K. M. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) LAKHTARIYA Premjibhai Narsinhbhai, petitioner has filed this petition challenging the order dated 9. 3. 1999 passed by Ministry of Labour, Government of india. The Government of India by the said letter considered the report of Conciliation officer and opined that the Central Government is of the opinion that the dispute between petitioner-workman and IOC - respondent No. 2 is not for adjudication - industrial machinery on the ground:"there is no employer employee relationship between the workman and the IOC ltd. and hence no dispute". ( 2 ) THE present petition has been filed on 14th November, 2000, which has been placed for hearing before me on 2nd November, 2001. ( 3 ) LOOKING to the importance of the matter, I have requested Mr. D. N. Patel, learned Senior Standing Counsel for Central Government to appear on behalf of Union of India and also requested Mr. Manish Bhatt, learned Advocate who normally appear on behalf of IOC. Both the learned Counsels have readily agreed to appear. Learned advocate for the petitioner as well as learned advocate for the respondents have addressed me at length and, therefore, I am deciding this petition accordingly. ( 4 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition are as under : 4. 1 The petitioner was serving with the respondent No. 2-Indian Oil Corporation ltd. (hereinafter referred to as IOC) since many years. The petitioner was working in salaya Mathura Pipeline Project. The petitioner was working in the said project under the supervision and control of Senior Operation Manager of the Salaya Mathura pipeline Project. It appears that the services of the petitioner was orally terminated on 1. 7. 1997. 4. 2 It was the contention of the petitioner that petitioner had completed 240 days of continuous days and the services of the petitioner terminated orally without issuing notice under Sees. 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)- 4. 3 The petitioner raised an industrial dispute and made an application to the assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) informing him about an existing industrial dispute and further requesting him to intervene and start conciliation proceedings. The said representation was made somewhere in January, 1998. 4. 4 The respondent No. 2 also filed a reply in the said application. 3 The petitioner raised an industrial dispute and made an application to the assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) informing him about an existing industrial dispute and further requesting him to intervene and start conciliation proceedings. The said representation was made somewhere in January, 1998. 4. 4 The respondent No. 2 also filed a reply in the said application. In the said application it was stated that there was no relationship of master and servant between petitioner and respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the said application is misconceived and not maintainable. It was stated that earlier petitioner had already filed two applications dated 11. 3. 1997 against respondent No. 2 before the Labour Court Ahmedabad and in that application it was prayed for interim relief. The said application was rejected on 12th March, 1997. 4. 5 It was further stated that petitioner was never engaged by respondent No. 2 and relationship of master and servant does not exists between respondent No. 2 and petitioner. All other contentions were denied by respondent No. 2 in this behalf. 4. 6 The Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ahmedabad, by its communication dated 25th May, 1998, addressed to the Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, and report of the failure of the conciliation proceedings between petitioner and respondent No. 2 and stated that every efforts have been made to bring about an amicable settlement between the parties but both the parties remained stuck to their respective claim and no settlement could be arrived at during conciliation. After the said report was sent to labour Commissioner, the Labour Commissioner by its communication dated 9. 3. 1999 which I have referred earlier that there is no employer employee relationship between the workman and the IOC Ltd.-respondent No. 2 and hence, no dispute. ( 5 ) MR. A. H. Shah, learned Advocate for the petitioner has raised various contentions in this behalf. However, before I consider his contention let me set out relevant sections in this behalf. Section 2 (g) provide definition of employer. Section 2 (k) provides definition of industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any persons (in relation to the nature of work carried out by Central Government authority prescribed under the Act ). Section 2 (s) provides definition of workman: "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person". Chapter 3 provides reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals under which Sec. 10 provides reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals:"section 10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing, (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication". Section 12 provides duties of Conciliation Officers:" (1) Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under sec. 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. (2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. (2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. (3) If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government (or an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government) together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. (4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances, relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at. (5) If, on a consideration of the report referred to in Sub- sec. (4), the appropriate government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, (Labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal) it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor". ( 6 ) LEARNED advocate for the petitioner submitted that the issue is that whether direct relationship of master and servant is exists or not is a disputed question of facts and law and cannot be fully adjudicated by the appropriate Government. It was submitted that appropriate Government while reference to adjudication of the Labour Court on the ground that there was no direct relationship of employer - employee between the respondent No. 2 Corporation and the petitioner has attempted to adjudicate the dispute itself on merits and thereby has usurped the power of the Tribunal which is impossible under the Act. 6. 1 Similarly the learned advocate for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists and ors. 6. 1 Similarly the learned advocate for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists and ors. vs. State of Bombay and Anr. , reported in 1964 (1) LLJ 351 particularly on page 355 it has been observed as under:"besides, in dealing with this contention, it is necessary to remember that in entertaining an application for a writ of mandamus against an order made by the appropriate Government under Sec. 10 (1) read with Sec. 12 (5), the Court is not sitting in appeal over the order and is not entitled to consider the propriety or the satisfactory character of the reasons given by the said Government. It would be idle to suggest that in giving reasons to a party for refusing to make a reference under Sec. 12 (5), the appropriate Government has to write an elaborate order indicating exhaustively all the reasons that weighed in its mind in refusing to make a reference. It is no doubt desirable that the party concerned should be told clearly and precisely the reasons why no reference is made, because the object of sec. 12 (5) appears to be require the appropriate Government to State its reasons for refusing to make a reference, so that the reasons should stand public scrutiny; but that does not mean that a party challenging the validity of the Governments decision not to make a reference can require the Court in writ proceedings to examine the propriety or correctness of the said reasons". 6. 2 Learned advocate for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment of the honble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Avtar Sharma and Anr. vs. State of haryana and Anr. , reported in 1985 (2) LLJ 187 particularly Paras 4 and 6 the Honble supreme Court has observed as under:"para 4. The view that while exercising power under Sec. 10 (1), the Government performs administrative function can be supported by an alternative line of reasoning. Assuming that making or refusing to make a reference under Sec. 10 (1) is a quasi-judicial function, there is bound to be a conflict of jurisdiction if the reference is ultimately made. A quasi- judicial function is to some extent an adjudicatory function is a lis between two contending parties. Assuming that making or refusing to make a reference under Sec. 10 (1) is a quasi-judicial function, there is bound to be a conflict of jurisdiction if the reference is ultimately made. A quasi- judicial function is to some extent an adjudicatory function is a lis between two contending parties. The Government as an umpire, assuming that it is performing a quasi-judicial function when it proceeds to make a reference, would imply that the quasi- judicial determination of lis prima facie shows that one who raised the dispute has established merits of the dispute. The inference necessarily follows from the assumption that the function performed under Sec. 10 (1) is a quasi-judicial function. Now by exercising power under Sec. 10, a reference is made to a Tribunal for adjudication and the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that there was no merit in the dispute". "para 6. Now if the Government performs an administrative Act while either making or refusing to make a reference under Sec. 10 (1), it cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of lis. That would certainly be in excess of the power conferred by Sec. 10. Section 10 requires the appropriate Government to be satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This may permit the appropriate Government to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons not for justice or industrial peace and harmony. Every administrative determination must be based on grounds relevant and germane to the exercise of power. If the administrative determination is based on the irrelevant, extraneous or grounds not germane to the exercise of power it is liable to be questioned in exercise of the power of judicial review". 6. 3 Learned advocate further submitted that the aforesaid order of Ministry of labour is contrary to and inconsistent with the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and Anr. vs. State of Bihar and ors. , reported in 1989 (2) LLJ 558 in para 14 the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under:"applying the principle laid down by this Court in the above decision, there can be no doubt that the Government was not justified in deciding the dispute. vs. State of Bihar and ors. , reported in 1989 (2) LLJ 558 in para 14 the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under:"applying the principle laid down by this Court in the above decision, there can be no doubt that the Government was not justified in deciding the dispute. Where, as in the instant case, the dispute is whether the persons raising the dispute are workmen or not, the same cannot be decided by the Government in exercise of its administrative function under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act. As has been held in M. P. Irrigation Karamchari Sanghs case (Supra), there may be exceptional cases in which the State Government may, on a proper examination of the demand, come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference. Further, the Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to declining reference and Courts will always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the Tribunal for adjudication of valid disputes, and to allow the government to do so would be to render Sec. 10 and Sec. 12 (5) of Act nugatory". 6. 4 The learned counsel has also relied upon another judgment of the Honble supreme Court in the case of Abad Dairy Dudh Vitran Kendra Sanchalak Mandal vs. Abad Dairy and Ors. , reported in 1999-SCC (Lands) 1079 wherein Para 5 on page 1080 it has been observed as under:"we are of the opinion that neither a writ proceeding in the High Court nor an appeal under Art. 136 is the proper forum in which these factual contentions and allegations should be gone into. The High Court itself has observed at various place in its judgment that the nature of the dispute between the parties and the facts and circumstances were such that a writ petition was not the appropriate forum to enter into such facts but seems to have allowed itself to be persuaded to go into the question perhaps because the counsel on both sides were not averse to that course. We however think that the High Court should not have done this but, instead, should have directed the Government to refer the disputes between the parties to an Industrial Tribunal, making the issue of the jurisdictional fact, viz. We however think that the High Court should not have done this but, instead, should have directed the Government to refer the disputes between the parties to an Industrial Tribunal, making the issue of the jurisdictional fact, viz. , as to "whether the appellants are workmen?" also one of the terms of reference. We say this because though there are agreements between the parties, not only is the interpretation of the agreements a matter of dispute, it will also be necessary to consider whether the agreement reflects the real position or whether the conduct of the parties and other material placed on record show that the appellants were employees as suggested by the appellants and not commission agents as suggested on behalf of the respondents. Also, the only ground on which the State Government declined to make a reference was that the appellants were not workmen. This view is not so obvious or patent on the facts before us. In the circumstances, we think the best course is to set aside the order of the high Court and direct that the matter be gone into by an Industrial Tribunal after the Government has made an appropriate order. We, therefore, allow to refer to an Industrial Tribunal all the disputes between the parties including the preliminary question whether the appellants are workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act or not". 6. 4. A. Learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of this Court in the case of Hardesh Kumar Rajaram vs. K. V. B. Unni and Ors. , reported in 2000 (3) GLH 196. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that in that case the learned Single judge of this Court has considered other judgments of the Honble Supreme Court including the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Telco Convoy drivers Mazdoor Sangh and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. , AIR 1989 SC 1565 and also the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Indian Tea association vs. Ajitkumar Barat, reported in 2000 (1) Scale page 515 = (2000) 3 SCC 93 which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for he respondent and after referring these two decisions the learned Single Judge of this Court in Para 6 of his judgment has observed as under:"6. 1 have considered the submission of both the learned advocates and also the decisions cited by both the learned advocates. The facts of the present case are that the order dated 16. 4. 1998 under Sec. 12 Sub-clause (5) of ID Act has been challenged wherein the reason given by the Ministry of Labour for not referring the matter for adjudication while exercising the power under Sec. 10 Sub-clause (1) of he ID Act, 1947 was that the petitioner workman has not put more than 240 days of continuous service during the 12 months period which is a clear conclusion on merits and not having any prima facie opinion to he subject matter of the dispute. Whether the workman has completed 240 days continuous service or not is a question of fact requiring oral and documentary evidence and to be proved by the workman concerned before the Labour Court. Therefore, if the order of appropriate Government is considered to be an administrative order then the appropriate Government should not decide the lis between the parties which converts the administrative order into quasi judicial or judicial order and which is beyond the function of the appropriate Government while exercising the powers under Sec. 10 of the ID Act, 1947". He submitted that in view of this decision, the petition requires to be admitted and interim relief to be granted. Contention of learned counsel for respondent IOC Mr. M. R. Bhatt ( 7 ) ON the other hand Mr. M. R. Bhatt, learned Advocate for the respondent has relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Indian tea Association vs. Ajit Kumar Barat and Ors. , reported in (2000) 3 SCC 93 relevant paragraphs 7, 10, 11, 14 and 19 the Honble Supreme Court has laid down the law as under: 7. 1 "para 7. The law on the point may briefly be summarised as follows: 7. 2 (1) The appropriate Government would not be justified in making a reference under Sec. 10 of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and if such a reference is made it is desirable wherever possible, for the Government to indicate the nature of dispute in the order of reference. 7. 7. 3 (2) The order of the appropriate Government making a reference under Sec. 10 of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-judicial one and the Court, therefore, cannot canvass the order of the reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial order. 7. 4 (3) An order made by the appropriate Government under Sec. 10 of the Act being an administrative order no lis is involved, as such an order is made on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. 7. 5 (4) If it appears from the reasons given that the appropriate Government took into account any consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the Court may in a given case consider the case for a writ of mandamus. 7. 6 (5) It would, however, be open to a party to show that what was referred by the government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act". 7. 7 (Para 10 ). Before making a reference under Sec. 10 of the Act the appropriate government has to form an opinion whether an employee is a workman and thereafter has to consider as to whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". 7. 8 (Para 11 ). In the present appeal we find that the State Government rightly approached the question whether Respondent was a workman. Unless this condition is satisfied on reference can be made". 7. 9 (Para 14 ). Respondent 1 has not been able to show that while passing the above administrative order, the State Government took into consideration any irrelevant or foreign matter. We, therefore, hold that the above administrative order was passed by the State Government after taking into consideration the material available on record and it could not be faulted". 7. 10 (Para 19 ). For the reasons stated above we hold that both the appellate Court and the learned Single Judge of the High Court erred in law in issuing a mandamus directing the State Government to make an appropriate reference, therefore, the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in Writ Petition No. 155 of 1998 and the judgment of the appellate Court are hereby set aside". 7. 7. 11 He has also relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of N. D. D. B. Employees Union vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. , reported in 1991 (1) GLR 410 . The Division Bench of this Court (Coram: M. B. Shah, J. (as he was then) and V. H. Bhairavia, J. in para 12 on page 418 and Para 15 on page 420 observed as under:"para 12. From the aforesaid various judgments, it can be said that under Sec. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Government or the concerned authority can prima facie, decide from the evidence whether the person raising the industrial dispute is a workman within the definition of Sec. 2 (s) of the industrial Disputes Act. Consideration of prima facie evidence would not empower the State Government to adjudicate the dispute of law or facts and decide it finally. But from the record, if it is apparent without any detailed investigation that the person raising the industrial dispute is not a workman as defined under Sec. 2 (s) of the Act, then the Government is entitled not to make reference by assigning reasons for doing so as provided under Sec. 12 (5) of the industrial Disputes Act". 7. 12 ("para 15) In our view, these question are not required to be dealt with at this stage because the Deputy Labour Commissioner has not assigned any specific reasons for arriving at the conclusion as provided under Sec. 12 (5) of the l. D act that the persons are not the workmen of the respondent No. 3. Therefore, in any set of circumstances, considering the controversy between the parties, in our view, this would nbt be a fit case the for this Court to straightway refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal as it is sought to be contended by the petitioner. Hence, the order passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Annexure d is required to be quashed and set aside. The State Government is required to pass appropriate order in conformity with the provisions of Sec. 12 (5) and Sec. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, the order passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Annexure d is required to be quashed and set aside. The State Government is required to pass appropriate order in conformity with the provisions of Sec. 12 (5) and Sec. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. While deciding the question, the jurisdiction of the State Government, as stated above, would be only limited to find out prima facie from the evidence on the record whether the persons mentioned in annexure a are workmen as defined under Sec. 2 (s) of the l. D. Act. It would also be open to decide prima facie whether the relationship of employer and employee exists between the respondent No. 3 and the employees without finally adjudicating the dispute either on facts or law. It may consider prima facie the merits of the dispute and take into account other relevant considerations, which would help it to decide whether making a reference would expedient or not". 7. 13 Mr. Bhatt and Mr. Patel, both the learned Counsels for the respondents stated that the aforesaid judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in Ajitkumars case (Supra) and the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in N. D. D. Bs case (Supra) clearly decide the point in favour of the respondents and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the order of the Central Government in this behalf. ( 8 ) THE learned advocate for the respondent No. 1 stated that the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Barat, (Supra) and the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of NDDB Employees Union, (Supra) are binding on this Court and this Court must dismiss the petition in limine. 8. 1 Mr. Bhatt, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 further submitted that in the facts of Hardesh Kumar Rajaram, (Supra) if one read Para 2 of the judgment in the case of Hardesh Kumar, (Supra) it is clear that in that case the petitioner has challenged the termination order by raising an industrial dispute under the provisions of the Act. The challenge of the petitioner was that the termination was violative of Secs. 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. On the basis of the dispute raised by the petitioner, the conciliation proceedings were initiated and ultimately failure report was submitted by the conciliation officer on 25. 2. The challenge of the petitioner was that the termination was violative of Secs. 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. On the basis of the dispute raised by the petitioner, the conciliation proceedings were initiated and ultimately failure report was submitted by the conciliation officer on 25. 2. 1998 and after receipt of the same from the conciliation officer, the Ministry of Labour has examined the said dispute on 16. 4. 1998 and came to the conclusion that the Ministry does not consider this dispute fit for the following reasons. The reasons given by the Ministry are that; that is found that the workman has not put in more than 240 days of service during the 12 months period prior to his alleged termination and as such cannot claim any protection under the ID Act. The petitioner in that case has also requested to the Assistant Labor Commissioner, Adipur by his application for reconsideration dated 21. 11. 1998 wherein the certificate of completion of more than 240 days during 12 months in service was produced before the assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Adipur. Inspite of that, the case of the petitioner has not been considered, after the decision dated 16. 4. 1998 and, therefore, the present petition has been filed. In that context, after considering the facts of the case in para 6 this Court in Hardesh Kumar, case (Supra) has observed that in that case the reason given by the Ministry of Labour for not referring the matter of adjudication while exercising the power under Sec. 10 Sub-clause (1) of the ID Act, 1947 was that the petitioner workman has not put more than 240 days of continuous service during the 12 months period which is a clear conclusion on merits and not having any prima facie opinion to the subject matter of the dispute. This Court has further observed that whether the workman has completed 240 days continuous service or not is a question of fact requiring oral and documentary evidence and to be proved by the workman concerned before the Labour Court. In view of that peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court has further observed that on such decisions on merits, the appropriate Government have no power to consider the facts and to decide the same while referring the matter under Sec. 10 of the Act. In view of that peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court has further observed that on such decisions on merits, the appropriate Government have no power to consider the facts and to decide the same while referring the matter under Sec. 10 of the Act. In view of the same this Court observed that if order of appropriate Government is considered to be an administrative order then the appropriate Government should not decide the Us between the parties which converts the administrative order into quasi-judicial or judicial and which is beyond the function of appropriate Government while exercising the powers under Sec. 10 of the ID Act. ( 9 ) THE learned advocate for the respondents, therefore, submitted that the judgment of this Court in Hardesh Kumar, (Supra) is clearly distinguishable on the facts of the case and, therefore, that judgment may not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. In this case the Government has only stated that there is no employer-employee relationship between the workman and the IOC and hence no employer-employee dispute exists. The learned advocate for the respondents referred to the relevant section of the said Act particularly Sec. 2 (g) of the Act which defines "employer" and Sec. 2 (k) defines "industrial dispute". Learned advocate for the respondents submitted that the definition of Sec. 2 (k) means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. Section 10 provides reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. Section 10 further provides that where the appropriate Government is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time pass an order in writing. So an industrial dispute must exist or apprehended between the employer and employee. This is a jurisdictional fact and here the Government has only stated about the question of fact. The Government has also stated as to whether the employee is a workman or not as per the definition of the ID Act. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel further contended that before the Division Bench, i. e. , nddb- (199l) 1 GLR 140 said adjudication was not there and, therefore, this Court had remanded the matter. The Government has also stated as to whether the employee is a workman or not as per the definition of the ID Act. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel further contended that before the Division Bench, i. e. , nddb- (199l) 1 GLR 140 said adjudication was not there and, therefore, this Court had remanded the matter. However, in Para 12 the Court has held that if there is no such relationship of employer-employee exists or there is no industrial dispute exists, then the Government is entitled not to make a reference by assigning reasons for doing so as provided under Sec. 12 (5) of the I. D. Act. The Government has passed the order as per sec. 12 (5) of the Act after considering the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act which is clearly in consonance with judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. The decision is also inconsonance with the principles laid down by the Honble Supreme court in the case of Ajit Kumar Barat, (Supra ). 10. 1 Learned advocate for the respondent further submitted that the Government did not consider any irrelevant or foreign material and, therefore, there is no question of issuing any writ of mandamus in this case. As per Para 10 of the judgment in the case of Ajit Kumar Barat, (Supra) the appropriate Government has to form an opinion whether an employee is a workman and thereafter has to consider as to whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The Central Government has considered these two aspect and, therefore, the order of the Central Government is completely in consonance with the case of Ajit Kumar, (Supra) and, therefore, also this Court may not interfere with the order of the Central Government and the petition may be dismissed. ( 11 ) I have given my anxious consideration to all the aspects involved in this case. I have also considered the provisions of the Act which I have referred to earlier. I have also considered the judgments of Telco Convey Drivers Mazdoor Sangh, Hardesh kumar Rajaram, Ram Avtar Sharma, Bombay Union of Journalists, Abad Dairy Dudh vitran Kendra and Ajit Kumar Barat, (All Supra) and the judgment of the Division bench in the case of NDDB Employees and also the judgment of this Court in Hardesh kumar Rajaram, (Supra) which has been heavily relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner. ( 12 ) IN my view the order of the Central Government is completely in consonance with the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar barat, (Supra) and the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of nddb, (Supra ). In my view the judgment of this Court in Hardesh Kumar, (Supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts of the case and said decision is based on the peculiar facts of that case. I do not see any infirmity in the reasoning of the Central government. The Central Government has not considered any irrelevant or foreign material and, therefore, in my view the petition is required to be dismissed. Accordingly the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. ( 13 ) IT has been submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the petition is required to be dismissed on the ground of delay. Since I have dismissed the petition on merits, I have not considered the said ground in this behalf. .