JUDGMENT : Jayant Patel, J. As the present appeals arise from the very judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, they are being considered together. The only distinction is that Criminal Appeal No.73 of 2006 is against the conviction, whereas Criminal Appeal No. 709 of 2006 is against the acquittal granted by the learned Sessions Judge. 2. Both the appeals arise from the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No.61 of 2003 dated 28.10.2005, whereby Accused-1 (Appellant in Criminal Appeal No.73 of 2006 - hereinafter referred to 'A-1') has been convicted for the offences under Section 364-A, Section 387, Section 365, Section 120(B) and Section 506(2) of IPC and sentence has been imposed upon A-1; (a) life-imprisonment with the fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence under Section 364-A; (b) R.I. for 5 (five) years with the fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the offence under Section 387 of IPC; and (c) R.I. for 4 (four) years with the fine of Rs.2,000/- for the offence under Section 365 of IPC and life-imprisonment with the fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the offence under Section 120(B) of IPC. No separate punishment has been imposed for the offence under Section 506(2) of IPC. All punishments are ordered to run concurrently. However, A-1 has been acquitted for the offence under Section 394 of IPC. A-2 is acquitted for the offence charged under Section 394, 387, 364-A, 365, 506 and 120B. A-3 has been acquitted for the offence under Section 212 of IPC. As recorded herein above, A-1 has preferred appeal against the order of conviction, whereas State has preferred appeal against the order of acquittal, but both from the very judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge from the very Sessions Case No.61/2003. 3. As per the Prosecution Case, the complaint was filed by Mohammad Faruk - PW-1, stating that some unknown calls were being received at the shop, where the complainant and his father are doing business. On 25.1.2000 his father left the shop earlier and when the complainant reached at his residence, he was told by his mother that his father had already gone out, saying that he might come late. At 2.30 a.m., a phone call was received at the residence and when it was picked up, the inquiry was made about Farukbhai, and the phone was disconnected. At 2.30 a.m., a phone call was received at the residence and when it was picked up, the inquiry was made about Farukbhai, and the phone was disconnected. At that time, the complainant found that his father had not come back. Again such type of calls were received about five times and the phone calls were disconnected from other end. At about 3 a.m., again one phone call was received and the said call was picked up by the wife of the complainant and she was conveyed that within short time they would arrange for the talk between Faruk - complainant and his father Babubhai. Therefore, the complainant doubted about the whereabout of his father, whether something had happened or not and, therefore, he picked up the phone when it was received next time and when he started talking he found that his father was speaking on the other end but the phone was disconnected. Since the voice of his father was identified by the complainant he realised that somebody might have kidnapped his father and, therefore, he called the other relatives. The other phone-calls were also received. Thereafter, at 4 a.m., one person talked on the phone and told the complainant that the complainant might talk to Babubhai and when the complainant talked with his father, he (father) said that he was kidnapped and those persons are demanding Rs.10 lac. Therefore, the complainant should make arrangement for the amount by 1 O'clock noon and he was also told that again phone call would be made and complainant would be informed about the place at which the amount was to be given at about 2 O'clock and the complainant was asked to bring the amount somehow or the other and if the amount was not given, the kidnappers would kill the victim. The complainant thereafter approached the police officer, who asked for keeping watch over the phone and the caller ID facility was also arranged. The complainant thereafter approached the police officer, who asked for keeping watch over the phone and the caller ID facility was also arranged. Next day at about 1.15 p.m., again phone call was received, enquiring as to whether Rs.10 lac was ready, to which the complainant replied 'yes' and said that he should be permitted to talk with his father and thereafter his father talked with the complainant on phone and the complainant informed him that the arrangement of Rs.5 lac was made, but the other money was yet to be arranged and, therefore, more time may be demanded and the complainant conveyed that the arrangement of money shall be made by about quarter to 3 O'clock. Thereafter, the father of the complainant conveyed to the complainant that they (kidnappers) had agreed and they would make phone call after two hours. The complainant prepared a bag as per the arrangement made by the police officer and waited for the second call and the phone call was received at 3 O'clock and the inquiry was made by unknown person as to whether the money was ready and the complainant said 'yes', then the complainant was informed to reach within 20 - 30 minutes Near Ankur School, Paldi Bus Stand, with the money and his person would say 'Babubhai' and thereafter within 20 minutes his father would reach his residence. Accordingly, the complainant in rickshaw reached the spot and the police officers and other staff were in maruti, watching the complainant and his movement. At that time one person came in Hero Honda Motor Cycle bearing Registration No.GJ-01- JJ-1052 and he said 'Babubhai' to the complainant and the complainant was about to undertake the exercise of handing over of the bag. At that time all the police officers and other persons caught hold of the said person and when they inquired about the father of the complainant, the said person agreed to show the place. All went to one house at Anwar Park Society of Juhapura area and he said that Babubhai was inside. Since the premises was locked, the lock was broken open and when they entered the premise, Babubhai was inside, tied with the rope and then he was released. All went to one house at Anwar Park Society of Juhapura area and he said that Babubhai was inside. Since the premises was locked, the lock was broken open and when they entered the premise, Babubhai was inside, tied with the rope and then he was released. The person, who led the police to the victim, was Arun Ramji Gajjar, who, upon further inquiry made by the complainant with his father, said that the main leader of the kidnapping is Shaukat Hajibhai Shaikh, appellant herein and his father told him that he was kidnapped from Banas Flat, Opp: SLU College, Near Pritamnagar, Paldi, Ahmedabad. 4. The complaint was investigated by the police and since Arun Gajjar was already arrested, but as appellant - accused (A-1) was absconding, the police, at the relevant point of time, could not arrest appellant accused (A-1). Thereafter, a charge-sheet was filed for the offence under Sections 394, 387, 364, 365, 506(2) and 120(B) of IPC and 135(1) of Bombay Police Act, by the police against Arun Ramjibhai Gajjar only at that stage the case was ultimately committed to the Sessions Court being Sessions Case No.231 of 2000. It is not the part of the record of the present compilation but the statement has been made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that vide judgment in the month of April 2001, the said accused Arun Ramji Gajjar has been convicted for the offence under Section 120(B), 394, 365, and 387 of IPC and sentence has been imposed of five years' R.I., with the fine of Rs.2,000/- and it has been further stated by the learned Counsel that as per his information, no appeal is preferred by Arun Gajjar against the order of conviction and he has undergone the sentence. However, it appears that the appellant accused (A-1) thereafter was arrested on 27.10.2001 and the investigation was further made and another charge-sheet was filed against A-1, A-2 and A-3 by the police for the offence, including offence under Section 364A of IPC. The case thereafter was committed to the learned Sessions Judge being Sessions Case No.61/03. The prosecution, in order to prove the guilt of the accused, examined 38 witnesses, whose details are mentioned by the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned judgment at para 6. The case thereafter was committed to the learned Sessions Judge being Sessions Case No.61/03. The prosecution, in order to prove the guilt of the accused, examined 38 witnesses, whose details are mentioned by the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned judgment at para 6. The prosecution also produced documentary evidence of 22 documents, the details of which are mentioned by the Sessions Judge at para 7 of the judgment. The learned Sessions Judge thereafter recorded the statements of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., wherein the accused denied the evidence against them. In the further statement the accused only stated that false case has been filed against him/her. The learned Sessions Judge, thereafter heard the prosecution and the defence and found that the prosecution has been able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt against A-1 for all the offence, except Section 394 of IPC and the prosecution has not been able to prove the case against A-2 and A-3. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge convicted and imposed sentences upon appellant accused (A-1) as referred to herein above and acquitted A-1 for the offence 394 of IPC and also acquitted A-2 and A-3 as referred to herein above. Under these circumstances, A-1 has preferred appeal against the order of conviction and the State has preferred appeal against the order of acquittal before this Court. 5. We have heard Mr.N.K. Majmudar, learned Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.73 of 2003 and for the respondent - Accused No.1 and 2 in Criminal Appeal No.709 of 2006 and Mr. Pandya, learned APP for the State - respondent in Criminal Appeal No.73 of 2003 and appellant in Criminal Appeal No.709 of 2006. We have also heard Mr.J.R. Dave, learned Counsel for respondent No.3 (Accused No.3) in Criminal Appeal No.709 of 2006. The learned Counsel appearing for both the sides have taken us to the entire evidence on record. We have considered the judgment and the reasons recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. 6. Before we proceed to examine the evidence, it would be worthwhile to refer to certain observations of the Apex Court for constituting the offence under Section 364A of IPC and the gravity thereof. We have considered the judgment and the reasons recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. 6. Before we proceed to examine the evidence, it would be worthwhile to refer to certain observations of the Apex Court for constituting the offence under Section 364A of IPC and the gravity thereof. In case of Suman Sood v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2007) 5 SCC, 634, the Apex Court had an occasion to examine the scope and ambit of Section 364A of the IPC and it was observed by the Apex Court at paragraph 56 to 62 as under:- “56. Section 364A reads thus: 364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or 159[any foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation or any other person] to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 57. Before the above section is attracted and a person is convicted, the prosecution must prove the following ingredients;(1) The accused must have kidnapped, abducted or detained any person; (2) He must have kept such person under custody or detention; and (3) Kidnapping, abduction or detention must have been for ransom. [see also Malleshi v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 8 SCC 95 ] 58. The term 'ransom' has not been defined in the Code. 59. As a noun, 'ransom' means "a sum of money demanded or paid for the release of a captive". As a verb, 'ransom' means "to obtain the release of (someone) by paying a ransom", "detain (someone) and demand a ransom for his release". "To hold someone to ransom" means "to hold someone captive and demand payment for his release". (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2002; p.1186). 60. Kidnapping for ransom is an offence of unlawfully seizing a person and then confining the person usually in a secrete place, while attempting to extort ransom. This grave crime is sometimes made a capital offence. "To hold someone to ransom" means "to hold someone captive and demand payment for his release". (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2002; p.1186). 60. Kidnapping for ransom is an offence of unlawfully seizing a person and then confining the person usually in a secrete place, while attempting to extort ransom. This grave crime is sometimes made a capital offence. In addition to the abductor a person who acts as a go between to collect the ransom is generally considered guilty of the crime. 61. According to Advanced Law Lexicon, (3rd Edn., p.3932); "Ransom is a sum of money paid for redeeming a captive or prisoner of war, or a prize. It is also used to signify a sum of money paid for the pardoning of some great offence and or setting the offender who was imprisoned". 62. Stated simply, 'ransom' is a sum of money to be demanded to be paid for releasing a captive, prisoner or detenu.” 7. There are also other charges to which we shall be deal with at a later stage. However, the first aspect, which may be required to be considered is whether the offence could be said to have been constituted under Section 364A in the facts of the present case or not? 8. PW-1 complainant Mohmad Faruk has fully supported the case of the prosecution as stated in the complaint in his testimony recorded by Exh. 17, inasmuch as in his testimony it has transpired that his father Babubhai was kidnapped in rickshaw by A-1, who had ultimately taken over the control by driving rickshaw and Arun Gajjar was sitting at the backside. He has fully supported the telephonic talk when his father was not at his residence and was with the persons, who had kidnapped him. His father had conveyed to him that he had been kidnapped and the demand was made of Rs.10 lac and if the money was not given, the kidnappers would kill his father. The complainant in his deposition has further supported the case of the prosecution for the intimation given to the police and the place at which the money was to be delivered and when the complainant reached the place and made a show to hand over the money, the police officers caught hold of the person, who had come for collecting the money, was Arun Gajjar. In his testimony, it has come out, that upon the inquiry by the police officers when he (Arun Gajjar) was captured and forced, he took the police to the Juhapura Society, where inside the room his father was lying, but the room was locked and the lock was broken open and his father was tied on the chair. In the cross-examination of the said witness nothing has come out to the contrary, which may be termed as material contradiction in the testimony of the complainant for not to support the case of the prosecution as stated in the complaint. 9. The prosecution has been able to prove that the room in which the victim was kept by the kidnappers, was in exclusive possession of A-1 and panchnama drawn - Exh. 20 has been fully proved by the testimony of PW-2 Ishaqbhai - Exh. 19. The prosecution has been able to prove with the testimony of PW-27 Mohammad Asif - Exh. 60, who deposed that the rickshaw was being given by him on rented basis to various persons and on 25.1.2000, rickshaw bearing Registration No.2772 was given on rented basis to Anwarbhai - PW-30, who is the brother of A-1. PW-30 Anwarbhai in his testimony - Exh. 66, though at one point of time had turned hostile, but in his cross-examination after he was declared hostile, deposed that his brother A-1 used to take rickshaw during night time for driving and he used to return the rickshaw in the next day morning at 7 O'clock and he deposed that from January 20, 2000 to January 26, 2000 continuously his brother and A-1 used to take rickshaw at about 8 O'clock in the evening and was returning on the next day morning at 7 O'clock. Therefore, the vehicle, which was used for kidnapping the victim is duly proved by the prosecution, as was in possession of A-1 on the date of incident i.e. 25.1.2000 during the evening time. The incident of rickshaw is also proved by the prosecution in the testimony of the complainant - PW-1 in corroboration of the testimony of victim - PW-3, though he was declared hostile at a later stage when the prosecution found that on certain aspect he did not depose as declared before the Police, but on the aspect of taking up rickshaw by the victim and boarding on the rickshaw has transpired in his testimony. Further in the testimony of the victim it has also transpired that the rickshaw was started and after some distance was crossed, one another person, who was called as Chacha by the driver of the rickshaw and he informed the victim that the said person was his chacha (uncle) and he asked whether he could allow him to sit in the rickshaw, which was permitted by the victim. Thereafter that rickshaw driver came on the back seat and requested the Chacha to drive the rickshaw. The victim has in his testimony deposed that immediately after sitting on the back seat, one knife was pointed on his back and the victim was told that he should come at the place, where it was so directed and he was blindfolded. The victim further deposed that if they wanted money he could give, but the victim was informed that his further action would be as per the direction of his boss. Thereafter, the rickshaw was driven for about 15 to 20 minutes and they came near one house and he was pushed inside the house and tied on the chair and his mouth and eyes were closed by strangulation. The victim has deposed that both the persons were inside the room where he was kept and one, who was coming from front when he was sitting on rickshaw i.e. Chacha took away the money from his pocket. In this manner, the victim, who has been examined as PW-3 for use and kidnapping through rickshaw, has fully supported the case of the prosecution. The pertinent aspect is that in the testimony of the victim subsequently when he narrated for the demand of ransom he has referred to the name of the person, who was coming from front after he boarded on rickshaw i.e. Chhacha as Shaukat - A- 1. Thereafter, the demand of ransom of Rs.10 lac and if not given, Babubhai - victim will be killed is supported by the testimony of PW-1 and also the testimony of victim - PW-3. The use of the telephone, mobile are also proved by the prosecution during the examination of the witnesses and relevant call details are also produced at Exh. 88. The use of the telephone, mobile are also proved by the prosecution during the examination of the witnesses and relevant call details are also produced at Exh. 88. The victim in his testimony has stated that when the knife was pointed out on his backside he had resisted and, therefore, he had sustained injury on his last finger and he was also treated in V.S. Hospital and his blood sample was also taken. But when the victim declared before the Court that he could not identify Shakat - A-1 and further he could not say that victim was present in the Court or not since the period of about four years had passed, the prosecution realised that the victim now was not supporting the case of the prosecution. At that stage, the request was made by the prosecution to declare him hostile since he did not support the case of the prosecution. Thereafter he was declared as hostile. But the pertinent aspect is that in his cross-examination after he was declared hostile, he has fully supported the case of the prosecution for the phone call received by him of the lady prior to his kidnapping and the ransom demanded of Rs.10 lac and the amount of Rs. 5,000/- robbed by the person, who was driving the rickshaw i.e. Chacha. In the cross-examination, he has deposed about the darkness in the room, but he has not been contradicted on the other material part of the evidence of receiving the phone call of the lady prior to the kidnapping, his kidnapping in rickshaw and the rickshaw being driven by Chacha -Shaukat - A-1, the demand of ransom of Rs.10 lac and release after the lock was broken open by the police. 10. The demand of the money i.e. ransom has been proved by the prosecution during the testimony of PW-1, complainant and through the testimony of the police officers with the support of Bhagwan Nathu Sonu - PW-31 Exh. 66 - Constable, who accompanied in the raid and Sameerbhai Ahmad Mansuri - PW-25, Exh. 58, who had carried the police officers in Santro Car. The discovery of the weapon - knife and the note of Rs. 1,000/- were made at the instance of A-1 and the panchnama has come on record for such purpose at Exh. 27. 66 - Constable, who accompanied in the raid and Sameerbhai Ahmad Mansuri - PW-25, Exh. 58, who had carried the police officers in Santro Car. The discovery of the weapon - knife and the note of Rs. 1,000/- were made at the instance of A-1 and the panchnama has come on record for such purpose at Exh. 27. The another relevant aspect is that the knife, which was discovered at the instance of A-1 was containing blood stain and, therefore, was sent to FSL and the FSL report Exh. 100 and more particularly Serological report shows that the blood stain found on the knife was of 'B' group, which matches with the group of the victim. Therefore, incriminating material i.e. knife through which the injury was caused to the victim when he was kidnapped in the rickshaw itself is found at the instance of A-1 and fully supports the case of the prosecution with the FSL report for use of the knife while kidnapping. 11. The additional aspect is that TI was held in presence of the Executive Magistrate - Akbarkhan V. Pathan - PW-9 - Exh. 35 and he has fully supported the case of the prosecution for the genuineness of the TI parade and the identification by the victim of A-1 during identification parade. In the testimony of Executive Magistrate, he has stated that when TI parade was held and A-1 was identified by the victim, the victim also stated that he did remember his face when A-1 came from the front side when the victim was in rickshaw and thereafter A-1 had driven the rickshaw. The victim further stated before Executive Magistrate that the very person had stayed for about 16 hours with him with the knife and, therefore, he remembered the face of the said person, who was identified i.e. A-1. It is true that pancha for TI parade Mohammad Alias - PW-6 - Exh. 29 has not fully supported the case of the prosecution and he was declared hostile at one point of time, but he has admitted the signature on the panchnama for TI parade and he has also stated that another panch was also there. It is true that pancha for TI parade Mohammad Alias - PW-6 - Exh. 29 has not fully supported the case of the prosecution and he was declared hostile at one point of time, but he has admitted the signature on the panchnama for TI parade and he has also stated that another panch was also there. He has stated that Shaukat was to be identified but thereafter he was declared hostile, but in his cross-examination he has stated that the complainant - victim had identified one person and when his name was asked the said person stated his name as Shaukat Hussein Haji - A-1. If the TI parade is considered with the testimony of the Executive Magistrate, Panchs, and Second I.O., Rameshkumar PW-38 Exh.95, it can be said that TI parade is proved by the prosecution. It is in this light that even if the victim in his testimony PW-3 Exh. 22 has not identified A-1 in the Court, such would not frustrate the case of the prosecution in identification of A-1 since the identity of A-1 was already proved in TI parade, which has come on record by reliable material evidence of the Executive Magistrate - PW-9 with the panch witness - PW-6 Mohammad Alias Exh 29 and the testimony of Second I.O., Shri Joshi - PW-38 - Exh.95. 12. The aforesaid shows that the prosecution has been able to prove the kidnapping of victim by A-1 in rickshaw, the confinement of victim in the room under the exclusive occupation of A-1, the demand of Rs.10 lac, made and if not given, the threat of killing victim and thereafter when it was arranged to give the amount of ransom and when agent of A-1 came for collecting the money, the said agent was caught resultantly, the police officer could reach to the place at which the victim was kept and the victim was released. It has also come on record that through kidnapping the amount of Rs. 5,000/- was robbed and knife was used through which the injury was sustained by the victim and the knife and the amount of Rs. 1,000/- both were discovered at the instance of accused A-1 and the knife contained blood stain and the FSL report shows that the blood on the knife was found matching with the blood group of the victim. 1,000/- both were discovered at the instance of accused A-1 and the knife contained blood stain and the FSL report shows that the blood on the knife was found matching with the blood group of the victim. There is no explanation in the further statement by A-1 of the incriminating material found from his possession used for commission of offence. 13. Therefore, as such it can be said that the prosecution has been able to prove the case of kidnapping for ransom. However, the learned Counsel for the appellant raised the contention that when the victim had turned hostile, and did not support the case of the prosecution for identification in the Court, it can be said that the presence of A-1 for kidnapping was not established. He, therefore, submitted that it can be said that the presence of A-1 was not established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 14. The contention, if examined, it appears that it is true that in the testimony of the victim PW-3 he was not identified him in the Court, but other evidence as led by the prosecution is also required to be considered in light of the situation that victim has been subsequently declared as hostile, since he declined to identify A-1 by showing the excuse that since the period of 3-4 years had passed, he could not identify, but such declaration even if considered, in our view, would not frustrate the case of the prosecution for involvement of A-1 and the identification of A-1 and rather presence of A-1 during the incident. If the testimony of victim PW-3 is considered, as observed by us in earlier paragraph, he has stated that he was told that the name of the person, who had driven the rickshaw was Shaukat. Further, he had also stated before police that the person, who robbed the victim was Shaukat. In TI parade, the victim is identified A-1 not only that but before the Executive Magistrate he has stated that A-1 was the very person, who had driven rickshaw and thereafter the knife was pointed by him, he had carried the victim by blindfolding him and he had remained with the victim for about 16 hours. In TI parade, the victim is identified A-1 not only that but before the Executive Magistrate he has stated that A-1 was the very person, who had driven rickshaw and thereafter the knife was pointed by him, he had carried the victim by blindfolding him and he had remained with the victim for about 16 hours. Therefore, when such evidence of involvement and identity of A-1 was already successfully led by the prosecution, it cannot be said that the involvement and identity of A-1 in the incident of kidnapping for ransom would be frustrated merely because at the later point of time victim declined to identify A-1 in the Court. Therefore, the said contention cannot be accepted. 15. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the panchnama for discovery of the weapon could not be said to have been proved since, the panch was declared hostile and the victim had not identified A-1. 16. Concerning to the identification of A-1 by the victim not in the Court, the aspect is already dealt with herein above and, therefore, we need not repeat the discussion again, but if the contention for consideration of discovery panchnama for weapon and for currency is to be considered, the same can be considered in light of the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. This Court had an occasion to consider the scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, in case of Mohmed Tahir Mohmed Arif Bakaswala v. State of Gujarat, in Criminal Appeal No. 1800 of 2005 and allied matters at para 10 and 11 it was observed thus :- “10. The examination of the said contention shows that it is on account of the discovery of certain facts and the information received under section 27 of the Evidence Act, the matter has been further investigated. Section 27 of the Evidence Act for ready reference, reads as under: “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved - Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” 11. The Apex Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, reported at 2005(11), SCC 600 had an occasion to consider the scope and ambit of section 27 of the Evidence Act. At para 121 of the said judgment, it was inter alia observed, relevant of which reads as under: “The first requisite condition for utilising Section 27 in support of the prosecution case is that the investigating police officer should depose that he discovered a fact in consequence of the information received from an accused person in police custody. Thus, there must be a discovery of fact not within the knowledge of police officer as a consequence of information received. Of course, it is axiomatic that the information or disclosure should be free from any element of compulsion. The next component of Section 27 relates to the nature and extent of information that can be proved. It is only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered that can be proved and nothing more. It is explicitly clarified in the Section that there is no taboo against receiving such information in evidence merely because it amounts to a confession. At the same time, the last clause makes it clear that it is not the confessional part that is admissible but it is only such information or part of it, which relates distinctly to the fact discovered by means of the information furnished. Thus, the information conveyed in the statement to police ought to be dissected if necessary so as to admit only the information of the nature mentioned in the Section. The rationale behind this provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is true and can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the accused.“ Further, at para 125, it was observed thus - “We are of the view that Kotayya's case is an authority for the proposition that 'discovery of fact' cannot be equated to the object produced or found. It is more than that. It is more than that. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place.” At para 142, it was observed as under: “There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads the Police Officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out in order to make the information admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of information furnished by the accused, the Investigating Officer may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material object. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact viz., the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the Police Officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section 27. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the Police Officer chooses not to take the informant accused to the spot, it will have no bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of evidence.” 17. If the facts of the present case are considered, in light of the aforesaid legal position when the panchnama is proved of discovery through the panch witness - PW-6, Exh. 29 and PW-5 - Exh. 28, partly supporting the case of the prosecution for admission of his signature on the panchnama and procedure followed for the discovery made at the instance of the accused. 29 and PW-5 - Exh. 28, partly supporting the case of the prosecution for admission of his signature on the panchnama and procedure followed for the discovery made at the instance of the accused. In the cross-examination of the said witness - PW-5, after he was declared hostile when he was cross-examined by APP, he has admitted that A-1 wanted to show something from his house and thereafter they entered one house and from the house, A-1 climbed over the wall and there was one manhole and inside the manhole one bag of old clothes was lying. He opened the same and took out one knife and from the other bag of rexine he had shown the currency notes of Rs. 100/- each total Rs. 1,000/-. Therefore, if in the cross-examination the said panch has supported the case of the prosecution that part of the evidence can be considered. The additional aspect in the present case is that the knife, discovered was containing blood stain and when it was sent to FSL, the blood is found of the group, which matches the blood group of the victim. Therefore, it can be termed as incriminating material since as per the prosecution case the knife was used while kidnapping and injury was also caused to the victim while kidnapping. We may not give weightage to the confessional statement made by the accused before panchs about commission of offence, since he was in police custody, but such incriminating material found at the instance of A-1 is a relevant situation pointing the guilt of the accused, which is required to be taken into consideration as per the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Hence, we cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the discovery panchnama cannot be considered for the purpose of tracing the guilt of the accused merely because at one stage panch was declared as hostile. 18. Hence, we cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the discovery panchnama cannot be considered for the purpose of tracing the guilt of the accused merely because at one stage panch was declared as hostile. 18. The learned Counsel for the appellant next contended that the offence under Section 364A has not been established by the prosecution showing that A-1 had played any role in making phone call for demand of ransom and, therefore, if the ransom is not believed or involvement of A-1 in demand of ransom is not believed, it would result into the case under Section 365, 364 and 387 of IPC, wherein the maximum punishment can be of seven years R.I., whereas the learned Sessions Judge in the present case having found the offence proved under Section 364A has imposed sentence of life imprisonment. It was, therefore, submitted that the said aspect be considered by this Court. 19. In order to examine the said contention we may once again state that the victim - PW-3 in his testimony when talked for demand of ransom specifically referred to the name of A-1 Shaukat, stating that they will come for collecting the money at Paldi - Ankur Bus stand. Further, he confirms that the person, who came from the front side when he was in rickshaw was Shaukat and he had accordingly given his statement before the police. He has further stated that when identification parade was held he had identified one person named as Shaukat - A-1. In his testimony, he has stated that before the police, he had declared that the one, who was driving rickshaw had told him that if he wanted to save his life, then he had to pay the money and at that time the victim was further told that the victim was known and the victim can pay Rs.18 lac, and the victim was further told that whether the same was the targeted amount that should be given by the victim. This shows that the demand of ransom was made by Shaukat - A-1. The said aspect is to be considered with the statement made by the victim in TI parade, that too, in presence of Executive Magistrate - PW-9, before whom the victim stated that A-1 is the very person, who stayed with the victim with the knife for about 16 hours. The said aspect is to be considered with the statement made by the victim in TI parade, that too, in presence of Executive Magistrate - PW-9, before whom the victim stated that A-1 is the very person, who stayed with the victim with the knife for about 16 hours. Under these circumstances, it is not possible for us to accept the contention that the identity of A-1 for the demand of ransom was not proved by the prosecution. 20. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the language of Section 364A showing the words “any other person”, are not for any person whosoever, but deserves to be read by taking the character of the earlier words used by the Parliament namely; Government or Foreign State or International Inter-Governmental Organisation. Therefore, it was submitted that the words 'any other person' must be the person of the Government or of any Foreign State or of any international inter-governmental organisation. He submitted that Section 364A may not be applied in a case of kidnapping for ransom, if such kidnapping is of any person, who is not connected with the Government or Foreign State or International Inter-Governmental Organisation. The learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that if Section 364A is not at all applicable, no conviction can be recorded in the present case, since the Victim was neither employed nor engaged by the Government or Foreign State or International Inter-Governmental Organisation. 21. Since Section 364A is already reproduced in the earlier paragraph when we have referred to the decision of the Apex Court in case of Suman Sood v. State of Rajasthan (supra), it may not be necessary to reproduce it again. However, the relevant aspect is that Section 364A, which has been reproduced earlier is based 1995 Amendment made in IPC. Section 364A was brought in the statute book by the Amendment through the Act No.42 of 1993 namely; Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1993. However, the relevant aspect is that Section 364A, which has been reproduced earlier is based 1995 Amendment made in IPC. Section 364A was brought in the statute book by the Amendment through the Act No.42 of 1993 namely; Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1993. Section 364A as was inserted by the aforesaid Act reads as under:- “Section 364A kidnapping for ransom etc.- Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” 22. The aforesaid shows that the words “the Government or 'any other person', both were independent to bring into the net of Section 364A. Further, the relevant aspect is that the language used by the Parliament is not 'any such person', but is 'any other person'. Therefore, the literal meaning would be that such kidnapping for ransom may be to compel the 'Government' or to compel 'any other person' and such any other person would include any other person whosoever and the word 'any other person' does not appear to be relating to only the governmental person or any employee or any person working in the Government. 23. The aforesaid section has further been amended by the Act No.24 of 1995 namely; IPC (Amendment) Act, 1995 and in place of the word 'any other person', the substitution of the words is 'any foreign state or international inter-governmental organisation or any other person'. Therefore, the words 'any other person' has been retained, but additionally after the word 'government', the words 'any foreign state or international intergovernmental organisation” have been added. This shows that had the intention of the Parliament was to give the meaning related to the words 'any other person', the amendment would have been after the words 'any other person' for inclusion of the words 'any foreign state or international inter-governmental organisation', which has not been done by the Parliament. Again the words used are not 'any such person'. 24. Again the words used are not 'any such person'. 24. Under these circumstances, it is not possible for us to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that Section 364A would apply in a case of kidnapping for ransom of only Government or Foreign State or International Inter-Governmental Organisation or its employee and it would not apply to any other person, who are not connected with any governmental or foreign State or International Inter-Governmental Organisation. 25. It is hardly required to be stated that when any word or section is to be interpreted, purposive interpretation is to be given if any doubt arises about the true and correct interpretation of any statute. In our view, as observed earlier, the literal interpretation itself makes it clear that Section 364A applies to any person irrespective of the fact that whether he is Government employee or not and the word 'any other person' is wide enough to cover all other person, in contradiction to Government or foreign state or international inter-governmental organisation'. Apart from the aforesaid if the restricted meaning is given to the words 'any other person' limiting to the person, who is directly or indirectly connected with the Government or Foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation, it would result into a situation of excluding the case of kidnapping for ransom outside the net of Section 364A if made of any citizen or any person, who is not connected with the Government or Foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation. Such would take away shield conferred by the statute namely; IPC for protection against such offences to the citizens and other persons staying in the country and consequently the deterrent effect in the society against kidnapping for ransom against serious crime of kidnapping for ransom would stand diluted. Therefore, even if the purposive interpretation is given, it would not be possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that Section 364A cannot be made applicable to the case of kidnapping for ransom of any other person not connected with the Government or Foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation. Therefore, even if the purposive interpretation is given, it would not be possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that Section 364A cannot be made applicable to the case of kidnapping for ransom of any other person not connected with the Government or Foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation. In view of the aforesaid, with respect, we are not inclined to agree with the view taken by the Bench of Haryana High Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Etc., v. State of Haryana, reported in 2006 Criminal Law Journal, p. 170, taking the view that Section 364A could not be applied against the appellant therein in a case of kidnapping for ransom of a girl aged 3 years named Disha, daughter of Ashok Kumar. 26. On the aspect of appeal against the order of acquittal preferred by the State Government we find that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge while discussing the case for the offence under Section 394 (Below Issue No.7 and 9) is not only erroneous, but could be termed as self-contrary and rather, perverse to the record of the case. When the clear evidence had come on record, as referred to by us herein above, for the robbery of Rs. 5,000/- by A-1 from the victim with the use of the knife as the weapon may be at one point of time, wherein knife was used by Arun Gajjar and subsequently, pointed out by A-1 to the victim with the important circumstance of incriminating material of the discovery of the currency notes at the instance of the accused, A-1, which was the subject matter of the robbery, it could not be concluded by the learned Judge that the case was not proved for the offence under Section 394 of IPC. The view taken by the learned Sessions Judge on the aspect of identity of A-1 not proved for the offence under Section 394 and the identification parade being farce, in our view are not only misconceived but rather could be said as by not taking into consideration the material evidence of the witness for test identification parade more particularly of the Executive Magistrate - PW-9 - Akbarkhan - Exh. 35 and in his testimony. Since we have already discussed the evidence in detail also for the robbery of Rs. 35 and in his testimony. Since we have already discussed the evidence in detail also for the robbery of Rs. 5,000/- we need not repeat once again in great detail, but suffice it to state that the robbery of Rs. 5,000/- with the use of the knife, is supported by FSL report and the discovery of the knife and the currency notes recovered at the instance of A-1, if considered, it could be said that the prosecution has successfully proved the case for the offence committed by A-1 under Section 394 of IPC. Further the finding by the learned Sessions Judge for acquittal for the offence under Section 394 so far as identity and the use of weapon is concerned, could also be termed as self-contrary, since the learned Sessions Judge had found that the case for the offence under Section 364A was duly proved. Hence, findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge for the offence under Section 394 of IPC are contrary and rather perverse to the record of the material evidence of the witnesses and, therefore, it would be a case to interfere in the acquittal appeal against A-1. However, keeping in view the sentence imposed upon the Arun Gajjar for the offence proved under Section 394 of IPC in the Sessions Case No.231 of 2000, we find that appropriate sentence should be five years R.I., with the fine of Rs. 500/-. 27. But such cannot be equally said for A-2, who is the wife of A-1, since her active role, except phone-call is not proved. No evidence has come on record through testimony of any of the witness showing the presence of A-2 from the stage kidnapping until victim was released. In the same manner so far as A-3 is concerned, mere allowing the person to stay, who is accused for any offence, would not be sufficient to prove the case under Section 212 of IPC. There has to be a conscious knowledge on the part of the accused that the shelter given by him to another person is involved in any offence. No evidence has been led by the prosecution to show that A-3 had any knowledge that A-1 was an offender involved in serious offence. Under these circumstances, we find that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge for acquitting A-2 and A-3 does not call for interference. No evidence has been led by the prosecution to show that A-3 had any knowledge that A-1 was an offender involved in serious offence. Under these circumstances, we find that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge for acquitting A-2 and A-3 does not call for interference. Hence, the State appeal against the acquittal of A-2 and A-3 being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 28. In view of the observations and discussion, the conviction recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Accused No.1, Shaukat Hussein Hajibhai Shaikh for the offences under Section 364A, 387, 365, 120B and 506(2) and the sentence imposed do not deserve to be interfered with, but it is further observed and directed that Accused No.1 is also held guilty for the offence under Section 394 of IPC and further sentence of R.I. of 5 (five) years is imposed with the fine of Rs. 500/-. It is also observed that all the sentences shall be undergone concurrently. 29. The appeal preferred by the appellant (Accused No.1) is hereby dismissed and the appeal preferred by the State against the order of acquittal is partly allowed qua Accused No.1, but is dismissed qua Accused No. 2 and 3. Order accordingly.