court was not considering the form in which the notice for proceedings of contempt of Court should be issued. It was concerned with interpretation of section 20 of the Act. The sections 14, 15 and 17 of the Act deal with criminal contempt. There appears to be no analogus provision regarding civil contempt. The legislature in its wisdom has left the procedure for proceedings in contempt of civil nature by way of sub-ordinate legislation. Most of the High Courts have framed rules prescribing the procedure. It appears "The law of Contempt, Court and Legislature, Justice Lekchand now edited by Justice B.L. Yadav, Fourth Edition Published in 1997, that the High Court of Delhi, Gujarat and Jammu and Kashmir have not framed any rules. Most of the High Courts have prescribed forms under the appropriate rule for issuing notice of proceedings for contempt. The Form prescribed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court under rule 18. Contempt of Court Rules, 1980 requires the notice to mention show cause why you should not be punished or appropriate order be not passed against you. The rule 6 of Contempt of Courts (Allahabad High Court) Rules, 1977 employs that notice be issued to any person to show cause why he should not be punished for Contempt of Court. The Bombay High Court does not prescribed any form. It does not indicate in rule also the nature of notice to be issued as per Contempt of Courts (Bombay High Court) Rule, 1975. The Calcutta High Court (Contempt of Court) Rules, 1978 prescribes model Form No. 1 Appendix No. 1 and Model form No.2 Appendix No.1. The Form No. 1 refers to issuance of rule nisi. The form No.2 deals with contempt suo motu or report of Advocate General. It is issued under the caption "came to the notice of .........".Both these forms require the alleged contemner to show cause why he/they should not be committed to prison or otherwise dealt with. It is not necessary to refer to rules framed by other High Courts. The aforesaid rules or forms have been referred to show the variety of forms in which the notice of the contempt proceedings have been prescribed. A close scrutiny of rules of the various High Court may show there was no uniformity of language. It is not necessary to refer to rules framed by other High Courts. The aforesaid rules or forms have been referred to show the variety of forms in which the notice of the contempt proceedings have been prescribed. A close scrutiny of rules of the various High Court may show there was no uniformity of language. These rules were not considered in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal (supra), therefore it cannot be said that Supreme Court wanted to lay down that forms prescribed or the rules made should not be followed and there should be one and only form in which the notices should be issued. If this be so, then mention of form in the category (iii) would be obiter and shall not be binding on the particular High Court because under the law and the Constitution, the High Court cannot be directed to act contrary to the Rules framed by itself under the Act. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules. 1980 prescribes as per rule 8(a) of those rules that notices shall be issued in Form No.1 appended to the rules. This form requires the contemnor to show cause why such action as is deemed fit should not be taken against you. The words "take action" appear to have been borrowed from section 15 of the Act. The Form No.1 of Karnataka High Court's Contempt of Proceedings Rules, 1981 employs identical language. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the firm opinion that the words employed in category (iii) discussed above are merely illustrative and indicative. They were employed for the purpose of distinguishing proceedings for contempt from other proceedings in the context of word "initiate" used in section 20 of the Act. A rule of law derived from a precedent can be stated in varying degree of generalisation. It can be reduced to a small or large concentric circle depending upon the degree of abstraction. It would be doing violence to the doctrine of precedent to select the largest pattem of generalisation without applying mind to the facts of that case. Nor can the effect of a procedent be destroyed by reducing it to the smallest of the form of concentric circle so as to render it practically ineffective as a precedent. It would be doing violence to the doctrine of precedent to select the largest pattem of generalisation without applying mind to the facts of that case. Nor can the effect of a procedent be destroyed by reducing it to the smallest of the form of concentric circle so as to render it practically ineffective as a precedent. It is the duty of the Court dealing with a precedent to endeavour to select the right size and shape of circle. Nay; it is also its responsibility. It is in this spirit, the case of Om prakash Jaiswal (supra) and the cases cited therein were examined and not in the spirit of a knight errant tilting at imaginary windmills. It is proper to remind oneself of the memorable words of Cromwell at the time of writing a judgment: "I beseech you in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken." (Letter to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 3rd August, 1950). These words were often repeated in mind during the course of discussion in this judgment. 21. After rejecting the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents that the Court was bound to express the order of issuance of notice in terms of category (iii) in the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal (supra). It would be proper to record a finding that this Court applied its mind to the facts of the case before passing the order dated 16.8.1999. It was not a routine order of admission or issuance of notice within the meaning of category (ii)(a). It was also not an order by category (ii) (b). Therefore, the question is what did this Court do before recording the statement of counsel of relater Shri Surendra Gangele. As is clear from the previous paragraphs that it took all the care to satisfy itself if prima facie case existed. Thereafter, it expressed itself by recording the statement of the counsel and confirming the facts from him. Thus, the order dated 16.8.1999 showed that the Court was initiating proceedings for contempt of Court on 16.8.1999 and did not want to wait for reply of the alleged contemners. Otherwise, the Court would not record the statement and simply direct issuance of notice as indicated by category (ii)(a). If the contemners did not take coercive action to remove the petitioners from gumtis they were liable to be discharged. Otherwise, the Court would not record the statement and simply direct issuance of notice as indicated by category (ii)(a). If the contemners did not take coercive action to remove the petitioners from gumtis they were liable to be discharged. The contempt application was not based on complicated facts requiring any verification. On the other hand, the facts were simple and they spoke for themselves. No enquiry prior to issuance of contempt notice was called for. The stay order was operative. This position held good - till the date the case was heard on the question of preliminary objection. The use of words "issue notice" in order dated 16.8.1999 should be read in the context what precedes it. It was not necessary for the Court to refer to the Rule No.8 and Form No.1 of the Rules of M.P. It is the office which is required to issue notice as per appropriate rule. It is in essence a ministerial job. The orders of this kind are passed by this Court as per its practice. This Court has taken the view that the ratio of the Supreme Court is confined to principle that for the purpose of initiating proceedings for contempt as per section 20 of the Act, the Court must apply its mind arid indicate in its order that it has done so, prior to start of proceedings for contempt, and further it must start contempt proceedings and no other proceedings. It is reiterated that there was no intention to start any other proceedings except the proceedings for contempt of Court. Consequently, the order dated 16.8.1999 amounted to initiation of proceedings for the contempt of Court. It did not matter that this Court did not mention Rule 8(a) or form No.1. This was implied and was in accordance with the practice of the Court. 22. For all these reasons, this Court does not find any merit in the objection of the: respondents. It is, accordingly, rejected.