S. K. SEN, C. J. ( 1 ) WE have heard Sri Rajesh Kumar, learned advocate for the writ petitioner and Mr. S. P. Kesawarwani, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. ( 2 ) IN the instant writ petition the writ petitioner has challenged the order dated July 30, 2001 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Assessment 9), Trade Tax, Agra, respondent No. 3 cancelling the certificate issued under Section 4-B of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in favour of the writ petitioner. Under Section 9 of the Act an appeal lies against the said order and there is no dispute with regard to the same before us. ( 3 ) THE contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, however, is that since in another writ petition [being Writ Petition No. 741 of 2001 (Tax)], P. N. C. Construction Company Limited v. State of U. P. , a Division Bench of this Court has passed the interim order, a similar order should be passed in the instant matter as well. The interim order passed in the aforesaid writ petition is set out herein below : "learned standing counsel may file counter-affidavit within a month. Issue notice to respondents nos. 4 and 5 returnable at an early date. Until further orders of this Court, the operation of the notice dated May 9, 2001 (annexure 7 to the petition) shall remain stayed. Sd/- M. Katju, J. Sd/- R. B. Mishra, J. 21-5-2001. " the aforesaid interim order does not lay down any ratio or principle which is of binding nature. ( 4 ) IN this connection we may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra reported in AIR 1968 SC 647 . The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision observed in paragraph 13 at page 651 as follows : ". . . . . A decision is only an authority for what is actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury LC said in Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495. . . . A decision is only an authority for what is actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury LC said in Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495. now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what i have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what is actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. " ( 5 ) IN Virjiban Dass Moolji v. Biseswar Lal Hargovind reported in AIR 1921 Cal. 169, Ashutosh mookerjee, acting as Chief Justice speaking in a division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a decision of a superior court is binding on an inferior court and on court of co-ordinate jurisdiction provided it contains reasons and principles of law and the same is binding to the extent the reasons and principles of law are laid down therein. In the aforesaid decision reference was also made to the judgment and decision in Merry v. Nickalls (1872) 7 Ch. App. 733 ; 27 d. T. 12 ; 20 W. B. 929 wherein Lord Justice James observed as under : "the whole theory of our system is, that the decision of a superior court is binding on an inferior court and on a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, in so far as it is a statement of the law which the court is bound to accept. " ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the view that interim orders not laying down any principle of law or ratio for the decision, are not binding, inasmuch as, only a judgment laying down certain ratio is to be followed as a binding precedent. Interim orders of the nature passed in the aforementioned Writ Petition No. 741 of 2001 do not lay down any such ratio so as to be followed as a binding precedent. ( 7 ) IT is well-settled that in order to be binding precedent, the decision to that effect must lay down some ratio. In that view of the matter, mere interim orders need not be followed as a precedent. Since the interim order passed in Writ Petition No. 741 of 2001 does not contain any reason, the same does not appear nor does it lay down any ratio or principle to be followed. In the instant case, it is not necessary for us to follow the same particularly when the statute provides the remedy of appeal. ( 8 ) WE have in the instant case considered the matter in detail. Since, we find that an appeal lies, the proper course for the writ petitioner is to prefer an appeal before the appellate authority. In the instant case, admittedly, the order impugned is neither without jurisdiction nor in violation of principles of natural justice as it appears from the impugned order that notices were duly served on the petitioner and, therefore, he ought to have exhausted the statutory remedy available to him by way of appeal before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. ( 9 ) MR. Rajesh Kumar, has however, submitted that the circular dated January 17, 2001, issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Trade Tax) having been issued contrary to law, the impugned order is also contrary to law since it is based on the circular. That apart, Mr. Kesawarwani, learned Standing Counsel has also made it clear to us that the impugned order is not based on any circular. That apart, Mr. Kesawarwani, learned Standing Counsel has also made it clear to us that the impugned order is not based on any circular. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that in the event an appeal is preferred against the impugned order before the appellate authority, which the learned counsel for the assessee-petitioner undertakes to prefer within a period of one week from today, the same shall be disposed of by the appellate authority in accordance with law within a period of one month from the date of communication of this order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner and without taking into consideration the circular dated July 30. 2001 issued by the commissioner. It will be open to the writ petitioner to make such submission or adduce such evidence or documents as the petitioner may be advised. In the meantime, the respondent-authorities may furnish form 3 Kha to the writ petitioner on the conditions imposed by the concerned authority to its satisfaction. ( 10 ) THE writ petition stands disposed of with the direction as above. ( 11 ) REGISTRY of the court is directed to list the other matter, namely Writ Petition No. 741 of 2001 in the next week for orders along with the record of the instant case. .