GHULAM MOHAMMED, J. ( 1 ) JUDGMENT at the request made by the learned Counsel for both the parties, the above two writ petitions, which are filed in pursuance of award proceedings in Rc. No. 4106/97 dated 29. 1. 1999 on the file of the respondent-the Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, Mancherial, are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. Writ Petition No. 18382 of 1999. ( 2 ) THE petitioners in W. P. No. 183 83 of 1999 state that the 2nd respondent in this writ petition - M/s. Singareni Collieries company Limited, submitted requisition to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nirmal, in reference Nos. 91/88/124, dated 19-8-1988 and 91/88/48 dated 28-2-1989 for acquisition of the lands to the extent of Ac. 95-14 guntas of Mandamarri Village, Adilabad District and requested to initiate land acquisition proceedings. ( 3 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the proposals for approval of notification under Section 4 (1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, (for short "the Act"), have been submitted to the Government. The petitioners, initially, however, filed Writ Petition No. 14574 of 1997 praying this Court to direct the respondent No. l therein to issue a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, and to pay the compensation under the provisions of the Act. This Court by its order dated 9. 9. 1997 allowed the said writ petition directing the respondents therein to complete the acquisition proceedings as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of a copy of that order. However, it is stated that after filing C. C. No. 1850 of 1998, alleging wilful disobedience of the orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No,14574 of 1997, the first respondent herein-Land Acquisition Officer, Mancherial passed an award in reference No. A/4106/97, dated 29. 1. 1999. ( 4 ) IT is the case of the petitioners that advance possession of the lands was taken on 1. 6. 1. 1999. ( 4 ) IT is the case of the petitioners that advance possession of the lands was taken on 1. 6. 1989 by the respondent No. 2 and therefore possession of acquired lands is deemed to have been taken under Section 17 (1) of the Act, even otherwise, the respondent No. 1 is liable to pay additional amount at 12% per annum on the market value so fixed from the date of taking possession of the acquired property or issue of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act to the date of award, whichever is earlier, in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 23 (I-A) of the Act. They also urged that as the compensation amount was not paid on the date of award to the petitioner, interest is payable under Section 34 of the Act from the date of taking possession to the date of payment. ( 5 ) WP No. 18382 of 1999 has been filed seeking writ of mandamus directing the respondent No. l to pass award for payment of additional market value at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value of the lands in Sy. Nos. 118 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126 and 129 of Mandamarri Village of Adilabad District covered by award no. A/4106/97 dated 29. 1. 1999 from the date of taking possession on 1-6-1989 to the date of award i. e. , 29. 1. 1999 instead of from the date of DN i. e. , 25-12-1997 to 24-12-1998 as per the mandatory provisions of Section 23 (I-A) of the Land Acquisition Act and to pass award for payment of interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act from the date of taking possession of the land to the date of payment of compensation, instead of 24. 12. 1998. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner Sri P. V. Narayana Rao, vehemently contended that though the land owners filed applications before the first respondent seeking reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act, there is no bar for this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to grant two reliefs viz. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner Sri P. V. Narayana Rao, vehemently contended that though the land owners filed applications before the first respondent seeking reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act, there is no bar for this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to grant two reliefs viz. , (1) To grant benefit of payment of additional market value at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value of the lands from the date of taking possession i. e. , 1-6-1989 to the date of award i. e. , 29. 1. 1999 and (2) to order the interest under Section 34 of the Act from the date of taking possession of the land to the date of payment of compensation, instead of up to 24. 12. 1998. It is his submission that in the present case grant of benefit under Section 23 (I-A) of the Act should be effective from the date of taking advance possession till the date of award and this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the decisions reported in L. A. O. v. P. Sarangapani, 1998 (2) ALT 134 (DB), Vanga Narsaiah v. District Collector, Nizamabad, 1996 (2) ALD 234 , Asst. Commissioner, Gadag v. Mathapati Basavannewwa, AIR 1995 SC 2492 , Special Tahsildar (LA) P. W. D. Schemes Vijayawada v. M. A. Jabbar, AIR 1995 SC 762 , L. A. O.-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer v. Swaminatha Madaliar, 1998 (1) LACC 582, Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur v. Vasireddy, AIR 1970 AP 262 , Manipur Tea Co. , Pvt. , Ltd. v. Collector Of Hailakandi, AIR 1997 SC 1779 , Union of India v. Mangatu Ram, AIR 1997 SC 2704 , U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam, AIR 1998 SC 1028 , Samjuba Merambhai v. 2nd Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad, AIR 1998 Guj. 112 , Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 656 . ( 7 ) IN Sarangapani s case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: ". . . Further, the decisions relied upon by Sri Rajagopal Rao, learned Government Pleader in our view are distinguishable. The proposition in the two decisions are that when O. Ps. ( 7 ) IN Sarangapani s case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: ". . . Further, the decisions relied upon by Sri Rajagopal Rao, learned Government Pleader in our view are distinguishable. The proposition in the two decisions are that when O. Ps. are pending writ petitions are not maintainable. We do not say that the said view is incorrect. We are quite aware of the said legal position, but here the peculiarity is inspite of the claimants are being entitled for statutory benefits yet the same are not given to the claimants, and therefore, the claimants approached this Court for writ of mandamus which, was rightly granted by the learned single Judge. " ( 8 ) IN Asst. Commissioner, Gadag s (supra) the possession of the land was taken on 23. 1. 1971, but the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act was published in the gazettee on 2. 8. 1984, the award came to be made on 15. 1. 1986. The Supreme Court has held as follows: "the object of introducing Section 23 (1-A) is to mitigate the hardship caused to the owner of the land, who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by taking possession from him and using it for the public purpose, because of considerable delay in making the award and offering payment thereof. To obviate such hardship, Section 23 (1-A) was introduced and the Legislature envisaged that the owner of the land is entitled to 12 per cent per annum additional amount on the market value for a period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act in respect of such land up to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. At times, after publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) by invoking power of urgency under Section 17 (4), possession is taken before making the award. At times, after publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) by invoking power of urgency under Section 17 (4), possession is taken before making the award. The additional amount at 12% per annum was intended to be paid as compensation from the date of taking possession in this case, since advance possession was taken before the publication of notification under Section 4 (1), which was never questioned by the owners in a Court of law, the claimants, by necessary implication are entitled to the payment of the additional amount by way of compensation from the date of taking over the possession for losses of enjoyment of the land. A different situation may arise where the claimants themselves may question the notification and its invalidity is upheld by the Court. Thereunder, the claimants may not be entitled to the additional compensation since they are not willing to surrender the possession under the notification and the State did not in law come into possession under the notification referred to in Section 23 (1-A ). " ( 9 ) IN Special Tahsider (LA) P. W. D. Schemes, Vijajawada s case (supra) it was held as under: "on a true interpretation of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23, we are of the considered view that the High Court is right in concluding that the claimants are entitled to the additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum from March 6, 1980, the date of publication of the notification till the date of award, namely, September 30, 1983. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 adumbrates that "in addition to the market value of the land, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve percentum per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. " In other words, the owner of the land who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by having been parted with possession, the Act intended that the owner be compensated by awarding an additional amount calculated at the rate of 12 percentum per annum on the enhanced market value for the period between the date of notification and the date of award or date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier. Admittedly, possession having already been taken on February 15,1965, before publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) on March 6, 1980, the award of additional amount for the period from March 6, 1980 to September 30, 1983, i. e. , the date of making the award under Section 11 is perfectly correct. In addition to other statutory benefits, the owner also is entitled to the additional amount but to given award additional amount from February 15, 1965, i. e. , from the date of taking possession, though apparently earlier in point of time mentioned in Section 23 (1-A), in effect it amounts to giving retrospective effect to sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 under the Amendment Act 68/84. Even though the Amendment Act was prospective and the transitory provision had only retro limited activity. Therefore, we hold that the claimants would be entitled to additional amount of the enhanced market value of 12% per annum from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) till the date of the award, since possession had already been taken before the Amending Act has come into force. " ( 10 ) THE above two decisions are not applicable to the facts of this case, as in the said two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, issue of interest was not awarded. ( 11 ) HE further contending that both interest under Section 34 of the Act and the payment of additional market value at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value of the lands from the date of possession till date of award has to be granted, has relied on decision reported in L. A. O.-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer (supra ). A learned single Judge of Madras High Court in that decision has held as follows: "in the instant case, since possession was taken on 15. 8. A learned single Judge of Madras High Court in that decision has held as follows: "in the instant case, since possession was taken on 15. 8. 1979, i. e. , long prior to the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, the respondents are entitled to the additional amount at 12% per annum, which was intended to be paid as compensation, from the date of taking possession. The Supreme Court, in the above case, has further held that if the possession is taken earlier and notification is issued later, but the award is subsequently made the owner or the claimant is entitled to the compensation from the date of taking possession till date of award, though possession was taken before the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act was published. The expression whichever is earlier in Section 23 (1-A) of the Act has to be construed in that backdrop and the claimant would be entitled to additional amount from the date of taking possession. " ( 12 ) IN Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur (supra) a Full Bench of this Court has held that even on equitable principles the claimant would be entitled to interest from the date when he was deprived of his possession, even if it was before the initiation of the proceedings under the Act. ( 13 ) IN Manipur Tea Co. , Pvt. , Ltd. s, case (supra) the Supreme Court has held as follows: "it is sought to be contended for respondents that the reference Court and the High Court have proceeded on the principle that the Court has discretion to award interest @ 15% or less and on facts, the Court found that 9% would be reasonable rate of interest. We find that the approach adopted by the reference Court and High Court is not correct since the statute has given measure of assessment of interest for the first year @ 9% from the date of taking possession and on expiry thereof @15% till date of deposit into Court on the enhanced compensation. It is a legislative principle that the claimant would be entitled to the rate of interest for the said period. It is a legislative principle that the claimant would be entitled to the rate of interest for the said period. Under these circumstances, though the word may has been used in proviso to Section 28 of the Act, it has to construed as "shall" and, therefore, the claimants would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% on the enhanced compensation for one year and thereafter @ 15% till date of deposit in the Court. " in Union of India case (supra) it was held as under: "under these circumstances, the doctrine of equality in the matter of payment of compensation under Article 14 is inapplicable. Accordingly, we hold that for "b" Class lands, the compensation would be at the rate of Rs. 30,000/- per acre. The claimants are entitled to solatium at the rate of 30% on the enhanced compensation. They are also entitled to interest @ 9% from one year from the date of taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15% on the enhanced compensation. In addition, they are entitled to additional amount at 12% per annum under Section 23 (1-A) of the Act. The High Court had not kept this perspective in view in determining the compensation and thereby it has committed manifest error of law warranting interference. " in U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad s case (supra), the Apex Court held as follows: "we would, therefore, examine whether the provisions of the Adhiniyam if they are so construed as to incorporate the provisions of the L. A. Act as it stood on the date of enactment of the Adhiniyam without the amendments introduced in the L. A. Act by the 1984 Act relating to determination and payment of compensation would be violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this context, it may be stated that if the provisions are construed as indicated above an owner whose lands are aquired for the purpose of the Adhiniyam would be entitled to payment of solatium under Section 23 (2) of the L. A. Act @ 15% and interest under Section 28 of the L. A. Act @ 6% but an owner whose lands are acquired under the provisions of the L. A. Act as amended by the 1984 Act would be entitled to payment of solatium @ 30% and interest @ 9% and 15% and would also be entitled to payment of additional amount as per the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) of L. A. Act, as amended. " ( 14 ) SAMJUBA Merambhai s case (supra) it was held as follows: "if the date of taking possession of the respective lands of the claimants is earlier than the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, the benefit available under Section 23 (1 A) of the Act shall be given from that date being earlier date between the date of taking possession and publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. In other words, the claimants shall also be entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) of the Act not from the date of publication of the notification but from the date of taking possession of their lands, if possession as such and in reality taken prior to the date of publication of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, over and above what is awarded by the reference Court. " ( 15 ) THE Apex Court in Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Ltd s case (supra) held as follows: "there is no dispute that under the Act the claimant is entitled to compensation at the rate of the market value of the land on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. Section 23 (1) of the Act enumerate the matters which are to be taken into consideration in determinaing the compensation. On a reference under Section 18 of the Act the parties go to trial before the Court primarily on the issue of determination of market value of the land. So far as award of interest is concerned it is never an issue between the parties. On a reference under Section 18 of the Act the parties go to trial before the Court primarily on the issue of determination of market value of the land. So far as award of interest is concerned it is never an issue between the parties. Once the conditions under Section 28 or Section 34 of the Act are satisfied the award of interest is consequential and automatic. The High Court while appreciating the point in issue did not consider the mandatory provisions of Section 34 of the Act. The said section specifically provides that when the amount of compensation is not paid on or before taking possession of the land the Collector shall pay interest at 6% per annum from the date of taking over possession. The payment of interest is not dependent on any claim by the person whose land has been acquired. There can be no controversy or any lis between the parties regarding payment of interest. When once the provision of Section 34 are attracted it is obligatory for the Collector to pay the interest. If he fails to do so the same can be claimed from the Court in the proceedings under Section 18 of the Act or even from the appellate Court/ Court thereafter. ( 16 ) IN Executive Engineer v. Laghubhai Nanubhai, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 583, the Apex Court has held as follows: "the present dispute is as regards the claimants right to get compensation for the period preceding the date of Section 4 (1) Notification i. e. , the period between March 7, 1963 and December 20, 1989. We are of the view that the claimants are entitled to mesne profits for the aforesaid period from March 7, 1963 to December 20, 1989. They are not entitled to any other amount for the said period. It is proper that the mesne profits are determined by the concerned District Judge to whom necessary directions may be issued by the High Court. The High Court is directed accordingly. . . " there is no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down in those judgments. They are not entitled to any other amount for the said period. It is proper that the mesne profits are determined by the concerned District Judge to whom necessary directions may be issued by the High Court. The High Court is directed accordingly. . . " there is no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down in those judgments. Further, in those cases, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the statutory obligations were not discharged while granting the interest @ 4% p. a. , for the first year and @ 6% for the subsequent year and it is in that context the Courts have granted the interest under Section 34 of the Act. ( 17 ) HOWEVER, the petitioners state that they filed applications before the Land Acquisition Officer seeking reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. Section 4 (1) notification was issued on 3. 11. 1997. In the writ petition the petitioners seek that the benefits under Section 23 (1a) of the Act for payment of additional market value should be from the date of advance possession till the date of award and for payment of interest under Section 34 of the Act from the date of taking possession of the land to the date of payment of compensation. The point that arise for consideration is whether they are entitled for such relief in the writ proceedings, pending reference applications. ( 18 ) THE contention of the learned Government Pleader is that the writ petition is premature as the petitioner made application seeking reference under Section 18 and the reference Court can go into that aspect. He relied upon an unreported judgment of learned single Judge of this Court in WP No. 5527 of 1997 dated 28. 7. 1998. The learned single Judge of this Court while dismissing the WP No. 5527 of 1997 held that the Land Acquisition Act is a code in itself providing for comprehensive remedies and if the Land Acquisition Officer has not awarded additional market value under Section 23 (1-A), it is open to the petitioners to seek reference under Section 18 of the act to the jurisdictional civil Court for that relief. It is also his contention that once benefit under Section 34 of the Act is availed the petitioners cannot claim market value under Section 23 (1 A) of the Act. It is also his contention that once benefit under Section 34 of the Act is availed the petitioners cannot claim market value under Section 23 (1 A) of the Act. ( 19 ) IN Venigundla Srinivas v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by the Deputy Secretary, 1996 LACC 344, a learned single Judge of this Court has held as under : "mr. A. Pulla Reddy has relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in Spl. Tahsildar (L. A) PWD, Schemes Vijayawada v. M. A. Jabbar, AIR 1995 SC 762 = 1995 LACC 182 SC and Asst. Commissioner, Gadag Sub-Division, Gadag v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa and others, 1995 (6) JT 242 = 1995 LACC 536, in support of his argument for the award of additional compensation @ 12% per annum under Section 23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, but those two decisions are not applicable to the facts of this case, as in the said two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the interest was not awarded to the deprived property owners while in the instant case interest has been awarded to the petitioner, but on a wrong computation and calculation and the same is being rectified in this writ petition, which now conforms fully to the constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A of the Indian Constitution. In view of what is stated supra, I hold that the petitioners are entitled for interest @ 9% per annum for the first year from 8. 2. 1971 to 8. 2. 1972 and @ 15% per annum from 9. 2. 1972 till payment, computed on the market value of Rs. 12,500/- per acre as already determined by the Land Acquisition Officer plus 30% solatium. After computing the amounts on this basis, the 3rd respondent is directed to pay the same to the petitioners within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order. The 2nd respondent who is the requisitioning authority shall deposit the amount within the said period. " ( 20 ) A Division Bench of this Court in Land Acquisition Officer/spl. Deputy collector, Jagtial v. Lal Naik (Died) and others, 1997 (2) LACC 668, has held as follows: "if the date of taking possession is earlier to the date of Section 4 (1) notification, in our view, the date of the award should be taken as the crucial date. Deputy collector, Jagtial v. Lal Naik (Died) and others, 1997 (2) LACC 668, has held as follows: "if the date of taking possession is earlier to the date of Section 4 (1) notification, in our view, the date of the award should be taken as the crucial date. That means, where the date of taking possession precedes Section 4 (1) notification, there will be no occasion to apply the words "whichever is earlier" and they become pro tanto inapplicable. It is only if the date of taking possession follows the date of Section 4 (1) notification, the words "whichever is earlier" will have their full play and intended effect. Where in a case like this, the possession of the land was taken over long prior to Section 4 (1) notification, the starting point is the date of publication of notification and the terminus is the award of the Collector. It is between these two dates the additional market value under sub-section (1-A) will accrue to the claimant. Sub-section (1-A) speaks of two termini - one is the date of award and the other is the date of taking possession. Whereas the first one invariably follows the date of publication of notification, the second one may or may not. It cannot be said that unless the second contingency also occurs after the date of notification, the provisions as a whole becomes unworkable. Any such interpretation would result in an unjust situation of the claimant being denied of market value if the possession was taken over from him rather illegally even prior to the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings. We would like to avoid an interpretation having the potentiality of vesting a law abiding ryot who voluntarily surrenders possession of his land at the request of the authorities concerned with a disadvantage and we would prefer to give an interpretation which advantages the objective of the provision. We cannot therefore, accept the contention put forward by the learned Government Pleader. However, we find that an obvious mistake has been committed by the lower Court in awarding the amount under sub-section (1-A) from 6-6-1981 (which is the date of approval of Section 4 (1) notification ). The amount has to be awarded from 9. 12. 1981 in view of the plain language of sub-section (1-A ). However, we find that an obvious mistake has been committed by the lower Court in awarding the amount under sub-section (1-A) from 6-6-1981 (which is the date of approval of Section 4 (1) notification ). The amount has to be awarded from 9. 12. 1981 in view of the plain language of sub-section (1-A ). To this extent the appeal is partly allowed and the decree of lower Court will stand modified. " ( 21 ) IN an unreported judgment the Division Bench of this Court in AS No. 1170 of 1999 and cross objections dated 24-7-2001 held as follows: "so far as the additional market value under Section 23 (1-A) of the Act is concerned, the same cannot be awarded for the reason that the possession was taken on 4. 6. 1984. The claimants shall be entitled for interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the period from 4. 6. 1984 to 3. 6. 1985 and for the period from 4. 6. 1984 til! payment at the rate of 15% per annum. The claimants are also entitled to 3% solatium. " ( 22 ) CONSIDERING the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and also submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners already filed applications before the first respondent seeking reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. I am of the view that it will be inappropriate to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioners exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Land Acquisition Act is a code in itself providing for comprehensive remedies, and empowers the reference Court to deal with the situations as to grant statutory benefits and if the Land Acquisition Officer has not granted the statutory benefits, it is open to the petitioners to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act to the appropriate civil Court for that relief and can sought for the same. The Collector having discharged his obligation under Section 11 of the Act, the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act is competent to go into this aspect according to law. ( 23 ) THE writ petition is therefore misconceived and it is accordingly dismissed. The Collector having discharged his obligation under Section 11 of the Act, the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act is competent to go into this aspect according to law. ( 23 ) THE writ petition is therefore misconceived and it is accordingly dismissed. However, the first respondent is directed to make reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the jurisdictional civil Court within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. W P No. 7989 of 1999: ( 24 ) M/s. Singareni Collieries Company Limited, represented by its General Manager, Mandamarri. 2nd respondent in Writ Petition No. 18382 of 1999 filed another Writ Petition No. 7987 of 1999 questioning the said award dated 29. 1. 1999 passed by the first respondent. ( 25 ) THE petitioner prays to issue writ, order or direction particularly one in the nature of the writ of certiorari and calling for the record from the respondents and quash the award in Rc. No. 4106/97 dated 29. 1. 1999 to the extent of items E and G relating to 12% additional market value from 25. 12. 1997 to 24. 12. 1998 and interest on land value from 1-6-1989 to 24-12-1997. This writ petition filed by the requisition authority-Singareni Collieries Co. Limited challenges award on the ground that crop compensation was granted and an agreement was also entered into between the parties, therefore the grant of interest is not warranted. Learned Counsel for the writ petitioner herein has relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer (Irrigation) Division v. Lagubhai and Nanabhai and others, in SLPs (C) 5403-13 of 1992, wherein it was held as under: "the possession of the land in question was taken over by the Government under an agreement dated March 7, 1963. Subsequently a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in respect of the same land on December 20, 1989. The present dispute is as regards the claimants right to get compensation for the period preceding the date of Section 4 (1) Notification, i. e. , the period between March 7, 1963 and December 20, 1989. We are of the view that the claimants are entitled to mesne profits for the aforesaid period from March 7, 1963 to December 20, 1989. We are of the view that the claimants are entitled to mesne profits for the aforesaid period from March 7, 1963 to December 20, 1989. They are not entitled to any other amount for the said period, it is proper that the mesne profits are determined by the concerned District Judge to whom necessary directions may be issued by the High Court. The High Court is directed accordingly". ( 26 ) IN the instant case no doubt an agreement was entered into between the parties. But that payment is with regard to damage to the crop compensation but not with regard to the denial of statutory benefits conferred under the Act. The case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-company has no application to the facts of the present case. Learned Government Pleader at this stage contended that the petitioner can challenge the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer only on three grounds as held by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in M/s. Neyvely Lignite Corporation Limited v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition ), Neyvely, AIR 1995 SC 1004 . He further contended that as the writ petition was not filed challenging the above three grounds, the same is liable to be dismissed. In M/s. Neyvely Lignite Corporation Limited s case (supra) the Supreme Court has held as under : "when the award made under Section 11 of the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption, the beneficiary is entitled to challenge it in the writ petition apart from the settled law that the conduct of the Collector or Civil Judge is amenable to disciplinary enquiry and appropriate action. These are very valuable and salutary rights. . " ( 27 ) ADMITTEDLY, the above writ petition is not filed challenging the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on the above three grounds. That apart since I have directed the respondents-Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference to the civil Court in WP No. 183 82 of 1999, it is inappropriate to exercise the jurisdiction in the absence of any alleged three grounds namely fraud, collusion or corruption. I do not see any grounds to entertain this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.