Honble MADAN, J.–This second appeal is directed against the judgment of the first appellate court which has confirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs suit for permanent injunction. (2). The facts relevant for,deciding the appeal are that as per his case, appellant (plaintiff) has been in continuous possession of his ancestors land presently situated in Jaipur City Chowkri Haweli Shahar (Hanuman Badri, Amer Road) which is land of Mandir Shri Kala Hanumanji duly surrounded by Pucca Boundary Walls. According to him, the suit land has been in management and continuous possession of his ancestors for more than 300 years; at the time of death of his grand father, his father Mahant Ramnarainji was minor, therefore, during minority of appellants father, the management of the land, temple and property was managed by Mahakma Punya as mentioned in Misal No.10 of Samvat year 1986. Further, it is his case that management of the said temple and suit land property was transferred to majority on the appellants father on attaining his majority on the recommendation of Mahkma Punya by Kefiyat cum order No.236 dt. 17/12/1906 i.e. dt. 27/2/47, to which acceptance was given by order dt. 18/3/1947 in favour of his father and thereupon after demise of his father, the appellant has been in possession thereof. However, upon proclamation of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagir Act, the land in his 1952 (for short Jagir Act), the land in his possession alongwith surrounding walls were accepted as private property description of which is said to have been shown in the plaint, itself. It has also been the case of the plaintiff (appellant) that after death of his father on 26/2/76, the Deputy Collector (Jagir) 07/04/77 declared the appellant as successor of his father and since then he has been in continuous possession of his ancestral suit land and property as successor of Mahant Ramnarain. (3). The dispute arose when suddenly on 25/12/89 the defendants (respondents) namely Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) & Ramcharan of Prachya Vidhyapeeth Museum Trust tried to dispossess the appellant, therefore, suit for permanent injunction was filed, to which no written statement was filed on behalf of the JDA, but Prachya Vidhyapeeth Museum (defendant/respondent No.2) filed written statement to the plaint. (3). The dispute arose when suddenly on 25/12/89 the defendants (respondents) namely Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) & Ramcharan of Prachya Vidhyapeeth Museum Trust tried to dispossess the appellant, therefore, suit for permanent injunction was filed, to which no written statement was filed on behalf of the JDA, but Prachya Vidhyapeeth Museum (defendant/respondent No.2) filed written statement to the plaint. After framing issues, recording the evidence and hearing both the parties, the learned trial court dismissed plaintiffs suit by its judgment dated 03/03/97, against which first appeal was preferred by the appellant but it was also dismissed by the lower appellate court affirming the dismissal of the suit by the impugned judgment. Hence this second appeal. (4). Upon issuing show cause notice as to why this appeal be not admitted and heard finally at admission stage and on service of the show cause notice, learned counsel for the respondents filed their power. Since defendant No.2 Ramcharan died on 18/5/2000, application to bring his L/rs on record was filed to which reply had been filed to the effect that Ramcharan has not been impleased as respondent in his individual capacity but respondent No.2 is Shriram Charan Prachya Vidhyapeeth Museum Trust, which was represented through its Chairman Ramcharan, after whose death, new Chairman is Saraswati Sharma. Hence after taking note of submission of learned counsel for the respondent that since respondent No.2 which is a Trust, it would be better if represented by its new Chairman, this Court by its order dated 27/3/2001 directed that the respondent No.2 be represented through its newly appointed Chairman. Amended cause title has been filed. (5). Both the learned counsel for the parties were heard on the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the courts below have not committed gross error by misconstruing and wrongly interpreting documents (Exs.1, 4 to 8) and whether these documents related to the suit land? (2) Whether the suit land stood proved to be in continuous possession of appellant and/or his ancestors for more than 300 years and if so, the suit for permanent injunction is maintainable without seeking declaration? (2) Whether the suit land stood proved to be in continuous possession of appellant and/or his ancestors for more than 300 years and if so, the suit for permanent injunction is maintainable without seeking declaration? (3) Whether by virtue of provisions of Sec. 95(4) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (for short the Land Revenue Act) the land being in possession of appellants father during proclamation of the Revenue Act, became property of the appellant thereby could not vest in the JDA u/Sec. 54 of the JDA Act? (4) Whether plaintiffs suit could have been dismissed under impugned judgments without JDA (defendant) having filed written statement and without denial of plaint averments and in the presence of written statement of the co-defendant whom the JDA had allotted suit land? (5) Whether allotment made by the JDA in favour of co- defendant without vesting suit land in JDA is non-est under the law? (6) Whether in case of the plaintiff being proved in lawful possession of the suit land he could be dispossessed without due process of law under the garb of dismissal of the suit under the impugned judgments? (6). I have perused the impugned judgments of the courts below. Shri R.P. Garg learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was not given any opportunity to lead evidence as Exs.4, 5 & 6 relating to the suit land and also to establish his continuous possession from the time of his ancestors, and without examining this vital aspect of the matter, the trial Court erred in law in dismissing his suit. It is the appellants case that aforesaid documents created a right of continuous possession in his favour so also his ancestors, being successor of Mahant Ramnarainji, inasmuch as Exs.7 & 8 proved factum of continuous possession. Further contention is that as per requirement of S.54 of the JDA Act, 1982, the suit land never vested in the JDA nor could have been allotted to the defendant No.2 and, therefore, once no rights were created in favour of defendant No.2, how could it be assumed that the JDA was competent to create right by transferring or alienating suit land for sale consideration in his favour? It has also been urged that report of Patwari Halka Nahargarh dt 28/2/77 proved the fact that Mahant Ramnarainji & his sons Mahesh Sharma (plaintiff) and Suresh are in continuous possession of suit land duly surrounded by boundary walls & gates. (7). The appellant did also want to prove by tendering in evidence ``Kifayat & orders of Mahkma Punia which have been marked as Exs.4, 5 & 6. Ex.4 dt 25/8/1929 was an order of the Mahakma Punya in relation to Bhograi of Mandir Kala Hanumanji having been passed in favour of appellants father and according to Ex.4, five bighas of land is shown as such, which has also been supported by other subsequent orders. Thus, trial Court misconstrued aforesaid exhibits and therefore, the impugned judgments are perverse. (8). Since the appellant claimed his right, title and interest over the suit land through his father, Shri Garg for the appellant highlighted the order dt 15/2/1977 of the Tehsildar Jaipur District, according to which u/S. 92 of the Revenue Act proceedings though were initiated against father of appellant as to the suit land but dropped, but the courts below failed to examine this aspect of the matter under impugned judgments and in my view also it has resulted in miscarriage of justice and so the impugned judgments are liable to be set aside. (9). As regards Khatoni (record of rights) (Ex-1) which was tendered in evidence by the plaintiff, the trial court misconstrued it by not appreciating the evidence of possession in favour of plaintiff in its true perspective, whereby it stands proved that Khasra No.169/4 and 191 so also ``Gair Mumkin abadi were surrounded by boundary walls and having two gates only. Similarly as rightly contended by Shri R.P.Garg, the courts below erred in law in ignoring statements of Mahesh (plaintiff) (PW-1), Shivprasad (PW-2), Jodharam (PW-3) & Mukesh (PW-4) which proved continuous possession of plaintiff appellant. Hence ignoring such vital aspects while dismissing the suit, the impugned judgments are liable to be set aside. (10). As regards vesting of the suit land with the JDA u/Sec. 54 of the JDA Act, relevant question to be considered was as to whether suit land which was in ``Gair Mumkin abadi and not Siwai Chak (Unirrigated land), could deem to have vested with the JDA as per Sections 103, 102-A & 92 of the Land Revenue Act. (10). As regards vesting of the suit land with the JDA u/Sec. 54 of the JDA Act, relevant question to be considered was as to whether suit land which was in ``Gair Mumkin abadi and not Siwai Chak (Unirrigated land), could deem to have vested with the JDA as per Sections 103, 102-A & 92 of the Land Revenue Act. That being so, unless and until this aspect was clarified and established on record, in my considered view, how could the suit land be held to have vested in the JDA in the absence of any mutation order having been passed as per revenue records in favour of the JDA indisputably the best person or authority to clarify this aspect of the matter could be non-else than JDA, itself. But curiously enough this aspect was again ignored and not considered by the courts below, which is an error apparent on the face of record and deserves to be interfered with. (11). That apart, though allotment letter issued in favour of the defendant No.2 as to the suit land was proved but unless it is established that the suit land was given in possession to the Trust defendant No.2 it could not be inferred that he was in lawful possession thereof. Thus it is a case of total misconstruction of document and misappreciation of evidence. As propounded by the Apex Court in Bhusawal B. Municipality vs. Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. (1), on which Shri Garg has placed reliance, misconstruction of a .document which is not merely of evidentiary value but one upon which the claim of a party is based would be an error of law, which this Court in second appeal would be entitled to correct it. In Jadu Gopal vs. Pannalal (2), cited by Shri Garg, the Apex Court observed as under:- ``In a suit to set aside earlier compromise decree on ground that it was obtained by collusion and fraud, the plaintiff set up the plea based on two primary circumstances : (i) that the suit property was absolute debuttar, and (ii) that no notice or opportunity was given to a person interested in Shebaitship. The existence or non existence of both these primary facts depended on a construction of the basic documents like Deed of Trust, etc. The existence or non existence of both these primary facts depended on a construction of the basic documents like Deed of Trust, etc. Held, construction of these basic documents which go to the root of the matter is a question of law and could be gone into in second appeal. (12). On the contrary, Shri G.C. Lunia associated with Shri Ajeet Bhandari learned counsel for the respondent No.2 contended that the plaintiff appellant since has not been in possession of the suit land, his suit for permanent injunction & not for declaration was not at all maintainable in view of the decisions in Gulam Mohd. Qureshi vs. Nagar Nigam Jaipur (3), Jeema vs. Raghu (4), Abdul Latif vs. Mahadeo (5), Kundan Mal vs. Thikana Siryari (6). Next contention urged by learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is that in fact plaintiffs land is in Khasra No.169/4 while the suit land allotted to respondent No.2 measuring 2 bighas 17 biswas (5766.83 sqm) is in Khasra No.191 being recorded as Sawai Chak in Khasra Girdawaris (ExA50 & A51), inasmuch as suit land being situated in Khasra No.191 & having already vested in the JDA in view of Section 54 of the JDA Act, was rightly allotted to respondent No.2 Trust in two parts as has been proved by statements of Vijya Kumbhat Dy. Commissioner AII Zone JDA (Dw5) and as per their evidence 1st allotment was made vide allotment letter (ExAI7), Site Plan (ExAl8) for the suit land measuring 1890 sqm. in Khasra No.191 on 19/11/88 and its possession was handed over by the JDA to respondent Trust vide ExAI9 to which license deed was executed vide ExA20; and second allotment was made of 3876.83 sqm. firstly @ Rs.200/-. (ExA23) but at reduced rate of Rs.100/- with the approval of State Govt. (ExA24). It has also been argued that Gazette notifications (ExA34 & A36)) were also produced to show the changing of the user of land and exempting suit land of Khasra No.191 from Urban Ceiling Act, and further approval of map in favour of respondent Trust (ExA37) was also produced. (ExA24). It has also been argued that Gazette notifications (ExA34 & A36)) were also produced to show the changing of the user of land and exempting suit land of Khasra No.191 from Urban Ceiling Act, and further approval of map in favour of respondent Trust (ExA37) was also produced. That apart, according to the learned counsel for the respondent Trust, once the appellant admitted that the suit land stood allotted to the Trust in his own letter written to the JDA (EXAB) and moreso all the documents (supra) which stood proved by the evidence of afore named officers of the JDA (DW1, DW5 & DW6) show that the suit land had already been duly allotted to the respondent Trust by the JDA whereupon it has been in its continuous possession by making substantial construction thereon, the documents (Exs. 4, 5, 6 & 7) of the plain- tiff though might have been misconstrued since do not relate to the suit land, itself, from his evidence it is not clear as to for which of the land they have filed their suit. (13). Lastly learned counsel for the respondents while citing the decisions in Shakir Hussain vs. Administrator Nagar Palika (7), Chandrabhagabai vs. Ramakrishan (8) and Shyamlal vs. Manohar Kumari (9) contended that findings of possession so also title is findings of fact which are not open to be interferred with by this Court in second appeal. (14). (13). Lastly learned counsel for the respondents while citing the decisions in Shakir Hussain vs. Administrator Nagar Palika (7), Chandrabhagabai vs. Ramakrishan (8) and Shyamlal vs. Manohar Kumari (9) contended that findings of possession so also title is findings of fact which are not open to be interferred with by this Court in second appeal. (14). Having considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the decisions cited by them (supra), I am of the considered view that since the impugned findings arrived at by the Courts below are based on misconstruction of documents, referred to above, and the appellant has been deprived of an opportunity to lead evidence besides there has been misappreciation of evidence while ignoring the fact of the JDA having failed to contest by filing its written statement to the plaint averments of the plaintiff by way of denial thereof, the ratio of decisions cited on behalf of the respondents is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case and also further that in view of the aforesaid situation of the JDA having failed to deny the plaint averments, how could the respondent Trust claim right of contesting the suit by pleading cause on behalf of the JDA atleast as to how and in what circumstances the land got vested with it and as to how could the possession be handed over to the respondent Trust on the basis of allotments without the same being proved in evidence for which the JDA was the only authority to establish its claim as regards vesting of the land allotted to the co-defendants by it. (15). (15). Thus viewed, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy raised in the suit by the plaintiff, I am firmly of the view that the courts below have failed to take; into consideration documentary as well as oral evidence of the plaintiff by misconstruction thereof (as found in earlier part of this judgment) as to the land being in continuous possession of the plaintiff who could not be dislodged without due process of law and that apart in view of provisions contained in Section 95(4) of the Revenue Act in case of the appellant so also his ancestors having been found in continuous possession over the suit land at the time of the proclamation of the Act how could it become the suit land as property of the JDA u/Sec. 54 of the JDA Act without determination of such vital question on the basis of the evidence on record in view of the pleadings made by the plaintiff in plaint which could not have been denied by the JDA by filing written statement thereto. (16). Since rights, title & interest for which parties to the suit have been litigating as regards suit land are yet to be finally determined and adjudicated upon by construction of documents and appreciation of evidence afresh, as held above, by giving due opportunity of leading their evidence to the respective parties, I am constrained to observe that it would be in all fairness if the status quo ante as to the suit land is directed to be maintained by both the parties, pending hearing and final determination by trial Court. (17). As a result of the above discussion, this second appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgments & decree of both the courts below, referred to above, are hereby set aside. However, the matter is remanded back to the trial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law in the light of the above observations so also by giving full opportunity of leading evidence to both the parties including the JDA which has not contested the suit by not filing the written statement or leading evidence with regard to the vesting of the suit land or otherwise as discussed above. Since this appeal has been finally disposed of the stay petition shall also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.