JUDGMENT - B.H. MARLAPALLE, J.:---This is a public interest petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and it came to be admitted by order dated 23rd August, 2001. Pursuant to the leave granted by this Court, respondent Nos. 8 to 12 have been subsequently impleaded. The substantial prayers, in this petition, read as under : “(B) By issuing appropriate writ or orders or directions or any other suitable writ or orders the election of the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 11 as Councilor(s), from respective ward(s) of Aurangabad Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad may please be quashed and set aside, on account of lack of basic qualification/eligibility i.e. not being from reserved Castes/Other backward Class Community, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of (K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan others)1, 1999 A.I.R. S.C.W. 1353 and respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 11 may please be declared as disqualified for holding any political and non-political post in Aurangabad Municipal Corporation or in any Local Self Government, as they had committed a fraud on the public at large by obtaining and submitting false caste certificates. Further, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 11 may please be directed to pay the expenses of last and future elections of concerned wards of Aurangabad Municipal Corporation because holding re-election will add an additional burden on public exchequer.” “(C) Exemplary costs may please be imposed on respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 11 for committing a fraud on society at large, Rule of Law and for contesting election from a constituency reserved for Other Backward Classes of citizens, voters of Aurangabad Municipal Corporation area and for making false declaration while submitting nomination paper for contesting election, then after elections while taking oath and for obtaining false caste certificates by filing false affidavits before concerned authorities.” 2. Petitioner No. 1 claims to be a social worker and a voter in Ward No. 64, though he is residing in Ward No. 63. Similarly, petitioner No. 2 is an elected Councillor from Ward No. 28, as an independent candidate. They have alleged that the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 11 submitted false/ bogus caste certificates alongwith their nomination forms for contesting the last held Municipal Corporation elections and also made a false declaration in the said nomination form. Similarly, petitioner No. 2 is an elected Councillor from Ward No. 28, as an independent candidate. They have alleged that the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 11 submitted false/ bogus caste certificates alongwith their nomination forms for contesting the last held Municipal Corporation elections and also made a false declaration in the said nomination form. Their nomination forms were accepted by the Returning Officer in spite of oral complaints/ protests and ultimately they contested the elections from the respective wards and got elected as Corporators in the month of April, 2000. The particulars of reserved seats and ward number of the respective respondents are as below : Name of the respondent Respdt. No. Ward No. Reserved for SC/OBC Shaikh Issak Shaikh Jainuddin. 3 71 OBC Gaji Sadoddin Gaji Jahir. 4 68 SC Naserkhan Sardarkhan 5 41 SC Abdul Rashid Abdul Sattar. 6 30 OBC Ayubkhan Sardarkhan 8 29 OBC Wadagale Sunil Buthwel 9 37 SC Sou. Babita Subhash Kagada. 10 80 SC (Woman) Vasant Pandurang Narwade. 11 63 OBC So far as the respondent No. 11 is concerned, his caste claim was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committed in the fresh round by order dated 21st September, 2001 and the said order has been upheld by us in Writ Petition No. 4219 of 2000 and by allowing Writ Petition No. 2885 of 2000 his election as corporator was quashed and set aside vide our judgment dated 5th/ 6th October, 2001, (Suhas s/o Anantrao Dashrathe v. State of Maharashtra)2, reported in 2002(2) Bom.C.R. 211 and, therefore, this petition is not pressed for against the said respondent. The respondent No. 12 is supporting the petitioners as an intervenor. 3. The petitioners contend that once the caste claim of an elected corporator is invalidated by the competent scrutiny committee, on a reference made by the respondent No. 2 he ceases to hold such an elected office and the remedy provided under section 16 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Corporations Act, for short) does not contemplate within its sweep for unseating such a corporator. Similarly, the provisions of section 10 of the Corporations Act have not provided for disqualification of the elected corporator on account of invalidation of his caste claim. Similarly, the provisions of section 10 of the Corporations Act have not provided for disqualification of the elected corporator on account of invalidation of his caste claim. It is also pointed out before us that though the State of Maharashtra has, in pursuant to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of (Director of Tribal Welfare, Government of (Andhra Pradesh v. Laveti Giri and another)3, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1506 and pursuant to our directions vide judgment dated 11th October, 2000 has enacted the “Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000” (for short, the Caste Verification Act) and though the same has been published in the Government Gazette dated 23rd May, 2001 the State Government has not issued a notification in the Official Gazette as yet as required under section 1(2) of the said Act and thus the Caste Verification Act has not come into force as at present. Section 10(4) and section 11 of the said Caste Verification Act do provide for the remedy of unseating the elected candidates pursuant to the invalidation of the caste claim but the said remedy as on today is on only paper and it cannot be enforced. It is for these reasons that the petitioners have approached this Court for directions to unseat respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 10 as corporators from the respective wards of the Aurangabad Municipal Corporation on the ground that their respective caste claims have been invalidated by the concerned verification committees and though these invalidation orders have been passed long back, no steps were taken either by the respondent No. 2 or the respondent No. 7 for holding fresh elections for the respective wards. It is also pointed out that all these respondents had challenged the orders passed by the verification committee invalidating their caste claim and in some petitions ad interim stay was obtained and in some others there was no stay order even for a period of about one year. The petitioners further alleged that neither the Municipal Corporation nor the State Election Commission has taken any steps to get the ad interim orders vacated in the respective petitions. The petitioners further alleged that neither the Municipal Corporation nor the State Election Commission has taken any steps to get the ad interim orders vacated in the respective petitions. The respondent No. 2 has placed before us the correspondence it had with the State Election Commission and it had taken up the issue with the Commission, as soon as the orders were received from the Committee and sought further advice. The Commission did precious little in response and the corporators concerned remained in office. 4. Shri Golegaonkar, the learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 8 has raised preliminary objections to the maintainability of this petition and these objections have also been supported by the learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 5 and 10 as well as respondent No. 9. The objections so raised are: (a) In view of the bar created by Article 243-ZG (b) of the Constitution no election of a corporator can be called in question except by an election petition to be presented under section 16 of the Corporations Act; (b) such election petitions have been filed against respondent Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 and on the same grounds as are raised in the instant petition i.e. submission of false caste certificates or making false caste claim to contest the election against a reserved seat for the respective categories and, therefore, the relief sought for in the instant petition is already sub-judice before the competent Court (Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad); (c) the right to contest an election is a statutory right and an elected candidate can be sought to be unseated only by way of such a statutory remedy viz. an election petition under section 16 of the Corporations Act; (d) neither the respodent No. 2 nor the respondent No. 7 have the powers to refer, for verification, the caste claims of those corporators who have been elected against reserved seats and, in any case, the scrutiny committee concerned is not empowered, in the eyes of law, to verify such caste claims. The veracity of the caste can be gone into by the election petition Court by adducing evidence and the adjudication in respect of the caste claim is already sub-judice before the said Court and, therefore, another parallel forum cannot be allowed to have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim which is already pending in an election petition. The veracity of the caste can be gone into by the election petition Court by adducing evidence and the adjudication in respect of the caste claim is already sub-judice before the said Court and, therefore, another parallel forum cannot be allowed to have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim which is already pending in an election petition. It was for the election petition Court to adjudicate this claim either on its own or by inviting expert views by way of evidence being recorded before it. 5. We shall deal with the last issue first and we note that the elections of respondent Nos. 3 to 6 have been challenged by filing election petitions though in one case such a petition has been presented belatedly and it is not known certainly whether the petition has been registered, as yet. It is also not known whether the returned candidates, who are the respodents before us and who are facing these election petitions, have filed their response before the Court concerned and taken any objections regarding the maintainability of the petition on account of either jurisdiction or limitations. We shall consider the objection so taken independently. 6. The Government of Maharashtra issued a Government Resolution on 1st January, 1998 and directed that the caste claim of those elected representatives to the local self governing bodies against seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Class shall be referred for verification by the competent verification committee. We shall consider the objection so taken independently. 6. The Government of Maharashtra issued a Government Resolution on 1st January, 1998 and directed that the caste claim of those elected representatives to the local self governing bodies against seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Class shall be referred for verification by the competent verification committee. The directives in paras 2 and 3 of the said Government Resolution are reproduced hereinbelow : ^^2- LFkkfud LojkT; laLFkkaP;k fuoM.kwdkae/;s vuqlwfpr tkrh] foeqDr tkrh] HkVD;k tekrh] brj ekxkloxZ ;kaP;klkBh dkgh tkxk jk[kho Bso.;kr ;srkr- vnj tkxkaoj dkgh mesnokj [kksV;k tkrhP;k izek.ki=kP;k vk/kkjs fuoM.kwd y kys vkgs- v'kk [kksV;k izek.ki=kph iMrkG.kh d:u ?ks.ks dzzeizkIr vkgs] R;klkBh 'kklu [kkyhy izek.ks vkns'k nsr vkgsr- ^^3- LFkkfud LojkT; laLFkkP;k fuoM.kwdkae/;s vuwlwfpr tkrh] ukxjhdkaP;k ekxkLoxhZ;ka lkBh ¼brj ekxkLoxhZ; o foeqDr tkrh½ dkgh tkxk jk[kho Bso.;kr ;srkr- lnj jk[kho tkxsoj [kksV;k tkrhP;k izek.ki=kOnkjs fuoM.kwdk y kY;kuarj jk[kho ernkj la?kkrwu fuoMwu vkysY;k loZ mesnokjkaps tkrh tekrhps izek.ki=s lacaf/kr ftYgkf/kdkjh ;kauh lacaf/kr tkrh izek.ki= iMrkG.kh lferhdMs 15 fnolkP;k vkr vko';d R;k dkxni=kalg ikBokohr o lacaf/kr tkrh izek.ki= iMrkG.kh lferhus v'kk mesnokjkaP;k tkrh nkO;kph iMrkG.kh 45 fnolkP;k vkr d:u vkiyk fu.kZ; lacaf/kr ftYgkf/kdk;kadMs u pqdrk ikBokok-^^ As per the said resolution the District Collector was required to send these caste claims for verification within 15 days from the declaration of election results and the verification committee, in turn, was required to adjudicate the said claims within a period of 45 days and communicate the decision to the Collector concerned without fail. Based on the Government Resolution dated 1st January, 1998, 31st December, 1998 and 19th April, 1999 the State Election Commission issued a circular on 4th June, 1999 and directed the Commissioners of the respective Municipal Corporations to refer the caste claims of the corporators elected against reserved seats and such reference was not left to the Collector or to the Divisional Commissioner concerned. The State Election Commission issued a communication dated 10th September, 1999 and informed the Municipal Commissioners as well as the District Collectors all over the State that the period of 15 days to refer the caste claims for verification was removed. The State Government issued a Government Resolution on 25th of January, 2000 and specifically designated the caste verification committees for the respective revenue divisions. The State Government issued a Government Resolution on 25th of January, 2000 and specifically designated the caste verification committees for the respective revenue divisions. On 17th April, 2000 the State Election Commission addressed a letter to the Municipal Commissioner of Aurangabad as well as New Mumbai and directed that the caste claims of all the corporators elected against the seats reserved for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Class be referred to the concerned verification committees. From these resolutions, as well as circulars, it is evident that the State Government has constituted caste verification committees for verification of the caste claims of the elected members to the local self governing bodies like Village Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti, Zilla Parishad, Municipal Council and Municipal Corporation and in the case of the Municipal Corporations the reference for such verification is required to be made by the Municipal Commissioner concerned whereas in other cases it is the Collector of the concerned district who has to make a reference. The Government Resolutions have also set out guidelines for the working of the verification committees in keeping with the law laid down by the Apex Court from time to time. The State Election Commission is enjoined with the powers of superintendence, direction and control over the elections of the Municipal Corporations in view of the scheme of section 14 of the Corporations Act. These powers are in relation to holding the elections as well as to do all such subsequent acts in connection with the said elections even after they are held. If there were corporators elected against reserved seats the State Election Commission has the powers within the ambit of section 14 to issue necessary instructions/ directions for verification of the caste claims of those elected representatives who contested the elections against the reserved seats and these are the powers ancillary to holding the elections and superintendence thereon. In the case of (Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others)4, 1995(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)690 the Supreme Court, in no uncertain words, held that verification of social status claim is the job of an expert committee and such an expert body is required to be constituted for verification of such claims. Guidelines were, therefore, issued by the Apex Court which were subsequently modified by order dated 28th April, 1997 which is reported in the case of (Kumari Madhuri Patil another v. Addl. Guidelines were, therefore, issued by the Apex Court which were subsequently modified by order dated 28th April, 1997 which is reported in the case of (Kumari Madhuri Patil another v. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development, Thane others)5, 1998(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)479 regarding the constitution of the committee and its coram as well as the Vigilance Enquiry Committee etc. In view of the law laid down in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra) it would be implied that a Civil Court or a Court trying the election petition would not have the powers or the competence to adjudicate upon such claims and these claims are required to be adjudicated upon by the specially constituted verification committees. Even when a returned candidate's caste is disputed in a pending election petition, it would be appropriate for the election petition Court to refer the dispute to the competent caste verification committee and proceed further on the basis of the adjudication so done in a given case. Even there, there will be some difficulty before such Court in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil's case (supra) wherein it has been, inter alia held that the order passed by the scrutiny committee shall be subject to challenge before this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and further appeal, if any, would be only under Article 136 of the Constitution, to the Supreme Court. We, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that the respondent Nos. 2 and 7 have acted within their powers to refer the caste claims of respondent Nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 10 for verification to the concerned caste verification committees at Aurangabad and the said committees have been empowered to adjudicate upon the respective claims in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra) and the Government Resolutions issued from time to time. We, therefore, reject the fourth objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent/ corporators. 7. Coming to the point of maintainability of the petition, in view of the scheme of Article 243-ZG (b) of the Constitution it would be necessary to reproduce the provisions of section 16 of the Corporations Act : “16. We, therefore, reject the fourth objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent/ corporators. 7. Coming to the point of maintainability of the petition, in view of the scheme of Article 243-ZG (b) of the Constitution it would be necessary to reproduce the provisions of section 16 of the Corporations Act : “16. (1) If the qualification of any person declared to be elected a councillor is disputed, or if the validity of any election is questioned, whether by reason of the improper rejection by the State Election Commissioner of a nomination, or of the improper reception or refusal of a vote, or by reason of a material irregularity in the election proceedings, corrupt practice, or any other thing materially affecting the result of the election, any person enrolled in the municipal election roll may at any time within ten days after the result of the election has been declared submit an application to the Judge for the determination of the dispute or question. (2) The State Election Commissioner may, if it has reason to believe that an election has not been a free election by reason of the large number of cases in which undue influence or bribery has been exercised or committed by order in writing, authorise any officer of the Commission to make an application to the Judge at any time within one month after the result of the election has been declared for declaration that the election of the returned candidate or candidates is void. (2-A) No election to any Corporation shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the Judge referred to in sub-section (1) and no Judge other than the Judge referred to in sub-section (1) shall entertain any dispute in respect of such election. (3) The Judge shall decide the applications made under sub-section (1) or (2) after holding an inquiry in the manner provided by or under this Act.” The term “corrupt practice” has been defined in the explanation provided below the said section. The procedure for election inquiries has been set out under section 403 of the Corporations Act. Sub-sections (1), (3), (5) and (6) are relevant for our considerations and the provisions of section 403 of the said Act are required to be read with in conjunction with the provisions of section 16 alone and not independently. The procedure for election inquiries has been set out under section 403 of the Corporations Act. Sub-sections (1), (3), (5) and (6) are relevant for our considerations and the provisions of section 403 of the said Act are required to be read with in conjunction with the provisions of section 16 alone and not independently. The provisions of Article 243-ZG (b) read thus : “243-ZG. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters.---(a) ... ... ... (b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State.” The language of Article 243-ZG(b) of the Constitution clearly stipulates that no election to the Corporation shall be called in question except by an election petition to be presented under section 16 of the Corporations Act. The constitutional mandate is certainly binding on all the courts. However, we have to examine whether the dispute raised in this petition falls within the ambit of section 16 of the Corporations Act. Before we deal with this issue, we refer to the decisions cited on behalf of the respondents/ corporations. 8. In the case of (N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem District others)6, A.I.R. 1952(39) S.C. 64 the Supreme Court considered whether the law of elections in this Country contemplated that there should be two attacks on the matters connected with election proceedings viz. one by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution while the elections are going on and secondly by way of an election petition after the elections are held. The Supreme Court considered the provisions of Articles 324, 327, 328 and 329 of the Constitution as well as the provisions of the Representation of People Act and held that the said Act provided for only one remedy viz. an election petition to be presented after the election is over and there was no remedy provided at any intermediate stage. This was so because of the constitutional mandate under Article 329 (b) read with the provisions of the Representation of People Act. In the case of (Jyoti Basu and others v. Debi Ghosal and others)7, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 983 the Supreme Court, in para 8, stated thus : “8. This was so because of the constitutional mandate under Article 329 (b) read with the provisions of the Representation of People Act. In the case of (Jyoti Basu and others v. Debi Ghosal and others)7, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 983 the Supreme Court, in para 8, stated thus : “8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at Common Law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to Common Law and Equity must remain strangers to Election Law unless statutorily embodied. A Court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such matters, as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. ... ..." In the case of (Krishna Ballabh Prasad Singh v. Sub Divisional Officer Hilsa-cum-Returning Officer and others)8, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1746 the Supreme Court held that the election process concludes only after the declarations is made by the Returning Officer regarding results of the election and the bar of Article 329 (b) of the Constitution come into operation only thereafter and an election petition alone was maintainable. A writ petition cannot be entertained when the election process was in progress. This was in keeping with the law laid down by the larger Bench earlier in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami (supra). In the case of (Boddula Krishnaiah and another v. State Election Commissioner, A.P. and others)9, (1996)3 S.C.C. 416 the Supreme Court, in para 11, observed : “11. This was in keeping with the law laid down by the larger Bench earlier in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami (supra). In the case of (Boddula Krishnaiah and another v. State Election Commissioner, A.P. and others)9, (1996)3 S.C.C. 416 the Supreme Court, in para 11, observed : “11. Thus, it would be clear that once an election process has been set in motion, though the High Court may entertain or may have already entertained a writ petition, it would not be justified in interfering with the election process giving direction to the election officer to stall the proceedings or to conduct the election process afresh, in particular when election has already been held in which the voters were allegedly prevented from exercising their franchise. As seen, that dispute is covered by an election dispute and remedy is thus available at law for redressal.” In the said case the elections to the Gram Panchayat were brought in question. In the case of (Jaspal Singh Arora v. State of M.P. and others)10, (1998)9 S.C.C. 594 the Supreme Court held that the bar to interference by courts in electoral matters contained in Article 243-ZG of the Constitution was apparently overlooked by the High Court in allowing the writ petition and apart from the bar under Article 243-ZG, on settled principles interference under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of setting aside election to a municipality was not called for because of the statutory provision for election petition and also the fact that an earlier writ petition for the same purpose by a defeated candidate had been dismissed by the High Court. In the case of (Anugrah Narain Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others)11, (1996)6 S.C.C. 303 the question that had come up before the Allahabad High Court was, as to whether in terms of Article 243-ZG of the Constitution there is a complete and absolute bar in considering any matter relating the municipal election on any ground whatsoever after the publication of the notification for holding municipal election and the Supreme Court answered the same question in the affirmative by holding that the bar imposed by Article 243-ZG is twofold viz. (a) validity of laws relating to delimitation and allotment of seats made under Article 243-ZA cannot be questioned in any Court, and (b) no election to a municipality can be questioned except by an election petition. (a) validity of laws relating to delimitation and allotment of seats made under Article 243-ZA cannot be questioned in any Court, and (b) no election to a municipality can be questioned except by an election petition. Further, the Apex Court held that if the election is imminent or well under way, the Court should not intervene to stop the election process and if this was allowed to be done no election would ever take place because someone or the other would always find some excuse to move the Court and stall the elections. 9. In the case at hand, we are not dealing with a challenge to an election process at an intermediary stage and we are required to consider the bar of Article 243-ZG (b) of the Constitution qua the provisions of section 16 of the Corporations Act. As per sub-section (1) of the said section any person enrolled in the municipal election rolls may, at any time, within ten days after the result of the election has been declared, submit an application to the Judge for the determination of the dispute or question in respect of the following issues: (a) if the qualification of any person declared to be elected as councillor is disputed; (b) if the validity of any election is questioned (i) whether by reason of the improper rejection, by the State Election Commission, of a nomination or (ii) of the improper reception or refusal of a vote or (iii) by reason of material irregularity in the election proceedings; (c) corrupt practice, or (d) any other thing materially affecting the result of the election. Undoubtedly, these are the only disputes or questions on the basis of which an election petition could be filed under section 16 of the Corporations Act. The returned candidate's disqualification, on account of invalidation of his caste claim, is not contemplated to be a subject matter of dispute which falls within the ambit of section 16(1) of the Corporations Act. The bar contemplated under sub-section (2-A) also refers to election petition submitted under sub-section (1) and not for any other reasons. Subsection (1) and (2-A) are, therefore, required to be read together. Sub-section (3) empowers the Judge to decide the applications made under subsection (1) or (2) after holding an inquiry in the manner provided by or under the Corporations Act. Subsection (1) and (2-A) are, therefore, required to be read together. Sub-section (3) empowers the Judge to decide the applications made under subsection (1) or (2) after holding an inquiry in the manner provided by or under the Corporations Act. Subsection (2) empowers the State Election Commission to make an application to the Judge, at any time, within one month after the result of the election has been declared for declaration that the election of the returned candidate or candidates is void. 10. Section 8 prescribes the qualifications for a voter and section 9 prescribes qualifications for elections as a councillor. Section 11 sets out disabilities from continuing as a councillor and section 12 deals with the questions as to disqualification to be determined by the Judge. Sections 11 and 12 are required to be read together and if so read it is clear that the reference to the Judge under section 12 can be made only in respect of the issues/ disabilities as set out under section 11 or 10 and none else. Section 10 sets out disqualifications for being elected and for being a councillor. However, in the long list of the contingencies, as set out under the said section, the disqualification on account of invalidation of caste claim is not included. We had examined the scheme of sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16 of the Corporations Act in Writ Petition No. 2885 of 2000 and vide our judgment dated 11th October, 2000 it was held that the remedy of filing an election petition, seeking to unseat the returned candidate on the ground of invalidation of his caste claim, is not available by an election petition to be submitted under section 16 of the Corporations Act. The said view has been reaffirmed by us in our subsequent judgment dated 5th/ 6th October, 2001. 11. In the case of K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan and another, A.I.R. 1999 S.C.W. 1353 the returned candidate of the Lalgudi Assembly Constituency in Tamil Nadu was not an elector in the electoral roll and his election was challenged in a writ petition before the Madras High Court. 11. In the case of K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan and another, A.I.R. 1999 S.C.W. 1353 the returned candidate of the Lalgudi Assembly Constituency in Tamil Nadu was not an elector in the electoral roll and his election was challenged in a writ petition before the Madras High Court. The election was set aside and in appeal the Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier judgments in the cases of N.P. Ponnuswami (supra), (Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh)12, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 520; (Brundaban Nayak v. Election Commission of India)13, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1892; (Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi)14, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851; Krushna Ballab Prasad Singh (supra), (Election Commission of India v. Shivaji)15, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 61, observed in paras 26, 27 and 28, as under : “26. The question that arises for consideration is if in such circumstances High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution declaring that the appellant is not qualified to be member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly from Lalgudi Assembly Constituency. On the finding recorded by the High Court it is clear that the appellant in his nomination form impersonated a person known as Venkatachalam s/o Pethu, taking advantage of the fact that such person bears his first name. Appellant would be even criminally liable as he filed his nomination on affidavit impersonating himself. If in such circumstances he is allowed to continue to sit and vote in the Assembly his action would be fraud to the Constitution.” “27. ... ... Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in widest possible term and unless there is clear bar to jurisdiction of the High Court its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised when there is any act which is against any provision of law or violative of constitutional provisions and when recourse cannot be had to the provisions of the Act for the appropriate relief. In circumstances like the present one bar of Article 329 (b) will not come into play when case falls under Articles 191 and 193 and whole of the election process is over. Consider the case where the person elected is not a citizen of India. Would the Court allow a foreign citizen to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly and not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?” “28. Consider the case where the person elected is not a citizen of India. Would the Court allow a foreign citizen to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly and not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?” “28. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and declared that the appellant was not entitled to sit in Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly with consequent restraint order on him from functioning as a member of the Legislative Assembly. The net effect is that the appellant ceases to be a member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. Period of the Legislative Assembly is long since over. Otherwise we would have directed respondent No. 2, who is Secretary to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, to intimate to Election Commission that Lalgudi Assembly Constituency seat has fallen vacant and for the Election Commission to take necessary steps to hold fresh election from that Assembly Constituency. ... ...” 12. When a person is contesting elections against a reserved seat he is required to submit a declaration in the nomination form (Part-II of the nomination form) to the effect that he belongs to a reserved category, as applicable to the State of Maharashtra and on the basis of such declaration the nomination form is not only accepted but is also held to be valid. If the caste claim, on reference, is invalidated by the competent verification committee it has to be held that the returned candidate made a false declaration and suppressed the disqualification that he had, to contest against a seat reserved. This disqualification was at the threshold and but for the false declaration having been made his nomination could not have been accepted to be a valid nomination and if such a false declaration was not made the nomination paper ought to have been rejected. If a candidate sustains the basic disqualification from contesting an election, it is certainly provided under the scheme of section 12 to make a reference to the Judge and section 12 will have to be read together with section 405 of the Corporations Act. If a candidate sustains the basic disqualification from contesting an election, it is certainly provided under the scheme of section 12 to make a reference to the Judge and section 12 will have to be read together with section 405 of the Corporations Act. However, the disability on account of the caste claim is not contemplated as a disqualification either under section 10 or section 11 of the Corporations Act, as at present and this lacuna has been sought to be filled in by the provisions of section 10(4) of the Caste Verification Act which has not yet come into force. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view, that this Court has powers to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to unseat the returned candidates whose caste claims have been invalidated. Our view is re-enforced by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (B.R.Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu another)16, J.T. 2001(8) S.C. 40, (popularly known as “Jayalalitha case”. A candidate who is elected against a reserved seat can not continue to represent the electorate immediately after invalidiation of his caste and this disability/disqualification did exist right at the time when he submitted the nomination form and hence the declaration made by the verification committee relates back to the stage of submission of nomination form. Such a person was not eligible to contest the said election against a seat reserved for the respective category. 13. There is one more aspect which requires to be highlighted on this issue. The election petition, as contemplated under section 16, is required to be filed within 10 days from declaration of the election results. As per the Government Resolutions issued by the State Government from time to time the Municipal Commissioner can make reference for caste verification at any time and the initial limit of 15 days has been removed. Thereafter, the verification committee is expected to verify the caste claim within a period of 45 days and invariably the committees do not maintain this time schedule. We are informed that the respondent No. 2 referred as many as 39 cases for caste verification as back as on 26th of April, 2000 and even by now result in five of these cases is still awaited. The adjudication process has taken three months to one year in cases which have been decided by the verification committee. We are informed that the respondent No. 2 referred as many as 39 cases for caste verification as back as on 26th of April, 2000 and even by now result in five of these cases is still awaited. The adjudication process has taken three months to one year in cases which have been decided by the verification committee. There is no provision under section 16 of the Corporations Act for condonation of delay. The State Government was alive to this factual as well as legal position and, therefore, it has rightly incorporated section 10 in the Caste Verification Act. The legislature was, thus, aware that within the ambit of section 16 of the Corporations Act an election petition was not contemplated for unseating a corporator who is elected against a reserved seat and whose caste claim has been subsequently invalidated. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondent corporators also raised a plea of pendency of the election petitions, in some cases. If the availability of an alternative remedy under section 16 of the Corporations Act is not applicable for unseating a returned candidate whose caste claim has been invalidated, pendency of such election petition in such cases is no bar in entertaining this petition inasmuch when the dispute itself is not covered it cannot be adjudicated in the pending petitions as well. We are, therefore, of the view that the pendency of the election petitions, against some of these elected respondent corporators, would not detain us from entertaining this petition. 15. The statutory remedy provided under section 16 is not a remedy in the cases at hand wherein the corporators' caste claim has been invalidated and the said orders passed by the Committee have been upheld by us in separate writ petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. When no other remedy is available or there is no provision in the Corporations Act to disqualify the elected corporators on account of invalidation of their caste claim, surely the petitioners have the right to approach us invoking our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution so as to unseat these corporators. The preliminary points, opposing the petition, must, therefore, fail on all counts. 16. Respondent No. 3 contested the election from Ward No. 71 against a seat reserved for O.B.C. His caste claim was initially invalidated by order dated 12th October, 2000. The preliminary points, opposing the petition, must, therefore, fail on all counts. 16. Respondent No. 3 contested the election from Ward No. 71 against a seat reserved for O.B.C. His caste claim was initially invalidated by order dated 12th October, 2000. The said order has been set aside by us and remanded for fresh adjudication as set out in our judgment rendered separately today in Writ Petition No. 3906 of 2000. We have also put some restrictions on him as a Corporator and these restrictions shall continue to operate till his caste claim is finally decided in his favour. Same is the case in respect of respondent No. 8 who has approached us in Writ Petition No. 3907 of 2001 against the order of the scrutiny committee on 14th February, 2001. The said petition has been partly allowed by us by a remand order. Respondent No. 4 was elected from Ward No. 68 against a seat reserved for Scheduled Caste. Similarly, respondent No. 5 came to be elected from Ward No. 41 also against a seat reserved for Scheduled Caste. Both of them profess Islam and we held that in view of the provisions of para 3 of the Presidential Order, 1976 the benefit of Scheduled Caste is available only to the persons professing Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism (Nav Buddhas) and the persons professing Islam or Christianity are not entitled for the benefits of Scheduled Castes. The claim of these respondents has, therefore, been negatived by the scrutiny committee and the said order has been confirmed by us while dismissing Writ Petition No. 4332 of 2000 and 3085 of 2001, both decided by a common judgment on 23rd October, 2001. Respondent No. 6 was elected from Ward No. 30 against a seat reserved for O.B.C. and his caste claim was invalidated by the committee vide order dated 25th January, 2000. The said order has been confirmed by us in Writ Petition No. 3905 of 2001 vide our judgment rendered today separately. Respondent No. 9 was elected from Ward No. 37 against a seat reserved for Scheduled Caste and same is the case with respondent No. 10 who is elected from Ward No. 80. The said order has been confirmed by us in Writ Petition No. 3905 of 2001 vide our judgment rendered today separately. Respondent No. 9 was elected from Ward No. 37 against a seat reserved for Scheduled Caste and same is the case with respondent No. 10 who is elected from Ward No. 80. The respective caste claims have been invalidated by the verification committee vide order dated 28th August, 2000 and 11th September, 2000 respectively and these orders have been confirmed by us in Writ Petition No. 1641 of 2001 and 1768 of 2001, judgments in both the petitions are rendered on 23rd October, 2001. 17. Under these circumstances we reaffirm our view in Writ Petition Nos. 2885 of 2000 and hold that the elected corporators viz. respondent Nos. 4 (Gazi Sadoddin Gaji Jahir Ahemad), 5 (Naserkhan Sardarkhan), 6 (Abdul Rashid Abdul Sattar), 9 (Wadagale Sunil Buthwel) and 10 (Sow. Babita Subhash Kagada) are disqualified to continue to be the Corporators elected from the respective wards of the Aurangabad Municipal Corporation any more so on account of their caste claims having been invalidated and thus they were disqualified to contest the said elections. We direct the Commissioner of Aurangabad Municipal Corporation to inform the State Election Commission that the said Corporators' seats from the respective wards of Aurangabad Municipal Corporation have fallen vacant and to take necessary steps as contemplated under section 18 of the Corporations Act forthwith. We also deem it appropriate to direct the State Election Commission to issue appropriate instructions so as to ensure that the nomination forms filled in by the persons professing any other religion other than Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism (Nav Buddha) are not accepted for any elections against seats reserved for Scheduled Castes in such elections and also to take suitable steps to modify the nomination forms in the respective elections. This should be done at the earliest possible and may be within two weeks from today. So far as respondent Nos. 3 and 8 are concerned the petition fails against them and each one of them shall be bound by the restrictions we have imposed until their respective caste claims are finally decided in their favour. This should be done at the earliest possible and may be within two weeks from today. So far as respondent Nos. 3 and 8 are concerned the petition fails against them and each one of them shall be bound by the restrictions we have imposed until their respective caste claims are finally decided in their favour. In case their caste claims are finally held against them, the provisions of section 10(4) of the Caste Verification Act shall operate against them forthwith, should the State Government bring into force the said Caste Verification Act as directed by us. Petition is partly allowed and rule is made absolute in terms of the above directions but without any orders as to costs. 18. At this stage, the learned Counsel representing the unseated respondent corporators pray for stay of this order. We have noted that the caste claims have been invalidated about a year ago, in some cases, in some other cases the caste claims were remanded for fresh verification and thus they continued to be elected corporators for about one year after the claims were invalidated. On the facts of these cases, we are satisfied that the prayer so made is devoid of merits and, therefore, the same is hereby rejected. Steno copies be provided to the respective parties. Petition partly allowed. -----