Judgment S.N.Pathak, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by appellants Baijnath Tiwary and Kanchan Prasad who were plaintiffs in title Suit No. 49 of 1978. The suit was decreed by Sri Surendra Kumar Srivastava, Munsif, Bettiah. Then, the defendant-respondents of this second appeal, preferred an appeal and the first appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. So the plaintiffs of title suit have preferred this second appeal. 2. The relevant facts are that plot No. 1922 was recorded in the name of Gopichand and Bhuar Rout, full brothers and its recorded area was 10 dhurs. Accordingly, plot No. 1923 was also recorded in the name of these two brothers having an area of 4 dhurs. There was one plot, i.e., plot No. 1924, also in the suit over which the plaintiffs claimed easementary right over 3 dhurs and this easemenlary right was not in dispute between the parties. So the decision of the lower Court regarding this plot is irrelevant. 3. It was the case of the plaintiff-appellants that Gopichand died in February 1937 leaving behind his widow Mateshwari Devi, who died subsequently and so Bhuar acquired plot Nos. 1922 and 1923 by survivorship. Bhuar left behind his wife Dhanwa. This Dhanwa sold 7 dhurs out of plot Nos. 1922 and 1923 to one Ram Prasad who, in turn, sold it to defendant-respondent. However, the actual area of plot No. 1922 was 1 katha 3 dhurs on the map and on the spot, although it was wrongly recorded in the record of rights as 10 dhurs. So after the sale of 7 dhurs of land to Ram Prasad and, in turn, to respondent Jamuna Singh, 18 dhurs of plot No. 1922 and 2 dhurs of plot No. 1923 still remained in possession in Most. Dhanwa which was purchased by plaintiff-appellants in the year 1967 by a registered sale-deed and he was put in possession thereof. However, the defendant-respondent encroached upon this land of the plaintiff and, in spite of request to vacate the same, did not oblige and then this suit was filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant-respondents case was that Gopichand did not die in the year 1937, rather he died in the year 1941 and, thereafter, his wife Mateshwari came in possession of disputed land jointly with Dhanwa. The defendant-respondents case was that Gopichand did not die in the year 1937, rather he died in the year 1941 and, thereafter, his wife Mateshwari came in possession of disputed land jointly with Dhanwa. Dhanwa sold 7 dhurs to Ram Prasad and then to defendant and Mateshwari had also sold her share to Dhanwa and, therefore, nothing was left for Dhanwa to sell to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to a decree and, hence, the suit was fit to be dismissed. 4. The trial Court discussed the oral as also the documentary evidence and gave a finding that plot No. 1922 had, of course, an area of 1 katha 3 dhurs and that Gopichand had died in the year 1937 before promulgation of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. Therefore, Most. Dhanwa, wife of Bhuar came in possession of the entire land of plot No. 1922 and plot No. 1923. So the sale of 7 dhurs to the defendant was invalid and the sale of 18 dhurs of plot No. 1922 and 2 dhurs of plot No. 1923 to the plaintiff was valid and so the suit was decreed by the trial Court. However, the first appellate Court came to the conclusion on the evidence adduced in the trial Court that neither of the parties had proved their title and, therefore, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed and the order and the judgment of the trial Court were set aside. 5. In this appeal before this Court, the substantial questions of law framed for consideration were to the effect whether the first appellate Court had ignored certain vital documents and evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs and whether its decision suffered from non-consideration of evidence. The order-sheet dated 21st April, 1986 shows that another question of law for decision in this appeal referred to the fact that the first appellate Court adopted wrong approach and fixed the onus of proving the subsisting title to the plaintiff-appellants. 6. I shall consider first, whether the first appellate Court had fixed the onus upon the plaintiff-appellants, to prove its subsisting title. In this connection, I find that the first appellate Court did not specifically mention that it was the duty of the plaintiff-appellants to prove the subsisting title. 6. I shall consider first, whether the first appellate Court had fixed the onus upon the plaintiff-appellants, to prove its subsisting title. In this connection, I find that the first appellate Court did not specifically mention that it was the duty of the plaintiff-appellants to prove the subsisting title. The first appellate Court, rather, had held that on the basis of the documents filed by the plaintiff-appellants as also on the basis of the evidence adduced on its behalf, it had failed to prove its title (of the plaintiff) and their dispossession, as alleged by them. The first appellate Court has also held that the title of the defendant-respondent was also not proved by the evidence adduced. It is pertinent to note that failure of the defendant to prove its title does not result in proof of title of the plaintiffs of a particular suit. The plaintiff has to depend on its own legs and first it has to prove its title and then only onus will shift to the defendant to prove its possession beyond 12 years in order to defeat the claim of the plaintiff to recover possession of the suit land. So the onus of the plaintiff-appellant was, of course, to prove its title on the basis of its case as also on the basis of the evidence, both, oral and documentary, adduced by it. 7. In this connection, pleading of the plaintiff-appellants is worth consideration. Admittedly, Dhanwa had sold 7 dhurs of land to Ram Prasad and Ram Prasad sold it to the defendant. The recorded area of the plot Nos. 1922 and 1923 admittedly came to 14 dhurs and so if 7 dhurs of the same were sold to the defendants priorto the sale in favour of plaintiffs by Dhanwa, Dhanwa would be left with no share,, if Gopichand had left behind his heir Matesnwari, who would come into possession of her husbands property along with Dhanwa, of course, having limited right, and so in this connection, a very relevant and pertinent question to be decided by the lower Court was to decide the exact period of death of Gopichand. The pleading of the plaintiff-appellants was, in the original plaint, at Paragraph 2 that Gopichand died in the year 1941. Subsequently, this year was amended and the period of death of Gopichand was changed into "month of February. The pleading of the plaintiff-appellants was, in the original plaint, at Paragraph 2 that Gopichand died in the year 1941. Subsequently, this year was amended and the period of death of Gopichand was changed into "month of February. This amendment, in my opinion, should not have been allowed; because it gave a substantive advantage to the defendant and it would change the nature of the case; because if Gopichand died after enactment of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, Mateshwari, the admitted widow of Gopichand would come in possession of suit land along with Dhanwa. Be that as it may, now the question simply is whether this pleading of the plaintiff that Gopichand died in the year 1937 was proved or not. In this connection, the trial Court has referred to one document of the defendant as also some recitals of the sale-deed of the plaintiff (Ext-1). In the sale deed of the plaintiff, it was mentioned that Gopichand died 30 years prior to the execution of the sale-deed on 8th May, 1967. Interpreting this averment in the sale-deed of the plaintiff (Ext-1), the Court held that Gopichand died in the year 1937. But, the trial Court failed to take notice that the plaintiffs sale-deed was executed on 8th May, 1967 and 30 years back to this date would go back to 8th May, 1937, after coming into force of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act 1937. In such a circumstance, Mateshwari could succeed to the property of her rjusband along with Dhanwa and Dhanwa shall not come into possession of suit plots exclusively ignoring the claim of Mateshwari. Another document on the basis of which the trial Court relied was the plaint filed by defendant-respondent Jamuna Singh (T.S. No. 56 of 1965). This was a plaint (Ext-8) filed by the defendant-respondent Jamuna Singh in the year 1965 against Dhanwa for partition of his land which he had purchased from Ram Prasad. In this plaint, Jamuna Singh defendant-respondent had stated that Gopichand died 25 years back and on his death, Bhuar succeeded to the entire suit plot by virtue of survivorship. This plaint was filed in the year 1965. So according to the recital of plaint, the date of death of Gopichand would go back to the year 1940. In this plaint, Jamuna Singh defendant-respondent had stated that Gopichand died 25 years back and on his death, Bhuar succeeded to the entire suit plot by virtue of survivorship. This plaint was filed in the year 1965. So according to the recital of plaint, the date of death of Gopichand would go back to the year 1940. The plaintiff, therefore, could not take the advantage of this recital in the plaint and base his claim that Gopichand died in the year 1937. The other recital in this plaint was that Bhuar came in possession of entire land of Gopichand by survivorship. This averment of Jamuna Singh was interpreted by the trial Court and by the plaintiff-appellant that Bhuar was the sole owner of the suit plot and, therefore, Dhanwa had entire share of her husband and so her sale to the plaintiff was valid. The law on this point is that an admission of a particular person in any previous suit-cannot amount to admission in subsequent suit between the two parties. Moreover, the suit No. 65 of 1965 was between Dhanwa and the defendant-respondent Jamuna Singh and so, if he made the aforesaid admission, he was making this concession between himself and Dhanwa for his own tactical reasons in order to prove his own title which he derived from Dhanwa. This admission, therefore, cannot be taken to be an admission in the suit under appeal which was between Jamuna Singh and Baidyanath Tiwary, the plaintiff-appellant before this Court. The question is whether this admission can amount to an act of estoppel. Any declaration or omission or commission of a party conferring any advantage to any other party can be interpreted to fall within the principle of estoppel; but the moot question is whether the plaintiff Baidyanath Tiwary had acquired any advantage by this admission by defendant-respondent Jamuna Singh. The sale-deed of Baidyanath Tiwary is of the year 1967 and the plaint was filed by Jamuna Singh in the year 1965 (5.4.1965), i.e., much before the sale to Baidyanath Tiwary. So do not think the statement of Jamuna Singh made in the year 1965 in Title Suit No. 56 of 1965 would give any advantage to Baidyanath Tiwary. So I am of the considered opinion that the aforesaid recital of the plaint of Title Suit No. 56 of 1965 (Ext. 8) will not operate as estoppel. So do not think the statement of Jamuna Singh made in the year 1965 in Title Suit No. 56 of 1965 would give any advantage to Baidyanath Tiwary. So I am of the considered opinion that the aforesaid recital of the plaint of Title Suit No. 56 of 1965 (Ext. 8) will not operate as estoppel. So Baidyanath Tiwary cannot take advantage of this recital as well. No other piece of evidence was adduced in the lower Court to prove that Gopichand died in the year 1937 before the promulgation of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. Against this, there was a clear pleading of the plaintiff in his plaint at Paragraph 5 that after purchasing the suit land from Most. Dhanwa, the plaintiff learnt that the widow of Gopichand had transferred her interest of 7 dhurs to one Dhanu Prasad by a registered sale-deed dated 19th June, 1956. This sale-deed cast a cloud on the title of the plaintiff and, therefore, he obtained a sale-deed from this Dhanu Prasad on 27th August, 1970 in the Bewnami name of Kanchan Prasad. So from this pleading of the plaintiff-appellant, it transpired that Mateshwari, the widow of Gopichand, was alive till 19th June, 1956 and that is why she had transferred her share of 7 dhurs to Dhanu Prasad. In such a circumstance, Dhanwa, the widow of Bhuar would be left with 7 dhurs of her share which she had sold to Ram Prasad in the year 1963 and this land was transferred to the defendant-respondent Jamuna Singh in the year 1964. So Dhanwa was left with no share to transfer the same to plaintiff-appellants. Besides, the purchase of 7 dhurs by the plaintiff from Dhanu in the fake name of Kanchan Prasad, was not proved, because the sale-deed concerned was not filed. Kanchan Prasad, who was added as plaintiff No. 2, did not appear in the suit either to support the claim of the plaintiff or to deny the same and in such a circumstance, the plaintiffs claim of Benami purchase in the name of Kanchan Prasad remained unsupported by evidence. So, the plaintiffs pleading that Mateshwari had sold her share of 7 dhurs to Dhanu Prasad remained conclusive. Accordingly, the share of Dtianwa remained only 7 dhurs which she had already transferred. So, the plaintiffs pleading that Mateshwari had sold her share of 7 dhurs to Dhanu Prasad remained conclusive. Accordingly, the share of Dtianwa remained only 7 dhurs which she had already transferred. So the title acquired by the plaintiff on the basis of sale by Dhanwa was not valid, and consequently plaintiffs claim of title was self-defeating on the basis of pleading itself. 8. There is another dispute which also deserves consideration. It was the case of the plaintiffs that the actual area of plot No. 1922 on the spot was 1 katha 3 dhurs, although the recorded area is 10 dhurs only. To prove this fact, there was no evidence on the record, except the confusing argument that the land in Bettiah town is measured by a Laggi of 8 1/2 cubits (Parti land) and the homestead land is measured by a Laggi measuring 5 1/2 cubits. The lower Court held that if a piece of land is measured by a Laggi of 8 1/2 cubits, the area would be reduced and if it is measured by a Laggi of 5 1/2 cubits, the area would be extended. I fail to understand why this aspect of the case was given so much importance and why the trial Court relied on this aspect of the case in order to hold that the area of plot No. 1922 was 1 katha 3 dhurs. Whatever may be the measurement of the Laggi by which survey record was prepared, it is apparent that the area as recorded in the municipal survey was admittedly 10 dhurs, so far as plot No. 1922 is concerned and the area of plot No. 1923 was 4 dhurs. So as per the method of measurement pleaded by the plaintiff himself, the survey record of rights was rightly prepared and the area mentioned was also rightly mentioned; because the measurement of the Laggi which, according to the evidence of plaintiff itself, was 8 1/2 cubits (Parti land) and 5 1/2 cubits (homestead land). Plot No. 1922 was Parti land whereas plot No. 1923 was homestead land. So the area mentioned in the municipal survey of record of right was properly and roughly mentioned. There was no confusion regarding the same. Plot No. 1922 was Parti land whereas plot No. 1923 was homestead land. So the area mentioned in the municipal survey of record of right was properly and roughly mentioned. There was no confusion regarding the same. Perhaps, the plaintiff and the trial Court both wanted to take advantage of sale-deed of the defendant-respondent where measurement of Laggi was mentioned, whereas the same was not mentioned in the sale-deed of Ram Prasad; but the admitted legal position is that the plaintiff cannot gain from the infirmity in the title-deed of the defendant or its evidence. I need not reiterate that the plaintiffs must stand on its own legs and must prove its case by its own evidence. The evidence on behalf of plaintiff to prove that actual area of Plot No. 1922 was 1 katha 3 dhurs was almost nil. The first appellate Court has taken note of the fact that no survey knowing Pleader Commissioner was deputed to measure plot No. 1922 and to refer to the actual area. In this connection, I must not fail to refer to the deposition of one S.B. Haider (P.W. 13) on the basis of which the appellants lawyer submitted that this P.W. 13 had proved that plot No. 1922 was measuring 1 katha, 3 dhurs; but I find that this P.W. 13 was man of the plaintiff and he had not gone to the plot to measure the disputed land; rather he had based his opinion on the basis of municipal record of right. He further stated that he had measured the map of plot No. 1922 and 1923 and made his assessment on the basis of the same. The question is whether the evidence of this witness was reliable. He was a witness brought to the Court by the plaintiffs and, therefore, his experts opinion and comparison of the map with the survey record of right would not be of much value; because he was not appointed by the Court to measure the land on the spot. His evidence becomes further suspect because he interpreted the municipal record of right to suit the case of the plaintiff-appellant. In the municipal khatian (Ext. 4), the area of plot No. 1922 has been mentioned as "036" in the decimal column, This P.W. 13 interpreted it to be read as 3.6 decimals which is apparently and patently wrong. His evidence becomes further suspect because he interpreted the municipal record of right to suit the case of the plaintiff-appellant. In the municipal khatian (Ext. 4), the area of plot No. 1922 has been mentioned as "036" in the decimal column, This P.W. 13 interpreted it to be read as 3.6 decimals which is apparently and patently wrong. He interpreted the area of plot No. 1923 mentioned as 006 decimals to be read as 0.6 decimals which is again wrong. If the plaintiffs case was that the area of plot No. 1922 was 1 katha 3 dhurs, it was incumbent on his part to take out a survey knowing Pleader Commissioner and get the land measured in presence of both the parties and to obtain a report from him or from a survey knowing Amin which was not done and, hence, the evidence of P.W. 13 was not reliable. The first appellate Court has noticed this fact and it has ignored the evidence of P.W. 13. I find no reason to disagree with the finding of the lower Court in this connection. The first appellate Court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove its title and the discussion which I have had on the documents and evidence on the record does not persuads me to disagree with the finding of the first appellate Court. 9. Now, so far the question of ignoring certain documents filed by the plaintiff, I find that the learned appellate Court referred to municipal receipts filed by the plaintiff and came to the conclusion that none of the receipts referred to the plot in question. So he has considered it. The appellants lawyer argued that the plaint of Jamuna Singh (Ext. 8) and the written statement of Dhanwa filed in title suit No. 56 of 1965 (Ext. 7) were referred to by this first appellate Court, but he did not consider them and opined that these documents were irrelevant. Of course, the first appellate Court should have considered these documents and should have given his finding, but the discussion which I have had on the recitals of documents did not confer any advantage to the plaintiff-appellants in proving his title and so even if these documents were held to be irrelevant by the first appellate Court, I do not think this Court committed any legal or material error in deciding the appeal. So far as oral evidence on behalf of plaintiff regarding possession is concerned, it was also useless because, unless the plaintiff proved his title, he was not entitled to seek any relief regarding recovery of possession. But, the. appellate Court has, however, considered the oral evidence also on behalf of plaintiff and has given his finding. 10. The trial Court had adopted a negative approach and it had discussed infirmities in the evidence of defendant-appellant and came to the conclusion that by the recitals of Dhanwa in sale-deed (Ext. 1) and recital of Jamuna Singh in his plaint (Ext. 8) it was indicated that Dhanwa had more remaining land over the suit land which she had sold to the plaintiff-appellants. In this connection, it may be noted that any statement in the sale-deed of Dhanwa (Ext. 1) will bind the plaintiff and Dhanwa, but not any third party to it. In all circumstances, therefore, I find that the plaintiff-appellant had failed to prove his title, so far as the suit lands were concerned and, .therefore, he was not entitled to any relief at all. So I am of the opinion that the judgment of the appellate Court does not call for any interference by this Court. 11. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are confirmed. 12. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this appeal.