ORDER: The petitioner is the management of Kaveripattinam Co-operative Marketing Society. The second respondent was employed as a ‘salesman’ in the petitioner society and he was suspended on 1.7.1974 for the charges of misappropriation. Three criminal complaints were given, which were tried by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri, in C.C. Nos.35, 36 and 37 of 1979 by the judgment dated 22.12.1980. Since the second respondent pleaded guilty, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate convicted him under Sec.408, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs.25, 25 and 50 in three cases respectively and in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate also convicted the second respondent under Sec.477-A, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs.50. The said order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has not been challenged by the second respondent. Based upon the said orders of conviction and sentence, the petitioner terminated the services of the second respondent by order dated 30.12.1980. Challenging the said order of termination, the petitioner filed I.D. No.186 of 1992. The first respondent Labour Court, Vellore, by award dated 8.12.1994 held that the order of termination was bad and consequently, directed the reinstatement of service. The said award has been challenged by the management in this writ petition. 2. Mr.M.R. Raghavan, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Labour Court did not consider the fact that the order of termination was issued to the second respondent based upon the convictions by a competent Criminal Court. However, much importance was attached to the oral evidence of the second respondent, wherein the second respondent has even denied the fact of conviction by a Criminal Court. The Labour Court came to the said conclusion since the copies of the judgments in three criminal cases have not been filed before it. The learned counsel further submitted that the finding of the Labour Court, based upon only the oral testimony of the second respondent, is perverse, when the fact remains on the face of the order of termination and the second respondent was terminated from service only on the basis of conviction by competent Criminal Court. The learned counsel further submitted that the finding of the Labour Court, based upon only the oral testimony of the second respondent, is perverse, when the fact remains on the face of the order of termination and the second respondent was terminated from service only on the basis of conviction by competent Criminal Court. The learned counsel, in fact, drew my attention to the fact that the conviction of the second respondent came to be considered by this Court in the proceedings between the petitioner and the second respondent in respect of surcharge proceedings and other proceedings initiated, in W.P. Nos.13187 of 1985 and 6267 of 1991. This Court, in the orders dated 8.1.1996 and 5.7.1999, had taken note of the conviction of the second respondent for the alleged breach of trust by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri. Therefore, the learned counsel submits that the finding of the Labour Court, which is contrary to the materials, would not be valid, as the same is perverse. 3. Learned counsel for the second respondent, on the other hand, would contend that in the absence of the copies of judgments of the Criminal Court before the Labour Court, the Labour Court was not in a position to give a finding on the stand taken by the writ petitioner as to the conviction of the second respondent for the alleged offence of criminal breach of trust and therefore, it is not now open to the petitioner to raise the said ground before this Court and attack the finding of the Labour Court on the ground which was rendered on the basis of the evidence of the second respondent. 4. The order of termination, which was very much available before the Labour Court, would reveal that the second respondent was terminated from service only on the basis of his conviction by a Criminal Court on three charges of criminal breach of trust. Strangely, the second respondent had taken a different stand before the Labour Court that he was not convicted by a Criminal Court. Obviously, the said stand has been taken by the second respondent only taking advantage of the fact that the judgments of the Criminal Court have not been placed before the Labour Court. Strangely, the second respondent had taken a different stand before the Labour Court that he was not convicted by a Criminal Court. Obviously, the said stand has been taken by the second respondent only taking advantage of the fact that the judgments of the Criminal Court have not been placed before the Labour Court. Further, the fact remains that the second respondent was convicted for the offences under Secs.408 and 477-A of the I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one day till the rising of the Court and was also imposed fine. The said fact of conviction has also been taken note of by this Court on two earlier occasions in the collateral proceedings between the petitioner and the second respondent. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it has been specifically pleaded that the order of termination was issued only on the basis of the conviction by a criminal Court. The counter affidavit is silent about the said averment and the same has not been denied. In the statement of the second respondent before the Labour Court, even though he has admitted that he was imposed a fine by a Criminal Court, he has denied the other portion of the sentence. The Labour Court ought to have considered the fact that the second respondent was convicted for criminal breach of trust and for the offences under three criminal cases. Non-consideration of the same would vitiate the finding of the Labour Court in coming to the conclusion that the order of termination was not on the basis of conviction by a Criminal Court. It is to be further seen that the second respondent, knowing fully well that he has been convicted by a Criminal Court, has come up with a case before the Labour Court that he is not convicted at all. Such a statement has been accepted by the Labour Court for the purpose of awarding the reinstatement with backwages. In my view, the said finding of the Labour Court based upon the evidence of the second respondent alone without reference to the conviction by a competent Criminal Court which has been referred to in the very order of termination would be perverse and the same cannot stand to the scrutiny of law. Hence, I am constrained to interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court first respondent. 5. Hence, I am constrained to interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court first respondent. 5. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. No costs.