ORDER Mohamed Anwar, J.—By this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Petitioner prays to "set aside the Order dated 20.1.2001 in PCR No. 165 of 1999 (C.C. No. 22084 of 2000) and quash the said proceedings on the file of Additional CMM of 10th Court Mayo Hall, Bangalore against the Petitioner and grant such other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to secure the ends of justice". The Petitioner is Accused No. 1 ('A-1' for short) therein. The operative portion of the impugned order reads: Register the case against accused Nos. 1 to 3 for the offences punishable under Section 341, 452, 427 and 380 read with 34 Indian Penal Code and issue SS to A-1 to A-3 returnable by 28.4.2001. 2. Heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for Petitioner. Despite repeated and sufficient opportunity granted to Respondent, he persistently remained absent and, therefore, he could not be heard (vide paragraph-2 of the order dated 8.11.2001 contained in the order sheet). However, he has filed the detailed statement of objections opposing the petition. I have gone through it. 3. A-1 Petitioner M/s. I.T.I. Limited, Bangalore, is a Central Government Company registered under the Companies Act and owned by the Central Government. Respondent is complainant in the said P.C.R. No. 165 of 1999, now registered as C.C. No. 22084 of 2000 on the file of the Court below. He filed the complaint therein under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 11.6.1999 before the learned Magistrate against Petitioner and five other accused arraigning them as A-1 to A-6. In the complaint, A-2 is one I.M. Devappa, Chief Security Officer, and A-3 M. Rajan is the Security Officer of the A-1 Company. A-4 are the Bangalore Police shown as represented by the Commissioner of Police, Bangalore. A-5 is described as Bangalore Telephones represented by its Senior General Manager. A-6 is Government of Karnataka. A-2 to A-6 are not made Respondent parties in this petition. However, hereinafter they are referred to as A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6, respectively. 4. The said complaint was filed by Respondent alleging commission of offences by A-1 to A-3 under Sections 107, 120A, 339, 340, 349, 350, 351, 378, 380, 390, 391, 424, 425, 441, 442, 445, 451, 452, 454, 455, 201, 355, 356 and 357 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short).
4. The said complaint was filed by Respondent alleging commission of offences by A-1 to A-3 under Sections 107, 120A, 339, 340, 349, 350, 351, 378, 380, 390, 391, 424, 425, 441, 442, 445, 451, 452, 454, 455, 201, 355, 356 and 357 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short). The complaint against A-4 Bangalore Police is for the offences under Sections 119, 166 and 217 of Indian Penal Code as they failed to prevent A-1 to A-3 from committing the offence despite the Police was informed of the same by the complainant. A-5, the Bangalore Telephones, are alleged to have committed the offence under Section 120-A of Indian Penal Code as the telephonic connection to the said quarters was disconnected by A-5 to facilitate complainant's eviction therefrom by A-1 to A-3. The state was made A-6 for a direction to it to pay compensation to complainant and his family members. At para-22 of the complaint it was prayed that A-1 to A-3 may be made to pay various figures of amounts mentioned therein towards the losses suffered by him, and that the said police may be directed to recover the household articles from A-1 to A-3 and be given over to the complainant. 5. Since the Respondent's said complaint dated 11.6.1999 is an outcome of several litigations between him and the Petitioner, it is necessary to advert to the relevant facts and the material allegations stated in the complaint for effective disposal of the petition. At paragraph-3 of the complaint, it is alleged: 3. In the year 1992, the Accused No. 1 made the first unlawful attempt to get the Complainant evicted from his house, but was restrained from doing so by an order of the High Court of Karnataka made in Complainant's Writ Appeal No. 3521 of 1993 on 31st January, 1994. underlining supplied It is further alleged therein that when the officials of Petitioner-1-company attempted to unlawfully evict the Petitioner from his house, he had given a complaint to the City Police for protection. At paragraph-6 in the complaint, it is further stated: 6.
underlining supplied It is further alleged therein that when the officials of Petitioner-1-company attempted to unlawfully evict the Petitioner from his house, he had given a complaint to the City Police for protection. At paragraph-6 in the complaint, it is further stated: 6. However, on 20th March, 1999, at about 10.30 A.M., when the Complainant and members of his family were in their house, the Accused Nos 2 and 3 had suddenly entered Complainant' premises, bringing with them several other employees of Accused No. 1 and over two dozens hired goons, and on entering the house had demanded that the Complainant and members of his family vacate the house forthwith. (underlining supplied) The further allegation in the complaint is that in collusion with the officials of A-5 Bangalore Telephones, the accused got the telephone line to his house disconnected since 16.3.1999. The General Manager of A-5 was approached by the complainant with a request to restore that line, but in vain. A-1's two employees A-2 and A-3, physically prevented him from going out of the house to telephone to the police against accused for having disconnected the said telephone line and his wife was confined to the kitchen. When the Petitioner, his family members and his house-hold articles were forcibly thrown out by A-1- company, he rushed to the local Police Station and lodged First Information Report with the police requesting them to take immediate action against accused. No action as such was taken by the police. Hence, his complaint to the learned Magistrate. 6. A few indisputable material facts pertaining to the relevant Court litigations which had taken place between Petitioner and Respondent prior to filing of the former's complaint on 11.6.1999 in the Court below, and which have direct bearing on his complaint, also require to be mentioned herein for just decision of the material question: whether the impugned criminal proceeding instituted by the Respondent against Petitioner and others in said P.C.R. No. 165 of 1999 in the Court below is sustainable in law? The certified copies of the relevant records of those litigations are made available on the file of this proceeding. 7. The Respondent was an employee of the Petitioner-Company.
The certified copies of the relevant records of those litigations are made available on the file of this proceeding. 7. The Respondent was an employee of the Petitioner-Company. Undisputedly, the house in question referred to by him in the complaint as "his house", is, in fact, the official quarters of the Petitioner-company which was allotted to him for his residence while he was in service of the company. During 1990, he was transferred from Bangalore unit of the company to its Raibareli unit. Refusing to join his service at the transferred post in compliance with the said transfer order, he filed Writ Petition No. 6340 of 1991 before this Court, challenging that transfer order. During pendency of that writ petition, disciplinary enquiry was initiated by the Petitioner-company against Respondent on charge of certain mis-conduct. That domestic enquiry resulted in termination of his services under order dated 13.8.1992 of the Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner-company. The validity of that termination order was challenged by him in Writ Petition No. 26208 of 1993 before this Court. In view of Respondent's dismissal from service by Petitioner by its said order dated 13.8.1992 during pendency of his said Writ Petition No. 6340 of 1991, that writ petition was dismissed by learned Single Judge as it having become infructuous. Against that order, Writ Appeal No. 3520 of 1993 was filed by Respondent. In the said Writ Petition No. 26208 of 1993, he had sought for an interim order staying the operation of that impugned termination order. That request of Petitioner was rejected by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 3.9.1993. Then, the Respondent approached the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 3521 of 1993 questioning that order dated 3.9.1993 of the learned Single Judge, and praying for an interim order as sought by him. His both Writ Appeal Nos. 3520 and 3521 of 1993 were disposed by the same Division Bench by its separate orders both dated 31.1.1994 restoring his said Writ Petition No. 6340 of 1991 to file with a direction to the learned Single Judge to finally dispose of Respondent's both said Writ Petitions viz., Writ Petition Nos. 6340 of 1991 and 26208 of 1993 together, on 7.3.1994.
6340 of 1991 and 26208 of 1993 together, on 7.3.1994. While so disposing of these appeals, upon the motion made by the Respondent in Writ Appeal No. 3521 of 1993 about his apprehension of being evicted from the said premises by the Petitioner, the following direction was made therein by the Division Bench in its disposal order dated 31.1.1994: 5. ...However, status quo regarding the quarters occupied by the appellant-party in person will continue till the final disposal of the writ petitions as aforesaid on the appellant paying the standard rent at the rate at which he was paying rent immediately prior to the removal order. (underlining supplied) 8. Respondent's both Writ Petition Nos. 6340 of 1991 and 26208 of 1993 were then heard together by learned Single Judge and they came to be allowed by order dated 27/30.10.1995. That order of the learned Single Judge, when challenged by Petitioner-company, was set aside by the Division Bench by its detailed and considered judgment dated 20.9.1996 in Petitioner's Writ Appeal Nos. 4591 of 1995 (against order in Writ Petition No. 26208 of 1993) and 4592 of 1995 (against order in Writ Petition No. 6340 of 1991) pronounced allowing them and dismissing the said writ petitions of the Respondent, by upholding the validity of the Petitioner's termination order dated 13.8.1992 by which Respondent was dismissed by the latter from its services. As a result, he stood terminated and removed from Petitioner's services with effect from 13.8.1992 as no any material is produced by him showing that he got the said judgment stayed or set aside by Hon'ble Supreme Court. 9. Thus, one significant legal consequence which has to be noticed at this juncture is that, with the final disposal of the said Writ Petition Nos. 6340 of 1991 connected with 26208 of 1993 by order dated 27/30.10.1995 of the learned Single Judge, the operation of the status-quo order made in said Writ Appeal No. 3521 of 1993 with respect to the quarters in question in occupation of the Respondent came to an end as on 30.10.1995, since there was no any further order, whatever, was passed in this respect either by the learned Judge in his said order dated 27/30.10.1995 or by the Division Bench in the said Writ Appeal Nos. 4591 and 4592 of 1995. 10.
4591 and 4592 of 1995. 10. Subsequent to the disposal of said Writ Appeal No. 4591 and 4592 of 1995 by judgment dated 20.9.1996, the concerned authority of the Petitioner-company initiated eviction proceeding under the Public Premises (Unauthorised Occupation) Eviction Act, 1971 ('the Act of 1971' in short) for eviction of Respondent from the said official quarters. Finally, the competent authority passed the eviction order dated 8.1.1998 against Respondent with respect thereto. That order was taken in appeal before the City Civil Court, Bangalore, in M.A. No. 9 of 1998 under Section 9 of the Act of 1971, by the Respondent. That appeal was dismissed by the considered judgment dated 29.8.1998 of the City Civil Court, Bangalore. Then, Respondent approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 28072 of 1998 challenging the said eviction order dated 8.1.1998 and the order dated 29.8.1998 of appellate Court made dismissing his Miscellaneous Appeal No. 9 of 1998. That writ petition was dismissed by this Court by its order dated 8.12.1998 granting him three months time to vacate the said premises. Then, it was challenged in appeal by Respondent in Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999 before the Division Bench (of which I was a member). By its considered judgment dated 24.9.1999, that writ appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench. It is pertinent to note that no interim order was passed either in said Writ Petition No. 28072 of 1998 or in Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999 staying the operation of the said impugned eviction order dated 8.1.1998. As there was no any such interim order operating against the said eviction order, and the three months time granted under the said order dated 8.12.1998 (pronounced disposing Writ Petition No. 28072 of 1998) for Respondent to vacate premises having expired on 17.3.1999, the concerned officials of the Petitioner-Company took delivery of the vacant possession of the Company's said quarters on 20.3.1999 in execution thereof by evicting the Respondent and his family therefrom. 11. It is in the backdrop of the aforestated legal proceedings which the Respondent filed his complaint in the Court below on 11.6.1999 against Petitioner and other accused. 12. Significantly, in all the aforestated legal proceedings and in the present proceeding as well, the Respondent had/has been either prosecuting or defending the proceedings, as the case may be, with all dexterity, as a party in person. 13.
12. Significantly, in all the aforestated legal proceedings and in the present proceeding as well, the Respondent had/has been either prosecuting or defending the proceedings, as the case may be, with all dexterity, as a party in person. 13. On going through the contents of the Respondent's complaint, it becomes clear that the material facts of the dismissal of his said Writ Petition Nos. 26208 of 1993 and 6340 of 1991 by the Division Bench judgment dated 20.9.1999 passed in Petitioner's said Writ Appeal Nos. 4591 and 4592 of 1995; and of the dismissal of Respondent's said Miscellaneous Appeal No. 9 of 1998, Writ Petition No. 28072 of 19998, and the said Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999, are not mentioned in the complaint and they are deliberately suppressed therein by him. Even the most material fact of his termination from service, by the Petitioner-company by its termination order dated 13.8.1992 is also not mentioned by him in the complaint. 14. When the matter came up in open Court i.e., on 3.12.2001 for further dictation, Respondent appeared in person and sought permission to submit his reply argument. He was accordingly granted the permission. Resisting the petition, he submitted the written notes of his arguments and also addressed the Court on each of those written submissions. 15. It has to be noticed that after the complaint was filed by the Respondent before the learned Magistrate, he had made two applications in that complaint proceeding - one under Section 93 and another under Section 94 of Code of Criminal Procedure on 27.3.1999 and 17.4.1999. Those two applications were rejected by order dated 16.8.1999 of the learned Magistrate. Thereupon, Respondent filed petition under Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court in Criminal Petition No. 2644 of 1999 praying that "...the Hon'ble Court take up the case Private Complaint No. 165 of 1999 for trial/making orders under Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure". That petition was disposed of by order dated 26.5.2000 of the learned Judge Mr. Justice H.N. Narayan, with a direction to the learned trial Magistrate to take up the Respondent's complaint forthwith and to pass further appropriate order either taking cognizance of the offence alleged or otherwise, as there was no sufficient justification for transfer of the matter from his file.
Justice H.N. Narayan, with a direction to the learned trial Magistrate to take up the Respondent's complaint forthwith and to pass further appropriate order either taking cognizance of the offence alleged or otherwise, as there was no sufficient justification for transfer of the matter from his file. It was thereafter which the order dated 20.1.2001 impugned herein was passed by the learned Magistrate. One observation which significantly needs to be made is that, even in the said petition under Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, none of the material facts mentioned in paragraph-13, supra, were stated by the Respondent. 16. In the written summary of the arguments submitted by Respondent purporting to canvas the 15 points listed therein for Court's consideration, I find that all of them run counter to and/or against the final and binding orders/judgments of this Court passed in the aforesaid Writ Petitions and Writ Appeals. Therefore, on this sole score, they are all untenable and irrelevant points of his arguments which do not merit any consideration at all. For instance, it was argued by him that his said Writ Petition No. 6340 of 1991 which was filed challenging Petitioner's order transferring him from Bangalore to its Raibareli Branch, is not yet finally decided and disposed of and that the same is still pending disposal, although his both said Writ Petition Nos. 6340 of 1991 and 26208 of 1993 had been finally disposed of by the learned Single Judge by a considered and detailed Common Order dated 27/30.10.1995 as borne out by the material portion whereof contained in paragraph-26 of the order which is extracted below: 26. As a necessary consequence of the findings of this Court, the Petitioner would be entitled to succeed in both the petitions. Rule is made absolute to the extent that the transfer order dated 14.6.1990 stands quashed and the subsequent enquiry proceedings which to my mind were unjustified, findings of the enquiry officer and the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are quashed in the facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore, legally speaking, the points of argument on which the Respondent dwelt upon for consideration of the Court are liable to be rejected outright as totally devoid of legal force and weight. 17. So, the resultant legal position emerging from the final disposal of Respondent's said Writ Petition Nos.
Therefore, legally speaking, the points of argument on which the Respondent dwelt upon for consideration of the Court are liable to be rejected outright as totally devoid of legal force and weight. 17. So, the resultant legal position emerging from the final disposal of Respondent's said Writ Petition Nos. 6340 of 1991 and 26208 of 1993 decided on 27/30.10.1999, as indicated at paragraph-9 supra, is that the order to maintain status quo with respect to the premises in question made by the Division Bench in the said Writ Appeal No. 3521 of 1993 came to an end and stood extinguished as on 30.10.1995. Therefore, there was absolutely no legal impediment for the Petitioner's Authority to initiate the eviction proceeding against Respondent under the Act of 1971 in respect of the said premises in his occupation. The said eviction order dated 8.1.1998 passed therein by the competent authority was enforceable against Respondent from the very date of its passing i.e. 8.1.1998 since its operation was not shown to have been stayed by any interim order of the appellate authority in the said Miscellaneous Appeal No. 9 of 1998 or of this Court in Respondent's said Writ Petition No. 28072 of 1998 or in his Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999. However, while finally disposing of Writ Petition No. 28072 of 1998 by order dated 8.12.1998, this Court had granted him three months time to vacate and deliver vacant possession to the Petitioner of the said house premises, which he failed to do so. As a result, on and from 9.3.1998, the Petitioner was legally entitled to get the Respondent evicted from its said official quarters in execution of the said eviction order dated 8.1.1998, that order having become binding between the parties. In that view of the legal position, the Petitioner proceeded to execute that eviction order against Respondent in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act of 1971 and the relevant Rule 7 of the Rules framed thereunder. 18. It could be seen from the undisputed documents produced along with the petition that by order dated 19.3.1999 of the Petitioner's concerned Estate Officer, A-2 M. Rajan, Assistant Manager (Security Services), of the Petitioner-company was authorised to evict the Respondent and other occupants from the said official quarters and take vacant possession thereof in execution of the said eviction order (vide page-21).
Accordingly, on the following day i.e., on 20.3.1999 at about 9.00 a.m., A-2 visited the said house premises along with witnesses, and took necessary legal steps towards taking delivery of the vacant possession of the premises by evicting the Respondent and other members of his family therefrom, after preparing the inventory of all the household articles found therein in the presence of panchas, since the Respondent refused to voluntarily vacate the premises. Further, requisite notice was issued to Respondent under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act of 1971, besides getting it published in the newspaper, calling upon the Respondent to take delivery of the said household articles, which he stoutly refused to take. On the other hand, he sent his reply thereto dated 17.4.2000 (vide page-37) to the Petitioner charging that: The contentions made by you in your above letter are misconceived and baseless. My belongings robbed by your officials and kept in their custody will have to remain there till the Court orders the Police to take them into their custody to hand them over to me. It is not the Respondent's case either in his complaint or in his sworn statement that any item of his property or household article was missing from the said inventory. Nor is it his case that any specific item of that property was damaged in any manner whatever. The complaint allegations in this regard are entirely omnibus and evasive. In that view of the matter, the above untenable adamant stand taken by him, makes it evident that the Petitioner was and is legally justified in taking steps for disposal of Respondents said household articles in the manner provided by the relevant provisions of the Act of 1971. 19. In the backdrop of the aforestated legal proceedings, the Petitioner was entitled to and was legally justified in evicting the Respondent and his family members from its said official quarters, after preparing the inventory of the household articles contained therein. The procedure for Respondent's eviction from the said premises adopted by the Petitioner's authorities was quite in accordance with the one prescribed by Sub-section (2) of Section 5 read with Section 6 of the Act of 1971.
The procedure for Respondent's eviction from the said premises adopted by the Petitioner's authorities was quite in accordance with the one prescribed by Sub-section (2) of Section 5 read with Section 6 of the Act of 1971. In that view of the matter, A-1 (Petitioner), A-2 and A-3, by no canon of construction could be stated to have committed the offences under Sections 341, 452, 427 and 380 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code while enforcing the Petitioner's legal right available to it under the said valid and binding eviction order dated 8.1.1998 and in taking possession of the said premises in a lawful manner. 20. In fact and in law, therefore, there was absolutely no legal justification whatever for the Respondent to file his complaint against them before the learned Magistrate. Indeed, by deliberately suppressing in his complaint all the material facts relating to the litigations between him and the Petitioner, and the result thereof (vide paragraph-13 supra), the Respondent is grossly guilty of misleading and attempting to practice fraud on the Court below. That apart, one of the most material facts that the said premises in occupation of Respondent was the official quarters allotted to him for his residence by the Petitioner-company was also deliberately suppressed by him from the complaint. On the other hand, he has brazenly made the false statement therein asserting repeatedly that the premises was "his premises" and it belonged to him. In his sworn statement recorded by the learned Magistrate, the certified copy whereof together with its English rendition was produced by the learned Counsel for Petitioner, however, he has, insidiously, made very casual statements that he was illegally removed from service and was illegally evicted from the premises by the Petitioner, without disclosing any material particulars of the domestic enquiry held against him and of the eviction proceeding conducted by the Competent Authority under the Act of 1971, and the results thereof. Therefore, for all these reasons the impugned order of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained in law and the criminal proceeding initiated by Respondent in P.C.R. No. 165 of 1999, now registered as Criminal Case No. 22084 of 2001, on the file of the Court below is liable to be quashed. 21.
Therefore, for all these reasons the impugned order of the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained in law and the criminal proceeding initiated by Respondent in P.C.R. No. 165 of 1999, now registered as Criminal Case No. 22084 of 2001, on the file of the Court below is liable to be quashed. 21. The matter does not rest with mere quashing of the impugned criminal proceeding in view of the contumacious and obdurate conduct of the Respondent demonstrated in this judicial proceeding, which calls for serious notice and appropriate order. The tell tale dependable materials on record make it crystal clear that Respondent's said complaint against Petitioner-company and its officials was wholly vexatious and the criminal proceedings against them was initiated by him solely with the ulterior motive to coerce the Petitioner to forfeit its right available to it under the said binding eviction order, to vacate Respondent from its official quarters. 22. During pendency of this proceeding, the Respondent filed a memo on 8.10.2001 seeking listing of the matter before another Bench as I am disabled to hear and dispose it of, in view of the judgment dated 24.9.1999 of the Division Bench rendered in his Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999 connected with Contempt of Court Case No. 309 of 1999 dismissing them, of which I was a member. This prayer of the Respondent was patently mala fide and was found unacceptable by my considered order dated 10.10.2001 (vide order sheet dated 10.10.2001). But, what is most disturbing are the contents of the said memo couched in highly insinuating and contemptuous language spitting fire against this Court for pronouncing certain adverse orders in his aforesaid disputes. For proper appreciation thereof, it is essential to reproduce whole of the contents of Respondent's said memo dated 8.10.2001: MEMO The Respondent begs to bring the following to the kind attention of the Honourable Court: 1.
For proper appreciation thereof, it is essential to reproduce whole of the contents of Respondent's said memo dated 8.10.2001: MEMO The Respondent begs to bring the following to the kind attention of the Honourable Court: 1. In the year 1999, when a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka consisting of Honourable Judges M/s. G.C. Bharuka and Mohamed Anwar brutally dismissed Respondent's Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999 ignoring the fact that the criminal actions of the Petitioner- company in making the Respondent and members of his family homeless and dispossessed of their entire belongings on 20th March, 1999, showing utter contempt for the standing order of the Honourable High Court made in Respondent's Writ Appeal No. 3521 of 1993 on 31st January, 1994, restraining the Petitioner company from evicting the Respondent from his house till the final disposal of his cases against the Petitioner- company, were not only barbaric, but also violative of the provisions of the very Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupant) Act, 1971 on which the Petitioner-company had claimed to have relied for making the Respondent and members of his family homeless and dispossessed of their entire belongings, in order to console his shocked wellwishers the Respondent had to tell them that THE QUALITY OF AN ORDER OF A COURT OF LAW CAN ONLY BE AS GOOD OR BAD AS ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AND/OR MORAL INTEGRITY. 2. The order of the High Court made in Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999 on 24th September, 1999 was an insult to the intelligence of even that of a lowest calibre person. 3. Now that even a Magistrate has found the actions of the Petitioner-company in making the Respondent and members of his family homeless and dispossessed of their entire belongings, as was done on 20th March, 1999, to be unlawful and criminal (REF: the Criminal Case No. 22084 of 2000 filed by the Court of the X Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore, in PCR No. 165 of 1999), and that in its order in Writ Petition No. 15671 of 2000, made on 10th July, 2001, the Honourable High Court, too, has found similar actions of the Petitioner-company in taking possession of a rented premises to be unlawful, the Honourable Judge of this Court may find himself to be disabled to sit in judgment in this Criminal Petition. 4.
4. In view of these, the Respondent believes that the Principles of Natural Justice, and the interests of justice, demand that this case be referred to the Honourable Chief Justice of the High Court to be posted for hearing and orders by any other Honourable Judge of the High Court other than the Honourable Judges M/s. T.S. Thakur, R.V. Raveendran, S.R. Bannurmath, R. Gururajan, Chandrasekharaiah, and H.N. Narayan who, too, are disabled to hear this case for one reason or the other. Bangalore Dated: 8th October, 2001 Sd/- (Prof. P.N. Shetty) Respondent Party-in-Person (Underlining supplied) 23. In his above quoted memo, it was also prayed by Respondent that the matter be not listed before "the Honourable Judges M/s. T.S. Thakur, R.V. Raveendran, S.R. Bannurmath, R. Gururajan, Chandrasekhariah and H.N. Narayan who, too, are disabled to hear the case for one reason or the other". The reason for their disability is not spelt out in the memo. However, it could be gathered from the material on record that Their Lordships had dealt with and disposed of one or the other afore-stated matters of Respondent in one way or the other. The feature of the language used by him in his said memo viz., "In the year 1999, when a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka consisting of Honourable Judges M/s. G.C. Bharuka and Mohamed Anwar brutally dismissed Respondent's Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999...showing utter contempt for the standing order of the Honourable High Court made in Respondent's Writ Appeal No. 3521 of 1993 on 31st January, 1994.... THE QUALITY OF AN ORDER OF A COURT OF LAW CAN ONLY BE AS GOOD OR BAD AS ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AND/OR MORAL INTEGRITY". (vide para-1), and further that "The order of the High Court made in Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999 on 24th September, 1999 was an insult to the intelligence of even that of a lower calibre person".
(vide para-1), and further that "The order of the High Court made in Writ Appeal No. 893 of 1999 on 24th September, 1999 was an insult to the intelligence of even that of a lower calibre person". (vide para-2), and also that "Now that even a Magistrate has found the actions of the Petitioner-company in making the Respondent and members of his family homeless and dispossessed of their entire belongings...to be unlawful and criminal...and that in its order in Writ Petition No. 15671 of 2000, made on 10th July, 2001, the Honourable High Court, too, has found similar actions of the Petitioner-company in taking possession of a rented premises to be unlawful, the Honourable Judge of this Court may find himself to be disabled to sit in judgment in this Criminal Petition" (vide para-3), is strikingly malicious and is, ex facie, made to scandalise this Court. It therefore, warrants serious notice and initiation of contempt proceedings against him. In particular, the aforequoted statements made by him, at para-2 of the memo is totally contemptuous and scandalous. In the context of his litigations, I find that these scandalous statements are deliberately and wilfully made by him with an oblique motive. 24. Therefore, the acts of Respondent in making the above said statements in his memo with malafide intention, prima facie scandalizing this Court; and the deliberate suppression of the above stated material facts from his complaint, and making patently false statements therein relating to other material facts, obviously, with the intention to substantially obstruct the due course of administration of justice in the judicial proceeding initiated by him against Petitioner- company and its officials before the learned Magistrate, as also before this Court by his said Criminal Petition No. 2644 of 1999 decided on 26.5.2000 by His Lordship Mr. Justice Narayan, provides sufficient and strong ground to presume the Respondent guilty of criminal contempt as defined in Sub-clauses (i) and (iii) of Clause (c) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 punishable under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, let this matter be placed before appropriate Bench for initiation of contempt proceeding against Respondent under the orders of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. 25. For all the reasons stated above and with my conclusion recorded in the preceding paragraph in regard to initiation of contempt proceeding against Respondent, the petition is allowed.
Therefore, let this matter be placed before appropriate Bench for initiation of contempt proceeding against Respondent under the orders of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. 25. For all the reasons stated above and with my conclusion recorded in the preceding paragraph in regard to initiation of contempt proceeding against Respondent, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 20.1.2001 and the entire criminal proceeding initiated by Respondent in P.C.R. No. 165 of 1999 subsequently registered as Criminal Case No. 22084 of 2001, on the file of the Court below against Petitioner and other accused are quashed.