VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH the matter was not admitted from 1980 onwards, coming up for admission. It was taken by consent following the Full Bench decision of this Court, the CRP is held to be maintainable. (ILR :1998 Kar. 3104 and 3048 is also followed ). ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by the dismissal of his appeal in MA EAP 30/93 onthe file of the Addl. City Civil Judge Bangalore, confirming the termination of his services, the petitioner, a teacher/lecturer, has come forward in the above revision petition. ( 3 ) IT is claimed that he was appointed as a lecturer in thepolytechnic on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1400/- p. m. with effect from 14-1-1991 and he was transferred as a lecturer in mechanical department of the second respondent college on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1700/- per month with effect from 1-3-1992. Till his termination on 6-3-1993 he was working in that new post. Making very many allegations against the respondent as oppressive to public policy, the petitioner claimed that the terms and conditions of the service are illegal. The lecturers of the second respondent college formed an association and that irked the management. 24 lecturers were found to be unsuitable for the post on 28-2-1993 by the management and they were terminated. The appeal filed against the termination was dismissed by the Tribunal and hence the present crr ( 4 ) IT is submitted by Mr. Narayana, learned Counsel for- thepetitioner that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by refusing to interfere with the impugned orders of discharge of the Tribunal under Section 8 of the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975. The impugned order is oppressive and against public policy. The discharge was not the discharge simpliciter, but penal in nature. Its smacks of victimisation and unfair practice. It is the result of the colourable exercise of power and even it is a fraud on power. No deficiency in the conduct or work during the period of probation was communicated nor claimed. The discharge on the ground of unsuitability is a stigma seriously prejudicial to the prospects of employment of the petitioner. The contract was not voluntarily signed, as there was no bargaining power against the management. No deficiency in the conduct or work during the period of probation was communicated nor claimed. The discharge on the ground of unsuitability is a stigma seriously prejudicial to the prospects of employment of the petitioner. The contract was not voluntarily signed, as there was no bargaining power against the management. ( 5 ) THUS the main attack as could be culled out from the groundsof the revision; are: (1) the stigma attached to the termination; (2) the contract of service was not voluntarily signed. Apart from agitating the above grounds, the learned Counsel relied upon Section 23 (5) of the Bangalore University Statutes, which runs as follows: "every teacher shall be appointed on probation for a period of one year, after satisfactory completion on which he shall be confirmed. During the period of his probation, the teacher concerned shall be informed to the unsatisfactory performance if any at intervals of three months and an opportunity given to him to improve himself in case of any lapses reported noticed during the course of performing the duties assigned to him. The probationary period may be extended, if necessary by another year, and if his work is still found not satisfactory, his services may be terminated with the approval of the University after giving him one month's notice. " ( 6 ) IT is contended that the probation must have been confirmedand the management has no other option. Reliance also was placed upon Rule 7 of the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions discipline and Control) Rules, 1978, which reads as follows: "period of Probation.- A person appointed under rule 6 (l) shall be on probation for a period of one year. Provided that the Board of Management may extend the period of probation by a further period of six months. " ( 7 ) RELIANCE also was placed-upon the dictum of the Supreme court in KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs S. MANJUNATH AND OTHERS, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:"as indicated by us, the Regulation deals with two different categories of cases one about the 'probation' of an appointee other than by way of promotion and the other relating to 'officiation' of a person appointed on probation. The similarity of purpose and identity of object apart, of such provision, there is an obvious difference and positive distinction disclosed in the manner they have to be actually dealt with. The similarity of purpose and identity of object apart, of such provision, there is an obvious difference and positive distinction disclosed in the manner they have to be actually dealt with. The deliberate use of two different phraseology 'probation' and 'officiation' cannot be so lightly ignored obliterating the substantial variation in the method of handling such categories of persons envisaged by the Regulations. The mere fact that a reference is made to Clause (3) also in the later part of Clause (8) of the Regulation could not be used to apply all the provisions relating to the category of appointees on 'officiation' to the other category of appointees on 'probation'. The stipulation in Clause (8) of the Regulation when making the passing of an order, a condition precedent for satisfactory completion specifically refers only to the completion of 'period of officiation'. Similarly, notwithstanding a reference made to Clause (3) along side clause (4) in stipulating the consequences of any delay in making an order declaring satisfactory completion, the reference is confined only to deemed satisfaction and completion of. 'the period of 'officiation', and not of probation. Clause, (9) of the Regulation in so far as it provides for confirmation as a sequel to declaration, only deals with a promotee to a temporary post and not of the other category. While dealing with the termination of a candidate, not found suitable for the post, Clause (3) of the regulation envisage such termination being made at any time 'within the period of probation', and not at any time after the completion of such maximum, period of probation. Consequently, the cases on hand also would fall within the category of cases dealt with in Dayaram Dayal's case (supra) and Wasim Beg's case (supra) and the services' of the respondents could not be put an end to except by means of Departmental disciplinary proceedings, afier following the mandatory requirements of law. Therefore the High Court cannot be faulted for interfering with the orders of termination of the services of the respondents. "thus it is contended that the order is liable to be quashed. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Vasanth Kumar appearing tor the respondent contended that admittedly the petitioner was purely on a contractual employment as per the terms of appointment mentioned in the agreement executed by him on a stamped paper. "thus it is contended that the order is liable to be quashed. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Vasanth Kumar appearing tor the respondent contended that admittedly the petitioner was purely on a contractual employment as per the terms of appointment mentioned in the agreement executed by him on a stamped paper. The terms of the agreement alone exclusively forms the conditions of service. Such a mode of appointment is permissible as per the Karnataka private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 and the K. P. E. I (D and C) Rules, 1978, framed there under. One of the terms of the agreement enables the management to discharge the service and the impugned order of discharge before the Tribunal dated 5-3-1993 was the out-come of such an agreement. It does not attach any stigma nor casts any aspersions on the conduct of the employee. Under the above said 1978 Rules, which are statutory rules, explanation 2 to Rule 10 lays down the exceptions to the list of penalties. Sub rule Vll (c) lays down that termination brought about in terms of the agreement of such category of employees is not a penalty. The Tribunal has not committed any material irregularity or error of jurisdiction in holding that the order of discharge is not penal in nature. ( 9 ) IT was further contended by the respondent that the University statute No 23. 10 refers to such class of teachers appointed under general law by direct recruitment in open competition and after due process of selection by 'board of Selection'. Such is not the situation in the instant case. Hence prior approval of the University is not a condition precedent to be followed, while discharging a contractual employee, who is governed by special statutory rules framed by the government, which alone prevails over the University statute, which is clear also from statute 23. 25 itself. Since 1978 Rules framed by government prevails over statute 23. 10 failure to obtain prior approval will not make the order of discharge punitive. The management has denied that the petitioner was appointed on probation. Even otherwise, under Rule 7 of 1978 Rules, there is no provision under which a probationer continued by few months after the expiry of probation period is deemed to have become permanent. 10 failure to obtain prior approval will not make the order of discharge punitive. The management has denied that the petitioner was appointed on probation. Even otherwise, under Rule 7 of 1978 Rules, there is no provision under which a probationer continued by few months after the expiry of probation period is deemed to have become permanent. In the case of a probationary appointment, though the vacancy may be substantive, but that by itself will not make the appointment substantive, unless permanency is conferred by express order of the employer or by implication of the law governing a particular case. The petitioner is also unable to show any terms of agreement being contrary to public policy or having obtained under duress under section 19 or 23 of the Indian Contract Act resulting in causing prejudice to the petitioner. ( 10 ) HAVING considered the submissions made by both the counsel, I find that the order passed by the appellate authority does not call for any interference. In respect of the appeal by the petitioner before the Tribunal, it appears that no witnesses were examined on his behalf, except a common evidence given. In the common evidence it was elicited that the management has not issued any memo to the teachers alleging any misconduct against them. No document was produced to evidence that the terms of appointment were forged against him. No intimidation or coercion was either pleaded or spoken to by the witnesses. Nobody forced the teachers to accept the appointment as lecturer. The terms of appointment are not against the rules. The signatures were taken on stamp papers only after the contract was typed and made ready for perusal, understanding and appreciation. Neither the Principal nor the Head of the Department or the Secretary has issued any memo of misconduct against the teacher. ( 11 ) ON the other hand, the evidence of R. W. 1 examined on behalf of the respondent in all the appeals deposed that consolidated pay is fixed. It was also his evidence that except for appointment the statutes of the Bangalore University is not followed with regard to other aspects. They have followed the rules in accordance with the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) act. It was also his evidence that except for appointment the statutes of the Bangalore University is not followed with regard to other aspects. They have followed the rules in accordance with the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) act. They have entered into contract of service with the concerned teacher and made it clear that in the contract there is no provision of any probation, but only contractual obligation inter se parties are engrossed. He also deposed that no notice was given to the teachers with regard to any short comings, conduct or anything during the tenure. He has further confirmed that the teacher was appointed including all the appellants on temporary basis as temporary employees only. The Tribunal relied upon the ruling of 1981 (1) KLJ 559 to the effect that as per the letter of appointment and also the service contract executed by the employee in favour of the respondent the management is having the right to terminate their services without assigning any reason. On the evidence, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no order treating the petitioner as a permanent employee and all the appointments are on contractual basis for a temporary period as agreed between the parties. The petitioner cannot be termed as permanent employee, at any point of time. When the service contract relied on by the petitioner are proved to have been executed by the petitioner voluntarily without there being any influence, as alleged, and when they themselves have admitted that nobody forced them to accept the appointment offered by the respondent, it cannot be claimed that such a contract is against the public policy. The Tribunal also found that the bangalore University Rules or the Karnataka Private Educational institutions Act will not be applicable until the case is one of termination by way of penalty. The Tribunal also followed the ruling in THE STATE OF U. P. vs RAMCHANDRA TRIVEDI only when a stigma is attached to the orders of appointment, the appeals are maintainable. Reference also was made to N. V. R. RAM vs INDIAN institute OF MANAGEMENT to the following effect: "while the termination of services of the petitioner was a termination simpliciter in accordance with the rights of the parties under the letter of appointment, an appeal to the Tribunal is not maintainable. A termination simpliciter would not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. A termination simpliciter would not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Rights flowing out of a contract entered into between parties can be agitated before the 3rd respondent Tribunal only if it strictly falls within the ambit of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. " From the relevant dates already pointed out such as the letter of appointment and the date of termination, it is clear that the petitioner had not earned the right to be considered for confirmation. " assuming that it is a case of victimisation, the right of the employer to terminate the services cannot be curtailed if the contract otherwise provided for it, by interpreting the provisions of the Act, so as to destroy the legal character of a bilateral contract or the sanctity attached to such contract. In other words, under contractual employment the employee cannot assert any legal right which does not flow from the terms of the contract. Where the letter Of appointment was not disputed the Tribunal is only required to satisfy itself whether the employer by virtue of the right under the contract had power to terminate the employment. In this position the Tribunal does not err in not recording evidence as to the nature and cause of victimisation. " the ruling in 1976 SC 2547 to the effect that termination of temporary service by a State having a right in the terms of contract and service rules is valid so far as the order does not cast any stigma. The Court cannot go beyond the order to find out the motive in passing the order. Thus the Tribunal has dismissed the appeal. ( 12 ) SECTION 10 under Chapter III of the Private Educational Rules, 1978, contains the explanation clause in explanation 2. In explanation 2 (vii) deals with termination of service under the following grounds: (a) Of an employee appointed for three months or less; (b) of a part-time employee appointed for a period less than a year; (c) Of a person employed under an agreement in accordance with the terms of such agreement; (d) Of an employees appointed on probation at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation. Clause (c) contemplates termination in terms of such an agreement. Clause (c) contemplates termination in terms of such an agreement. When on evidence the Tribunal has come to the conclusion the contract executed by the petitioner is a valid and enforceable contract. Termination of service by not extending the contract is certainly valid in the eye of law. The ruling of the Supreme Court referred to by the petitioner does not have a bearing on the facts of this case. The other case of V. P. AHUJA vs STATE OF PUNJAB also do not have relevance to this case as in that case the Apex court held "the order impugned is stigmatic on the face of if and that is not the case on hand. ( 13 ) RELIANCE placed by the counsel for the respondent in the dictum of the Apex Court in DIPTI PRAKASH BANERJEE vs satvendranath BOSE NATIONAL CENTRE FOR BASIC sciences, CALCUTTA is to the effect that as to in what circumstances an order of termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation. The relevant para reads thus: "as to in what circumstances an order of termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation. If findings were arrived in inquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as 'founded' on the allegations and will be bad. But if the inquiry was not held, no finding were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an inquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to inquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstances, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. " ( 14 ) IN this view, confirming the order of the Tribunal, the CRP is dismissed. In such a circumstances, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. " ( 14 ) IN this view, confirming the order of the Tribunal, the CRP is dismissed. --- *** --- .