ORDER These two appeals by the State of Orissa, by special leave, from separate judgments of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in O.J.C. Nos. 5149 and 5150 of 1995 dated November 2, 1995, raise a common question, so they are being disposed by a common order. We shall now refer to the facts giving rise to these appeals. 2. Under the Orissa Land Ceiling Act one Sadasiba Naik of village Lipinda was declared to hold surplus land which vested in the State of Orissa. The Orissa Land Reforms (General) Rules, 1965 (for short the Rules ), inter alia, provide for settlement of the excess land. The relevant rule is Rule 38A. Claiming to be a landless poor, the husband of the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1926 of 1997 and the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1927 of 1997 applied in March, 1977 for allotment of land in their favour and under sub-rule (2)(a) of the said Rules pattas of an extent of acres 2.85 and acres 2.97 in village Ghodadiha, respectively, were granted in their favour. Possession of the land was also delivered to them in 1986. It appears these settlements gave rise to cause for complaints to the villagers and objections were filed by them alleging that the grantees were not landless poor. The Revenue Authorities investigated into the matter and submitted reports. In exercise of the power under clause (bb) of sub-rule (10) of Rule 38A, the Revenue Divisional Commissioner after making necessary enquiry cancelled patta granted in favour of the said persons on November 15, 1994. They challenged the orders of the Revenue Divisional Commissioner cancelling patta in Writ Petitions (O.J.C.No. 5149 of 1995 and O.J.C.No. 5150 of 1995). The High Court took the view that the impugned orders of the Revenue Divisional Commissioner after a long lapse of about 13 years would not be a proper exercise of power conferred upon him under the Rules and quashed the said orders on November 2, 1995. Those orders of the High Court are under challenge in these appeals. 3. Mr. Radhe Shyam Jena, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that patta was obtained by the respondents by misrepresentation and playing fraud, therefore, the High Court ought not to have quashed cancellation orders as it results in encouraging the fraud played by the settlees. Those orders of the High Court are under challenge in these appeals. 3. Mr. Radhe Shyam Jena, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that patta was obtained by the respondents by misrepresentation and playing fraud, therefore, the High Court ought not to have quashed cancellation orders as it results in encouraging the fraud played by the settlees. As the respondents though served did not enter appearance, we requested Mr. Naik to appear for them as an amicus curiae. The learned amicus curiae has argued that patta was cancelled after long lapse of time which by no standard can be termed as reasonable and that the facts in the case of Ghasiram Rana disclose that he was not in possession of any land on the date of grant of patta but came into possession of the land on the death of his father, therefore, patta ought not to have been cancelled in the case of the said Ghasiram Rana. 4. The power to cancel patta of land was exercised by the Commissioner under clause (bb) of sub-rule 10(a) of Rule 38A which reads as follows: "(bb). The Revenue Divisional Commissioner may at any time revise the order of the settlement of lands passed by the Revenue Officer, Sub-Divisional Officer, Additional District Magistrate or Collector, whether in exercise of original appellate or revisional jurisdiction under this rule." 5. The said clause confers power on the Revenue Divisional Commissioner to revise the order of the settlement of land passed under Rule 38A by the Revenue Officer, Sub-Divisional Officer, Additional District Magistrate or Collector whether in exercise of original appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No period of limitation is prescribed. There is nothing in the Act or the Rules prescribed period of limitation for exercise of the power under the said clause. Indeed the said clause provides that the power may be exercised at any time. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that where no time limit is fixed for exercising any statutory power, it should be exercised in a reasonable time which will vary from case to case and has to be determined on the facts of each case. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that where no time limit is fixed for exercising any statutory power, it should be exercised in a reasonable time which will vary from case to case and has to be determined on the facts of each case. This limitation of exercise of power within reasonable time is read by the courts in a provision granting power on the principle of the finality of the litigation : that is when an order granting a benefit or deciding a lis is allowed to rest without challenge for a long length of time, public policy demands that the persons affected by the order are entitled to assume that the matter has been settled. But this principle can have no application to a case where the exercise of power is warranted on account of fraud played by a party to obtain the benefit. It would also be against the public policy to allow a person to retain the ill gotten benefit as a result of misrepresentation or fraud and perpetuate the fraud. In such a case not taking action of cancellation on the ground of delay or latches will only encourage committing fraud. In such circumstances, in our view, the principle of the finality of litigation will have to yield. Basically, an order obtained by fraud is a nullity. It has no legal sanctity. And it can be so declared when it comes to the notice of the authorities. 6. In passing the impugned orders the Revenue Divisional Commissioner has merely followed the said principle and he is fortified by observations of this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. & Ors. ( 1994(1) SCC 1 ) and State of Orissa & Ors. v. Brundaban Sharma & Anr. (1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 249). Though the High Court noted Brundaban s case (supra), it did not appreciate the principle laid down therein in proper perspective. 7. Regarding the case of Ghasiram Rana, there is no material to support the contention of the learned amicus curiae. We are, therefore, unable to accept his contention. 8. For the abovementioned reasons, the orders of the High Court under challenge, cannot be sustained. They are accordingly set aside and the orders of the Revenue Divisional Commissioner are restored. 7. Regarding the case of Ghasiram Rana, there is no material to support the contention of the learned amicus curiae. We are, therefore, unable to accept his contention. 8. For the abovementioned reasons, the orders of the High Court under challenge, cannot be sustained. They are accordingly set aside and the orders of the Revenue Divisional Commissioner are restored. The Civil Appeals are accordingly allowed; having regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Before parting we record our appreciation for the hard work done by the learned amicus curiae. Appeal allowed. ************** Parallel Citations of other Journals : State of Orissa & Ors. v. Ms. Surya Rana, 2001(8) Supreme 519 00031