Judgment :- 1. Aggrieved by the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, restoring the complaint, the above writ petition is filed. 2. Learned counsel appearing in person has submitted that the order is not actually an ex parte order and therefore, there is no scope for restoration. He further submits that the Disciplinary Committee has become functus officio and therefore has no power to restore the application and if at all the order of review can be filed, it can only be under Sections 23 and 44 of the Advocates Act, 1961. He ultimately submitted that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to contest the application. 3. From the Judgment of the Disciplinary Committee, it is seen that two notices were sent to the complainant/respondent returned unserved with a postal endorsement ‘Left’ and therefore, the Committee proceeded on the basis that there was sufficient notice and that the complainant had no evidence to adduce on her side. 4. Taking into account the case of the petitioner herein, according to the Committee, there is no evidence of any kind on the side of the complainant to prove the charge. The charge against the petitioner was therefore dismissed. 5. The operative portion of the order of the Committee is as follows: “Now, the point for consideration is whether the respondent is guilty of the charge against him. It is to be seen that there is no evidence of any kind on the side of the complainant so as to prove the charge. But on the other hand, the respondent has adduced evidence on his side by examining himself as RW1. He has categorically stated that he has handed over the demand draft to the complainant and a perusal of Ex.R-1 shows that the complainant has received the demand draft from the respondent. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the complainant has not proved the charge against the respondent and therefore, the complainant is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.” 6. As against this order, the third respondent herein filed an application to restore the complaint. According to this application, she learnt that her complaint was dismissed for default. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the complainant has not proved the charge against the respondent and therefore, the complainant is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.” 6. As against this order, the third respondent herein filed an application to restore the complaint. According to this application, she learnt that her complaint was dismissed for default. She says that she was residing originally at No. 29, Corporation I Lane, Panamarathotti, Royapuram, Chennai-600 13 and subsequently, she changed her residence and that she was not given information about the date of hearing and she was not at all kept informed about the development of the complaint due to change of the residence. She further says that she has got all material evidence to prove her statements and therefore, prayed for restoration of the complaint. 7. Notice in this application dated 18.5.2001 was served on the petitioner on 20.7.2001 and the matter posted for hearing on 28.7.2001. Vakalat was filed on behalf of the petitioner on 28.7.2001. Though there was no sitting according to the petitioner on 28.7.2001, the matter appears to have been posted to 29.7.2001 and the Committee decided to allow the application on that day. The order reads: “Counter not filed. The petition is allowed.” 8. From the above facts, it is seen that the Committee proceeded on the basis that the earlier order was passed without giving an opportunity to the complainant and that the complaint submitted that due to change of address, she did not receive the date of hearing and that she had sufficient evidence to prove her case and consequently, the Disciplinary Committee thought it fit to restore the complaint and allowed the application. When the application was served, the applicant did not file any counter. The Committee, which has got power to pass the final order, has power to pass order of restoration also as per the General Clauses Act. Further, the Disciplinary Committee has got powers regarding the said matters set out in the petition. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the Committee has no power to restore the complaint if it considers that the final order is passed without giving opportunity to the complainant. 9. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 enables the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council to pass orders set out in Sub-section (3). Therefore, it cannot be stated that the Committee has no power to restore the complaint if it considers that the final order is passed without giving opportunity to the complainant. 9. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 enables the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council to pass orders set out in Sub-section (3). Section 42 says that the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code in respect of the matters set out therein and all proceedings shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings under Sub-section (2) of Section 42. Section 44 gives power to the Committee to review its order. The Supreme Court, in O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 107, held that the Bar Council does not act wrongly if they entertain subsequent petitions from a person whose case has been dealt with by the Disciplinary Committee. Their Lordships supported the view of the Disciplinary Committee as follows: “But, as the Disciplinary Committee themselves observed, there should not be too much technicality where professional honour is involved and if there is manifest wrong done, it is never too late to undo the wrong.” 10. On the question of reopening of a case in a matter arising under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, this Court, in Raman Nair v. Govindaswamy Naidu, 76 L.W. 252 = (1963) 2 M.L.J. 19, held that though the Rent Controller becomes functus officio, he has sufficient jurisdiction to reopen the case and receive the additional evidence, though arguments were concluded and the case closed. It was held that when a party, for good and sufficient reasons, convinces the authority that he could not let in evidence before the case was concluded and that the evidence being available should be taken by that authority, it would be open to that authority to reopen the case, receive such evidence and decide the case on the basis of such evidence. The only condition is that he should give a fair opportunity to the other side to meet that evidence. This power is really a part of his power to decide the question entrusted to him and not an independent inherent power. The power can be exercised till the matter referred to him has not been disposed of. The only condition is that he should give a fair opportunity to the other side to meet that evidence. This power is really a part of his power to decide the question entrusted to him and not an independent inherent power. The power can be exercised till the matter referred to him has not been disposed of. Therefore, it was held that the Rent Controller had sufficient jurisdiction to reopen the case, which was concluded, and receive the evidence let in. 11. As pointed out by the petitioner, this is not a review of the order passed earlier. It is only an application to restore the original application in order to give fair opportunity and accordingly, the Committee restored the application. 12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, though serious allegations are levelled against a member of the Bar and that allegation should be completely gone into by giving sufficient opportunity to the complainant also, the decision of the Disciplinary Committee to give opportunity to the complainant and decide the matter after hearing both the parties cannot be held to be illegal. 13. Hence, the writ petition fails it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. No. 21166 of 2001 is closed.