Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 89 (PNJ)

Harinder Pal Singh Shergill v. Union Of India

2001-01-16

S.S.NIJJAR

body2001
Judgment S.S.Nijjar, J. 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court, it was incumbent on the authorities to re-examine the whole matter and enforce the order of detention only if any afresh circumstance has come into existence. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that it was not open to the State Government to implement the original order without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The operative part of the order of the Supreme Court is as under : "Therefore, we do not think that it would be appropriate to state that merely by passage of time the nexus between the object for which the husband of the respondent is sought to be detained and the circumstances in which he was ordered to be detained has snapped. However, we make it clear that if those circumstances did not exist, then it would be appropriate for the Government to revoke the order of detention and, if still certain circumstances as apprehended in the order of detention exist, it will be open to the Government to enforce the same. Making the position clear, we allow this appeal and set aside the order made by the High Court." 2. A perusal of the extract of the order reproduced above would make it abundantly clear that while allowing the Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India, the Supreme Court had made it clear that if circumstances which had earlier existed do not now exist, then it would be open to the appropriate Government to revoke the order of detention. It is further made clear that if still certain circumstances as apprehended in the order of detention exist, it would be open to the Government to enforce the same. Therefore, in view of the above, the State had to be satisfied that the original circumstances as apprehended in the order of detention still exist. If that be so, the State is at liberty to enforce the order of detention. After examining the matter, the State has decided to enforce the original order of detention. 3. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that since October 2000, though the proceedings have been continuing, yet no efforts have been made by the Government to enforce the order of detention. After examining the matter, the State has decided to enforce the original order of detention. 3. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that since October 2000, though the proceedings have been continuing, yet no efforts have been made by the Government to enforce the order of detention. Therefore, now it can no longer be said that there is any nexus between the order of detention and the object sought to be achieved. I find no merit in the aforesaid submission also. The State is merely trying to implement the order passed by the Supreme Court. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Fulchand Shah etc. v. Union of India and others, 2000(2) RCR (Crl.) 176, would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Funchands case (supra), the Supreme Court has held that when the maximum period of detention has expired, detention could not be continued unless there exist a proximate temporal nexus between the period of detention prescribed at the initial stage and the date when the order is sought to be implemented on the basis of any appellate order after setting aside the order of original Court setting aside the order of detention. It has also been held that the Court has to be satisfied of the necessity to detain the petitioner after a long lapse of time. In the present case, the Supreme Court has already given directions that the State may enforce the order of detention if it is found by the State that some circumstances still remain which resulted in the passing of the order of detention. In Funchands case (supra) a period of 12 to 13 years had elapsed between the passing of the original order of detention and the order passed by the Supreme Court. In the present case, the order of detention was passed on 17.11.1998; and the matter was decided by the Supreme Court on 13.9.2000. In the present case, the Supreme Court had itself made it clear that passage of time by itself would not be sufficient to indicate that "the nexus between the object for which the husband of the respondent is sought to be detained and the circumstances in which he was ordered to be detained, has snapped." As noticed earlier, the enquiry into these proceedings is underway. By an order dated 2.1.2001, the Committee has been asked to submit the report within one month. 4. In view of the above, petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.