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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 859 (MP)

Pramila Singh v. State of M. P.

2001-11-26

DIPAK MISRA

body2001
ORDER 1. By this writ petition preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed to call for the records and upon perusal thereof to issue a writ of certiorari for quashing of the order dated 24.8.2001, Annexure P-8, and further to restore the order passed by the appellate authority, Annexure P-7. 2. The fact as have been exposited are that the petitioner was elected as the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat Intora District, Rewa. The respondent No.4, the Naib Tahsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate, submitted a report against the petitioner. On the basis of the said report "show cause notice was served upon the petitioner on 16.3.1001. The notice to show cause indicated five charges which were reported by the respondent No.4. The respondent No.3, the competent authority, directed the petitioner to file her reply within eight weeks and also required her to show cause, why action should not be taken against her under the provisions of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (for brevity 'the Act'). A copy of the chargesheet has been brought on record m Annexure P-3. It is pertinent to state that in the chargesheet 13 charges were mentioned. By the show cause notice the petitioner was required to file her reply of respect of eight charges. The petitioner submitted her reply vide Annexure P-4 dated 9.4.2001. Considering the reply of the petitioner, the respondent No.3 passed an order on 8.5.2001 that the continuance of the petitioner as the Sarpanch was against public interest. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the competent authority, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Collector of the District, which was heard by the Addl. Collector, who set aside the order passed by the competent authority. The appellate authority came to hold that some mistakes had been committed by the petitioner but it could not be concluded that she committed such acts which warranted he removal. The said order passed by the appellate authority has been brought on record as Annexure P-7. 4. Being aggrieved the respondent No. 5 preferred a revision petition before the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa respondent No.2, herein. The Commissioner set aside the order passel by the appellate authority and restored the order passed by the original authority. 5. The said order passed by the appellate authority has been brought on record as Annexure P-7. 4. Being aggrieved the respondent No. 5 preferred a revision petition before the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa respondent No.2, herein. The Commissioner set aside the order passel by the appellate authority and restored the order passed by the original authority. 5. It is urged in the petition that the main charge against the petitioner was that she had removed certain Panchas without an basis though as an actual fact, the petitioner had acted in a most bonafide manner as the Panchas had refused to attend and take part in the proceedings c the Panchayat. It is also putforth in the petition that in the meeting of the Gramsabha held on 26.1.2001 the suspension of the Panchas was approved It is also averred the due opportunity was afforded to the Panchas to explain their conduct and thereafter action was taken. It is also setforth that the aforesaid action of the petitioner cannot be regarded as a misconduct warranting removal from the post of the Sarpanch. 6. Assailing the aforesaid order it is urged by Mr. Ajit Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner that on a perusal of the charges framed against the petitioner it would be clear as day that all the charge relate to convening of the meeting and removal of the' Panchas' Learned counsel has also referred to the findings recorded by the original authority whereby the said authority has referred to the provisions enshrined under the Act and came to hold that the petitioner was guilty of certain charges but the findings recorded by the said authority were not tenable and accordingly the appellate authority vide Annexure P-7 dislodged the same. It is putforth by him that the appellate authority has given cogent reasons and there was no justification on the part of the revisional authority to reverse the same. Mr. Singh has also contended that the respondent No 5 who filed the revision petition on behalf of the persons of the locality, had no locus standi to maintain the revision. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and others [ AIR 2001 SC 2524 ]. 7. Mr. R.S. Jha, learned Dy. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and others [ AIR 2001 SC 2524 ]. 7. Mr. R.S. Jha, learned Dy. Advocate General for the State has supported the order passed vide Annexure P-8 by the revision authority. It is his contention that as the petitioner has acted against the public interest it is not desirable to continue he in the office of the Sarpanch. Mr. S.P. Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent No.5 has submitted that the respondent No. 5 had preferred the revision as she was a person aggrieved and being the person of the locality she had the locus standi to file the revision. The learned counsel has submitted that the order passed by the revisional authority is justified as the facts clearly depict that the petitioner was not entitled in law to continue in the post of Sarpanch. 8. Mr. Ajit Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, though initially raised the question of locus standi of the respondent No.5 later on very clearly submitted that this Court need not dwell upon the said issue and decide the controversy on merits of the case. Accepting the aforesaid submission, I proceed to deal with the lis on merits. 9. Mr. Ajit Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the order passed by the appellate authority The said authority has upon perusal of the allegations come to hold that the chargesheet which was served on the petitioner was different than the allegations which were inquired into by the original authority. The appellate authority has also recorded a finding that the petitioner had committed some mistakes but the same do not warrant action to be taken under section 40 of the Act. The revisional authority in paragraph 4 has come to hold that the petitioner had removed some Panchas though she had no authority to do so. In paragraph 5 the said authority has opined that the allegation with regard to improper utilisation of Rs 10,000/- was not properly proved. In paragraph 6 the said authority has opined that the allegation that the petitioner had appointed her nephew, Shri Dhirendra Singh, as Chairman of the Committee, was not proved. In paragraph 5 the said authority has opined that the allegation with regard to improper utilisation of Rs 10,000/- was not properly proved. In paragraph 6 the said authority has opined that the allegation that the petitioner had appointed her nephew, Shri Dhirendra Singh, as Chairman of the Committee, was not proved. The said authority it paragraph 8 has expressed the opinion that one charge i.e. removing the Panchas was proved, as the same was done in an illegal manner. Thus, the singular question that arises for consideration, was the removal of the petitioner justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. In this context, I may profitably refer to section 40 of the Act. It reads as under: "40. Removal of office bearers of Panchayat -- (1) The State Government or the prescribed authority may after such enquiry as it may deem fit to make at any time, remove an office bearer – (a) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties; or (b) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the interest of the public: Provided that no person shall be removed unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed from his office. Explanation : For the purpose of this sub-section 'misconduct' shall include- (a) any action adversely affecting -- (i) the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; or (ii) the harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of State transending religious linguistic, regional, caste or sectional diversities; or (iii) the dignity of women; or (b) gross negligence in the discharge of the duties under this Act. (c) the use of position or influence directly or indirectly to secure employment for any relative in the Panchayat or any action for extending any pecuniary benefits to any relative such as giving out any type of lease getting any work done through them in the Panchayat by an office bearer of Panchayat. Explanation -- (1) For the purpose of this clause the expression 'relative' shall mean father, mother, brother, sister husband, wife, son, daughter mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law: Provided that the final order in the inquiry shall as far as possible be passed within 90 days from the date of issue of show cause notice to the concerned office bearer. (2) A person who has been removed under sub-section (1) shall forthwith cease to be a member of any other Panchayat of which he is a member, such person shall also be disqualified for a period of six years to be elected under this Act." 11. It is submitted by Mr. Ajit Singh learned counsel for the petitioner that she was an elected Sarpanch and she cannot be removed on a flimsy charge. The learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner has misconstrued the provision enshrined under section 36 of the Act and passed the order of removal. The learned counsel has also contended has it been done to avoid a motion of no-confidence, the matter would have been different. 12. Mr. R.S. Jha, learned Dy. AG for the State and Mr. Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent No.5 on the other hand submitted that the petitioner had taken an action which was illegal and hence, the same warranted her removal. 13. In this context, I may profitably refer to the case of Trilochan Dev. Sharma (supra) wherein their Lordships held as under: "In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returnee candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returnee candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within S. 22 of the Act must be clearly made out.(quoted from the placitum)" 14. I am conscious, in the aforesaid decision their Lordships were dealing with a case of Panjab Municipal Act, expressing their opinion with regard to the concept 'abuse of powers'. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within S. 22 of the Act must be clearly made out.(quoted from the placitum)" 14. I am conscious, in the aforesaid decision their Lordships were dealing with a case of Panjab Municipal Act, expressing their opinion with regard to the concept 'abuse of powers'. In the case at hand though the factual scenario is different but the spirit of the decision would be applicable inasmuch as it cannot be said with certitude that the petitioner had done any act with any dishonest intention and her continuance in the office is not desirable in public interest. I may hasten to add that there was no financial irregularity or any other kind of irregularity that has been proved. Though so many charges were levelled against the petitioner, the revisional authority could only form the opinion on the basis of one charge. True it is, a singular charge, under some circumstances may be good enough warranting removal of the Sarpanch, but in the case at hand, as genuine steps were taken by the petitioner in misconstruing the provisions enshrined under section 36 of the Act, I am of the considered opinion the power under section 40 of the Act should not have been invoked and the Additional Collector had rightly exonerated the petitioner. 15. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the Commissioner, Rewa Division, Rewa Annexure P-8 is quashed and that of the Additional Collect, Annexure P-7, is restored. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.