G. C. BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) THIS intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the Karnataka State Road transport Corporation. It is aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge who has directed for payment of 50% back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement, though considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Labour Court had denied grant of back wages. ( 2 ) IT is not in dispute that the respondent was gainfully employed as a conductor in the establishment of the appellant-Corporation. On november 10, 1990, he was on duty in a bus bearing Registration No. KA 05/f-502, which was plying on Mangalore-Bangalore Route. The bus was intercepted and checked by the line Checking Squad. On being checked, it was found that despite collection of fare of Rs. 3. 25 each from 12 passengers, the respondent had failed to issue tickets to them. The statements of the said passengers, who were travelling from Kushalnagar to Piriyapatna, were recorded. Based on the report of the checking inspector, articles of charges were framed and issued to the respondent on december 18, 1990. The respondent-conductor furnished his explanation. However, the disciplinary authority not being satisfied with the explanation offered by the respondent-workman directed for holding of an enquiry. The enquiring officer found the respondent guilty of the charges. Copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the respondent. Thereupon, the respondent filed his representation assailing the findings. The disciplinary authority considering the enquiry report and representation, agreed with the findings of the enquiring officer and passed the order dated March 13, 1997 awarding major punishment of dismissal. ( 3 ) AGAINST the above order of the disciplinary authority, the respondent preferred an appeal under Regulation 30 of the Karnataka state Road Transport Corporation Servants (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations, 1971 (in short 'the Regulations' ). The Appellate authority by its order dated February 17, 1998 rejected the appeal on merits upholding the order of the disciplinary authority. The order of the Appellate Authority was placed by the respondent as Annexure- B to the writ petition filed by him. ( 4 ) THE respondent thereafter questioned the validity of the appellate order by filing a revision under Regulation 35 of the regulations. The order of the Appellate Authority was placed by the respondent as Annexure- B to the writ petition filed by him. ( 4 ) THE respondent thereafter questioned the validity of the appellate order by filing a revision under Regulation 35 of the regulations. The Revisional Authority by its order dated June 15, 1998 (Annexure-C) remanded the matter to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration on the quantum of punishment. The Appellate Authority took the view that at the time of checking, the bus was overcrowded being packed with 99 passengers and the non-issue of tickets might have occasioned for the said reason. He opined that"the punishment of dismissal appears, too harsh, which has been affirmed by the appellate Authority, compared to the gravity of the offence committed by the conductor". Accordingly, he directed the Appellate authority to dispose of the appeal afresh and to pass appropriate orders by taking into consideration the following points: (I) The penalty imposed is proportionate or otherwise to the gravity of the offence committed by the conductor in the light of the decision of the Labour Court as well as the High Court in similar matters in the recent past of last one year. (II) History sheet of the conductor. ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, the revisional authority did not interfere with the findings of the disciplinary authority or Appellate Authority on merits of the charges which were found to be well proved and the order of remand was limited only on the question of quantum of punishment. After the above remand order, since the Appellate Authority had not promptly passed order afresh on quantum of punishment, the respondent filed writ petition in W. P. No. 23961 of 1998 with a prayer to direct the appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal in terms of the revisional order. This writ petition was disposed on August 26, 1998 with a direction to the Appellate Authority to pass appropriate orders within a month from the date of the order. This writ petition was disposed on August 26, 1998 with a direction to the Appellate Authority to pass appropriate orders within a month from the date of the order. ( 6 ) THEREAFTER, the Appellate Authority reconsidered the matter afresh and by its order dated September 21/22, 1998 again rejected the appeal by holding that-"in pursuant to the orders of the Director (Personnel) to reconsider the order passed by the Appellate Authority, the default file of Sri G. M. D. Murthy, Ex-Conductor, B. No. 2078 BNG-I Depot, Bangalore (Central) Division was once again reviewed in detail by me and with reference to his default history sheet. The incumbent has been involved in 40 default cases earlier and can be termed as a chronic defaulter. Further on perusal of the final dismissal order passed by the disciplinary authority the penalty of dismissal is proportionate to the gravity of offence committed and the case does not warrant for reconsideration and the appeal stands once again rejected". ( 7 ) THE respondent did not assail the above order of the Appellate Authority by filing any further revision under Regulation 35 of the regulations. Thus, the findings on merits of charges as recorded by the statutory authorities under the regulations attained its finality. Proceedings Before The Labour Court ( 8 ) CURIOUSLY, the respondent despite having prefence appeal under Regulation 30 of the Regulations also raised dispute in I. D. No. 34 of 1997 before the Labour Court under section 10 (4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court, Bangalore. The labour Court passed its award dated June 4, 1999 directing reinstatement of the respondent with continuity of service and other consequential benefits but without back wages. For denying back wages it held that the corporation is rendering public utility service without any profit motive and therefore it cannot be punished by directing it to pay back wages to the respondent from whom no work was taken during the period in which his dismissal was operative and for that purpose he relied on various judgments of this Court. ( 9 ) IT may be of relevance to observe here that the Labour Court had clearly held that the said 12 passengers were found without tickets in the bus. It is also not in dispute that fare of rs. 3. 25 has been collected from those passengers. ( 9 ) IT may be of relevance to observe here that the Labour Court had clearly held that the said 12 passengers were found without tickets in the bus. It is also not in dispute that fare of rs. 3. 25 has been collected from those passengers. The Labour Court also agreed with the finding of the disciplinary authority that the respondent despite collection of fare had not issued tickets. The Labour Court despite having found as above, held that the charges to be not proved on two technical grounds, namely, that the checking inspectors had not checked the cash in the bag of the respondent-conductor and the passengers to whom the tickets had not been issued were not examined during the departmental enquiry. Both the grounds so taken were clearly extraneous for interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority. This aspect has been specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and Another v rattan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1512 : 1977 (2) SCC 491 : 1982-I-LLJ-46. ( 10 ) IN the case of State of Haryana, (supra), the delinquent was a conductor in haryana Roadways. He was subject to disciplinary proceedings on the charge that despite collection of fares from passengers he had failed to issue tickets to them. The charge having been found proved in the departmental proceedings he was dismissed from service. One of the grounds taken for annulling the order of punishment was that the concerned passengers were not examined. This ground was found to be irrelevant. It has been held by the Supreme Court in 1982-I-LLJ-46 at 47:". . . . . . the Courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded". ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court in the above case has further held that:"the simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the. sense of the technical rules governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept". ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court in the above case has further held that:"the simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the. sense of the technical rules governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept". Problem of Conflicting Orders ( 12 ) IT is of utmost importance to notice here that for one or the other reason, which I do not propose to ponder over in the present proceedings, either the Labour Court was not made aware of the parallel proceedings, which had been undertaken by the respondent before the authorities under the statutory regulations, or the Labour Court had just ignored the same. The fact remains that the Labour Court proceeded to interfere with the order of the disciplinary authority though on the date of award the order had become non est in the eye of law having merged with the order of the appellate Authority which was passed pursuant to the directions of this Court in W. P. No. 23961 of 1998. ( 13 ) IN support of our view on merger of original order with the appellate order, we may refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Somnath Sahu v. State of Orissa and Others 1969 (3) SCC 384 and Rathore S. S. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 10 : 1989 (4) SCC 582 . ( 14 ) A 3 Judges Bench decision in the case of Somnath Sahu, (supra), had held that even in the case of a service dispute, the original order merges in the appellate order and it is the appellate decision which subsisted and became operative in law and was capable of enforcement. ( 15 ) IN the case of Rathore S. S. , (supra), a 7 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has held that:"the distinction adopted in State of Uttar pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 between a Court and a Tribunal being the appellate or the revisional authority is one without any legal justification. Powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in Courts are being exercised under the law by Tribunals and other constituted authorities. In fact, in respect of many disputes the jurisdiction of the Court is now barred and there is a vesting of jurisdiction in Tribunals and authorities. Powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in Courts are being exercised under the law by Tribunals and other constituted authorities. In fact, in respect of many disputes the jurisdiction of the Court is now barred and there is a vesting of jurisdiction in Tribunals and authorities. That being the position, we see no justification for the distinction between courts and Tribunals in regard to the principle of merger". ( 16 ) THOUGH in the present appeal, the order of the learned single Judge has been questioned only in respect of grant of back wages but since the order of the disciplinary, appellate and revisional authorities passed under the statutory regulations were on the records of the Court, we called upon the learned counsel for the Corporation to secure the original records and file in the present proceedings, which has been accordingly done. We also heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent on the issue pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Labour court to entertain the dispute raised under section 100 (4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act when equally efficacious alternative remedies were available and had been availed by the workman under the provisions of the statutory regulations. We found it essential to do so in order to finally settle the law in this regard having direct bearing on the jurisdiction of the labour Courts at least at our end, in discharge of constitutional obligation of superintendence over Courts and Tribunals cast on this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which certainly includes Labour Court as well. ( 17 ) IN the case of Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and Another, AIR 1954 sc 215 , 5 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has clearly held that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 can be exercised "in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. . . ". Re: Corporation and its Officers ( 18 ) THE appellant-Corporation has been incorporated under Section 4 of the Road transport Corporations Act, 1950 (in short the 'act' ). This Act was enacted by the Parliament to enable the State Governments to set up transport Corporations with the object of providing efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport service. This Act was enacted by the Parliament to enable the State Governments to set up transport Corporations with the object of providing efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport service. Corporations like the appellant though statutory has independent personality under section 4 of the Act as explained in the case of andhra Pradesh State Road Transport corporation, Hyderabad v. Income tax Officer, b-I-B-Ward, Hyderabad and Another, AIR 1964 SC 1486 . Section 14 of the Act has made provisions for officers and servants of the corporation. This Section reads as under.-"14. Officers and servants of the corporation.- (1) Every Corporation shall have a Managing Director, a Chief accounts Officer and a Financial Adviser, appointed by the State Government: provided that the same person may be appointed as the Chief Accounts Officer and the Financial Adviser. (2) A Corporation may appoint a Secretary and such other officers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. (3) The conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of the officers and employees of a Corporation shall- (a) as respects the Managing Director, the chief Accounts Officer and the Financial adviser, or, as the case may be; the Chief accounts Officer-cum-Financial Adviser, be such, as may be prescribed, and (b) as respects the other officers and employees, be such, as may, subject to the provisions of Section 34, be determined by regulation made under this Act". Re: Status of Regulations ( 19 ) SIMILARLY, Section 45 of the Act reads as under:"45. Power to make regulations.- (I) A corporation may with the previous sanction of the State Government, make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder, for the administration of the affairs of the Corporation. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely- (c) the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of officers and other employees of the Corporation other than the Managing Director, the Chief accounts Officer and the Financial Adviser or as the case may be, the Chief Accounts officer-cum-Financial Adviser: ( 20 ) THE Corporation pursuant to powers conferred under Section 45 of the Act and after obtaining sanction of the State Government, framed regulations. Part-in of the Regulations makes elaborate provisions for disciplinary proceedings and penalties to be awarded for conduct of disciplinary proceedings and punishment to be awarded. Regulation 30 of the regulations give statutory right to the servants of the Corporation to prefer appeal against an order of disciplinary authority and on preferring of such an appeal, the Appellate authority has to inter alia consider validity of the order impugned imposing penalties and keeping in view the following aspects: (A) Whether the procedure laid down in these regulations has been complied with, and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the failure of justice? (B) Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record? and (C) Whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe? ( 21 ) THE order of the Appellate Authority is subjected to further revision under regulation 35 of the Regulations. Clause (1) of this regulation reads as under:"35. (B) Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record? and (C) Whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe? ( 21 ) THE order of the Appellate Authority is subjected to further revision under regulation 35 of the Regulations. Clause (1) of this regulation reads as under:"35. Revision.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations.- (i) the Corporation; or (ii) any other authority specified in this behalf by the Corporation by a general or special order and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order may at any time on its own motion call for the records of any inquiry and revise any order made under these regulations or under the rules or standing orders or other provisions repealed by Regulation 39 from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed and may- (a) confirm, modify or set aside the orders; or (b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed, or (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit: provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty, shall be made by any revising authority unless the Corporation servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in Clause (ix) or (x) of Regulation 18 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be revised to any of the penalties specified in these clauses, no such penalty shall be imposed except after the enquiry, in the manner laid down in Regulation 23". Remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ( 22 ) AN individual workman can take remedial measures under the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act only in a case where an industrial dispute can be said to be existing within the meaning of Section 2-A of the said act. This Section reads as under:"2-A. Dismissal, etc. Remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ( 22 ) AN individual workman can take remedial measures under the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act only in a case where an industrial dispute can be said to be existing within the meaning of Section 2-A of the said act. This Section reads as under:"2-A. Dismissal, etc. of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute. Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute". ( 23 ) TO our mind, the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination cannot be said to be giving rise to an industrial dispute so long as management like the Corporation is duty-bound to entertain and resolve the grievance of the workman within the framework of its statutory regulations providing for appeals and revisions. As already noticed above, the workman has a statutory right to assail the order of disciplinary authority on all the grounds which can be raised before the Tribunal or Labour Court under the industrial Disputes Act. ( 24 ) THEREFORE, we are of the opinion that till the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination does not attain its finality up to revisional stage contemplated under Regulation 35 of the Regulations, the action of the Corporation taken against the workman cannot be said to have matured into an industrial dispute entitling the workman to invoke the provisions of reference and adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 25 ) TAKING of the above view will avoid chances of conflicting orders and the corporation will have full opportunity to rectify any error committed by its officers, may be disciplinary or appellate. This will also reduce the load on the dockets of the Labour court which are already overburdened. By this process, the Labour Court will have the benefit of views of the appellate and revisional authorities who are duty-bound to take care of all the permissible grievances raised by the workmen in relation to their discharge, dismissal etc. , may be regarding the procedure, finding or the quantum of punishment. By this process, the Labour Court will have the benefit of views of the appellate and revisional authorities who are duty-bound to take care of all the permissible grievances raised by the workmen in relation to their discharge, dismissal etc. , may be regarding the procedure, finding or the quantum of punishment. Therefore, adopting of such a recourse cannot in any way prejudice the cause of the workman rather it will facilitate him to get his grievances properly ventilated before the authorities of the corporation who will have full access to all the records and can better appreciate the facts and the related grievances. ( 26 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we hold that no industrial dispute can be raised or referred to Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of any individual workman employed in the Corporation unless it is shown and found that he has exhausted all his statutory remedies provided under the regulations. It is only if, even after the finality of such internal remedies the workman still feels dissatisfied with the action of the Corporation, then only he can seek for his remedy under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 27 ) FOR the reasons set out above, we direct all the Industrial Tribunals and the labour Courts in the State to require both the workman and the Corporation to state whether the workman has availed and exhausted all his internal statutory remedies under the regulations and if so, to furnish copies of the orders passed by the appellate and revisional authorities, if there had been any appeal or revision. Thereupon the Tribunal or Labour court can examine the validity of final order only since earlier orders stand merged in the final order. ( 28 ) IN case the Tribunal or Labour Court finds that the workman has failed to avail internal remedies, it should relegate the workman to the respective appellate or revisional authority in order to permit him to exhaust internal statutory remedies. The appellate or revisional authority, as and when cases of the workman are transferred to them, should examine the grievances of the workman in accordance with law by treating such proceedings to have been instituted within the period of limitation and must dispose of the appellate or revisional proceedings within a period of 6 months from the date of transfer or institution. ( 29 ) THE facts of the present case is a typical example of conflicting orders as noticed above where the respondent-workman had resorted to parallel remedies both before the labour Court as well as appellate and revisional authorities. Under the Industrial disputes Act, he could secure the relief of reinstatement without back wages from the labour Court, whereas final order passed by the Appellate Authority, on remand, has confirmed of order of his dismissal. ( 30 ) IN our considered opinion, the appellate order to the extent of confirmation of the order of dismissal appears to be clearly without jurisdiction because the revisional authority while remanding the case to him had clearly stated that keeping in view the facts of the present case, dismissal of the workman will be too harsh. But, both the revisional authority as well as the Labour Court have found that the respondent-workman had failed to issue tickets to 12 passengers despite collecting of fare from them. ( 31 ) IN the above view of the matter, in our considered opinion, it was not a case where the learned single Judge could have rewarded the respondent-workman with back wages as well. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the learned single Judge. ( 32 ) THE appeal is accordingly allowed. The parties to bear their own costs. ( 33 ) THE Registrar (Judicial) is directed to take steps for circulating a copy of this judgment to all the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals in the State for immediate compliance. --- *** --- .