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2001 DIGILAW 894 (RAJ)

Ram Bilas v. Bangar Charitable Trust

2001-05-17

MOHD.YAMIN

body2001
JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is directed against the order passed by the learned District Judge, Sawaimadhopur on 24.3.2001 by which he confirmed the order of learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Sawaimadhopur dated 19.3.2001. 2. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the orders of both the courts below. 3. Briefly stated, Ram Bilas is a contractor while respondent is a Trust. There existed a Dharamshala at Sawaimadhopur which was to be reconstructed and the contract was given to the petitioner-contractor on 15.2.2000. The plaintiff-petitioner started construction and seven shops were constructed. The rest of the work was to be completed but on 14.2.2001 when the Manager of the plaintiff Ratan Lal Sharma went to start work, it were Ram Prakash Bairwa and other 10-15 persons who took away their material. They stopped the labourers to work and ultimately it so happened that the work was stopped. A report was lodged to the police on 14.2.2001 about the incident. The plaintiff filed a suit along with an application for temporary injunction. 4. The case of the defendant-respondent was that only a work contract was given and that the labourers of the plaintiff were not in possession of any part of the property. It was admitted that contract was given to the plaintiff-petitioner on 17.1.99 and it was agreed that the old construction would be demolished for which an amount of Rs. 59,122/- would be paid while Rs. 4,19,252/- would be paid for work contract of the new construction. Material worth Rs. 12,22,921/- was given to the plaintiff- petitioner and a total amount of Rs. 6,62,900/- was paid to the petitioner. Thus, a sum of Rs. 1,84,527/- was paid in excess. It was further pleaded that about two months before the plaintiff-petitioner realised a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- from a third person as `pagri' and handed over possession of some property to him. The plaintiff stopped the work in the month of November, 2000 and despite contact did not restart. With the result that the defendant is getting the work done from Ram Prakash Bairwa. A wall was constructed and gate fixed which were demolished by the petitioner and his labourers on 17.2.2001. Objection about the pecuniary jurisdiction was also raised. The plaintiff stopped the work in the month of November, 2000 and despite contact did not restart. With the result that the defendant is getting the work done from Ram Prakash Bairwa. A wall was constructed and gate fixed which were demolished by the petitioner and his labourers on 17.2.2001. Objection about the pecuniary jurisdiction was also raised. The learned Civil Judge after perusing all the documents and hearing both the parties came to the conclusion that no contract was executed according to the provisions of the Contract Act and there existed no prima facie case. Hence, the petitioner was not entitled for temporary injunction. This order was affirmed by the learned District Judge while dismissing the appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Bangar Charitable Trust vide letter dated 15.2.2000 authorised the petitioner-plaintiff to carry on the work according to estimate and site plan. He also submitted that on 10.2.2001, a certificate was issued that the petitioner was carrying on work and the estimate was about Rs. fifty lacs and that the Trust was fully satisfied with the work of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner in view of these documents submitted that if the petitioner is not allowed to complete the work, the goodwill which he carries would be lost. He also submitted that there will be an irreparable injury to the petitioner-plaintiff and, therefore, the revision should be allowed. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent did admit that there was a contract but it related only to the labour and that the petitioner suddenly stopped working because of which the defendant suffered materially. He also submitted that when there are concurrent findings of the two courts below, this Court in view of the Supreme Court judgment will not interfere in the orders under the provisions of Section 115 CPC. He also submitted that there was no case of loss of goodwill as it was not set up in the plaint, rather it is a case of breach of contract and mandatory injunction cannot be granted. He also submitted that the petitioner-plaintiff can at the most bring a suit for damages for the breach of contract but he is not entitled for any relief under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. My attention has been drawn to various provisions of the Specific Relief Act. He also submitted that the petitioner-plaintiff can at the most bring a suit for damages for the breach of contract but he is not entitled for any relief under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. My attention has been drawn to various provisions of the Specific Relief Act. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act provides that there are certain contracts which cannot be specifically enforced and one of them is such a contract for the non-performance of which compensation is an adequate relief. So, if the petitioner's contract has not been completed then remedy does not he under the law of equity as Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act specifically bars it. Then Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act provides that in injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. In view of these provisions, the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner are not tenable. To say that goodwill of the petitioner's firm will be lost and the public opinion will be against him are perhaps the sentimental argument because the contract could not have been specifically enforced under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act as stated above. 7. It is settled law that when compensation can be given in the terms of money, no irreparable injury is caused. Learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff relied on Raj Kumar Bahal v. Food Corporation of India & Ors., AIR 1990 Raj. 64 in which work contract was given to the main contractor but the sub-contractor was executing the work. The contract was cancelled because of delay in execution and notice was given to the contractor but not to the sub-contractor. It was held that there was no illegality. This citation does not apply to the facts of the present case at all and is of no help to the petitioner. He also relied on Dalpat Kumar & Anr. v. Prahlad Singh & Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 719 in which principles to grant interim injunction have been restated. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to para No. 5 of this judgment which elucidates the irreparable injury and according to this citation, the irreparable injury means one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. So far as facts are concerned, they are different in this citation. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to para No. 5 of this judgment which elucidates the irreparable injury and according to this citation, the irreparable injury means one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. So far as facts are concerned, they are different in this citation. However, it cannot be said that the petitioner-plaintiff cannot be compensated adequately by way of damages. Having regard to the principles enunciated even in this citation, I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in this revision petition. The another citation relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner Agriculture Produce Market Committee Gondal & Ors. v. Girdharbhai Ranjibhai Chhaniyara & Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 468 is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court in Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Limited & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1272 has held that an injunction cannot be granted when it is specifically barred under the Special Relief Act. Present one is such a case. Secondly, there are concurrent findings of facts which cannot be interfered in revision. 8. Consequently, there is no force in this revision petition and it is o hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.Revision dismissed. *******