JUDGMENT P.C. Agrawal, J.—Appellants on 25-4-1989 filed a civil suit for declaration that the Will dated 9-1-1982 allegedly executed by late Smt. Nanhibai in favour of Respondent is forged, fabricated and void and for possession of Khasra No. 80/1, area 8.81 acres, in village Bharkawari, Tahsil and District Betul (to be called as suit land). 2. Suit land was owned by late Dina. On his death in the year 1937-38 the land was inherited by his widow Smt. Nanhibai. Smt. Girjabai was daughter of late Dina. Appellants are sons and daughter of late Smt. Girjabai. Late Smt. Girjabai and Appellants used to reside at Jabalpur. 3. As per plaint, late Smt. Nanhibai was mother of late Smt. Girjabai. She was an old and infirm lady of about 86 years of age at the time of her death on 5-3-1982. She was ill and confined to bed and was not in full senses. She was being looked after by her servant Manorilal (PW 3) who used to cultivate the suit land. The Appellants with their mother Smt. Girjabai had gone to village Bharkawari to look after the old lady but could not stay there for long. After death of Smt. Nanhibai the Appellants' mother Smt. Girjabai could come to know that the Respondent had got mutated his name in revenue papers. It was learnt that a Will was created by him to support his claim. Despite objections of the Appellants revenue Courts did not enter their names. The Respondent has taken forcible possession of the suit land. Late Smt. Nanhibai had never executed any such Will which is null and void and a fictitious document. 4. On the other hand, the Respondent had claimed that late Smt. Girjabai was daughter of Smt. Tapibai alias Taptibai, who was the first wife of late Dina. After marriage of Girjabai, Dina had remarried Smt. Nanhibai whose name was mutated after his death. Late Smt. Nanhibai had executed a Will on 9-1-1982 in favour of Respondent, who is son of Raghu Kunbi and nephew of late Smt. Nanhibai. Late Smt. Girjabai or the Appellants had never cared for late Nanhibai during her lifetime. Late Nanhibai was of sound physical and mental condition at the time of execution of Will. Neither Smt. Girjabai nor the Appellants stayed with late Smt. Nanhibai during her last days nor did they perform her last rites. Late Smt. Girjabai or the Appellants had never cared for late Nanhibai during her lifetime. Late Nanhibai was of sound physical and mental condition at the time of execution of Will. Neither Smt. Girjabai nor the Appellants stayed with late Smt. Nanhibai during her last days nor did they perform her last rites. The Respondent cared for and tended the old lady during her last days. The Respondent has naturally claimed that the Will in his favour has been valid and operative. 5. The challenge to the impugned Will dated 9-1-1982 found favour with the trial Court who found that the Will being suspicious was void and inoperative and passed the decree for possession in favour of the Appellants. However, the first Appellate Court has held otherwise and has upheld the Will and dismissed the suit of the Appellants. 6. The following substantial questions of law were framed by this Court: (a) whether under the facts and in the circumstances of the case the first Appellate Court was justified in holding that the Will Ex.D.l was executed by the deceased Nanhibai and was not shrouded by the suspicious circumstances, when there are material contradictions in the statement of the scribe and the two attesting witnesses? (b) Whether under the facts and in the circumstances of the case the first Appellate Court was justified in reversing the findings of the learned trial Court which were based on due appreciation of evidence? (c) Where under the facts and in the circumstances of the case the first Appellate Court was right in holding that the suit is barred by limitation? 7. Question (a): The law as to proof of execution and attestation is well established. The mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document, except as to special requirement of attestation. Onus lies on the propounder and in absence of any suspicion the proof of testamentary capacity and due execution and attestation of the Will may be sufficient to discharge the onus but when the Will is shrouded with suspicious circumstances the onus of proof of genuineness of the Will and explain away all the suspicious circumstances to the satisfaction of judicial conscience lies heavily on the propounder. H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, 8. H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, 8. The propositions put in this leading case have been consistently followed later in Rani Purnima Devi and Another Vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev and Another, Jaswant Kaur v. Amrendra Kaur AIR 1978 SC 74 , Kalyan Singh Vs. Smt. Chhoti and Others, , Guro (Smt.) Vs. Atma Singh and Others, Kashibai and Another Vs. Parwatibai and Others, and Gurdial Kaur and others Vs. Kartar Kaur and Others, . The propositions are so well established that no further quote of authorities is necessary. 9. Anyhow it is also to be noted that in case the propounder is able to dispel the suspicious circumstances by his evidence and satisfies the judicial conscience of the Court then there is no reason why a Will should not be given effect. Smt. Indu Bala Bose and Others Vs. Manindra Chandra Bose and Another, Sushila Devi v. Pandit Krishna Kumar AIR 1978 SC 2236, Lakshmi Chand Khajuria and Others Vs. Ishroo Devi, 10. Now I proceed to apply these propositions to the Will Ex.D. 1 in the present case. This Will was executed on 9-1-1982. The testator Smt. Nanhibai died on 5-3-1982 or in other words, about two months after the execution of the Will. On 15-3-1982 the Respondent applied for mutation of his name before Patwari and on 21-5-1982 the matter was referred to the Tahasildar. On 7-6-1982 late Smt. Girjabai presented her objection to such mutation and on 29-7-1982 late Smt. Girjabai withdrew her objection through her advocate, Shri J.P. Yadav (DW 5). Though of course the statement of J.P. Yadav (DW 5) has not been consistent about filing of Ex.D. 2 before the Revenue Court and Girjabai's marking her thumb thereon. It is past belief that an advocate would sign Ex.D. 2 without consent of his client whose thumb mark is purported to be there in the application. Thus obviously this Will was brought to the light immediately after its execution and was not kept hidden or concealed. It is noteworthy that the Appellants have not seriously challenged the application Ex.D. 2 or its conscious presentation by late Girjabai, their mother. Thus obviously this Will was brought to the light immediately after its execution and was not kept hidden or concealed. It is noteworthy that the Appellants have not seriously challenged the application Ex.D. 2 or its conscious presentation by late Girjabai, their mother. Though in the application by late Girjabai filed on 15-4-1988 i.e. after about five years and half of the withdrawal of the first application, complete innocence about the previous proceedings for its withdrawal was shown, it was not sufficient in itself to show that late Smt. Girjabai was not knowing about the Will till 15-4-1988. In my considered opinion, use of the Will by Respondent just after death of testator Smt. Nanhibai, objection to the same by Smt Girjabai and withdrawal of such objection go a long way to show that the Will was neither forged nor fictitious. 11. Execution and attestation of the Will Ex.D. 1 was proved by its attesting witnesses Bajilal (DW 2) who is a relative of Appellants (being Mousa), Gajanan (DW 3) who is a village Kotwar and by Deepchand Sahu (DW 4) a professional petition writer-cum-document writer, who was not knowing either the testator Smt. Nanhibai or the attesting witnesses from before. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the testator Smt. Nanhibai was of sound physical and mental capacity to dispose of her property by this Will. She had come independently to Betul Court where petition-cum-document writers sit from Bharkawari, a village situate at a distance of 8 - 10 kilometer away. Both Bajilal (DW 2) and Gajanan (DW 3) attesting witnesses claimed that testator Nanhibai had come to their respective houses to invite them to come to Betul for execution of the impugned Will. The learned advocate for the Appellants has vehemently argued that it is unnatural and improbable that Bajilal (DW 2) should come by bi-cycle to Betul and the Gajanan (DW 3) should travel by bus. He has argued that it would have been more natural that all these three i.e. that old lady and her witnesses could have come by the same transport to Betul. However, both these witnesses have claimed that the testator Smt. Nanhibai had told them that she would meet them at Betul which means that she had already left for Betul before the witnesses had started from the village. However, both these witnesses have claimed that the testator Smt. Nanhibai had told them that she would meet them at Betul which means that she had already left for Betul before the witnesses had started from the village. In itself, in my considered opinion, this is not; a sufficient circumstance to disbelieve the Will. 12. It has been vehemently argued by the learned Senior advocate for the Appellants that 9-1-1982 was second Saturday and the Court was closed on that day. However, no such suggestion was put to any of the attesting witnesses or the scribe in the cross-examination. It is noteworthy that all the second Saturdays are not holidays in the District Courts. The learned first Appellate Court has in para-22 of his judgment claimed that on 9-1-1982 festival of Miladunnabi had fallen. However, there has been no cross-examination of any of the witnesses on this point. These witnesses have clearly claimed that as usual on 9-1-82 the Court was open and the usual business was going on. It is true that this Will is typewritten on a water-marks paper which can be procured from a Stamp vendor and the register of the stamp vendor had not been produced to show any such sale of the watermarks paper but, in my opinion, that in itself is not sufficient to disbelieve the Will. 13. It has further been vehemently argued by the learned advocate for the Appellants that Gajanan (DW 3) in para-4 had admitted that the Will was written by ink-pen whereas the same is typewritten which, according to him, shows that the Will is not genuine. The learned first Appellate Court has verably tried to explain away the circumstance. Obviously, ink-pen was used for signing the Will and Gajanan (DW 3) cannot be discredited on this count alone. 14. It is noteworthy that though the Appellants in their plaint had claimed that their mother Smt. Girjabai was daughter of the testator Smt. Nanhibai but during evidence it has been proved beyond doubt that Smt. Girjabai was daughter of late Dina and Smt. Tapibai alias Taptibai, the first wife of late Dina. Smt. Girjabai was married where her mother Smt. Tapibai alias Taptibai was alive, Smt. Girjabai was living at her nuptial house at Jabalpur away from Bharkabari in Ditrict Betul since her marriage. Appellants were also residing at Jabalpur. Smt. Girjabai was married where her mother Smt. Tapibai alias Taptibai was alive, Smt. Girjabai was living at her nuptial house at Jabalpur away from Bharkabari in Ditrict Betul since her marriage. Appellants were also residing at Jabalpur. There seems to be no love lost between late Nanhibai and late Girjabai or the Appellants. Admittedly late Nanhibai was not brought to Jabalpur for her treatment. Admittedly none of the Appellants ever thought of the treatment of late Nanhibai though both Ramgopal (PW 1) and Tekram (PW 2) claim that late Nanhibai was sick. Both of them never cared to inquire from Dr. Chandra Kumar Verma about the illness or state of health of late Nanhibai. Obviously the Appellants had not performed last rites of late Nanhibai. It is true that the Appellants have claimed that late Girjabai and the Appellants had gone to village Bharkawari to look after the old lady yet such claim is not supported by Raghunandan (PW 4). Manohrilal (PW 3) has his account against the Respondent who initiated a criminal case against him and if his statement is not believed by learned Court below then there has been no error. In such state of affairs, if no share was given to the Appellants or late Smt. Girjabai by the testator late Nanhibai it is neither unnatural nor improbable. Obviously, the testator late Nanhibai has her reason to prefer the Respondent to the step daughter Smt. Girjabai and the Appellants, her sons, who were residing at Jabalpur and were not taking care of the old lady in her old age. 15. In my considered opinion, the first Appellate Court has considered all the material on record. of course he has not based his judgment on any inadmissible evidence. His approach to the matter has neither been improper nor unnatural. of course the question whether the Will was executed and attested and the same was free from suspicious circumstances is a question of fact and unless non-consideration of relevant evidence or essentially erroneous approach to matter is proved such a finding cannot be disturbed in second appeal in view of Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh, and Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Natthu Singh, and Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) By Lrs., Obviously, the statements of attesting witnesses and the scribe were not materially contradictory and there has been no sufficient ground for interference in the findings recorded by the first Appellate Court. 16. Question (b): First Appellate Court is a Court of fact. The learned first Appellate Court has after consideration of the Will and the evidence on record appraising the probabilities has differed from the learned trial Court. It is true that the evidence was recorded by the trial Court and he had an opportunity to mark the demeanour of the witnesses but present is not a case which could be decided on pure appreciation oral evidence of the witnesses. Complicated question as to probabilities and inferences to be drawn from facts were involved in the case and in the present case learned first Appellate Court has come to a different finding on balance of probabilities of the case and thus it cannot be said that the first Appellate Court has erred in any way. I hold accordingly. 17. Question (c): Obviously, the civil suit was not barred by limitation under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The suit was for declaration and possession. The Appellants had claimed their title being heirs of late Dina and his widow late Nanhibai who had died issueless. u/s 14 of the Hindu Sucession Act, 1956, late Smt. Nanhibai being a widow in possession had become absolute owner of the suit property. However, on her death but for this Will, u/s 15(2)(b), as the suit land was inherited by her from her husband, it had to devolve in absence of her own son or daughter, upon heirs of the husband, i.e., late Dina. Smt. Girjabai being the daughter of late Dina was entitled to the suit property as an heir of the husband of late Smt. Nanhibai. After death of late Girjabai her sons, the Appellants were the direct successors. However, as late Smt. Nanhibai has executed a valid Will in favour of the Respondent, the Appellants have no case. 18. Thus, there is no merit in this appeal. The same is dismissed with costs. Judgment and decree of the learned first Appellate Court are hereby confirmed. Advocate's fees, as per Schedule, if certified. Final Result : Dismissed