Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (to be called as code only ). ( 2. ) MANSHA Ram (R-l ). on 30-9-77 filed a suit for declaration that sale-deed dated 27-6-73 was sham and fictitious, for confirmation of his possession and for permanent injunction. Admittedly the appellant is a moneylender. A sale-deed was executed by Mansha Ram (R-l) for 1. 5 acre of land out of Khasra No. 207, area 3. 404 hectare (8. 48 acres) for a consideration of Rs. 3000/ -. Name of appellant was mutated in revenue papers. Mansha Ram (R-l) has claimed that he was in dire necessity of money to pay loans of other money-lenders and for purchase of a bullock. On his approach to the appellant he demanded interest at the rate of 25% per annum and directed him to execute a sale-deed as a collateral security for the loan. He has repaid Rs. 2000a in Jeth 1976. In Vaisakh 1977 when he went to repay the remaining amount of Rs. 1000/- the appellant demanded Rs. 11000/ -. According to him the value of suit land was Rs. 25000/- and there was no question of selling the same for just Rs. 3000/ -. On the other hand the appellant has claimed that he had actually purchase the land and got possession of the same. ( 3. ) THE case of respondents did not find favour with the Trial Court. The suit was dismissed with the holding that it was not a loan transaction. Neither Rs. 2000/- was repaid nor the sale-deed was sham and fictitious. However, learned First Appellate Court did not agree with the Trial Court and held that sale-deed was sham and fictitious and was written merely as a collateral security for the loan and ordered Mansha Ram (R-1) to repay Rs. 1000/- with interest @ 1% per month. A decree for declaration that sale-deed did not create any title in the appellant, with a permanent injunction against interference in his possession was also granted in favour of Mansha Ram (R-1 ). ( 4. ) HERE in second appeal, on 6-3-90 following substantial questions of law were framed : " (i) Whether admission of the plaintiff about defendant No. 1s possession over the suit land in Ex. ( 4. ) HERE in second appeal, on 6-3-90 following substantial questions of law were framed : " (i) Whether admission of the plaintiff about defendant No. 1s possession over the suit land in Ex. P-1 could be ignored and contrary findings can be arrived at by the learned Lower Appellate Court ? (ii) Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court on the facts and circumstances of the case was justified in holding the sale transaction dated 27-6-73 as sham document and money-lending transaction ? (iii) Whether findings arrived at by the learned Lower Appellate Court about alleged repayment of Rs. 2,000/- by the plaintiff to defendant No. 1 are perverse ?" As all the three questions framed above are inter-linked and inter-related, they are being considered together. ( 5. ) IT is well settled that oral evidence is admissible under Section 92 (1) of the Evidence Act to prove that a document though executed was a sham document. In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal ( AIR 2000 SC 426 ) at page 431, the decision in Gangabai v. Chhabubai [ (1982) 1 SCC 4 : ( AIR 1982 SC 20 )] was relied for the proposition that it is permissible for a party to a deed to contend that deed was not intended to be acted upon but was only a sham document. The bar arises only when the document is relied upon and its terms are sought to be varied and contradicted D. A. Desai, J. , was quoted : "the bar imposed by Section 92 (1) applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction and not, when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose, oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. " ( 6. For that purpose, oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. " ( 6. ) THIS Court has also consistently held the same view in Lekhraj v. Sardar Sawan Singh [ 1971 JLJ 545 = AIR 1971 MP 172 (DB)], Mandas v. Manbai [ 1972 JLJ 632 (DB)], Kodu Satnami v. Ramdayal [1986 (1) MPWN 114], Babu Khan v. Mahila Narayan Devi [1993 (1) Vidhi Bhasvar 93]. ( 7. ) HOWEVER, certainly execution of a registered document is a solemn affair and the party who alleges that he did not do what otherwise appears to have been done by him has to prove such allegation. Necessarily burden to prove such an allegation lies on the plaintiff. Subhra Mukherjee v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. ( AIR 2000 SC 1203 ). Thus, evidence led by the parties have to be scanned and appreciated for seeing whether such an allegation was established. ( 8. ) MANSHA Ram (P. W. 1) in his statement had claimed that he had to repay the loan of bank. However, in plaint he had claimed that he had to repay the loan taken from money-lenders. Neither any document of such loan from bank of money-lenders was filed nor any money-lender was examined to show existence of any such debt. He had claimed that the appellant had demanded interest @ 25% per annum. However, he had merely claimed that he had paid Rs. 2000/- at one time and tendered Rs. 1000/- thereafter. There is neither any pleading nor proof that he ever tried to pay any interest to the appellant. Evidence regarding repayment of Rs. 2000/- by him to the appellant has been most shaky and infirm. Mansha Ram (P. W. 1) in para 4 claimed that he had paid Rs. 2000/- at the house of appellant. He does not say that Shobharam (P. W. 3) had gone with him. However, Shobharam (P. W. 3) arrogates himself to be a witness of such repayment. Both of them have admitted that no acknowledgment of receipt was taken from the appellant. . It is noteworthy that no attempt to get the payment entered in the account books of the appellant was made. However, Shobharam (P. W. 3) arrogates himself to be a witness of such repayment. Both of them have admitted that no acknowledgment of receipt was taken from the appellant. . It is noteworthy that no attempt to get the payment entered in the account books of the appellant was made. Mansha Ram (P. W. 1) claims in para 4 that he had gone with Kattha Gujar to the appellant for account. Thereupon appellant told him that he would come to the village in two or four days but he did not come to the village thereafter. However, Kattha Gujar has not been examined to support the assertion. In para 5 he claims that the appellant had come with Revenue Inspector for measurement. In para 6 he claims that thereafter when he approached the appellant he demanded Rs. 11000 or 12000/ -. However, once again this evidence controverts the plea of Mansha Ram (R-1) in para 2 (c) of the plaint. ( 9. ) MANSHA Ram (P. W. 1) claimed in para 3 that he remained in possession of the suit land and on date of evidence also he was in possession of the same. Baluram (P. W. 2) in para 5, Shobharam (P. W. 3) in para 3 and Champalal (P. W. 6) have also supported the appellant on the point. However, Ex. P-6 Khasra Panchshala for the year 1976-77 tells a different story. Name of Sitaram, the appellant is entered therein. It is also noteworthy that in para 2 of notice Ex. P-1 Mansha Ram (R-1) had put forward a different story that Sitaram was cultivating the suit land in lieu of interest and thereby in notice Ex. P-l he has admitted that the appellant was in possession of the suit land. ( 10. ) IT is true that Baluram (P. W. 2) had produced Ex. P-3 a sale deed dated 4-5-65 executed by Jainarayan in favour of Sitaram of Khasra No. 106/4 and Ex. P-4 a sale-deed dated 2-6-72 whereby Sitaram the appellant sold the same to Ramchandra and others but definitely that transaction has no nexus with the present transaction and does not prove that the present transaction was also a loan transaction. Merely because appellant purchased land from some body in year 1965 and sold it to another in the year 1972 no inference can be drawn that the present transaction was a loan transaction. Merely because appellant purchased land from some body in year 1965 and sold it to another in the year 1972 no inference can be drawn that the present transaction was a loan transaction. Mangilal (P. W. 4) claimed that he had also taken loan after writing a document for his loan. However, such writing is not produced in Court. At the most such evidence is merely inconclusive. ( 11. ) IN para 2 (c) of the plaint it was claimed that the land was valuing about Rs. 25000/- in year 1973. Mansha Ram (P. W. 1) in para 6 claims that value of suit land was about Rs. 15 -16. 000/ -. Champalal (P. W. 6) also claims value of suit land to be Rs. 14-15000/ -. However, none of them deals in land to know the real value of the land. It is not shown that the suit land was either irrigated or was so productive that its value could be either Rs. 15000/- per acre or Rs. 25000/per acre in the year 1973. Obviously prices of land have escalated but not to that extent. Champalal (P. W. 5} claimed that he had purchased. 22 acre land for Rs. 2000/- vide Ex. P-5. He claims that this land is situated in the same locality. However, no further information is given by him so that it can be held that an ordinary agricultural land could value in village of Shahdol District to that exhorbitant limits as is suggested by Mansha Ram (R-1 ). It is noteworthy that only a piece of 1. 5 acre of land was transferred for Rs. 3000/- which could be a fair market value of such land in 1973. Thus, the suggestion that transaction was unconscionable cannot be upheld. ( 12. ) THE appellant has examined Imratlal (D. W. 2), Banwari (D. W. 3) the attesting witnesses and Ramchandra (D. W. 4) the scribe of sale-deed Ex. D-1. They have not been able to furnish any useful information about the tenor of the transaction. Thus it was not established that sale-deed was either sham or fictitious. ( 13. ) EXTENT of power and duty of First Appellate Court and the High Court are well settled. D-1. They have not been able to furnish any useful information about the tenor of the transaction. Thus it was not established that sale-deed was either sham or fictitious. ( 13. ) EXTENT of power and duty of First Appellate Court and the High Court are well settled. In Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra, 1988 Supp SCC 716 : ( AIR 1988 SC 1858 ) N. L. Sharma, J. , observed: "the Court (the First Appellate Court) is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises as of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case. " In that case, an admission by the defendant/tenant in the reply notice in regard to plaintiffs title and the description of the plaintiff as owner of the property were not considered by the First Appellate Court while holding that the plaintiff has not proved his title. Obviously, non-consideration of relevant evidence or an essentially erroneous approach to the matter authorises this Court to interfere. Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh ( AIR 1992 SC 1604 ), Sundra Naicka Vadiyar v. Ramaswami Ayyar ( AIR 1994 SC 532 ), Mehrunissa v. Visham Kumari ( AIR 1998 SC 427 ). Certainly, in the present case, learned First Appellate Court did not consider the admission of Mansha Ram (R-l) in his notice (Ex. P-l) and the divergence between the pleadings and evidence led by Mansha Ram and broad probabilities of the case. Obviously, the approach of First Appellate Court was essentially wrong and he had based his conclusion on surmises and wrong assumptions which was not permissible. Thus, after a considered re-valuation of the evidence on record and its appreciation on correct principles of law, this Court is of opinion that all three substantial questions of law have to be decided in positive. It is held that the sale-deed dated 27-6-73 was neither sham nor fictitious. It was not a mere money-lending transaction or a document to secure loan, repayment of Rs. 2000/- by Mansha Ram (R-l) was not established. Thus, the decree given by the First Appellate Court merits to be set aside. It is held that the sale-deed dated 27-6-73 was neither sham nor fictitious. It was not a mere money-lending transaction or a document to secure loan, repayment of Rs. 2000/- by Mansha Ram (R-l) was not established. Thus, the decree given by the First Appellate Court merits to be set aside. The decree given by Trial Court has to be affirmed in its place and the civil suit of Mansha Ram (R-l) has to be dismissed. ( 14. ) THE appeal is accordingly allowed with casts. Judgment and decree given by First Appellate Court is hereby set aside. In its place decree given by the Trial Court is affirmed and civil suit is dismissed. Advocates fee as per schedule, if certified. ( 15. ) SECOND Appeal allowed.