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2001 DIGILAW 883 (PNJ)

Bhim Singh v. Mamo

2001-08-20

M.M.KUMAR

body2001
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - Could the Court grant extension of time to make up the marginal deficiency in deposit of pre-emption amount in execution of a decree passed in favour of a pre-emptor is the significant question which arises for consideration in the present revision petition ? 2. The brief facts of the case are that the decree holder-respondent Inder Singh (now represented by Smt. Mamo his widow, Smt. Resalo, Roshni, Phullo daughters of later Shri Inder Singh, Zille Singh, Dharam Singh sons of late Shri Inder Singh) filed a pre-emption suit being suit No. 638 of 1974 claiming decree for possession by pre-emption of 24 kanals 1 marla of land representing 1/2 share of land bearing Rect. No. 407, Rect. No. 59 Killa Nos. 3 to 9, 10/2, 11 to 13, 14/1, 20/1 (Total Kittas 14) entered at khewat No. 1 according to jamabandi 1968-69 of village Sanch, Tehsil and District Kaithal. It was further claimed that the suit be decreed in respect of the above said land on payment of Rs. 31,100/-. A decree for possession by pre-emption in respect of land measuring 24 kanal 1 marla representing 1/2 share of the ownership and 1/4th share of the land measuring 96 kanal 3 marlas comprised in Rect. No. 407 Rect No. 59 (Killa Nos. 3 to 9, 10/2-11-12-13-14/1, 20/1 (Total 14 killas) situated in village Sanch, Tehsil Kaithal as per jamabandi 1968-69 was passed by the learned trial Court on 5.3.1976. It was directed that a sum of Rs. 31,100/- be deposited on or before 20.5.1976. Against the decree, first appeal was dismissed on 3.8.1977 and the High Court dismissed R.S.A. No. 1331 of 1977 on 16.7.1986. Even the S.L.P. No. 11796 of 1986 also stood dismissed on 9.10.1987. Hence, the decree dated 5.3.1976 had attained finality. it is appropriate to mention that on the direction of the trial Court dated 13.9.1974 1/5th of the pre-emption amount was deposited by the respondent decree holder in the trial Court on 23.10.1974 i.e. at the time of filing of suit in compliance with the provisions of Section 22 of the Punjab Pre-Emption Act, 1913 (as applicable to the State of Haryana). On 7.5.1976, when the suit was decreed, the remaining 4/5th amount of Rs. 25,400/- was also deposited although the trial Court has fixed the date for that deposit to be 20.5.1976. On 7.5.1976, when the suit was decreed, the remaining 4/5th amount of Rs. 25,400/- was also deposited although the trial Court has fixed the date for that deposit to be 20.5.1976. In order to execute the decree, the execution petition was filed being Execution No. 75 of 1992. In the execution petition all the afore-mentioned details were given and the petition was thumb marked by the legal representatives of late Shri Inder Singh, respondent-decree holder. To the execution petition, petitioner-Judgment debtor filed objections and an objection was taken in paragraph 4 of the objection petition that the decree holder-respondent did not deposit the full amount and it was mandatory to verify the same before warrant of possession could be issued. In paragraph 5 it was further objected that unless full amount is deposited, the execution is liable to be dismissed because the suit itself stood dismissed and no execution would lie. Another application was also filed by the petitioner- judgment debtor seeking stay of the execution proceedings. In reply to the objections filed by the judgment debtor-petitioner, replication was also filed alleging that the objections were malafide and were filed to protract the illegal possession. It is also pertinent to point out that the decree-holder respondent revealed in the replication that the decree was also challenged in a suit on the ground of gross negligence and the ex-parte stay order granted in that suit by the Court of Shri Subhash Goel, Sub Judge Kaithal, stood vacated on 21.5.1988. Even the appeal against that order was dismissed on 9.91988 and the High Court dismissed the revision petition on 30.9.1988. 3. The decree holder-respondent also filed an application in the original suit being Suit No. 638 of 1974 under Sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the Code). In the application averments were made that the learned trial Court calculated the amount payable under the decree and filled the same in the challan in words as well as in figures. The challan, after calculation of the amount duly signed by the Sub Judge Ist Class alongwith the date, was given to the decree holder-respondent and a sum of Rs. 25,400/- was ordered to be deposited. In order to make up the deficiency of Rs. 100/- a request was made for extending time and permission of the Court was sought to deposit the deficient amount of Rs. 25,400/- was ordered to be deposited. In order to make up the deficiency of Rs. 100/- a request was made for extending time and permission of the Court was sought to deposit the deficient amount of Rs. 100/- in the Court. The learned trial Court after perusal of the record and recording of statements of various witnesses reached the conclusion that the decree holder was not at fault in depositing deficit amount of Rs. 100/-. Vide impugned order dated 24.4.1996, the Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Kaithal, allowed the decree holder-respondent to deposit the short amount of Rs. 100/- in the Court by 25.5.1996 failing which he was to face the consequences in terms of the decree dated 7.3.1976. The record shows that balance amount of Rs. 100/- was deposited on 6.5.1996 in the Court. The findings of the trial Court are as under : "Moreover, decree in question is silent about the exact pre-emption amount which was to be deposited and the pre-emption money of Rs. 25,400/- had been deposited by DH on the basis of challan Ex.DH, which bears the signatures of Presiding Officer and official who filled the challan by figuring Rs. 25,400/-. The concerned official namely: Chanan Dass and Pawan Kumar have appeared before the Court and proved the signatures of concerned person by whom it has been filled. From this it appears that concerned official has committed error in calculating the pre-emption amount which was to be deposited and it is the view of the Honble Supreme Court in case Jang Singh v. Brij Lal 1963 C.L.J. 11 (SC). that due to mistake of court or its official, litigants should not suffer and they cannot be held responsible for that mistake. This authority is extending full support to the stand of the DH and in view of the same, present DH should not suffer if the amount in question has been filled wrongly by concerned official and same view is also of our Honble High Court in supra case Het Ram v. Rajinder Parshad according to which DH cannot be made to suffer for fault of Court officials and no malafides can be attributed to decree-holder for depositing short amount. This authority is also giving full support to the case of the DH and in view of the same court cannot fix responsibility of DH for depositing short Pre-emption amount." 4. This authority is also giving full support to the case of the DH and in view of the same court cannot fix responsibility of DH for depositing short Pre-emption amount." 4. It is against this order, the present revision petition has been preferred by the judgment-debtor. 5. I have heard Shri Rajive Bhalla, Advocate and Shri Vikram Singh, Advocate for the judgment-debtor/petitioner and Shri C.B. Goel, Advocate and Shri Vikas Mor, Advocate for the decree-holder/respondent. 6. The learned counsel for the judgment-debtor has made two fold submissions. Firstly, he contended that under Order 20 Rule 14(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the Code, it is only after payment of pre-emption amount that title is conferred on the decree holder. He further contends that the decree becomes final when full amount is deposited. The Court passing the decree becomes functus officio and the executing Court would not have any jurisdiction to grant extension of time under Section 148 of the Code. Secondly, he contends that vide Haryana Act No. 10 of 1995, the Pre- Empton Act had come to an end and, therefore, the Courts deciding the pending matters should take into consideration the change in law and refuse relief to the pre-emptor on that score. 7. For the first proposition, the learned counsel cited numerous judgments. He relied on Naguba Appa v. Namdev, AIR 1954 SC 50; Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, 1961 SC 882; Kirpa Ram v. Ghasi, 1981 PLJ 257; Sulleh Singh and others v. Sohan Lal and another, 1975 PLJ 400. He further relied on Jang Singh v. Brij Lal and others, 1963 Cu. L.J. 11 to argue that although exact amount was not given yet it was the responsibility of the decree holder-respondent to calculate the amount and to pay the same. The act of calculation by the Court officials, in the absence of any statutory obligation on them, should be treated as an act of the decree holder himself. He further contended that once the amount has not been deposited, however short it may be, the suit should be deemed to be dismissed. He cites Jagtar Singh and another v. Kartar Singh and others, AIR 1980 P&H 313. He goes to the extent of arguing that even for the amount rendered in short, the suit would stand dismissed in the case of conditional decree. He cites Jagtar Singh and another v. Kartar Singh and others, AIR 1980 P&H 313. He goes to the extent of arguing that even for the amount rendered in short, the suit would stand dismissed in the case of conditional decree. For this proposition he relies on Labh Singh v. Hardayal, AIR 1977 P&H 294. Learned counsel argued that in procedural matters the power of condonation of delay in depositing the pre-emption amount could be condoned but not in cases of conditional decrees. For this proposition, he relies on Smt. Parmeshri v. Naurata, AIR 1984 P&H 342. 8. For the second proposition, the learned counsel argued that the right of pre-emption should be available to the plaintiff-decree holder on the date of the sale, on the date of the suit, on the date when the decree was passed. He relied on Karan Singh and others v. Bhagwan Singh and others, 1996 PLJ 89 to contend that once the right of pre- emption has been effaced from the statute book by an enactment of Haryana Act No. 10 of 1995 then the Court should not exercise powers in negation to that statute. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent, argued that once the application is filed on which the order has been passed for deposit of pre-emption amount of Rs. 25,400/- which was actually deposited on 7.5.1976 it cannot be claimed by the judgment-debtor that there was any fault on the part of the decree-holder to deposit the whole amount as on the application having been made by the decree holder for deposit of pre-emtion amount, the learned trial Court has given a finding of fact that the decree holder did not commit any error in the calculation of pre-emption amount. The shortage of Rs. 100/- was on account of the bona-fide mistake committed by the Court officers/officials. He submits that it is well settled proposition of law that for the fault of the Court or the counsel, the litigant should not suffer. For this proposition, he relies on Jang Singh v. Brij Lal and others, 1963 Cur. L.J. 11 (SC). However, the most firm reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent on a Supreme Court judgment in Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh and others, 1989 PLJ 723. For this proposition, he relies on Jang Singh v. Brij Lal and others, 1963 Cur. L.J. 11 (SC). However, the most firm reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent on a Supreme Court judgment in Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh and others, 1989 PLJ 723. It was argued by him that the observations made in para 5 of the afore-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court squarely cover his case. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that before the Supreme Court the facts were identical to the case in hand as there was deficiency of Rs. 100/- in that case also. He further argued that a decree would not become inoperative or ineffective merely because a fraction of amount, which was result of bona- fide mis-calculation/mistake could be defeated for that reason. According to him, such a decree becomes final and has to be executed. He sought support from Het Ram v. Rajinder Parshad, 1988 PLJ 103; Manohar Singh v. Amar Singh and others, 1985 PLJ 364 and Sher Singh v. Puran and others, 1985 PLJ 536. Moreover, in their objection, the judgment debtor has never raised this point before the learned trial Court. Such a point had also not been raised either before the first appellate Court, High Court or before the Honble Supreme Court at the time of challenging the decree itself. Therefore, he claimed that a small amount of Rs. 100/- which was the result of bona fide mistake could be made the basis for defeating the decree. 10. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record which was requisitioned from the trial Court through special messenger. 11. Before I deal with the various judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties, I deem it appropriate to refer to the provisions of Order 20 Rule 14(1) of the Code which reads as under : "14. 11. Before I deal with the various judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties, I deem it appropriate to refer to the provisions of Order 20 Rule 14(1) of the Code which reads as under : "14. Decree in pre-emption suit - (1) Where the Court decrees a claim to pre- emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall - (a) specify a day on or before which the purchase money shall be so paid, and (b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase-money, together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in clause (a), the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment, but that, if the purchase-money and the costs (if any) are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs." 12. A persual of Rule 14(1) of the Code makes it obvious that an obligation has been imposed on the Court to specify the date on which the purchase money had to be paid and issue direction that on payment of pre-emption money into the Court, the defendant would deliver possession of the property to the decree-holder. The title of the decree holder would accrue from the date when such payment is made. In the absence of payment of purchase money/pre-emption money, the suit would be deemed to be dismissed. At the first place, the decree requires to satisfy these things in case the purchase money/pre-emtion money has not been paid in the Court. In the absence of such a situation, the decree does not need to specify any such thing. 13. In so far as the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Naguba Appas case (supra) is concerned it was a case of non-compliance of a pre-emption decree inasmuch as no amount was deposited making it absolutely clear that the decree holder had no intention to comply with the decree. Therefore, this judgment does not advance the case of the judgment debtor-petitioner. The judgment in Mahanth Ram Dasss case (supra) also has no bearing on the proposition which arises for consideration in this case. Therefore, this judgment does not advance the case of the judgment debtor-petitioner. The judgment in Mahanth Ram Dasss case (supra) also has no bearing on the proposition which arises for consideration in this case. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were seized of a situation as to whether a Bench of the High Court while deciding the appeal was competent to grant extension beyond the period fixed for payment of pre-emption amount by the inferior Court. There an application for extension of time had been made before the Division Bench of the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not powerless to enlarge the time even though it had pre-emptorily fixed the period for payment. With regard to Section 148 it was observed that Section 148 allows time even if the original period fixed had expired. This judgment rather goes against the judgment debtor-petitioner. The judgment rendered by a Single Bench of this Court in Kirpa Rams case (supra) also renders no help to the case of the judgment debtor-petitioner. In that case, the decree holder did not comply with the terms of the decree and failed to deposit even a single penny. Therefore, the judgment is distinguishable on facts as well as on law. The next judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the judgment debtor-petitioner in Jang Singhs case (supra) also to my mind go against him. In that case also, the facts were similar to the case in hand as the mistake had occurred on the part of the officials of the Court and resultantly, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the Court must undo that mistake. Even the judgment of the learned Singh Judge in Het Ram v. Rajinder Parshad, 1988 PLJ 103 goes against him. 14. On the second proposition, the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the judgment debtor-petitioner in Karan Singhs case (supra) also does not lend support to his case. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the right to claim pre-emption must be available on the date of sale, the date of suit and on the date on which the decree is passed. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the right to claim pre-emption must be available on the date of sale, the date of suit and on the date on which the decree is passed. The observations of the Honble Supreme Court in para 7 of the judgment are as under : "...........the right to claim pre-emption must be available on the date of sale, the date of suit and the date on which the decree is passed. When appeal against a decree is pending, the court of appeal had seisin of the whole case and the whole matter becomes sub judice again though for certain purposes, i.e., execution, the decree is regarded as final. The decree of the trial Court gets merged with the decree of the appellate Court. Therefore, the court of appeal shall have all the powers and shall perform as nearly as may be, the same duties as are conferred and imposed on the court of original jurisdiction. When the appeal, therefore, is pending in the Supreme Court, it is a continuation of the original proceedings and the entire issue is at large." (emphasis supplied) 15. The other judgments relied by the judgment debtor-petitioner also lacks support to the proposition which arises for consideration in the present case. In Jagtar Singh case (supra) the facts were entirely different as no part of the pre-emption amount was paid. Similarly, Full Bench judgment in Labh Singhs case (supra) also deals with entirely different proposition namely, whether failure to take objection for the deficit pre-emption amount at the appellate stage would amount to waiver of the right to raise such an objection at the execution stage. Hence, I find that even this judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. The judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in Parmeshris case (supra) also has no bearing. In that case, the conditional decree for possession on payment of certain amount in instalments within specified period was passed. The plaintiff having failed to pay the last instalment according to the conditions of the decree had asked for extension of time. It was in these circumstances that the learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Court was not competent to extend the time for payment under Section 148. 16. The plaintiff having failed to pay the last instalment according to the conditions of the decree had asked for extension of time. It was in these circumstances that the learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Court was not competent to extend the time for payment under Section 148. 16. In so far as the argument of Shri Rajive Bhalla, learned counsel for the judgment-debtor that the right of pre-emption of co-sharer has been abolished by the Haryana (Amendment) Act, 1995 which has substituted Section 15 is concerned, also deserves to be rejected. In a recent judgment, Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Sunder and another v. Ram Kumar and another, JT 2001(6) SC 94 has held that the amendment of 1995 is prospective. The basic reason given by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is that in procedural law, there might be retrospective effect but so far as substantive rights of parties are concerned, they would remain unaffected by the amendment in the enactment. The observations of their Lordships in para 29 are pertinent in this regard and read as under : "From the aforesaid decisions the legal position that emerges is that when a repeal of an enactment is followed by a fresh legislation such legislation does not effect the substantive rights of the parties on the date of suit or adjudication of suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of suit. However, the position in law would be different in the matters which relate to procedural law but so far as substantive rights of parties are concerned they remain unaffected by the amendment in the enactment. We are, therefore, of the view that where a repeal of provisions of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act such legislation is prospective in operation and does not effect substantive or vested rights of the parties unless made retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment. We are, therefore, of the view that where a repeal of provisions of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act such legislation is prospective in operation and does not effect substantive or vested rights of the parties unless made retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment. We are further of the view that there is a presumption against the retrospective operation of a statute and further a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation that its language renders necessary, but an amending Act which affects the procedure is presumed to be retrospective, unless amending Act provides otherwise. We have carefully looked into new substituted Section 15 brought in the parent Act by amendment Act 1995 but do not find it either expressly or by necessary implication retrospective in operation which may effect the right of the parties on the date of adjudication of suit and the same is required to be taken into consideration by the Appellate Court." 17. On the other hand, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent lend substantial support to the proposition arising for consideration of this court. It appears to me that the judgment in Johri Singhs case (supra) provides a complete answer to the proposition in hand. The observations of the Court in paragraph 9, 10, 11 and 12 of that case squarely cover the case of the decree holder-respondent and the same reads as under : 9. From the above provision there is no doubt that where the entire purchase- money payable has not been paid and there is no order from any Court to justify or excuse non-payment, the suit shall be dismissed with costs. This shall be done by virtue of the above provision. But when the decree-holder deposits into Court what he believes to be the entire purchase-money but due to inadvertent mistake what is deposited falls short of the decretal amount by a small fraction thereof and the party within such time after the mistake is pointed out or realised, as would not prove wilful default or negligence on his part, pays the deficit amount into the Court with its permission, should the same result follows 10. This Court in Naguba Appa v. Namdev, AIR 1954 SC 50, has held that mere filing of an appeal does not suspend the pre-emption decree of the trial Judge and unless that decree is altered in any manner by the Court of appeal, the pre-emptor is bound to comply with its directions and has upheld the finding that the pre-emption suit stood dismissed by the reason of his default in not depositing the pre-emption price within the time fixed in the trial Courts decree and that the dismissal of the suit is as a result of the mandatory provisions of Order 20 Rule 14 and not by reason of any decision of the Court. There the pre-emption money was not deposited within the fixed time. The pre- emptor thereafter made an application to the Court for depositing the amount without disclosing that the time fixed had expired. The application was allowed; but the defendant applied to the Court for disposal of the suit pointing out that the time fixed for deposit had expired. The trial Judge held that the pre-emtion money not having been paid within the time fixed in the decree the suit stood dismissed. This decision was held to be correct. It was a case of non-desposit of the whole of the purchase money and not of any fraction thereof. 11. In Jang Singh v. Brijlal and others (supra) the pre-emption decree on compromise was passed in favour of Jang Singh and he was directed to deposit Rs. 5951/- less Rs. 1000/- already deposited by him, by May 1, 1958, and failing to do so punctually his suit would stand dismissed with costs. On January 6, 1958, Jang Singh made an application to the trial Court for making the deposit of the balance of the amount of the decree. The Clerk of the Court, which was also the executing Court, prepared a challan in duplicate and handed it over with the application to Jang Singh so that the amount might be deposited in the Bank. In the challan (and in the order passed on the application, so it was alleged) Rs. 4950/- were mentioned instead of Rs. 4951/- and it was deposited. In May 1958, he applied for and received an order for possession of the land and the Naib Nazir reported that the entire amount was deposited in Court. In the challan (and in the order passed on the application, so it was alleged) Rs. 4950/- were mentioned instead of Rs. 4951/- and it was deposited. In May 1958, he applied for and received an order for possession of the land and the Naib Nazir reported that the entire amount was deposited in Court. Bhola Singh (the vendee) then applied on May 25, 1958, to the Court for payment to him of the amount lying in deposit and it was reported by the Naib Nazir on that application that Jang Singh had not deposited the correct amount and the deposit was short by one rupee. Bhola Singh applied to the Court for dismissal of Jang Singhs suit and for recall of all the orders made in Jang Singhs favour. The trial Court allowed that application and also ordered reversal of its earlier orders and directed that the possession of the land be restored to him. On appeal, the District Judge, holding that Jang Singh having approached the Court with an application intending to make the deposit the Court and its clerk made a mistake by ordering him to make the deposit of an amount which was less by one rupee. Jang Singh was excused inasmuch as the responsibility was shared by the Court and it accordingly held that the deposit made was a sufficient compliance with the terms of the decree and accordingly allowed the appeal setting aside the trial Courts order dismissing the suit. On appeal by Bhola Singh the High Court took the view that the decree was not complied with and that under the law the time fixed in the decree for payment of the decretal amount in pre- emption case could not be extended by the Court and that the finding that the short deposit was due to the act of the Court was not supported by evidence and accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the District Judge and restored that of the trial Court. On appeal by Jang Singh this Court found that the application whereupon the Court directed the deposit of Rs. 4950/- remained untraced. However, it was quite clear that the challan was prepared under the Courts direction and the duplicate challan prepared by the Court as well as the one presented to the Bank had been produced in the case and they showed the lesser amount. 4950/- remained untraced. However, it was quite clear that the challan was prepared under the Courts direction and the duplicate challan prepared by the Court as well as the one presented to the Bank had been produced in the case and they showed the lesser amount. The challan was admittedly prepared by the Execution Clerk and it was also an admitted fact that Jang Singh was an illiterate person. The amount was deposited promptly relying upon the Courts Officers. The Execution Clerk had deposed to the procedure which was usually followed and he had pointed out that first there was a report by the Ahlmad about the amount in deposit and then an order was made by the Court on the application before the challan was prepared. It was, therefore, quite clear that if there was an error the Court and its officers largely contributed to it. This Court observed: "It is no doubt true that a litigant must be vigilant and take care but where a litigant goes to Court and asks for the assistance of the Court so that his obligations under a decree might be fulfilled by him strictly, it is incumbent on the Court, if it does not leave the litigant to his own devices, to ensure that the correct information is furnished. If the Court in supplying the information makes a mistake the responsibility of the litigant, though it does not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the litigant acts on the faith of that information the Courts cannot hold him responsible for a mistake which it itself caused. There is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Courts should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly summed up in the maxim : Actus curiae neminem gravabit." 12. In the facts of that case it was held that an error was committed by the Court which the Court must undo and which could not be undone by shifting the blame on Jang Singh, who was expected to rely upon the Court and its officers and to act in accordance with their directions. In the facts of that case it was held that an error was committed by the Court which the Court must undo and which could not be undone by shifting the blame on Jang Singh, who was expected to rely upon the Court and its officers and to act in accordance with their directions. It was also observed that he deposited the amount promptly and a wrong belief was induced in his mind by the action of the Court that all he had to pay was stated in the challan. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the High Courts order was set aside and the appellant was ordered to deposit Re. 1 within one month from the date of receipt of the record in the trial Court. It should be noted that in the facts and circumstances of a case of non-deposit of a fraction of the purchase-money extension of time to deposit the balance was granted by this Court. It cannot therefore be said that on failure to deposit a minute fraction of the amount by the fixed date owing to wrong belief induced by Court officials the suit must be taken to have stood dismissed. No doubt this was so because of the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" but there is no reason why the same result should not follow on similar justifiable grounds." 18. On the second proposition, Shri C.B. Goel, learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent relied on a judgment in the case of Atam Parkash v. State of Haryana, 1986 SC 859 rendered by a Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench laid down that a right of pre-emption was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution in certain specified categories of persons. However, it saved the right of pre-emption in those cases where the decrees have become final and such decrees would be binding inter-parties. It further laid down by carving out exception that declaring the right of pre-emption in certain case as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution would not adversely effect those decrees which were binding inter-parties. Learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent placed strong reliance on the observations made in Para 14 which reads as under : "We are told that in some cases suits are pending in various Courts and, where decrees have been passed, appeals are pending in appellate Courts. Learned counsel for the decree holder-respondent placed strong reliance on the observations made in Para 14 which reads as under : "We are told that in some cases suits are pending in various Courts and, where decrees have been passed, appeals are pending in appellate Courts. Such suits and appeals will now be disposed of in accordance with the declaration granted by us. We are told that there are few cases where the suits have been decreed and the decrees have become final. No appeal having been filed against those decrees. The decrees will be binding inter parties and the declaration granted by us will of no avail to the parties." 19. These observations of the Constitution Bench protect the rights of the decree holder-respondents as decree in this case had attained finality. 20. The position of law is absolutely clear from the binding precedents noted in the preceding paras. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Johri Singhs case (supra) also relied upon earlier judgment rendered in Jang Singhs case (supra) and concluded that the executing Court/civil Court could extend time to make up deficiency in the deposit of pre-emption amount at the stage of execution of the pre-emption decree. When the pre-emption amount has been deposited in the Court then the time could be extended by the civil Court. It cannot be claimed that the civil Court has become functus officio or for its mistake the pre-emption decree could be defeated for want of deposit of small amount of Rs. 100/-. It is no bodys case that the decree holder did not have the capacity to pay that amount or had no intention to do so. Once the calculations have been made by the Court or at the instance of the Court by its officials then no fault can be found with the decree holder-respondent. 21. No other point has been argued. 22. In view of the reasons given above, I am of the considered view that the answer to the question which arises for consideration in the present revision has to be in affirmative and the revision petition merits dismissal. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. The records summoned be returned forthwith by the Registry. Petition dismissed.