Papai Travel & Tours Private Limited v. Essem Consultant
2001-02-20
BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. This revisional application is at the instance of a plaintiff in a suit for declaration and injunction and is directed against Order No. 53 dated December 4, 2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 9th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 76 of 1999 thereby rejecting an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a direction upon the opposite parties to open the lock of the gate of the suit property. 2. The present petitioner filed against the opposite parties in the 4th Court, learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alipore a suit being Title Suit No. 138 of 1998 which was transferred to the 9th Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alipore and was renumbered as Title Suit No. 76 of 1999. 3. In the suit, the present petitioner filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the opposite parties, their men and agent from entering into 'A' scheduled property and from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioner in any manner. The petitioner also prayed for an ad interim order of injunction in terms of the aforesaid prayer. 4. The learned trial Judge by Order No. 2 dated November 13, 1998 issued notice upon the opposite parties to show cause why the prayer of the petitioner for temporary injunction should not be granted. The learned trial Judge considering the urgency of the matter also restrained the opposite parties by an ad interim order of injunction from disturbing the petitioner's possession in respect of 'A' scheduled property till the disposal of the injunction application. 5. The present opposite parties entered appearance and filed an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for variation of the ad interim order of injunction. In the said application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code the opposite parties specifically asserted that the petitioner was not in possession of the suit property and as such no question of disturbing the peaceful possession of the petitioner arose. In the said application it was specifically stated that the opposite party no.1 was given possession of the suit property following work order dated July 20, 1998 pursuant to a letter of agreement dated June 24, 1998 by the petitioner and till that day the opposite party no.1 was in actual physical possession over the same.
In the said application it was specifically stated that the opposite party no.1 was given possession of the suit property following work order dated July 20, 1998 pursuant to a letter of agreement dated June 24, 1998 by the petitioner and till that day the opposite party no.1 was in actual physical possession over the same. It was further stated that the opposite party no.1 had almost complied with its entire part of the contract although the plaintiff had not made payment in terms of the aforesaid agreement. 6. The learned trial Judge by Order No. 35 dated November 16, 1999 disposed of the main application for temporary injunction along with the application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code filed by the opposite parties by making the previous ad interim order of injunction dated November 13, 1998 absolute till the disposal of the suit. By the said order, the learned trial Judge thus allowed the application for temporary injunction filed by the petitioner. 7. While passing the aforesaid Order No. 35, the learned trial Judge specifically recorded that the defendant/opposite party no.1 was entrusted with the interior decoration of the suit flat which was owned and possessed by the plaintiff. The learned trial Judge further observed that for the work like interior decoration, the plaintiff might have entrusted the workmen of the opposite party no.1 with the key of the flat for its decoration, but it did not mean that the opposite party no.1 or its men and agent could go on holding possession of the said flat on the ground of dispute as to the payment. The learned trial Judge further by relying upon Annexure to the application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit flat. Ultimately, the learned trial Judge further held that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss if the ad interim order of injunction earlier granted was not allowed to continue or made absolute till the disposal of the suit and the plaintiff would suffer if the plaintiff's right of running business in the suit place was obstructed. Neither of the opposite parties preferred any appeal against such order and thus the said order has attained finality. 8.
Neither of the opposite parties preferred any appeal against such order and thus the said order has attained finality. 8. It may be pertinent to mention at this stage that after the passing of the Order No.2 dated November 13, 1998 the petitioners filed an application under section 151 of the Code thereby praying for an order implementation of the said order through help of police on the allegation that the defendants were trying in various ways to disturb plaintiff's possession in the suit property. It was further alleged that opposite party no.1 was threatening to put a lock and key in the entrance door of the suit premises and was threatening to take possession of the said promises. 9. The learned trial Judge by Order No. 32 dated September 29, 1999 on contested hearing disposed of the said application by allowing the said prayer and Officer-in-Charge of the Bhowanipore Police Station was directed to see that Order No.2 dated November 13, 1998 was complied with by the parties. 10. Subsequently, on December 7, 1999 the petitioner filed another application under section 151 of the Code thereby praying for calling the Officer-in-Charge of the Bhowanipore Police Station to be present in court personally to show cause for non compliance of the order of the court and to enquire the matter in terms of section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said application there was specific allegation that inspite of communication of the court's order dated November 16, 1999, the Officer-in-Charge of the Bhowanipore Police station was not inclined to given any importance to the said order and was not assisting the petitioner. It was further alleged that the said Officer-in-Charge was under direct influence of the defendant. 11. It appears from the record that the learned trial Judge on the basis of such application by Order No. 46 dated June 6, 2000 held that the report given by the Sub-Inspector of Bhowanipore Police Station as forwarded by the Officer-in-Charge was not satisfactory and the Court directed the Officer-in-Charge of the Bhowanipore Police Station to personally visit the suit premises to see that the order of the court was complied with. Thereafter, a Special Officer was appointed by the court and other directions were given to the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station.
Thereafter, a Special Officer was appointed by the court and other directions were given to the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station. It further appears from Order dated July 25, 2000 passed by the court, a copy of which has been filed by the learned advocate for the opposite parties that the learned trial Judge by the said order directed the Special Officer to submit independent report in the matter on the question whether the flat in question was in possession under the lock and key of the plaintiff and/or of the defendant. 12. Subsequently, however, the petitioner filed another application under section 151 of the Code thereby praying for an order directing the defendants to forthwith open the padlock of the main entrance of the shutter and door of the suit premises and to restore peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff and further for a direction upon the Officer-in-Charge of the Bhowanipore Police Station to take all steps to enforce the said order in the presence of the Special Officer already appointed. 13. In the said application, the plaintiff stated that being encouraged by the observation made in order dated July 25, 2000, the defendants had changed the lock of the shutter and lock of the entrance door of the suit premises. According to the plaintiff, such illegal acts have been done after opening the doors with the help of the key which the defendant no.2 was admittedly in possession and which had been handed over to her at the time of her appointment as interior decorator. It was further stated that alteration of lock and key of the shutter and door of the suit premises had come to the knowledge of the petitioner when the petitioner's men and agent Ameer Shakeeb and Dipak Kundu went to locale on August 9, 2000 at about 3:00 P.M. and on inspection it was found that the lock of the shutter had been changed as the key possessed by the plaintiff was not working in the said lock. 14. By the order impugned herein the learned Trial Judge has rejected such prayer made by the plaintiff, in the aforesaid third application filed under section 151 of the Code. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up with the instant revisional application. 15. Mr.
14. By the order impugned herein the learned Trial Judge has rejected such prayer made by the plaintiff, in the aforesaid third application filed under section 151 of the Code. Being dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up with the instant revisional application. 15. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted before this court that the earlier application for temporary injunction having been disposed of on contest with a specific finding that the plaintiff was in possession of the property and that by taking aid of the duplicate key the defendant had no right to interfere with the right of the plaintiff and the said order having attained finality, the learned trial Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in refusing to pass a direction upon the Officer-in-Charge of the local police station for opening the key which has been set up by the opposite party no.1 during the subsistence of the injunction order. 16. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has however supported the order impugned herein and has contended that the plaintiff obtained the ad interim order as well as final order of temporary injunction by suppressing the fact that plaintiff was not in actual physical possession of the property. According to Mr. Mukherjee by taking aid of an order of police help the plaintiff is now trying to get actual possession of the property. Mr. Mukherjee contends by referring to the decision in the case of London Borough of Hounslow vs. Twichenham Garden Developments Limited, 1970 (3) All ER 326, that his client is entitled to maintain its possession in the property so long the payment is not made by the plaintiff. Mr. Mukherjee contends that by the previous order of temporary injunction his client was merely directed not to disturb the possession of the plaintiff in the property but by the said order no mandatory order of injunction was passed against his client to restore possession in favour of the plaintiff. Under such circumstances Mr. Mukherjee contends, his client did not prefer any appeal against such order and his client was entitled to maintain possession notwithstanding passing of the earlier order of temporary injunction. 17. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record I am not at all convinced by the submission of Mr.
Mukherjee contends, his client did not prefer any appeal against such order and his client was entitled to maintain possession notwithstanding passing of the earlier order of temporary injunction. 17. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record I am not at all convinced by the submission of Mr. Mukherjee that his client is under no obligation to honour the earlier order of temporary injunction and his client was entitled to retain possession. I have already indicated that while disposing of the application for temporary injunction the learned trial Judge specifically recorded that the plaintiff was in actual possession and by taking aid of duplicate key, the defendant could not disturb the possession of the plaintiff in the property. In the application under section 151 of the Code the petitioner specifically alleged that since the entire premises is under the control of opposite party no.2 as security officer of the building, the opposite party no.1 changed the lock and thus plaintiff was unable to enter into the property. 18. In my view, without preferring any appeal against the earlier Order No.35 disposing of the main application for temporary injunction the opposite parties cannot disobey the said order by contending that there was no direction for mandatory injunction directing restoration of possession. Since the court specifically held that the plaintiff was in possession and the defendant had no right to create disturbance by interfering with the possession of the plaintiff with the aid of the duplicate key, there was no scope of passing any direction for mandatory injunction. In view of such order of injunction, the opposite party no.1 could not try to enter into the possession with the duplicate key nor could they change the lock thereby preventing entry of the plaintiff in the property. Under such circumstances, it was the duty of the learned trial Judge to pass direction for breaking open the existing lock for implementation of Order No. 35. In my view, the opposite parties cannot now at this stage dispute the correctness of the Order No. 35 disposing of temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff. It appears from the order impugned that the learned trial Judge has blamed the plaintiff for not cooperating with the Special Officer appointed by the court for ascertaining actual possession.
In my view, the opposite parties cannot now at this stage dispute the correctness of the Order No. 35 disposing of temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff. It appears from the order impugned that the learned trial Judge has blamed the plaintiff for not cooperating with the Special Officer appointed by the court for ascertaining actual possession. It is needless to mention that the plaintiff has admitted in its application that the men of the plaintiff are not in a position to enter into the property and at the same time the defendants have asserted that plaintiff was not in possession and they are in actual possession and that they are entitled to retain the same. In view of such admitted fact, there was no necessity of ascertaining the actual possession of the plaintiff after the main injunction application has been disposed of with a finding that plaintiff was in possession. From the fact, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that during the subsistence of the order of injunction the defendants have changed the lock. At any rate, after the passing of the Order No. 35 holding that the plaintiff is in possession and is entitled to retain the same and the defendants had no right to interfere with such possession, the defendants cannot insist that they will not permit the plaintiff to enter into the flat. I thus find that the learned trial Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in not passing necessary direction upon the local police station for opening the padlock and for putting the plaintiff into possession. It is now settled position of law as pointed out by Sir Robert Megarry VC in Clarke vs. Chadburn, (1985) 1 All ER 211, and approved by the Apex Court of this country in the case of DDA vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., 1996 (4) SCC 622 , that under such circumstances it is the duty of the court to put the plaintiff into possession by passing necessary order. 19. I thus set aside the order impugned and allow the application for putting the plaintiff into possession with the help of police by breaking the existing lock.
(P) Ltd., 1996 (4) SCC 622 , that under such circumstances it is the duty of the court to put the plaintiff into possession by passing necessary order. 19. I thus set aside the order impugned and allow the application for putting the plaintiff into possession with the help of police by breaking the existing lock. The defendants are directed to forthwith open the padlock of the main entrance of the shutter and the door of the suit premises and to restore possession to the plaintiff in the presence of the Special Officer who was appointed by the learned trial court and the Officer-in-Charge of the local police station. In default, the Special Officer is directed to break open the padlock with the help of police and to restore possession to the plaintiff. 20. The application is thus allowed. 21. In the facts and circumstances there will be however no order as to costs. 22. Let the xerox copies of the various applications filed before the learned trial Judge and of the certified copies of the orders passed on such applications filed by the parties at the time of hearing of this application be kept with the record. Later:- 23. Let xerox certified copy of the order, if applied for, be supplied by day after tomorrow. Appeal allowed.