Judgment Rajesh Balia, J.-The above appeal has been referred to a larger Bench by the Division Bench hearing aforesaid special appeal arising out of the Judgment of learned Single Judge dated 10th August, 1998. The appellant-petitioner has filed Writ Petition No. 1984/98 challenging the award passed by the Labour Court dt. 16.97 at the instance of the appellant-petitioner claiming himself to be an employee of Rajasthan State Electricity Board (for short ‘the Board’) as then existed. The following disputes were referred to the Labour Court for adjudication: qrhflag jktiwr lkfdu jkeiqjk Þ¼1½ D;k jkt- jkt; fo|r e.My }kjk muds vnZyh Jh bZojflag iq= Jh eksa ds ikl rS rglhy fljksgh tks fd e.My ds fljksgh vf /kdkfj;ksukr Fks] dk lsokdky fnukad 06-01-1985 ls qok yxkkrkj ugha ekuuk rFkk mls lgk;d vfHk;Urk ¼vks ,.M ,e½ jktLFkku jkT; fo|r e.My] fljksgh }kjk lsi`Fkd fd;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oS/k gS\ ;fn ugha rks Jh bZoj flag vnZyh fdl jkgr dk vf /kdkjh gS\ ¼2½ D;k Jh bZoj flaqfy;ksg dks jktLFkku jkT; fo|r e.My }kjk tSlk fd e.My ds vnZa dks nks o"kZ ls vf /kd lsokdky okyksa dks prqFkZ Js.kh ;k led{k in ij lek;ks ftr djus ds vknsk dk ykHk ugha fn;k tkuk mfpr ,oa oS/k gS\ ;fn ugha rks Jh bZoj flag fdl jkgr dk vf /kdkjh gS\ß (2). The aforesaid dispute had been raised and referred to the Labour Court, as a result of termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents w.e.f 19.5.89, and because of non-regularisation of petitioner’s services, to which he has laid claim before termination of his services. (3). The petitioner has claimed that he was appointed as an Orderly by the respondents in the first instance on 7.1.85 by the order of Executive Engineer, Sirohi (respondent No.2) for a period of three months to discharge duties at residence. This appointment continued uninterruptedly until his services were terminated by order dt. 19.5.89. During this period, quarterly appointment orders were issued from time to time by the such officer of the Board at whose residence he was required to discharge his duties. In this connection, after respondent No.2, has appointed him in the first instance, in 1985 and continued with him. Thereafter, his further appointment was renewed by the order of Assistant Engineer, Sirohi, vide his order dated 8.4.77 and that order was also continued from time to time by holder of that office. In this connection, after respondent No.2, has appointed him in the first instance, in 1985 and continued with him. Thereafter, his further appointment was renewed by the order of Assistant Engineer, Sirohi, vide his order dated 8.4.77 and that order was also continued from time to time by holder of that office. He was lastly working under R.K. Shah, Assistant Engineer, from 28.5.88. By order dated 19.5.89, his services were terminated. Throughout this period he was appointed on consolidated wages of Rs. 240/-per months in terms of the instruction ot the Board dt. 6.1.79. (4). According to the appellant-petitioner all appointment orders were made as an office order of the Board, by the officer holding the post from time to time and under whom he was to discharge duties as Orderly at his residence as per orders of the Board dt. 6.1.79, as part of additional facilities provided by the Board to its officers in the rank of Assistant Engineer and above as per term of their appointment. Payment of salary was being made to the petitioner directly from the Board, on the basis of Bill sanctioned by drawing officer who was not necessarily the appointing authority for the time being. He claimed that persons who were appointed along with the petitioner, they have been made permanent in the service as Class IV servant on completion of two years satisfactory service as Orderly. He too was entitled to be regularised on completion of two years continuous service as an Orderly. However, he has not been so regularised and was illegally deprived of the benefits of regular appointment in Class IV servant as other Orderly had been given. On raising demand for justice to be treated alike, his services have been terminated. Therefore, he alleged the termination of service as well a denial of regular status and deprivation of regular emoluments for such a long period was as a result of unfair labour practice. He also alleged that before terminating the services of the petitioner, neither compliance of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act was made, nor seniority list was published and therefore, the termination was invalid, being not in accordance with the provisions of Section 2SF and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act. (5). With the aforesaid allegations he asked for declaring the termination of services vide order dated 19.8.89 to be invalid and reinstatement with full back wages. (5). With the aforesaid allegations he asked for declaring the termination of services vide order dated 19.8.89 to be invalid and reinstatement with full back wages. He also asked for regularisation as class IV servant and consequential benefits. (6). The respondent No. 3 in his reply to claim before Labour Court admitted the successive employment since order of appointment dt. 6.1.85 by the Executive Engineer. However, it was asserted that claimant being appointed as an Orderly to discharge domestic work at home was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s), employed in connection with any industry. He also alleged that in view of definition of employer under Section 2(g), the Chief Executive of RSEB is the employer of the claimant and not the Assistant Engineer, but he has not been impleaded as party to dispute. He further stated that since there was no supervision or control of the Board, over the petitioner’s work, no relationship of master-servant existed between the Board and the claimant. (7). With these preliminary objections it was alleged by the then incumbent on the post of respondent No. 3 on merit of the claim that he was in employment only for the period between 28.5.88 to 8.5.89, under appointment from him which was less than one year, he was neither entitled to protection under Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act nor was he entitled to be regularised because he had not completed two years service. This plea obviously reflect, the respondent No. 3 was treating the petitioner to be his domestic servant, only with effect from the appointment given by him under order dt. 28.5.89 since he had assumed the office and issued order for deploying at his residence and was not treating the same in continuation of the earlier employment, which admittedly existed. With all these pleas on merit also he joined issue on two counts viz, that though termination of petitioner’s services does not come within the definition of retrenchment, he was informed by the office order No. 405 dt. 19.5.89 (o obtain retrenchment compensation, and in fact a Cheque dt. 20.5.89 for Rs. 120/-(15 days wages for one years continuous service) was sent to him, which he has refused to accept. 19.5.89 (o obtain retrenchment compensation, and in fact a Cheque dt. 20.5.89 for Rs. 120/-(15 days wages for one years continuous service) was sent to him, which he has refused to accept. Secondly his services have been terminated only because he has not completed two years services, therefore, he was not found eligible for regularisation and his services were terminated as per the orders of the Board. 20.5.89 for Rs. 120/-(15 days wages for one years continuous service) was sent to him, which he has refused to accept. Secondly his services have been terminated only because he has not completed two years services, therefore, he was not found eligible for regularisation and his services were terminated as per the orders of the Board. As these averments have important bearing on the question to be decided hereinafter, we reproduce the same: Þ¼1½ iSjk ,d ds lEcU/k esa dFku gS fd Jh bZojflag dks vf /kkklh vfHk;Urk ¼Vh Mh&11½ jk-jk-fo- e.My] ywukSq fljksgh ds vknsk la[;k 138 fnukad 06-01-1985 }kjk rhu ekg ds fy, ?kjsdj ¼vnZyh½ ds :i easfu;Dr fd;k x;k FkkA jk ds lEcU/k esk fo ¼2½ iSa ys[k gS fd izkFkhZ dks vknsk la[;k 48 fnukad 08-04-12987 }kjk lgk;d vfHk;Urk ¼xzfu½ jk-jk-fo- e.My fljksgh }kjk rhu ekg ds fy;s ?kjsqyw ¼vnZyh½ ds :i esa fu;Dr fd;k x;k Fkk rFkk vknsk r vizkFkhZ }kjk iw.kZ :is.k rnFkZ fu;fDr ij iz la- 821 fnukad 28-05-1988 }kjk izLrqqFke :i ls rhu ekg ds ywukSqfy, ?kjsdj ¼vnZyh½ ds :i easfu;Dr fd;k x;k Fkk rFkk fnukad 19-05-1989 dks fu;ekuqlkj vknsk la[;k 405 fnukad 19-05-1989 }kjk fjVªspesUV dEiulsku ysus gsrq lwfpr djrs gq, lsok ls i`Fkd fd;k x;k FkkA bl lEcU/k esa fuosqnu ;g gS fd jkt- jkT; fo|r e.My us 06-01-1979 ds vius vknsk }kjk e.My a dks ?kjsa #- 240@& izfr ekg ij vnZyh fu;Dr djus dh lqvf /kdkfj;ksyw uksdj ds :i esqfo/kk iznku dh gqbZ Fkh vkSj e.My ds vknsk fnukad 09-05-1989 }kjk ;g funsZk tkjh fd;s x;s fd ftu vnZfy;kas us 09-05-1989 dk yxkrkj nks o"kZ dh lsok iw.kZ dj yh gS mUgsa fu;fer lsok esa ysus gsrq lk{kkRdkj ;ksX; ekuk tk;s rFkk ftu a us fnukad 09-05-1989 dks yxkrkj ¼Continuously½ nks o"kZ dh lsvnZfy;ksok iw.kZ u dh gks mugsa /kkjk 25¼,Q½ ds rgy fjVªspesUV dEiulsku iznku djrs gq, lsok ls i`Fkd dj fn;k tk;A pw¡fd izkFkhZ] Jh bZoj flag dks fnukad 09-05-1989 dks vnZyh ds :i esa nks o"kZ iw.kZ ugh gq, Fks] vr% bUgsa fu;ekuqlkj lsok ls i`Fkd djuk vko;d gks x;k FkkA ¼3½ XX XX XX ¼4½ XX XX XX fd;k x;k vLohdkj gSA budh ls ¼5½ iSjk ik¡p dk dFku ftl izdkj of.kZok fnukad 09-05-1989 dks yxkkrkj nks o"kZ iw.kZ ugha gksus ds dkj.k fu;ekuqlkj lsok ls i`Fkd fd;k x;k FkkA ¼6½ XX XX XX ¼7½ iSjk lkr dFku vlR; gksus ds dkj.k vLohdkj gSA gkykafd izkFkhZ ij vkS|ks fxd fookn vf /kfu;e dh /kkjk 25¼,Q½ ykxw ugha gksrh fQj Hkh lsok ls i`Fkd djus ij bUgsa NaVuh eqvkotk jkf k ysus gsrq bl dk;kZy; ds vknsk la[;k 405 fnukad 19-05-1989 }kjk lwfpr dj fn;k x;k FkkA rFkk budk Hkqxrku jkf k dk fcy la- 34 fnukad 20-05-1989 #i;s 120-00 dk ikl dj bUgsa Hkqxrku ysus gsrq lwfpr dj fn;k x;k Fkk] fdUrq mUgksaus jkf k ysus ls bUdkj dj fn;kA a yxkrkj lsa ugha jgk gSaA ¼8½ iSjk vkB dk dFku vLohdkj gSA izkFkhZ vnZyh ds :i esok esj nks o"kZ dh yxkrkj lsok iw.kZ ugha djus ds dkj.k gh bUgsa e.My ds fu;ekuqlkj lk{kkRdkj ,oa fu;fer lsok ds ;ksX; ugha ekuk x;k gSA ¼9½ iSjk ukS ds kCn iSjk ¼v½ ls ¼g½ rd ds dFku vLohdkj gSA izkFkhZ dks e.My ds vknskkuqlkj gh lsok ls yxkrkj lsok iw.kZ ugha djus ds dkj.k i`Fkd fd;k x;k gSA iw.kZ fooj.k mijksDr tokc iSjk&1 ls 8 rd fn;k x;k gSAß (8). The Labour Court has rejected the claim of the petitioner solely on the ground that as he was appointed only as domestic help at the residence of AEN, he cannot be considered to be an employee of Board as per the decision of this Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Ashok Lal (1), decided on 29th January, 1992. (9). The learned Judge, labour Court also placed reliance on another decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in RSEB v. Judge, Labour Court & Anr. (2). (10). The order of Labour Court was challenged by way of writ petition as aforesaid. (11). Learned Single Judge after noticing the aforesaid finding reached by the Labour Court did not find any infirmity, illegality or error in the award and was of the opinion that evidence cannot be appreciated and the writ petition was dismissed. However, no discussion of issues arising out of claim finds place in the order, on merit of conclusion reached by the Tribunal. (12). When the matter was taken in appeal before the Division Bench, the Division Bench vide its order dt. 6.1.99 admitted the appeal recorded its disagreement with the view taken by the Division Bench in RSEB v. Ashok Lal (supra) and required that matter may be placed before the larger Bench for examining the correctness of the decision. This is how the matter is before us. (13). The petitioner contends the existence of relationship of master and employee is not dependent on what duty is required to be discharged by the person engaged but depends on whether a person engages another person under a Contract of employment, under which the employee agrees to serve the engagement subject to his control and supervision. (14). The employer has been defined under Section 2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act as under:- Section 2(g): “employer” means (i) in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf , or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department; (ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the Chief Executive Officer of the authority; (15). This definition is neither exhaustive nor inclusive. It defines only employer in relation to industries mentioned therein. This definition is neither exhaustive nor inclusive. It defines only employer in relation to industries mentioned therein. No attempt has been made to define the term employer generally. So also term ‘employment’ has not been defined in the Act anywhere. (16). Industry has been defined under Section 2(j) and workman has been defined under Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947. For the purposes of finding out that ‘employer-employee’ relationship exist between the workman with the industry at which he is working is relevant factor. The question has to be first viewed on first principle. (17). As seen from three definitions referred to above the definition of employer under the Act is not exhaustive but only illustrative. It only provides for determination of question as to who is treated to be employee in the case industry is carried out by the Central Government or by some local authority. Else expression ‘employer’ has to be given its ordinarily grammatical meaning. In its ordinary sense it means where a person is engaged to do something for another for remuneration. In that sense if a person is employed to do work for him, the person engaging him is employer, the person engaged is the employee, and if the work for which the employee is engaged can properly be termed as industry within the term as is understood, the employee shall be workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) if he discharges any function manually or mechanically as skilled or unskilled workman. (18). Any dispute then arising between such employer and employee relating to employment or non-employment becomes an industrial dispute, which may invite provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. These principles appear to us to be fairly well settled. (19). In Sukhnandan Thakur v. State of Rajasthan (3), Ahmad J. said: “One of the meanings of the word employment as given in Webster’s Dictionary is occupation, business; that which engages the head or hands as agricultural employment or mechanical employment. This clearly suggests that word employment refers to a condition in which a man is kept occupied in executing any work.” (20). Ramaswami J., as he then was, drew the distinction between ‘an appointment’ and ‘an employment’ in the manner ot appointment. According to him an appointment denoted an appointment to any office, under statutory terms. An employment on the other hand is contractual. (21). Ramaswami J., as he then was, drew the distinction between ‘an appointment’ and ‘an employment’ in the manner ot appointment. According to him an appointment denoted an appointment to any office, under statutory terms. An employment on the other hand is contractual. (21). In Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P. (4), the Supreme Court said: “The concept of employment involves three ingredients: (1) employer (2) employee and (3) the contract of employment. The employer is one who employs, i.e., one who engages the services of other persons. The employee is one who works for another for hire. The employment is the contract of service between the employer and the employee whereunder the employee agrees to serve the employer subject to his control and supervision.” (22). In Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharashtra (5), the Court reiterated the view expressed in Chintaman Rao’s case and added: “Employment brings in contract of service between the employer and employee”. (23). In the said case the Court found that though the Pandurag, the concerned person, was engaged in the process which falls within the meaning of Section 2(s) defining workman, he could not still be called a workman because it lacked relationship of service through a contract of service. It was a contract ofjob work only. (24). In fact existence of contract between the petitioner and the Board in terms of instruction dt. 21.79 was never denied. What was contended that since he was not to work at the premises of the Board but at residence of the officer under whom he was to work as Orderly, he was not employed in an industry. (25). Apart from existence of contract, another important and relevant consideration in determining the master-servant relationship is that in order to be a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s), the person must be employed in an industry. The term industry has been defined in Section 2(j), which has since been invited attention of many a debates, but for the present it stands settled by statement of law made in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa (6). (26). The Court laid emphasis that word “Industry” in Section 2(j) has a wide import. The term industry has been defined in Section 2(j), which has since been invited attention of many a debates, but for the present it stands settled by statement of law made in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa (6). (26). The Court laid emphasis that word “Industry” in Section 2(j) has a wide import. Where there is systematic activity, organished by co-operation between employer and employee the direct and substantial element is chimerical, for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large Scale, prasad or food, prima facie, there is an “industry” in that ‘enterprise. The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations. (27). It has now been re-stated by the Supreme Court on a reference by constitution Bench that Bangalore water case, correctly lays down the contours of terms industry and does not call for reconsideration. (28). In fact this has not been argued and perhaps about which there cannot be any dispute that the Board which is engaged in generation, and distribution of electricity is an industry and any person employed at it is a workman, if he otherwise fulfills the requirement of the term. It cannot also be doubted that if the master-servant relationship is established on the anvil of an employment under the contract at the industry owned by the Board, the petitioner discharged such manual duties, which shall bring him within the definition of workman, on the basis of duties discharged by him as an Orderly. (29). With this definition of the industry and the emphasis on employer employee relationship and the definition of the workman to include discharging of any duties skilled or unskilled, manual, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory, we may examine the question of exercise of control. We shall notice that there is great deal of departure from traditional view of meaning of control as power to direct how the servant should do his work. The emphasis has shifted upon the question of control. More often than not it is an important, in some cases is decisive factor yet not always so. This becomes, an all important factor where work is discharged at the premises of the employer. The emphasis has shifted upon the question of control. More often than not it is an important, in some cases is decisive factor yet not always so. This becomes, an all important factor where work is discharged at the premises of the employer. However, where a workman is employed to discharge duties incidental to the industry at distant place, obviously this factor cannot exist, in the sense that the worker does not directly receive his instruction what to do at the industrial premise. Moreover where, as in the present case, the employee is not a natural person but a juristic person, or where he is employed to work in subordination to one or more of its officers, the instructions are imparted by such officer under whom he works and at a place where he is to discharge his duties. In such case supervision and control of manner of discharging duty is of the employer through its officers under whom a person is engaged to discharge his duties. This charge in shift can be gathered with reference to some recent decisions. (30). In Short v. J&W Handerson Ltd. Lord Thankerton (7), recapitulated four indicia of contract of service resulting in master-servant relationship viz. (i) the master’s power of selection of his servant; (ii) payment of wages or other remuneration; (iii) the master’s right to control the method of doing work; and (iv) master’s right of suspension and dismissal. However, he reflected: “Modern industrial conditions have so much affected the freedom of the master in cases in which…………..it will be incumbent on this House to consider and to restate these indicias”. (31). In the language of Mocatta, J. in Whittaker v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance (8), “the test of control is, therefore, not as determinative as used to be thought to be the case, though no doubt, it is still of value in that the greater the degree of control exercisable by the employer, the more likely it is that the contract is one of service.” (32). In Argent v. Minister of Social Security (9), Roskill J. stated: “control is obviously an important factor. In some cases it may still be a decisive factor, but it is wrong to say that in every case it is the decisive factor. It is now, as I venture to think no more than a factor, albeit a very important one.” (33). In some cases it may still be a decisive factor, but it is wrong to say that in every case it is the decisive factor. It is now, as I venture to think no more than a factor, albeit a very important one.” (33). At home in V.P. Gopala Rao v. Public Prosecutor (10), Bachawat, J. said that whether the relationship of master and servant exists between the management and the workman there is no abstract a ‘priori test’ of the work control required for establishing the contract of service. The Court also expressed that nature and method of control varies from industry to industry. In coming to this conclusion that Court relied on ratio laid by Lord Thankerton in Short v. J.W Henderson Ltd. (supra) and Birdhichand Sharma v. First Civil Judge (11). It was a case arising under Factories Act. (34). The view expressed by Mathew, . in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Inspector of Shops and Establishments (12), spells out deviations in the approach to the traditional view of the test of control as part of determining the master-employee relationship. He said by referring to Roskill, J.’s view in Argent’s case (supra): “During the last two decades the emphasis in the field that shifted and no longer rest so strongly upon the question of control. Control is obviously an important factor and in many cases it may still be the decisive factor. But it is wrong to say that in every case it is decisive. It is now no more than a factor, although an important one,” (35). In Silver Jubilee Tailoring House’s case it was made clear that in interpreting ‘control’ in modern time as meaning the power to direct how the servant should do his work, the Court has been applying a concept suited to a past age and may not provide a true test in all cases. He said: “It is exceedingly doubtful today whether the search for a formula in the nature of a single test to tell a ‘contract of service’ from a ‘contract for services’ will serve any useful purpose. The most, that profitably’ can be done, is to examine all the factors that have been referred to in the cases on the topic. Clearly, not all of these factors would be relevant in all these cases or have the same weight in all cases. The most, that profitably’ can be done, is to examine all the factors that have been referred to in the cases on the topic. Clearly, not all of these factors would be relevant in all these cases or have the same weight in all cases. It is equally clear that no magic formula can be propounded which factors should in any case be treated as determining ones. The plain fact is that in a large number of cases, the Court can only perform a balancing operation weighting up the factors which point in one direction and balancing them against those pointing in the opposite direction”. (36). The Court further held that right to remove a person from his engagement is sufficient evidence of control and supervision by the person having such right. It was said: “The further fact that “a worker can be removed” which means nothing more than that the employer has the liberty not to give further work to an employee who has not performed his job according to the instructions of the employer, or who has been absent from the shop for a long time as spoken to by the Inspector of Labour in his evidence, would be speak of control and supervision consistent with the charter of the business.” (37). The above principle of right to remove to be a manifestation of control was reiterated by Desai, j. in Shining Tailors v. Industrial Tribunal (13) wherein he observed: “right of removal of the workmen or not to give work has the element of control and supervision.” (38). While considering the different test for determining the question about existence of master-servant relationship, we are also tempted to refer in Atiyah’s book -Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts: “The most that can profitably be done is to examine all the possible factors which have been referred to in these case as bearing on the nature of the relationship between the parties concerned. Clearly not all of these factors will be relevant in all cases, or have the same weight in all cases. Clearly not all of these factors will be relevant in all cases, or have the same weight in all cases. Equally clearly no magic formula can be propounded for determining which factors should, in any given case, be treated as the determining ones, the plain fact is that in a large number of cases the Court can only perform a balancing operation, weighing up the factors which point in one direction and balancing them against those pointing in the opposite direction. In the nature of things it is not to be expected that this operation can be performed with SC ientific accuracy” (39). It is also relevant to consider in the context of an industrial dispute under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 that a workman means a person employed in an industry. In this connection we notice that the principle is well settled on high authority of Supreme Court that the expression ‘employed in any industry’ would take in also the employees who are employed in connection with operations incidental to the main industry. In the context of case at hand the question arises. Can person employed al residential Bungalow of officers as per terms and conditions of employment of such officer has held as persons employed in the industry so as to establish master-servant relationship on the test of ‘person employed in an industry’? The question has been answered in positive by the Apex Court. (40). In J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India (14), Gajendragadkar speaking for the Court said:- “In this connection, it is hardly necessary to emphasis that in the modern world industrial operations have become complex and complicated and tor the efficient and successful functioning of any industry, several incidental operations are called in aid and it is the totality of all these operations and ultimately constitutes the industry as a. whole. Wherever it is shown that the industry has employed an employee to assist one or the other operation incidental to the main industrial operation, it would be unreasonable to deny such an employee the status of a workman on the ground that his work is not directly concerned with the main work or operation of the industry. Wherever it is shown that the industry has employed an employee to assist one or the other operation incidental to the main industrial operation, it would be unreasonable to deny such an employee the status of a workman on the ground that his work is not directly concerned with the main work or operation of the industry. While we are dealing with this point, it is necessary to bear in mind that the bungalow are owned by the appellant and they are allotted to the officers as required by the terms and conditions of the officers’ employment. Since the bungalows are allotted to the officers, it is the duty of the appellant to look after the bungalows and take care of the gardens attached to them. If the terms and conditions of service require that the officers should be given bungalows and gardens are attached to such bungalows, it is difficult to see why in the case of Malis who are employed by the appellant, are paid by it, and who work subject to its control and supervision and discharge the function of looking after the appellant’s property, it should be said that the work done by them has no relation with the industry carried on by the appellant. The employment is by the appellant, the conditions of service are determined by the appellant, the payment is substantially made by the appellant, the continuance of service depends upon the pleasure of the appellant, subject, of course, to the Standing Orders prescribed in that behalf , and the work assigned to the malis is the work of looking after the properties which have been allotted to the officers of the appellant the Malis who look after the gardens must, therefore, be held to be engaged in operations which are incidentally connected with the main industry carried on by the employer”. (41). This case is nearer home. The worker employed to look after the gardens at the residential bungalows of officers of the Co., as per the requirement of terms of employment of Officer were held to be employed in industry as an activity incidental thereto. (42). This was followed in Ahmedabad MFg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ramtahel Ramanand (15). This was a case of engagement of coolies to look after gardens, large part of which formed part of the residential quarters of the officers of the Co. (43). (42). This was followed in Ahmedabad MFg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ramtahel Ramanand (15). This was a case of engagement of coolies to look after gardens, large part of which formed part of the residential quarters of the officers of the Co. (43). Likewise it is to be seen from the definition of workman that it refers to a person who has been employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward. It makes no distinction that where a person has been employed by owner of the industry to do work for him it must necessarily mean worker engaged in principal work of the industry and the workers employed for doing incidental services attached to the industry shall not be considered as a workman, on the ground that the workman was not actually engaged in the production, manufacture or distribution of electricity at any of the business premises of the Board, he cannot be excluded from being considered an employee of the Board, if otherwise he has been employed by the authority of the Board for its purposes. (44). As a matter of fact, the purport of finding reached by the Labour Court is that because the petitioner has not been engaged for the principal work of the industry, he is not an employee of the industry. This reason obviously erroneous on principle. (45). From the aforesaid discussion, we can safely deduce that in order to determine whether the master and employee relationship existed between two persons, the factors required to be seen are (i) relationship of employee and servant is constituted by contract expressly or impliedly between the employer and employee. The said contract involves that there is an employer who engages service of the other person, (ii) the other person wants to work for another for hire, (iii) the remuneration is paid by the person who engages the person engaged in consideration of service rendered, (iv) such engagement is subject to control and supervision of the employer.