ORDER Arun Mishra, J. 1. The legality of the order of removal of the petitioner invoking the emergency powers under section 25(6) of the Chitrakoot Gramodaya Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1991 (for short "the Adhiniyam of 1991") without issuance of even a show cause notice is in question. 2. Petitioner was working as Deputy Registrar in Mahatma Gandhi Gramodya Vishwa Vidyalaya, Chitrakoot, District Satna which is established under Act No. 9 of 1991 called, The Chitrakoot Gramodaya Vishwavidhyalaya Adhiniyam, 1991; renamed as "Mahatma Gandhi Gramodaya Vishwavidhyalaya, Chitrakoot". The powers of Chancellor are contained in section 23 of the Adhiniyam of 1991; the powers and duties of Vice-Chancellor have been enumerated in section 25 of the Adhiniyam of 1991. The teachers, officers and staff can be appointed in accordance with the provision of section 32 of the Adhiniyam of 1991. Chapter 7 provides for framing of the statute, ordinance and resolutions. However, the petitioner alleges that there are no statute, ordinance and Regulations framed. 3. Petitioner submits that he is post-graduate, possesses doctor's degree and is a law graduate. In the year 1993 he was working as Assistant Registrar at Chandra Shekhar Azad Agriculture University, Kanpur (for short "the CSAA University, Kanpur"). He applied pursuant to an advertisement dated 1-12-1993 (Annexure P/1) issued by the respondent/University. Post of Deputy Registrar was advertised having a pay scale of Rs. 3700-5700. The educational requirement was that post graduate in second class; administrative experience of seven years; and at least 5 years working experience on the post of Assistant Registrar. Petitioner submits that he possesses educational qualification; he had seven years working experience on the post of Assistant Registrar in CSAA University, Kanpur; he was working there since 1984. Petitioner was having a degree of B.Sc. (Ag.) in IInd class, M.A. (Economics) in IIIrd Division, LL.B. in IInd class, B.Ed. in 1st Class, M.Ed. in 1st Class, Ph. D. in Education awarded by Kanpur University. Petitioner was having degree of post graduation in two subjects; one in education with 1st Class and another in Economics in IIIrd Division. 4. Petitioner faced the selection committee, his name was included in the select list; he was appointed on 11-7-1994 to the post of Deputy Registrar; the appointment was to be approved by the Board of Management. It was approved by the Board of Management in its meeting dated 14-8-1994. (Annexure P/5). 4. Petitioner faced the selection committee, his name was included in the select list; he was appointed on 11-7-1994 to the post of Deputy Registrar; the appointment was to be approved by the Board of Management. It was approved by the Board of Management in its meeting dated 14-8-1994. (Annexure P/5). His work was satisfactory; there were no complaints; he worked for three years nine months till 9-6-1997. Petitioner further alleges that Barrister Shri Gulsher Ahmed, Ex-Governor was appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the respondent/University who joined in first week of January, 1997. For the reasons best known to Shri Gulshar Ahmed, Vice-Chancellor of the respondent/University issued a termination order of the petitioner from the post of Deputy Registrar in exercise of powers conferred under section 25(6) of the Adhiniyam of 1991. Removal order P/7 was passed on 9-6-1997. 5. Petitioner has filed appreciation certificates P/8, P/9 and P/10. Petitioner challenges invocation of extra ordinary emergency powers contained in section 25(6) of the Adhiniyam of 1991. The petitioner was asked to go to his parent university, that is CSAA University, Kanpur or the ground that the petitioner was on deputation whereas he was not on deputation. The petitioner assails the order as fully arbitrary, illegal, mala fide and without authority of law, Chancellor invited comments from the Vice-Chancellor of the University. In the comments, it was mentioned that the petitioner did not possess the educational qualification and also that the petitioner was on deputation. It was also mentioned that the petitioner had started group leadership in the university; comments P/12 were sent by the then Vice-Chancellor to the Chancellor. Petitioner submits that he was simply holding a lien on the previous post of Assistant Registrar in CSAA University, Kanpur. He was not on deputation; he came as a direct recruit pursuant to an advertisement; he duly possesses the requisite qualifications for the post of Deputy Registrar. Representation was rejected by the Chancellor on 22-11-1997; though after the then Vice-Chancellor had vacated the office after removal of the Petitioner; he was again selected on 9-6-1997 which also shows that the petitioner was, as a matter of fact, suitable and was illegally removed. 6. Representation was rejected by the Chancellor on 22-11-1997; though after the then Vice-Chancellor had vacated the office after removal of the Petitioner; he was again selected on 9-6-1997 which also shows that the petitioner was, as a matter of fact, suitable and was illegally removed. 6. In the return filed by the respondents 1 and 2, it is contended that petitioner was unlawfully selected by mistake; he did not fulfil the eligibility criteria; petitioner has secured IIIrd division in M.A. Economics; petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands. He is still holding lien in the CSAA University, Kanpur. Direction of the Vice-Chancellor was noted by the Board of Management; appeal was rejected by the Board of Management. However, it is not disputed that petitioner possessed M.Ed. in 1st division and various other qualifications mentioned by him. The Chancellor/respondent No. 3 in its return contends that petitioner was having IIIrd division in M.A. Economics, but this fact was not correctly placed before the selection committee. The Vice-Chancellor removed the petitioner on 9-6-1997. Petitioner did not resign from CSAA University, Kanpur and was having a lien against the post of Assistant. Registrar in CSAA University, Kanpur; he did not disclose holding of the lien on the post; thus, petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the writ petition. 7. Learned senior counsel Shri R.N. Singh for the petitioner submits that invocation of emergency provision under section 25(6) of Adhiniyam of 1991 was absolutely unjustified, illegal and arbitrary; no show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and treating him on deputation and not possessing educational qualification, petitioner was removed; removal is wholly unjustified, uncalled for and as a matter of fact based on malice and contrary to factual and legal position. 8. Learned counsel for respondents Shri S. L. Saxena, and Shri Satish Sharma faced with the difficulty of sustaining the orders contend that the petitioner is not entitled for the relief. He was holding a lien in the CSAA University, Kanpur and could serve there. They have also tried to justify the action. 9. Primary question for consideration is whether the services of the petitioner could be get rid of by invoking the emergency provision under section 25(6) of the Adhiniyam of 1991. section 25 of the Adhiniyam of 1991 is reproduced hereunder:- 25. They have also tried to justify the action. 9. Primary question for consideration is whether the services of the petitioner could be get rid of by invoking the emergency provision under section 25(6) of the Adhiniyam of 1991. section 25 of the Adhiniyam of 1991 is reproduced hereunder:- 25. (1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and ex-officio chairman of the Academic Council. He shall, in the absence of the Chancellor preside at the Convocation of the University and confer degrees on persons entitled to receive them; (2) The Vice-Chancellor shall exercise general control over the affairs of the University and shall be responsible for the due maintenance of the discipline in the University; (3) The Vice-Chancellor shall convene meeting of the Academic Council in consultation with Chancellor. (4) The Vice-Chancellor shall ensure the faithful observance of the provisions of this Act and the Statutes and Regulations, and he shall possess such powers as may be necessary in that behalf. (5) The Vice-Chancellor shall be responsible for the presentation of the annual financial estimates and the annual accounts and balance sheets to the Board. (6) The Vice-Chancellor may take any action in any emergency which in his opinion calls for immediate action. He shall in such a case and as soon as may be thereafter report his action to the authority which will ordinarily have dealt with the matter. (7) Subject to the above provisions, the Vice-Chancellor shall give effect to the orders of the Board regarding the appointment, suspension and dismissal of officers, teachers and other employees of the University. (8) Where any action taken by the Vice-Chancellor under sub-section (6) affects any person in the service of the University to his disadvantage, such person may prefer an appeal to the Board within thirty days from the date on which such person has notice of the action. (9) The Vice-Chancellor shall be responsible for the proper administration of the University and for a close co-ordination and integration of teaching, research and extension education. (10) The Vice-Chancellor shall exercise such other powers as may be prescribed by the Chancellor for the carrying out the purpose and provisions of the Act. Section 12 of the Adhiniyam of 1991 provides powers and duties of the Board of Management; constitution of which is provided under section 11. (10) The Vice-Chancellor shall exercise such other powers as may be prescribed by the Chancellor for the carrying out the purpose and provisions of the Act. Section 12 of the Adhiniyam of 1991 provides powers and duties of the Board of Management; constitution of which is provided under section 11. Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Adhiniyam of 1991, the Board has the power to approve the recommendation of the teachers and employees of the university. Under sub-section (7) of section 25, Vice-Chancellor shall give effect to the orders of the Board regarding appointment, suspension and dismissal of officers, teachers and other employees of the university. Thus, it is clear from the reading of sub-section (7) of section 25 that power lies of dismissal with the Board of Management and sub-section (6) of section 25 deals with the emergency powers of the Vice-Chancellor to take immediate action. This emergency provision contained under sub-section (6) of section 25 was contended to be the subjective satisfaction of the Vice-Chancellor in the comments P/12 sent to the Chancellor on 10-9-1997. Para 10(b) of the reply of the Vice-Chancellor is relevant which is quoted below:- 10(b) In reply to para 10(b), it is submitted that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Vice-Chancellor whether there was any emergency or not. It cannot be questioned whether there was any emergency or not by any authority. If the Vice-Chancellor has taken any action in any emergency, he is only bound to inform the Board of Management which I have done. According to section 25, sub-section (6) of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor is not bound to show or discuss with anybody what was the emergency before passing the order. He is also not bound to write in his order what was the emergency. 10. Invocation of emergency clause was not at all warranted; no justification whatsoever has been shown in the return filed by the respondents for invocation of such emergency clause to get rid of an employee who was working on a responsible post for last three years nine months. In the instant case, there was no grave situation nor there was any emergent situation so as to give goby to the principles of natural justice. Vice-Chancellor is not the appointing authority nor he could have dismissed an employee as apparent from section 25(7) of the Adhiniyam of 1991. In the instant case, there was no grave situation nor there was any emergent situation so as to give goby to the principles of natural justice. Vice-Chancellor is not the appointing authority nor he could have dismissed an employee as apparent from section 25(7) of the Adhiniyam of 1991. It is the Board of Management who is competent to pass such an order. The principles of natural justice are recognized as part of guarantee contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India; the concept of equality means "equal protection of law." The violation of principles of natural justice is violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India. Audi alteram partem has a definite meaning in law. There was no exigency to give a goby to the salutary rule. Though such principles can be excluded and modified, but for that there has to be a situation. In the instant case, there was no such situation available. In Ku. Neelima Misra vs. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal and others, AIR 1990 SC 1402 , the Supreme Court held that the order having civil consequences should passed consistently with the observance of principles of natural justice. They are inhered in every administrative civil action carrying civil consequences. The Supreme Court held as under:- We find it difficult to accept the reasoning underlying the aforesaid view. Before we consider the correctness of the proposition laid down by the High Court we must, at the expense of some space, analyse the distinctions between quasi-judicial and administrative functions. An administrative function is called quasi-judicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice. Where there is no such obligation the decision is called "purely administrative" and there is no third category. This is what was meant by Lord Reid in Ridge vs. Baldwin, (1963) 2 All ER 66, 75-76: "In cases of the kind with which I have been dealing the Board of Works... was dealing with a single isolated case. It was not deciding like a judge in a law suit, what were the rights of the persons before it. But it was deciding how he should be treated - something analogous to a judge's duty in imposing a penalty. was dealing with a single isolated case. It was not deciding like a judge in a law suit, what were the rights of the persons before it. But it was deciding how he should be treated - something analogous to a judge's duty in imposing a penalty. So it was easy to say that such a body is performing a quasi-judicial task in considering and deciding such a matter and to require it to observe the essentials of all proceedings of a judicial character the principles of natural justice. Sometimes the functions of a minister of department may also be of that character and then the rules of natural justice can apply in much the same way......... An administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. It means that the decision maker should afford to any party to a dispute an opportunity to present his case. A large number of authorities are on this point and we will not travel over the field of authorities. What is now not in dispute is that the person concerned must be informed of the case against him and the evidence in support thereof and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. The shift now is to a broader notion of "fairness" or "fair procedure" in the administrative action. The administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. For this concept of fairness, adjudicative setting are not necessary, nor it is necessary to have lites inter parties. There need not be any struggle between two opposing parties giving rise to a "lis". There need not be resolution of lis inter parties. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances. It may arise expressly or impliedly depending upon the context and considerations. All these types of non-adjudicative administrative decision making are now covered under the general rubric of fairness in the administration. But when even such an administrative decision unless it affects one's personal rights or one's property rights, or the loss of or prejudicially affects something which would juridically be called at least a privilege does not involve the duty to act fairly consistent with the rules of natural justice. But when even such an administrative decision unless it affects one's personal rights or one's property rights, or the loss of or prejudicially affects something which would juridically be called at least a privilege does not involve the duty to act fairly consistent with the rules of natural justice. We cannot discover any principle contrary to this concept. 11. In Shridhar son of Ram Dular vs. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur and others, AIR 1990 SC 307 , the Supreme Court has held as under:- The High Court committed serious error in upholding the order of the Government dated 13-2-1980 in setting aside the appellant's appointment without giving any notice or opportunity to him. It is an elementary principle of natural justice that no person should be condemned without hearing. The order of appointment conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording opportunity of hearing to him. Any order passed in violation of principles of natural justice is rendered void. There is no dispute that the Commissioner's Order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant, therefore, the order was illegal and void. The High Court committed serious error in upholding the Commissioner's order setting aside the appellant's appointment. In this view, Orders of the High Court and the Commissioner are not sustainable in law. 12. In case of appointments which were made invalidly in Shrawan Kumar Jha and others vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1991 SC 309 , the Supreme Court held that it is necessary to give hearing to the employees so appointed and thereafter the services should have been dispensed with. Supreme Court held as under:- By an order dated November 2, 1988 the Deputy Development Commissioner cancelled the appointments of the appellants. Mr. Ashok H. Desai, learned Solicitor General appearing for the respondents has contended that the appointments have been cancelled because the District Superintendent of Education had no authority to make the appointments, it was a device of by-passing the reservations and that the conditions which are part of the appointment order were not complied with. Mr. U. R. Lalit and Mr. A. K. Ganguli, learned Sr. Advocates appearing for the appellants have controverted these allegations and have dated that all these teachers were validly appointed and they had joined their respective schools. Mr. U. R. Lalit and Mr. A. K. Ganguli, learned Sr. Advocates appearing for the appellants have controverted these allegations and have dated that all these teachers were validly appointed and they had joined their respective schools. It is not necessary to go into all these questions. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the appellants should have been given an opportunity of hearing before cancelling their appointments. Admittedly, no such opportunity was afforded to them. It is well settled that no order to the detriment of the appellants could be passed without complying with the rule of natural justice. 13. In Union of India and others vs Jaykumar Parida 1996 (1) SCC 441 , the Supreme Court held that when an incumbent had rendered three years service, there was allegation of having secured appointment by producing false income certificate, it was held that prior opportunity of hearing is a must. In Director General of Police and others vs. Mrityunjoy Sarkar and others, AIR 1997 SC 249 , the allegation was of securing the appointment on the basis of fake list of employment exchange. It was held that hearing opportunity should be provided before passing an adverse order; opportunity of representation should be afforded and thereafter speaking order should have been passed. 14. No doubt about it that principles of natural justice cannot be fitted in a straight jacket formula and vary from case to case and its applicability has to be considered in the situation of a given case whether it was afforded or not and to what extent it was necessary in a given situation as held by their Lordships in Ashwani Kumar and others vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1997 SC 1628 . However, in Uptron India Ltd. vs. Shammi Bhan and another AIR 1998 SC 1681 , the Supreme Court held that automatic termination clause in the event of over-staying the leave cannot be invoked without holding an enquiry into the causes of such overstay. 15. In Basudeo Tiwary vs. Sido Kanhu University and others, AIR 1998 SC 3261 , the Supreme Court held that if appointment is contrary to rules, it cannot be set aside without hearing even though rule provides that such an appointment can be terminated without notice. 16. The petitioner was duly selected and appointed by a selection committee. 15. In Basudeo Tiwary vs. Sido Kanhu University and others, AIR 1998 SC 3261 , the Supreme Court held that if appointment is contrary to rules, it cannot be set aside without hearing even though rule provides that such an appointment can be terminated without notice. 16. The petitioner was duly selected and appointed by a selection committee. His appointment was approved by the Board of Management; he was not even issued a show cause notice to show whether he was qualified or not. Certain allegations were also levelled of his being a group leader; he was not informed of any charge. He was not informed of any material against him; he was not informed of the proposal to remove him from the university. Thus, the action invoking the emergency provision was absolutely illegal as there was no emergent situation available for invoking such an extra ordinary power. If at all action was required to be taken, it was for the Board of Management under section 25(7) of the Adhiniyam of 1991 not for the Vice-Chancellor to act in the method and manner in which the action was taken. 17. The petitioner was stated to be on deputation while passing the order of removal on 9-6-1997 whereas he was not on deputation. The Vice-Chancellor has mentioned in his reply to the Chancellor that since the appointment was on deputation, he was rightly sent back to CSAA University, Kanpur. It passes comprehension how in the eye of law or on facts, the petitioner could be treated to be on deputation when he has applied pursuant to an advertisement and was selected by the selection committee. It was a case of direct recruitment and not that of deputation at all. Simply that the petitioner was holding alien on previous post was not enough to treat him on deputation. It was a case of direct recruitment. Thus, the respondents did not apply their mind at all and treated the petitioner's tenure on the basis of in-existent facts in total illegal and arbitrary manner. 18. Yet another facet is whether petitioner was not qualified at the time of appointment. Petitioner possesses the qualification of B.Sc. (Ag.) in End Class, M.A. Economics in IIIrd Division, LL.B. in IInd class, B.Ed. in 1st Class, M.Ed. in 1st class, Ph.D. in Education awarded by the Kanpur University. 18. Yet another facet is whether petitioner was not qualified at the time of appointment. Petitioner possesses the qualification of B.Sc. (Ag.) in End Class, M.A. Economics in IIIrd Division, LL.B. in IInd class, B.Ed. in 1st Class, M.Ed. in 1st class, Ph.D. in Education awarded by the Kanpur University. In the advertisement P/1 issued on 1-12-1993, IInd class post graduate degree was required. Petitioner possesses degree of M.Ed. in 1st class which is the post graduation degree. He possesses Ph.D. in Education also and he also possess the administrative experience of more than seven years having worked as Assistant Registrar from 1984 to 1993. M.Ed. degree was not treated as post graduate qualification by the respondents whereas law is settled in this regard in Dr. Ram Sevak Singh etc. vs. Dr. U. P. Singh and ors. JT 1999 (1) SC 106. It has been held that M.Ed. degree is the post graduate qualification. Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- The contention putforth on behalf of respondent No. 1 is that the Appellant possessed less than 54% marks in M. Sc. examination and, therefore, he did not satisfy the requirement of the aforesaid Statute 11.13-A. It is contended that the exemption could not be granted in respect of qualification. However, the High Court proceeded to decide the matter on the basis that M.Ed. degree is not an academic qualification as referred to in Statute 11.13-A and Master's degree would not include M.Ed. degree which is a professional degree and as such is liable to be distinguished as an academic qualification, relying upon the decision of this Court in Dr.Prit Singh (supra) and, therefore, the basis that the appellant lacked appropriate qualification did not consider other contentions as to whether relaxation was granted rightly and proceeded to accept that the Commission, though could relax in respect of consistent good academic record, could not have relaxed the condition with reference to Master's Degree, relying upon the decision of that High Court in another matter. Therefore, the principle question that falls for consideration is whether M.Ed. degree possessed by the appellant was a qualification for the purpose of appointment as Principal. In Dr. Therefore, the principle question that falls for consideration is whether M.Ed. degree possessed by the appellant was a qualification for the purpose of appointment as Principal. In Dr. Prit Singh (supra) the qualification required was a Master's degree in any subject and also a degree in education, whereas in the present case the qualification required is Master's degree or an equivalent degree in one of the subjects taught in the college or in a subject allied or interconnected therewith. The distinction between the requirement of qualification in these two cases is obvious. In Dr. Prit Singh (supra) the required qualification as a Master's degree and a degree in education as an additional qualification. In the present case, the College imparts education in teaching as well and, therefore, Master's degree in Education is a degree in respect of a subject taught in the College. We cannot apply the ratio settled in Dr. Prit Singh (supra) irrespective of the qualifications required for a particular post. In the present case a Master's Degree required can include a teaching subject and, therefore, M.Ed. degree possessed by the appellant was held to be a sufficient qualification by the Commission. It cannot be said that the principles stated by this Court in Dr. Prit Singh (supra) can be applied in the present case because in Dr. Prit Singh (supra) the qualifications were a Master's Degree and degree in education, whereas in the present case a Master's degree in any subject taught in the college was the requisite qualification. We think the appellant satisfied the same. In regard to other qualification of "consistently good academic record" which has been relaxed this has not been seriously disputed. 19. Thus, the petitioner possessed the requisite educational qualification. It was not the requirement that he should possess M.A. Degree in Economics in IInd Class. In addition, the petitioner was possessing post graduation in economics in IIIrd division. That does not wipe off his better qualification M. Ed. in 1st class and Ph.D. in Education. Thus, the main ground taken sinks and drowning fish is unable to catch the last straw. The action deserves burial and has no legs to stand. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is not necessary to go in the question whether the action was based on mala fide. in 1st class and Ph.D. in Education. Thus, the main ground taken sinks and drowning fish is unable to catch the last straw. The action deserves burial and has no legs to stand. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is not necessary to go in the question whether the action was based on mala fide. Action is arbitrary, unsustainable and the impugned order Annexure P/7 dated 9-6-1997 and rejection of appeal as per order dated 22nd November, 1997 (Annexure P/13) are quashed. Petitioner is directed to be reinstated along with back wages and other consequential service benefits to which petitioner would have been entitled but for his illegal removal. In case the petitioner has remained in gainful employment else-where, that amount shall be adjusted from the back wages. 21. Writ Petition is allowed. Cost on parties.